Category: CFO

Singapore – Cyber Intelligence Training

Cyber Intel – Brochure and Signup

Cheque: make payable to :
MaitreAllianz PteLtd
Mail to: 3 Queen’s Road, #10-163, Singapore 260003
Bank Transfer: MaitreAllianz PteLtd
United Overseas Bank Limited,
RochorRoad Branch
Account No: 147-3020-918
Swift Code: UOVBSGSG

Payment must be made in Singapore Dollars.
Payment is required within 5 working days on receipt of invoice.
Bookings received less than 14 working days –cash payment only
SUBSTITUTION, CANCELLATION, NO-SHOW, POSTPONEMENT POLICIES, CONTACT DETAILS, and EVENT CONFIRMATION
SUBSTITUTION is allowed up to 7 days before day of event. AdminCharge of S30.00 is required for substitution request received with less than 7 days advance notice.
CANCELLATION must be made in writing. Refunds are computed based on the date of receiving your notice.
Full Refund –28 days or more prior to the event
75% -21 to 27 days notice
50% -20 to 14 days notice
25% -7 to 13 days notice
NO REFUND or credit for 6 days or less notice
NO SHOW, Sick Leave, Urgent BusinessCallor Absent for any reason-the full course fee is due.
If we CANCEL or POSTPONE the event, full refund will be given.
FORCE MAJEURE CLAUSE: We shall assume no liability whatsoever if this event is altered, rescheduled, postponed or canceled due to a fortuitous event, unforeseen occurrence, or any other event that renders performance of this event inadvisable, illegal, impractical or impossible. For purpose of this clause, a fortuitous event shall include but not limited to: an Acts of God; governmental restrictions and / or regulations; war or apparent act of war; terrorism or apparent act of terrorism; disaster; civil disorder, disturbance and / or riots; curtailment, suspension, and/or restriction on transport facilities / means of transportation; any other emergency.
YOUR DETAILS: All details required for registration are mandatory. If you found errors, kindly notify us.
SPEAKER CHANGES: Speakers and topics were confirmed at the time of publishing, however, circumstances beyond the control of the organizers may necessitate substitution, alterations or cancellation of the speakers and/or topics. As such, we reserve the right to alter or modify the advertised speakers and/or topics if necessary. Any substitution or alteration will be reflected on our web page as soon as possible. All delegates or their representative will also be notified as soon as the changes are made.
Tel: 6100 0621
http://www.maitreallianz.com

Course Brochure and Signup

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Deception, Distortion, Dishonesty: The Real Story Behind the Hype – RSA Conference 2018 – San Francisco

Dr. Khatuna Mshvidobadze

In the summer of 2008, Russia attacked Georgia in the first-ever combined kinetic and cyberwar. Sure, the 1990-1991 Gulf War was dubbed the first information war—the use 226571794ecbc84a4232f3e9a42a7041-480x270of information in war is not new. What was new in 2008 was that Russia employed its cyber arm as an independent operational capability alongside its land, sea and air forces. The targets were critical infrastructure. The strategic objectives were to sap Georgia’s will to resist and to provide cover for Russia’s information campaign to deceive the west into believing that somehow little Georgia was the aggressor.

Operational security was paramount—Moscow had to keep everyone confounded about who was behind the cyber attacks. Just like the kinetic invasion, the cyber attacks were long and well-planned, but Russia did a great job covering its tracks. When the shooting stopped, well-meaning researchers investigated what had happened. However, coming from a profession that focuses on computer screens and a culture unaccustomed to the 2018-04-11_9-18-09kind of deception that is part of everyday Russian life, they foundered.

The attacks led us to Russia. We noted uncanny timing. Western experts were indeed confounded when the trail led to kids and criminals. I have been following that trail ever since. Insight into Russia, all-source intelligence and a keen understanding of denial and deception were needed.

