Nice to see that SANS is contributing to the Iranian Cyber Warfare effort. Fully available for download from an Iranian site in their entirety.
Nice to see that SANS is contributing to the Iranian Cyber Warfare effort. Fully available for download from an Iranian site in their entirety.
The recent Russian Zapad wargaming exercises included a plethora of electronic capabilities demonstration and potentially more. Russia is known to recently been involved in illegal immigration efforts in Sweden, Finland, and Norway along with hostile intent along its northern borders (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) including cell/communication tower tampering. Could the recent Zapad exercises be more than just wargaming?
Some What If thoughts on these non-linear actions:
Adamy, D. (2001) EW 101 A First Course in Electronic Warfare, Boston: Artech House.
Adamy, D. (2004) EW 102 A Second Course in Electronic Warfare, Boston: Artech House.
Adamy, D. (2009) EW 103 Tactical Battlefield Communications Electronic Warfare, Boston: Artech House.
Adamy, D. (2015) EW 104 EW against a New Generation of Threats, Boston: Artech House.
Anonymous, (2017) GPS/SBAS Signal Generator, GSS4100, Spirent Communications Data Sheet. Satellite AIS, Exact Earth, Ltd.
Anonymous, (9/8/2017) Innovation: Simulating GPS Signals, GPS World, http://gpsworld.com/simulating-gps-signals/
Anonymous, (8/22/2017) Nationwide Automatic Identification System, www.navgen.uscg.gov
Anonymous, (8/22/2017) Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) Overview, www.navgen.uscg.gov
Anonymous, (8/22/2017) How AIS Works, www.navgen.uscg.gov
Anonymous, (2015) Satellite AIS, Exact Earth, Ltd.
Anonymous, (6/21/2015) Cyber Threats against the Aviation Industry, in SCADA on April8, 2014, INFOSEC Institute.
Anonymous, (2012) A Guide for Testers of GPS Devices and Systems, spectracom, Test & Measurement technical Note, TN15-101A – What You Want to know about GPS.
Anonymous, (5/14/2012) what is a GPS Simulator? Spectracom, Test & Measurement White Paper, WP08-101A.
Anonymous, (1/10/2014) GPS Signal Plan, Navipedia, http://www.navipedia.net/index.php/GPS_Signal_Plan
Anonymous, (4/2017) Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System Techniques, HQ, Department of the Army, ATP-3-01.81, https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/atp3-01-81.pdf
Atayero, A.A, Luka, .K. & Alatishe, A.A (8/2011) Satellite Link Design: A Tutorial, International Journal of Electrical & Computer Sciences, IJECS-IJEND Vol: 11 No: 04.
Balduzzi, M., Wilhoit, K., & Pasta, A. (2014) A Security Evaluation of AIS, Trend Micro Forward-Looking Threat Research
Barker, B.C Capt., et.al. (2006) Overview of the GPS M-Code Signal, MITRE Report.
Bay-Yen, J. (2000) Chapter 5: GPS C/A Code Signal Structure, Fundamentals of Global Positioning System Receivers: A Software Approach, New York: John Wiley, http://read.pudn.com/downloads85/ebook/326017/Fundamentals%20of%20Global%20Positioning%20System%20Receivers/booktext05.pdf
Bhatti, J. & Humphreys, T. E. (2016) Hostile Control of Ships via False GPS Signals Demonstration and Detection, Navigation: Journal of the Institute of Navigation, Vol. 64, No.1, Spring 2017.
Buesne, G & DeSanto, D. (2017) GNSS Receivers and the Cyber-Threat: Lessons from the Information Security Community, Spirent Communications, Baltimore, MD
Buesne, G & Holbrow, M. (6/29/2017) GNSS Threats, Attacks and Simulations, Spirent: PNT Advisory Board, Baltimore, MD
Bussert, J.C. (10/2013) China Expands Influence through Electronics, Signal Magazine, https://www.afcea.org/content/china-expands-influence-through-electronics
Chachak, E. (retrieved 9/1/2017) U.S. Naval Mishaps – Human Error or Cyber Malfeasance? CyberDB.https://www.cyberdb.co/u-s-naval-mishaps-human-error-or-cyber-malfeasance/
Crosby, J. (12/16/2017) here’s What USNS Bowditch Does, Inverse Innovation, https://www.inverse.com/article/25346-usns-bowditch-underwater-drone-stolen-china
Demchak, C., Patton, K, T. & Tangredi, S.J. (8/25/2017) why are our Ships Crashing? Competence, Overload, and Cyber Considerations, Center for International Maritime Security. https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/08/25/why_are_our_ships_crashing_competence_overload_and_cyber_considerations_112152.html
Dupont, G. (2017) SIEM Fundamentals for your Threat Intelligence Program, Recorded Future, https://www.recordedfuture.com/security-operations-center-fundamentals/
Easton, R.D. & Frazier, E.F. (2013) GPS Declassified: From Smart Bombs to Smartphones, University of Nebraska Press.
