Africa – Where Counter-Terrorism and Modernization Meet

One more fascinating/outstanding effort by the new Kansas State Dragon Team. This time we researched the major powers’ use of Drones on bicoastal AOs in Africa. Many interesting conclusions and lots of resources involved. The false flag is counter-terrorism. The real agenda is resources: gold, diamonds, cotton. China continues it “Take and Talk strategy” in Africa and the Spratly Islands back in its home territory of the South China Seas.

We next intend to look at China’s interference with India and Pakistan. The next war will be by Drone proxy – as predicted. Too much UAS investment by so many big players to leave them dormant. Or it might be very subtle like disruption of GPS communications or replay of navigation bridge signals on US naval assets.

REPORT in PDF HERE

Team Dragon
Kansas State University

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Drone Wars! Threats, Vulnerabilities and Hostile Use

References

Adamy, D. (2001) EW 101 A First Course in Electronic Warfare, Boston: Artech House.

Adamy, D. (2004) EW 102 A Second Course in Electronic Warfare, Boston: Artech House.

Adamy, D. (2009) EW 103 Tactical Battlefield Communications Electronic Warfare, Boston: Artech House.

Adamy, D. (2015) EW 104 EW against a New Generation of Threats, Boston: Artech House.

Anonymous, (2017) GPS/SBAS Signal Generator, GSS4100, Spirent Communications Data Sheet. Satellite AIS, Exact Earth, Ltd.

Anonymous, (9/8/2017) Innovation: Simulating GPS Signals, GPS World, http://gpsworld.com/simulating-gps-signals/

Anonymous, (8/22/2017) Nationwide Automatic Identification System, www.navgen.uscg.gov

Anonymous, (8/22/2017) Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) Overview, www.navgen.uscg.gov

Anonymous, (8/22/2017) How AIS Works, www.navgen.uscg.gov

Anonymous, (2015) Satellite AIS, Exact Earth, Ltd.

Anonymous, (6/21/2015) Cyber Threats against the Aviation Industry, in SCADA on April8, 2014, INFOSEC Institute.

Anonymous, (2012) A Guide for Testers of GPS Devices and Systems, spectracom, Test & Measurement technical Note, TN15-101A – What You Want to know about GPS.

Anonymous, (5/14/2012) what is a GPS Simulator? Spectracom, Test & Measurement White Paper, WP08-101A.

Anonymous, (1/10/2014) GPS Signal Plan, Navipedia, http://www.navipedia.net/index.php/GPS_Signal_Plan

Anonymous, (4/2017) Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System Techniques, HQ, Department of the Army, ATP-3-01.81, https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/atp3-01-81.pdf

Atayero, A.A, Luka, .K. & Alatishe, A.A (8/2011) Satellite Link Design: A Tutorial, International Journal of Electrical & Computer Sciences, IJECS-IJEND Vol: 11 No: 04.

Balduzzi, M., Wilhoit, K., & Pasta, A. (2014) A Security Evaluation of AIS, Trend Micro Forward-Looking Threat Research

Barker, B.C Capt., et.al. (2006) Overview of the GPS M-Code Signal, MITRE Report.

Bay-Yen, J. (2000) Chapter 5: GPS C/A Code Signal Structure, Fundamentals of Global Positioning System Receivers: A Software Approach, New York: John Wiley, http://read.pudn.com/downloads85/ebook/326017/Fundamentals%20of%20Global%20Positioning%20System%20Receivers/booktext05.pdf

Bhatti, J. & Humphreys, T. E. (2016) Hostile Control of Ships via False GPS Signals Demonstration and Detection, Navigation: Journal of the Institute of Navigation, Vol. 64, No.1, Spring 2017.