Today, saying that the Russian state employs a network of cybercriminals to do its online dirty work is commonplace. One might just as well pretend not to know the identity of those little green men who seized Crimea. But when I started saying it in 2010, you would not believe the resistance I encountered.

Soon after, I met Jeff Bardin, my professor at Utica College, who became mentor and friend. Jeff brings an extraordinary expertise in all-source intelligence and the ways of denial and deception. At this year’s RSA Conference, it is my privilege to combine with him in a talk entitled Deception, Distortion, Dishonesty: The Real Story Behind the Hype.

Jeff will lead off, analyzing the types of D&D, its various dimensions and some tactics that can be employed online and offline. The planners, he will say, must have clear reasons for utilizing D&D based on their goals. They must define the strategic, operational and tactical goals of deception and the criteria for success.

I will point out that Russians do not see cyber warfare as distinct but regard it as just one tool of information war. Look at 2008. The cyber attacks aimed at hampering the Georgian government’s ability to communicate while Moscow’s propaganda machine painted Russia as the aggrieved party. “Information space opens wide asymmetrical possibilities for reducing the fighting potential of an enemy,” writes Valery Vasilyevich Gerasimov, Chief of the Russian General Staff. It’s a remarkable statement, but nothing new—Russian thinking on information warfare has been consistent since the 1980s.

Now, the Kremlin commands a vast network of online intelligence agencies, scientific organizations, academic institutions, criminals, and trolls. We’ll discuss how Russia deals with enemies, foreign and domestic, cyber players and organization, the growing role of the military, tactics, techniques, procedures and tools, vectors, false flags, troll factories and more. Come join us on Wednesday at the RSA Conference.

KM

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Africa – Where Counter-Terrorism and Modernization Meet

One more fascinating/outstanding effort by the new Kansas State Dragon Team. This time we researched the major powers’ use of Drones on bicoastal AOs in Africa. Many interesting conclusions and lots of resources involved. The false flag is counter-terrorism. The real agenda is resources: gold, diamonds, cotton. China continues it “Take and Talk strategy” in Africa and the Spratly Islands back in its home territory of the South China Seas.

We next intend to look at China’s interference with India and Pakistan. The next war will be by Drone proxy – as predicted. Too much UAS  investment by so many big players to leave them dormant.   Or it might be very subtle like disruption of GPS communications or replay of navigation bridge signals on US  naval assets.

REPORT in PDF HERE

  • Team Dragon
  • Kansas State University

ksu

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Treadstone 71 Selected to Deliver at the RSA Conference 2018 San Francisco

Foundations for a Strong Intelligence Program
April 18, 9AM-11AM RSA Conference
This Lab will explore key aspects of building a strong and long-lasting cyberthreat intelligence program. We’ll review methods of threat intelligence platform selection and bake-off techniques as well as cover stakeholder analysis and priority intelligence requirements. Additionally, we’ll practice collection planning and mission management as well as how to establish effective reporting and dissemination capabilities.

rsa2018
Cyber CounterIntelligence – Deception, Distortion, Dishonesty
April 18, 1:45PM-2:30PM RSA Conference
Deception, distortion, dishonesty are core to social media postings. Our adversaries use these methods concocting stories that create illusions that are meant to leave us divided. The talk will cover methods of countering their messaging while applying these tactics to protect your own organization and brand. Moving from intelligence to counterintelligence is the natural next step in our evolution.

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Zapad Exercises – 2nd/3rd Order Effects

 

The recent Russian Zapad wargaming exercises included a plethora of electronic capabilities demonstration and potentially more. Russia is known to recently been involved in illegal immigration efforts in Sweden, Finland, and Norway along with hostile intent along its northern borders (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) including cell/communication tower tampering. Could the recent Zapad exercises be more than just wargaming?