FCC Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, Marine VHF Radio Channels, per 47 CFR 80.371© and 80.373(f)
Fessenden, F. & Watkins, D. (6/18/2017) the Path of the Container Ship that Struck a U.S. Destroyer, NYT. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/18/world/asia/path-ship-hit-uss-fitzgerald.html?mcubz=3
Gaertner, U (2013) UAV Swarm Tactics: An Agent-Based Simulation and Markov Process Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School Thesis.
Haider, Z. & Khalid, S. (8/2016) Survey on Effective GPS Spoofing Countermeasures, 6th International Conference on Innovative Computing Technology (INTECH 2016), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/313543601_Survey_on_effective_GPS_spoofing_countermeasures
Heath, T. (5/7/2015) How to Hack a Military Drone Parts I & II, Technology-Hackers, www.cybersecurityintelligence.com/blog/
Hodge, H. (8/23/2017) why are Navy Ships colliding in the Pacific? Experts Weigh In, Military.com
Homeland Security (2017) Improving the Operation and Development of Global Positioning System (GPS) Equipment Used by Critical Infrastructure, NCIC/NCC Unclassified report.
Hurley, M. (9/2017) Beyond the Iron Triad: The Future of Airborne C2ISR, Arlington, VA: Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies.
Humphreys, T.E, e. al. (1/1/2009) assessing the Spoofing Threat: Development of a Portable Civilian GPS Spoofer, https://gps.mae.cornell.edu/humphreys_etal_iongnss2008.pdf, Cornell University
Humphreys, T.E, (7/18/2012) Statement on the Vulnerability of Civil Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Other Systems to Civil GPS Spoofing, Submitted to the Subcommittee on Oversight., Investigations, and Management of the House Committee on Homeland Security.
Kao, Lee, Chang, and Ko. (2007) A Fuzzy Logic Method for Collision Avoidance in Vessel Traffic Service, Journal of Navigation, 60, 17-31.
John, E.N & Schrage, D.P (2017) System Integration and Operation of a Research Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, Atlanta GA: School of Aerospace Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology.
LaGrone, S. (8/21/2017) Chain of Events Involving U.S Navy Warships in the Western Pacific Raise Readiness, Training Questions, USNI News
LaGrone, S. (1/31/2017) Cruiser USS Antietam Runs Aground in Tokyo Bay, Spills Oil, USNI News.
Mccaslin, I.B. (2017) Red Drones Over Disputed Seas: A Field Guide to Chinese UAVs/UCAVs Operating in the disputed East and South China Seas. Project 2049 Institute. http://project2049.net/documents/Red%20Drones%20Over%20Disputed%20Seas_PLA_Project2049.pdf
News Correspondent, (8/22/2017) USS McCain crash is 4th Navy Accident in Pacific this Year, The Washington Post, AP.
News Correspondent, (8/31/2017) DDG 51 Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer, Military.com
News Correspondent, (8/21/2017) CNO Orders Operational Pause, Review After Latest Ship Collision, Military.com
News Correspondent, (8/21/2017) 10 Sailors Missing, 5 injured after Destroyer Collides with Tanker, Military.com
News Correspondent, (8/22/2017) Remains of Navy Sailors found on USS John S McCain, Military.com
News Correspondent, (8/17/2017) Navy Fires Commander, XO from USS Fitzgerald for Fatal Collision, Military.com
News Correspondent, (7/21/2017) Investigation Faults Navy in Fitzgerald Collision Report, Military.com
News Correspondent, (6/20/2017) Stories of Fitzgerald Sailors Killed in Destroyer – Container Ship Crash, Military.com
News Correspondent, (6/16/2017) US Navy Destroyer Collides with Japanese Merchant Ship, Military.com
News Correspondent, (5/09/2017) US Navy Ship Collides with South Korean Fishing Boat, Military.com
News Correspondent, (1/31/2017) Oil Spill in Tokyo Bay After Navy Cruiser Runs Aground, Military.com
Nichols, R.K (8/31/2017) Stand By for a whole slew of military short articles on the Navy Collisions (my students only), Private memo to COT799 & CMST 455.