Buesne, G & DeSanto, D. (2017) GNSS Receivers and the Cyber-Threat: Lessons from the Information Security Community, Spirent Communications, Baltimore, MD

Buesne, G & Holbrow, M. (6/29/2017) GNSS Threats, Attacks and Simulations, Spirent: PNT Advisory Board, Baltimore, MD

Bussert, J.C. (10/2013) China Expands Influence through Electronics, Signal Magazine, https://www.afcea.org/content/china-expands-influence-through-electronics

Chachak, E. (retrieved 9/1/2017) U.S. Naval Mishaps – Human Error or Cyber Malfeasance? CyberDB.https://www.cyberdb.co/u-s-naval-mishaps-human-error-or-cyber-malfeasance/

Crosby, J. (12/16/2017) here’s What USNS Bowditch Does, Inverse Innovation, https://www.inverse.com/article/25346-usns-bowditch-underwater-drone-stolen-china

Demchak, C., Patton, K, T. & Tangredi, S.J. (8/25/2017) why are our Ships Crashing? Competence, Overload, and Cyber Considerations, Center for International Maritime Security. https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/08/25/why_are_our_ships_crashing_competence_overload_and_cyber_considerations_112152.html

Dupont, G. (2017) SIEM Fundamentals for your Threat Intelligence Program, Recorded Future, https://www.recordedfuture.com/security-operations-center-fundamentals/

Easton, R.D. & Frazier, E.F. (2013) GPS Declassified: From Smart Bombs to Smartphones, University of Nebraska Press.

FCC Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, Marine VHF Radio Channels, per 47 CFR 80.371© and 80.373(f)

Fessenden, F. & Watkins, D. (6/18/2017) the Path of the Container Ship that Struck a U.S. Destroyer, NYT. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/18/world/asia/path-ship-hit-uss-fitzgerald.html?mcubz=3

Gaertner, U (2013) UAV Swarm Tactics: An Agent-Based Simulation and Markov Process Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School Thesis.

Haider, Z. & Khalid, S. (8/2016) Survey on Effective GPS Spoofing Countermeasures, 6^th International Conference on Innovative Computing Technology (INTECH 2016), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/313543601_Survey_on_effective_GPS_spoofing_countermeasures

Heath, T. (5/7/2015) How to Hack a Military Drone Parts I & II, Technology-Hackers, www.cybersecurityintelligence.com/blog/

Hodge, H. (8/23/2017) why are Navy Ships colliding in the Pacific? Experts Weigh In, Military.com

Homeland Security (2017) Improving the Operation and Development of Global Positioning System (GPS) Equipment Used by Critical Infrastructure, NCIC/NCC Unclassified report.

Hurley, M. (9/2017) Beyond the Iron Triad: The Future of Airborne C2ISR, Arlington, VA: Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies.

Humphreys, T.E, e. al. (1/1/2009) assessing the Spoofing Threat: Development of a Portable Civilian GPS Spoofer, https://gps.mae.cornell.edu/humphreys_etal_iongnss2008.pdf, Cornell University

Humphreys, T.E, (7/18/2012) Statement on the Vulnerability of Civil Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Other Systems to Civil GPS Spoofing, Submitted to the Subcommittee on Oversight., Investigations, and Management of the House Committee on Homeland Security.

Kao, Lee, Chang, and Ko. (2007) A Fuzzy Logic Method for Collision Avoidance in Vessel Traffic Service, Journal of Navigation, 60, 17-31.

John, E.N & Schrage, D.P (2017) System Integration and Operation of a Research Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, Atlanta GA: School of Aerospace Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology.

LaGrone, S. (8/21/2017) Chain of Events Involving U.S Navy Warships in the Western Pacific Raise Readiness, Training Questions, USNI News

LaGrone, S. (1/31/2017) Cruiser USS Antietam Runs Aground in Tokyo Bay, Spills Oil, USNI News.

Mccaslin, I.B. (2017) Red Drones Over Disputed Seas: A Field Guide to Chinese UAVs/UCAVs Operating in the disputed East and South China Seas. Project 2049 Institute. http://project2049.net/documents/Red%20Drones%20Over%20Disputed%20Seas_PLA_Project2049.pdf

News Correspondent, (8/22/2017) USS McCain crash is 4^th Navy Accident in Pacific this Year, The Washington Post, AP.