Some What If thoughts on these non-linear actions:

– Testing capabilities, distance, strength, impacts
– Testing responses like a stone in pond
    – 2nd and 3rd order effects were measured to determine the impact on targets, targets responses, etc.
    – Russians had people in each target country assisting with target impacts
    – Russians monitored target government communications from within each country
    – Determine length of time for target government to respond and what methods were used and where to get communications back online (if at all) – the locations of the response represent capabilities unknown to Russia until such an exercise is performed
– Other possibles:
     – A cover for illegal activities that occurred during the exercise – a feint, a ruse
 – Testing a precursor to actual execution – that is why military exercises are performed
 – What capabilities are being left in the exercise areas; what is not being removed after the exercise using the exercise as a ruse to place assets close to Western borders that were not there before
 What do you think?
 https://uawire.org/news/media-belarusian-and-russian-militaries-are-jamming-mobile-communications-along-border-with-poland

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Drone Wars! Threats, Vulnerabilities and Hostile Use

Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_01Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_02Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_03Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_04Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_05Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_06Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_07Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_08Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_09Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_10Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_11Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_12Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_13Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_14Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_15Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_16Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_17Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_18Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_19Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_20Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_21Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_22Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_23Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_24Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_25Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_26Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_27Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_28Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_29Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_30Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_31Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_32Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_33Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_34Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_35Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_36Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_37Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_38Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_39Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_40Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_41Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_42Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_43Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_44Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_45Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_46Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_47Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_48Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_49Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_50Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_51Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_52Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_53Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_54Drone WARS presentation Cyber Event 100417 slides Rev17A_CMC RKN_201701002 (1)_Page_55

References

Adamy, D. (2001) EW 101 A First Course in Electronic Warfare, Boston: Artech House.

Adamy, D. (2004) EW 102 A Second Course in Electronic Warfare, Boston: Artech House.

Adamy, D. (2009) EW 103 Tactical Battlefield Communications Electronic Warfare, Boston: Artech House.

Adamy, D. (2015) EW 104 EW against a New Generation of Threats, Boston: Artech House.

Anonymous, (2017) GPS/SBAS Signal Generator, GSS4100, Spirent Communications Data Sheet. Satellite AIS, Exact Earth, Ltd.

Anonymous, (9/8/2017) Innovation: Simulating GPS Signals, GPS World, http://gpsworld.com/simulating-gps-signals/

Anonymous, (8/22/2017) Nationwide Automatic Identification System, www.navgen.uscg.gov

Anonymous, (8/22/2017) Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) Overview, www.navgen.uscg.gov

Anonymous, (8/22/2017) How AIS Works, www.navgen.uscg.gov

Anonymous, (2015) Satellite AIS, Exact Earth, Ltd.

Anonymous, (6/21/2015) Cyber Threats against the Aviation Industry, in SCADA on April8, 2014, INFOSEC Institute.

Anonymous, (2012) A Guide for Testers of GPS Devices and Systems, spectracom, Test & Measurement technical Note, TN15-101A – What You Want to know about GPS.

Anonymous, (5/14/2012) what is a GPS Simulator? Spectracom, Test & Measurement White Paper, WP08-101A.

Anonymous, (1/10/2014) GPS Signal Plan, Navipedia, http://www.navipedia.net/index.php/GPS_Signal_Plan

Anonymous, (4/2017) Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System Techniques, HQ, Department of the Army, ATP-3-01.81, https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/atp3-01-81.pdf

Atayero, A.A, Luka, .K. & Alatishe, A.A (8/2011) Satellite Link Design: A Tutorial, International Journal of Electrical & Computer Sciences, IJECS-IJEND Vol: 11 No: 04.

Balduzzi, M., Wilhoit, K., & Pasta, A. (2014) A Security Evaluation of AIS, Trend Micro Forward-Looking Threat Research

Barker, B.C Capt., et.al. (2006) Overview of the GPS M-Code Signal, MITRE Report.

Bay-Yen, J. (2000) Chapter 5: GPS C/A Code Signal Structure, Fundamentals of Global Positioning System Receivers: A Software Approach, New York: John Wiley, http://read.pudn.com/downloads85/ebook/326017/Fundamentals%20of%20Global%20Positioning%20System%20Receivers/booktext05.pdf

Bhatti, J. & Humphreys, T. E. (2016) Hostile Control of Ships via False GPS Signals Demonstration and Detection, Navigation: Journal of the Institute of Navigation, Vol. 64, No.1, Spring 2017.