Nichols, R.K. & Lekkas, P.L. (2002) Wireless Security: Threats, Models, Solutions, New York, McGraw Hill.
O’Donnell, W. (2017) Interview with Navy Captain. http://inmilitary.com/real-reason-us-navy-keeps-hitting-merchant-vessels/
Ranganathan, A, et.al, SPREE A Spoofing Resistant GPS Receiver, Department of Computer Science, ETH Zurich, Switzerland, Zurich Information Security and Privacy Center.
Richardson, J. Adm., (8/31/2017) No Evidence of Hacking in McCain and Fitzgerald Collisions, Military.com
Rudow, l. (2014) Where to Mount a Radome for best Performance, Boat US, http://www.boatus.com/magazine/2014/june/mounting-a-radome.asp
Schallhorn, K., (9/1/2017) US Military crashes, collisions in the Pacific, FoxNews. http://www.foxnews.com/us/2017/08/28/us-military-crashes-collisions-in-pacific.html
Schmidt, D.et.al., (5/2016) A Survey and Analysis of the GNSS Spoofing Threat and Countermeasures, ACM Computing Surveys, Vol 48, No 4, Article 64
Sickle, J.V. (8/25/2017) GEOG 862 GPS and GNSS for Geospatial Professionals, Lessons 1-10 complete, Penn State University, College of Earth and Mineral Sciences https://www.e-education.psu.edu/geog862/node/1407 [ Superb Course on the subject]
Sterling, J. 8/21/2017) A Spate of US Navy warship accidents in Asia since January, CNNNEWS. http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/21/politics/navy-ships-accidents/index.html
Tucker, P., e. al. (9/2017) Beyond GPS: Upgrading the Military’s Navigation-and-timing Backbone, Defense One, e-Book.
Volpe, J.A, (8/29/2001) Vulnerability Assessment of the Transportation Infrastructure Relying on the Global Positioning System, Final Report, Office of Assistant Secretary for Transportation Policy, U.S. Department of Transportation, John A Volpe Transportation Systems Center.
Warner, J.S. % Johnson, R.G. (2013) A Simple Demonstration That the Global Positioning System (GPS) is Vulnerable to Spoofing, Journal of Security Administration, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/8ddb/89f56dd3e2ae265047822bc47cfb06815d9a.pdf, LAUR-03-6163.
Warner, J.S. % Johnson, R.G. (2003) GPS Spoofing Countermeasures, Journal of Security Administration, LAUR-03-2384, Los Alamos, NM: Los Alamos National Laboratory
Weise, E. (8/23/2017) Could Hackers Be Behind The U.S. Navy Collisions? USATODAY.
Berry, R. & Cook, C. (2016) Detection of wireless data jamming and spoofing, US 9466881 B1
Banggood Blog (9/14/2017) Whats the difference between RHCP and LHCP antennae? https://blog.banggood.com/rhcp-and-lhcp-whats-the-difference-29046.html
King Blog (9/14/2017) what is the difference between Azimuth and Elevation? https://kingconnect.com/what-is-the-difference-between-azimuth-and-elevation/
Mike Willis Blog (9/13/2017) Propagation. http://www.mike-willis.com/Tutorial/propagation.html
Law and Cyber Warfare Blog. Groll, E. (2017) Investigating if Destroyer Crash was Caused by a Cyber Attack, http://www.jlcw.org/u-s-navy-investigating-if-destroyer-crash-was-caused-by-cyberattack/
Editor (8/31/2017) GPS Block IIIA, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GPS_Block_IIIA
Editor (9/14/2017) Circular polarization, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Circular_polarization
Editor (9/19/2017) Electromagnetic Spectrum, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electromagnetic_spectrum
Editor (9/19/2017) Continuous-wave Radar, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Continuous-wave_radar
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I keep a vigil in a wilderness of mirrors
Where nothing here is ever what it seems
“Instead of being relieved to hear that the Soviets had not been involved in the assassination, James Jesus Angleton, the C.I.A.’s legendarily suspicious counterintelligence chief, and others in the spy trade thought Mr. Nosenko’s apparent defection was a trick.”
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