News Correspondent, (8/31/2017) DDG 51 Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer, Military.com

News Correspondent, (8/21/2017) CNO Orders Operational Pause, Review After Latest Ship Collision, Military.com

News Correspondent, (8/21/2017) 10 Sailors Missing, 5 injured after Destroyer Collides with Tanker, Military.com

News Correspondent, (8/22/2017) Remains of Navy Sailors found on USS John S McCain, Military.com

News Correspondent, (8/17/2017) Navy Fires Commander, XO from USS Fitzgerald for Fatal Collision, Military.com

News Correspondent, (7/21/2017) Investigation Faults Navy in Fitzgerald Collision Report, Military.com

News Correspondent, (6/20/2017) Stories of Fitzgerald Sailors Killed in Destroyer – Container Ship Crash, Military.com

News Correspondent, (6/16/2017) US Navy Destroyer Collides with Japanese Merchant Ship, Military.com

News Correspondent, (5/09/2017) US Navy Ship Collides with South Korean Fishing Boat, Military.com

News Correspondent, (1/31/2017) Oil Spill in Tokyo Bay After Navy Cruiser Runs Aground, Military.com

Nichols, R.K (8/31/2017) Stand By for a whole slew of military short articles on the Navy Collisions (my students only), Private memo to COT799 & CMST 455.

Nichols, R.K. & Lekkas, P.L. (2002) Wireless Security: Threats, Models, Solutions, New York, McGraw Hill.

O’Donnell, W. (2017) Interview with Navy Captain. http://inmilitary.com/real-reason-us-navy-keeps-hitting-merchant-vessels/

Ranganathan, A, et.al, SPREE A Spoofing Resistant GPS Receiver, Department of Computer Science, ETH Zurich, Switzerland, Zurich Information Security and Privacy Center.

Richardson, J. Adm., (8/31/2017) No Evidence of Hacking in McCain and Fitzgerald Collisions, Military.com

Rudow, l. (2014) Where to Mount a Radome for best Performance, Boat US, http://www.boatus.com/magazine/2014/june/mounting-a-radome.asp

Schallhorn, K., (9/1/2017) US Military crashes, collisions in the Pacific, FoxNews. http://www.foxnews.com/us/2017/08/28/us-military-crashes-collisions-in-pacific.html

Schmidt, D.et.al., (5/2016) A Survey and Analysis of the GNSS Spoofing Threat and Countermeasures, ACM Computing Surveys, Vol 48, No 4, Article 64

Sickle, J.V. (8/25/2017) GEOG 862 GPS and GNSS for Geospatial Professionals, Lessons 1-10 complete, Penn State University, College of Earth and Mineral Sciences https://www.e-education.psu.edu/geog862/node/1407 [ Superb Course on the subject]

Sterling, J. 8/21/2017) A Spate of US Navy warship accidents in Asia since January, CNNNEWS. http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/21/politics/navy-ships-accidents/index.html

Tucker, P., e. al. (9/2017) Beyond GPS: Upgrading the Military’s Navigation-and-timing Backbone, Defense One, e-Book.

Volpe, J.A, (8/29/2001) Vulnerability Assessment of the Transportation Infrastructure Relying on the Global Positioning System, Final Report, Office of Assistant Secretary for Transportation Policy, U.S. Department of Transportation, John A Volpe Transportation Systems Center.

Warner, J.S. % Johnson, R.G. (2013) A Simple Demonstration That the Global Positioning System (GPS) is Vulnerable to Spoofing, Journal of Security Administration, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/8ddb/89f56dd3e2ae265047822bc47cfb06815d9a.pdf, LAUR-03-6163.

Warner, J.S. % Johnson, R.G. (2003) GPS Spoofing Countermeasures, Journal of Security Administration, LAUR-03-2384, Los Alamos, NM: Los Alamos National Laboratory

Weise, E. (8/23/2017) Could Hackers Be Behind The U.S. Navy Collisions? USATODAY.