Buesne, G & DeSanto, D. (2017) GNSS Receivers and the Cyber-Threat: Lessons from the Information Security Community, Spirent Communications, Baltimore, MD

Buesne, G & Holbrow, M. (6/29/2017) GNSS Threats, Attacks and Simulations, Spirent: PNT Advisory Board, Baltimore, MD

Bussert, J.C. (10/2013) China Expands Influence through Electronics, Signal Magazine, https://www.afcea.org/content/china-expands-influence-through-electronics

Chachak, E. (retrieved 9/1/2017) U.S. Naval Mishaps – Human Error or Cyber Malfeasance? CyberDB.https://www.cyberdb.co/u-s-naval-mishaps-human-error-or-cyber-malfeasance/

Crosby, J. (12/16/2017) here’s What USNS Bowditch Does, Inverse Innovation, https://www.inverse.com/article/25346-usns-bowditch-underwater-drone-stolen-china

Demchak, C., Patton, K, T. & Tangredi, S.J. (8/25/2017) why are our Ships Crashing? Competence, Overload, and Cyber Considerations, Center for International Maritime Security. https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/08/25/why_are_our_ships_crashing_competence_overload_and_cyber_considerations_112152.html

Dupont, G. (2017) SIEM Fundamentals for your Threat Intelligence Program, Recorded Future, https://www.recordedfuture.com/security-operations-center-fundamentals/

Easton, R.D. & Frazier, E.F. (2013) GPS Declassified: From Smart Bombs to Smartphones, University of Nebraska Press.

FCC Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, Marine VHF Radio Channels, per 47 CFR 80.371© and 80.373(f)

Fessenden, F. & Watkins, D. (6/18/2017) the Path of the Container Ship that Struck a U.S. Destroyer, NYT. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/18/world/asia/path-ship-hit-uss-fitzgerald.html?mcubz=3

Gaertner, U (2013) UAV Swarm Tactics: An Agent-Based Simulation and Markov Process Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School Thesis.

Haider, Z. & Khalid, S. (8/2016) Survey on Effective GPS Spoofing Countermeasures, 6th International Conference on Innovative Computing Technology (INTECH 2016), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/313543601_Survey_on_effective_GPS_spoofing_countermeasures

Heath, T. (5/7/2015) How to Hack a Military Drone Parts I & II, Technology-Hackers, www.cybersecurityintelligence.com/blog/

Hodge, H. (8/23/2017) why are Navy Ships colliding in the Pacific? Experts Weigh In, Military.com

Homeland Security (2017) Improving the Operation and Development of Global Positioning System (GPS) Equipment Used by Critical Infrastructure, NCIC/NCC Unclassified report.

Hurley, M. (9/2017) Beyond the Iron Triad: The Future of Airborne C2ISR, Arlington, VA: Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies.

Humphreys, T.E, e. al. (1/1/2009) assessing the Spoofing Threat: Development of a Portable Civilian GPS Spoofer, https://gps.mae.cornell.edu/humphreys_etal_iongnss2008.pdf, Cornell University

Humphreys, T.E, (7/18/2012) Statement on the Vulnerability of Civil Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Other Systems to Civil GPS Spoofing, Submitted to the Subcommittee on Oversight., Investigations, and Management of the House Committee on Homeland Security.

Kao, Lee, Chang, and Ko. (2007) A Fuzzy Logic Method for Collision Avoidance in Vessel Traffic Service, Journal of Navigation, 60, 17-31.

John, E.N & Schrage, D.P (2017) System Integration and Operation of a Research Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, Atlanta GA: School of Aerospace Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology.

LaGrone, S. (8/21/2017) Chain of Events Involving U.S Navy Warships in the Western Pacific Raise Readiness, Training Questions, USNI News

LaGrone, S. (1/31/2017) Cruiser USS Antietam Runs Aground in Tokyo Bay, Spills Oil, USNI News.

Mccaslin, I.B. (2017) Red Drones Over Disputed Seas: A Field Guide to Chinese UAVs/UCAVs Operating in the disputed East and South China Seas. Project 2049 Institute.  http://project2049.net/documents/Red%20Drones%20Over%20Disputed%20Seas_PLA_Project2049.pdf

News Correspondent, (8/22/2017) USS McCain crash is 4th Navy Accident in Pacific this Year, The Washington Post, AP.

News Correspondent, (8/31/2017) DDG 51 Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer, Military.com

News Correspondent, (8/21/2017) CNO Orders Operational Pause, Review After Latest Ship Collision, Military.com

News Correspondent, (8/21/2017) 10 Sailors Missing, 5 injured after Destroyer Collides with Tanker, Military.com

News Correspondent, (8/22/2017) Remains of Navy Sailors found on USS John S McCain, Military.com

News Correspondent, (8/17/2017) Navy Fires Commander, XO from USS Fitzgerald for Fatal Collision, Military.com

News Correspondent, (7/21/2017) Investigation Faults Navy in Fitzgerald Collision Report, Military.com

News Correspondent, (6/20/2017) Stories of Fitzgerald Sailors Killed in Destroyer – Container Ship Crash, Military.com

News Correspondent, (6/16/2017) US Navy Destroyer Collides with Japanese Merchant Ship, Military.com

News Correspondent, (5/09/2017) US Navy Ship Collides with South Korean Fishing Boat, Military.com

News Correspondent, (1/31/2017) Oil Spill in Tokyo Bay After Navy Cruiser Runs Aground, Military.com

Nichols, R.K (8/31/2017) Stand By for a whole slew of military short articles on the Navy Collisions (my students only), Private memo to COT799 & CMST 455.

Nichols, R.K. & Lekkas, P.L. (2002) Wireless Security: Threats, Models, Solutions, New York, McGraw Hill.

O’Donnell, W. (2017) Interview with Navy Captain. http://inmilitary.com/real-reason-us-navy-keeps-hitting-merchant-vessels/

Ranganathan, A, et.al, SPREE A Spoofing Resistant GPS Receiver, Department of Computer Science, ETH Zurich, Switzerland, Zurich Information Security and Privacy Center.

Richardson, J. Adm., (8/31/2017) No Evidence of Hacking in McCain and Fitzgerald Collisions, Military.com

Rudow, l. (2014) Where to Mount a Radome for best Performance, Boat US, http://www.boatus.com/magazine/2014/june/mounting-a-radome.asp

Schallhorn, K., (9/1/2017) US Military crashes, collisions in the Pacific, FoxNews. http://www.foxnews.com/us/2017/08/28/us-military-crashes-collisions-in-pacific.html

Schmidt, D.et.al., (5/2016) A Survey and Analysis of the GNSS Spoofing Threat and Countermeasures, ACM Computing Surveys, Vol 48, No 4, Article 64

Sickle, J.V. (8/25/2017) GEOG 862 GPS and GNSS for Geospatial Professionals, Lessons 1-10 complete, Penn State University, College of Earth and Mineral Sciences  https://www.e-education.psu.edu/geog862/node/1407 [ Superb Course on the subject]

Sterling, J. 8/21/2017) A Spate of US Navy warship accidents in Asia since January, CNNNEWS. http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/21/politics/navy-ships-accidents/index.html

Tucker, P., e. al. (9/2017) Beyond GPS: Upgrading the Military’s Navigation-and-timing Backbone, Defense One, e-Book.

Volpe, J.A, (8/29/2001) Vulnerability Assessment of the Transportation Infrastructure Relying on the Global Positioning System, Final Report, Office of Assistant Secretary for Transportation Policy, U.S. Department of Transportation, John A Volpe Transportation Systems Center.