Patents

Berry, R. & Cook, C. (2016) Detection of wireless data jamming and spoofing, US 9466881 B1

Blogs

Banggood Blog (9/14/2017) Whats the difference between RHCP and LHCP antennae? https://blog.banggood.com/rhcp-and-lhcp-whats-the-difference-29046.html

King Blog (9/14/2017) what is the difference between Azimuth and Elevation? https://kingconnect.com/what-is-the-difference-between-azimuth-and-elevation/

Mike Willis Blog (9/13/2017) Propagation. http://www.mike-willis.com/Tutorial/propagation.html

Law and Cyber Warfare Blog. Groll, E. (2017) Investigating if Destroyer Crash was Caused by a Cyber Attack, http://www.jlcw.org/u-s-navy-investigating-if-destroyer-crash-was-caused-by-cyberattack/

Wikipedia

Editor (8/31/2017) GPS Block IIIA, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GPS_Block_IIIA

Editor (9/14/2017) Circular polarization, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Circular_polarization

Editor (9/19/2017) Electromagnetic Spectrum, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electromagnetic_spectrum

Editor (9/19/2017) Continuous-wave Radar, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Continuous-wave_radar

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Valery Vasilevich Gerasimov – Валерий Васильевич Герасимов

Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation / First Deputy Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation, General of the Army.

Валерий Васильевич Герасимов

Born 8 September 1955 (age 62)

Kazan, Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic

Married – one son

Russian hackers reportedly stole NSA data via Kaspersky Lab software

http://algo.fyi/5vhjug

Born on 8 September 1955 in the city of Kazan. In 1977, he graduated from the Kazan Higher Tank Command School named after the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar ASSR (Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic). He commanded platoon, company, battalion in the Northern Group of Troops and Far Eastern Military District.

After his graduation from the Military Academy of Armored Troops named after Marshal of the Soviet Union R.Ya. Malinovsky in the year of 1987, he served as the chief of headquarters and commander of tank regiment, the chief of headquarters of motorized rifle division in the Baltic Military District. From 1993 to 1995 — the commander of motorized rifle division in the North-Western Group of Troops.

After graduating from the Kazan Higher Tank Command School Gerasimov was the commander of a platoon, company, and battalion of the Far Eastern Military District. Later he was chief of staff of a tank regiment and then of a motorized rifle division in the Baltic Military District. From 1993 to 1995 he was the commander of the 144th Guards Motor Rifle Division in the Baltic Military District and then the North-Western Group of Forces.

After he graduated from the General Staff’s academy he was First Deputy Army Commander in the Moscow Military District and commander of the 58th Army in the North Caucasus Military District during the Second Chechen War. His involvement in the arrest of Yuri Budanov led to praise from journalist Anna Politkovskaya.

In 2006, he became commander of Leningrad Military District and moved to be the commander of Moscow Military District in 2009 and Central Military District in April 2012. On 23 December 2010, he became deputy Chief of the General Staff

In 1997 after his graduation from the Military Academy of the RF Armed Forces’ General Staff, he served as the First Deputy Commander of Army in the Moscow Military District, the Deputy Commander, Chief of Staff and Commander of the 58th Army in the North Caucasian Military District.

From 2003 to 2005 — the Chief of Staff of the Far Eastern Military District. From 2005 — the Chief of the Main Administration of Combat Training and Troops’ Service of the RF Armed Forces, and from December 2006 — the Chief of Staff of the North Caucasian Military District.

In December 2006, he was assigned as the Commander of the Leningrad Military District, and in February 2009 — as the Commander of the Moscow Military District.

From December 2010 — the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

From 26 April 2012 — the Commander of the Central Military District.

By the RF Presidential Decree of 9 November 2012, he has been appointed the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation / First Deputy Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation. He was appointed by President Vladimir Putin on 9 November 2012. Some authors credit Gerasimov as the person behind a so-called “Gerasimov doctrine” – currently prevalent in Russian military strategy – combining military, technological, information, diplomatic, economic, cultural and other tactics, which are then deployed towards one set of strategic objectives. This “political warfare” is preferred due to its comparatively low cost.

The previous Chief of General Staff, Army General Nikolay Makarov, was seen as close to Serduykov and was seen by commentators as likely to be replaced by new Defence Minister Sergey Shoygu. It has been reported that Makarov resigned, but he was formally dismissed by President Vladimir Putin. Other changes were the dismissal of Alexander Sukhorukov from the position of First Deputy Defence Minister and his replacement by Colonel General Arkady Bakhin, formerly commander of the Western Military District. Aerospace Defence Forces commander Colonel General Oleg Ostapenko was also promoted to Deputy Defence Minister. He was promoted to the highest rank in the Russian Army, General of the Army as of 2014. On September 15, 2016, he and Turkish chief of staff General Hulusi Akar conducted a

meeting on the future of Syria in the Ankara headquarters of the army. That meeting will result in tightened dealings between Russia and Turkey.

There is an old Soviet-era rhetorical device that a ‘warning’ or a ‘lesson’ from some other situation is used to outline intent and plan. The way that what purports to be an after-action take on the Arab Spring so closely maps across to what was done in Ukraine is striking. Presenting the Arab Spring–wrongly–as the results of covert Western operations allows Gerasimov the freedom to talk about what he may also want to talk about: how Russia can subvert and destroy states without direct, overt and large-scale military intervention. However, the assumption that this is a Western gambit primarily does appear genuinely-held. https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war/

VPK_08_476

In April 2014 Gerasimov was added to the list of persons against whom the European Union introduced sanctions “in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence of Ukraine.”

Hero of the Russian Federation.

Personal decorations: Order for Military Merits, Order for Merits to the Fatherland 4th grade, Order for Service to the Homeland in the USSR’s Armed Forces 3rd grade, Order of St. George 4th grade, Order for Merits to the Fatherland with Swords 3rd grade, Order for Honor.

The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness.

For me, this is probably the most important line in the whole piece, so allow me to repeat it: The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness. In other words, this is an explicit recognition not only that all conflicts are actually means to political ends–the actual forces used are irrelevant–but that in the modern realities, Russia must look to non-military instruments increasingly. https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war/

https://warontherocks.com/2016/03/russian-hybrid-warfare-and-other-dark-arts/

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Dru’a al-Waaqiah lil-Bedoon – Syrian Sanctions Busting with Russian Help

Past report on Syrian Government collusion with Russia to bypass sanctions against Syria. This instance involves acquiring materials and machines to manufacture their own body armor in Latakia by way of the UAE where a Syrian soldier working with a female FSB agent centralize the acquisitions.

Visas, passports, military IDs, fake names, bills of lading and more for your reading and review.

The Treadstone 71 Report (pdf) – Treadstone 71 – drua-alwaaqiah-lilboodoon

Treadstone 71 acquired supporting files and documents (30MB zip) – drua-rawfiles-treadstone71

https://treadstone71llc.files.wordpress.com/2014/10/hatem-deeb-_-vk.pdf

https://treadstone71llc.files.wordpress.com/2014/10/zain-deeb-_-vk.pdf

https://cybershafarat.com/?p=524

http://www.treadstone71.com

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2017 Training Courses – Treadstone 71

2017 Training Dates

Main Page to Treadstone 71 Training – 2017

(or on demand including in-house or by location)

Treadstone 71 is working with FS-ISAC for training in London, Singapore, Malaysia, and Australia.

FS-ISAC Sponsored Courses:

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Wilderness of Shlemiels

Thurs 9:15 AM Moscone South 307. Treadstone 71 talk on adversary infiltration target centric DandD @RSAConference ‬https://www.rsaconference.com/events/us17/agenda/sessions/6113-wilderness-of-shlemiels

Register ahead of time for a seat

Be there!

www.treadstone71.com

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Full Suite of Cyber-Threat Intelligence and Counterintelligence Courses Ready for Global Delivery

HALF MOON BAY, CA (PRWEB) JANUARY 25, 2017

Treadstone 71 today announced a full suite of Cyber and Threat Intelligence and CounterIntelligence training courses. The courses drive the expansion of Treadstone 71’s accelerated, academically validated, intelligence training to global markets. Treadstone 71 delivers courses in California, Virginia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands and is set to expand to the Middle East and Asia later this year. (www.planetreg.com/T71IntelTraining)

Treadstone 71 offers a compelling business model that delivers rapid cyber and threat intelligence strategic planning, program build, and targeted training in sectors such as financial services, government, healthcare, energy, and other critical infrastructure verticals. Treadstone 71’s format, curriculum, and instruction model are helping meet critical global demand for cyber and threat intelligence and analysis expertise. Treadstone 71 training provide graduates with an attractive pathway to compensation increases, career progression, and much-needed attention to intelligence. The organization has been teaching cyber intelligence at the Master’s level and commercially for seven years. New courses include a focus on campaign management, the use of Tor, Tails, I2P, and Maltego as well as covering persona development and management. Students create a series of identities, character development, and dimensions, storyline, plot synopsis, story drive and limit, story weaving, applicability, scope, tools to be used, methods of interaction with other identities, engaging secondary characters, refining targeting while developing a campaign to gain street credentials.