Warner, J.S. % Johnson, R.G. (2013) A Simple Demonstration That the Global Positioning System (GPS) is Vulnerable to Spoofing, Journal of Security Administration, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/8ddb/89f56dd3e2ae265047822bc47cfb06815d9a.pdf, LAUR-03-6163.

Warner, J.S. % Johnson, R.G. (2003) GPS Spoofing Countermeasures, Journal of Security Administration, LAUR-03-2384, Los Alamos, NM:  Los Alamos National Laboratory

Weise, E. (8/23/2017) Could Hackers Be Behind The U.S. Navy Collisions? USATODAY.

Patents

Berry, R. & Cook, C. (2016) Detection of wireless data jamming and spoofing, US 9466881 B1

 

Blogs

Banggood Blog (9/14/2017) Whats the difference between RHCP and LHCP antennae?     https://blog.banggood.com/rhcp-and-lhcp-whats-the-difference-29046.html

King Blog (9/14/2017) what is the difference between Azimuth and Elevation? https://kingconnect.com/what-is-the-difference-between-azimuth-and-elevation/

Mike Willis Blog (9/13/2017) Propagation. http://www.mike-willis.com/Tutorial/propagation.html

Law and Cyber Warfare Blog. Groll, E. (2017) Investigating if Destroyer Crash was Caused by a Cyber Attack, http://www.jlcw.org/u-s-navy-investigating-if-destroyer-crash-was-caused-by-cyberattack/

Wikipedia

Editor (8/31/2017) GPS Block IIIA, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GPS_Block_IIIA

Editor (9/14/2017) Circular polarization, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Circular_polarization

Editor (9/19/2017) Electromagnetic Spectrum, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electromagnetic_spectrum

Editor (9/19/2017) Continuous-wave Radar, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Continuous-wave_radar

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Treadstone 71 Announces Cyber Intelligence Capability Maturity Model

Treadstone 71 developed a maturity model to help organizations determine the maturity of their cyber intelligence initiatives against the cyber intelligence common body of knowledge (CICBOK). The model provides strategic and operational aspects of your cyber intelligence maturity, where it needs to go, and where you should concentrate your attention to create more value for your business. Nearly 8 years in the making, the Treadstone 71 Cyber Intelligence Maturity Model uses traditional tradecraft as delivered by Sherman Kent and Richards Heuer, intelligence community standards, analytic standards, and experiential knowledge derived from years of training, assessing, and building cyber intelligence programs.

The Treadstone 71 Cyber Intelligence Capability Maturity Model (T71-CICMM) is a methodology used to develop and refine an organization’s cyber intelligence program. Not only is the model educational and practical skills for learning and developing expertise, but also a roadmap for building a cyber intelligence program. More information is available here:

Treadstone 71 Cyber Intelligence Maturity Model

T71CICMM.png

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It has not changed – Russian Maskirovka – Denial and Deception

I keep a vigil in a wilderness of mirrors
Where nothing here is ever what it seems

Yuri Nosenko

yuri

“Instead of being relieved to hear that the Soviets had not been involved in the assassination, James Jesus Angleton, the C.I.A.’s legendarily suspicious counterintelligence chief, and others in the spy trade thought Mr. Nosenko’s apparent defection was a trick.”

http://www.planetreg.com/T71IntelTraining including Cyber Counterintelligence Tradecraft 

“After all, the agency had suffered a series of setbacks, including the unmasking and execution of two Russian intelligence officials who had been spying for the C.I.A. inside the Soviet Union.”

Not much has changed with respect to Russian counterintelligence activities but for the medium of use. The Internet affords great opportunities for denial and deception, counterdenial and counterdeception, ruses, feints, doubleplays, and other methods of manipulation and influence management. Want to learn more? Try Treadstone 71’s Cyber Counterintelligence Tradecraft Certification – http://www.planetreg.com/T71IntelTraining

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/26/AR2008082603493

htmlhttp://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/russ/jfkinfo/jfk8/hscanpol.htm2017-04-28_7-19-37

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