“Our courses provide academic instruction combined with real-world, hands-on collection, analysis, analytic writing, dissemination, and briefings that many liken to an apprenticeship,” said Jeff Bardin, Chief Intelligence Officer for Treadstone 71. “Our curriculum follows the teachings of Sherman Kent and Richards Heuer giving students the tools necessary to perform targeted collection, structured analysis while authoring reports modeled after intelligence community standards. We teach methods of cyber infiltration, information and influence operations, counterintelligence strategies, mission based counterintelligence, denial and deception, and counter-denial and deception.”

Treadstone 71 courses are validated and proven by intelligence professionals creating job-ready threat intelligence professionals for global organizations suffering a talent shortage. “Intelligence analysis as an inherently intellectual activity that requires knowledge, judgment, and a degree of intuition,” continued Bardin. “Treadstone 71’s intelligence, counterintelligence, and clandestine cyber HUMINT training and services help organizations transform information into intelligence pertinent to their organization.”

Analysis includes integrating, evaluating, and analyzing all available data — which is often fragmented and even contradictory — and preparing intelligence products. Despite all the attention focused on the operational (collection) side of intelligence, analysis is the core of the process to inform corporate stakeholders. Analysis as more than just describing what is happening and why; identifying a range of opportunities… Intelligence Analysis is the key to making sense of the data and finding opportunities to take action. Analysis expands beyond the technical focus of today providing organizations with core capabilities for business, competitive, cyber, and threat intelligence.

Treadstone 71’s Cyber Intelligence Tradecraft Certification is the gold standard in the industry today derived from both academia and from Treadstone 71’s experience in building cyber intelligence programs at Fortune 500 organizations worldwide.

Treadstone 71

888.714.0071 – osint@treadstone71.com – http://www.planetreg.com/T71IntelTraining

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We Are in a State of Cyber Cold War?

Wisdom begins with the definition of terms – Socrates

Many believe that we are not in some sort of state of cyber warfare. Many believe that it is only influence operations. These are the same people who are selling you security technologies and services to protect your environment. They believe calling our current state cyber war is hype. They fact that they believe this is demonstrated in their technologies that have double and triple downed on solutions that do not work. Solutions based solely on see, detect, and arrest. A paradigm proven over the past 20 years to be a paradigm of failure. The game of many a vendor (not all) is to generate revenue off your fear. A fear that can be remedied if we fix information security by first starting to fix information technology (see Cyber Security Predictions – Not Reality TV – Just Daytime Entertainment). One of the problems we have is standard taxonomy and glossary. Most do not have an understanding of the basics of intelligence and war. Most feel the need to apply physical characteristics to cyber actions in order for those actions to be taken as some sort of warfare. This is a major misnomer. My request here is for you to read the limited glossary items below. Once you have read these items, think of where we are today with respect to cyber security. If after reading and applying critical thinking to the terms and our current state of cyber security you do not believe we are in a state of cyber cold war, then provide some well thought out comments as to what state we are in fact in.

Information Operations (IO). The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. (JP 1-02)

This includes five core capabilities incorporated into IO

Electronic warfare is any action involving the use of the electromagnetic spectrum or directed energy to control the spectrum, attack of an enemy, or impede enemy assaults via the spectrum.
Computer Network Operations (CNO)
1. Comprised of computer network attack, computer network defense, and related computer network exploitation enabling operations (JP 1-02)
Psychological operations
1. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-13.2)
Military Deception
1. Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. (JP 1-02)
2. According to JP 3-13.4, Counterintelligence provides the following for MILDEC planners:
3. Identification and analysis of adversary intelligence systems to determine the best deception conduits;
4. Establishment and control of deception conduits within the adversary intelligence system, also known as offensive CI operations;
5. Participation in counterdeception operations;
6. Identification and analysis of the adversary’s intelligence system and its susceptibility to deception and surprise; and
7. Feedback regarding adversary intelligence system responses to deception operations.
Operations Security

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Treadstone71 2017 Cyber Intel Courses – http://www.planetreg.com/T71IntelTraining

*******

OPSEC is a five-step iterative process that assists an organization in identifying specific pieces of information requiring protection and employing measures to protect them.

Identification of Critical information: Critical information is information about friendly intentions, capabilities and activities that allow an adversary to plan effectively to disrupt their operations. U.S. Army Regulation 530-1 has redefined Critical Information into four broad categories, using the acronym CALI- Capabilities, Activities, Limitations (including vulnerabilities), and Intentions.This step results in the creation of a Critical Information List (CIL). This allows the organization for focus resources on vital information, rather than attempting to protect all classified or sensitive unclassified information. Critical information may include, but is not limited to, military deployment schedules, internal organizational information, details of security measures, etc.
Analysis of Threats: A Threat comes from an adversary – any individual or group that may attempt to disrupt or compromise a friendly activity. Threat is further divided into adversaries with intent and capability. The greater the combined intent and capability of the adversary, the greater the threat. This step uses multiple sources, such as intelligence activities, law enforcement, and open source information to identify likely adversaries to a planned operation and prioritize their degree of threat.
Analysis of Vulnerabilities: Examining each aspect of the planned operation to identify OPSEC indicators that could reveal critical information and then comparing those indicators with the adversary’s intelligence collection capabilities identified in the previous action. Threat can be thought of as the strength of the adversaries, while vulnerability can be thought of as the weakness of friendly organizations.
Assessment of Risk: First, planners analyze the vulnerabilities identified in the previous action and identify possible OPSEC measures for each vulnerability. Second, specific OPSEC measures are selected for execution based upon a risk assessment done by the commander and staff. Risk is calculated based on the probability of Critical Information release and the impact if such as release occurs. Probability is further subdivided into the level of threat and the level of vulnerability. The core premise of the subdivision is that the probability of compromise is greatest when the threat is very capable and dedicated, while friendly organizations are simultaneously exposed.
Application of Appropriate OPSEC Measures: The command implements the OPSEC measures selected in the assessment of risk action or, in the case of planned future operations and activities, includes the measures in specific OPSEC plans. Countermeasures must be continually monitored to ensure that they continue to protect current information against relevant threats.The U.S. Army Regulation 530-1 refers to “Measures” as the overarching term, with categories of “Action Control” (controlling one’s own actions); “Countermeasures” (countering adversary intelligence collection); and “Counteranalysis” (creating difficulty for adversary analysts seeking to predict friendly intent) as tools to help an OPSEC professional protect Critical Information.

Offensive Cyber Operations. Programs and activities that through the use of cyberspace, 1) actively gather information from computers, information systems or networks or 20 manipulate, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy targeted adversary computers, information systems, or networks. (NSPD-38)

Cold War – a state of political hostility between countries characterized by threats, propaganda, and other measures short of open warfare – a conflict or dispute between two groups that does not involve actual fighting.

Cyber War – the use of computer technology to disrupt the activities of a state or organization, especially the deliberate attacking of information systems for strategic or military purposes. Cyber warfare involves the actions by a nation-state or international organization to attack and attempt to damage another nation’s computers or information networks through, for example, computer viruses or denial-of-service attacks.

Try this link for more definitions https://ccdcoe.org/cyber-definitions.html

To repeat. think of where we are today with respect to cyber security. Apply critical thinking to the terms and our current state of cyber security. Assess our relationship with Russia. Provide some well thought out comments as to what state we are in fact in if you believe we are not in a state of cyber cold war with Russia. If we are not, then how would you define our current state?

Treadstone 71

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The 12 Days of Cyber Christmas

…or What I want for Cyber Security and Intelligence Christmas 2016

All CIOs must have served as a CISO for at least 4 years before being allowed to be a CIO.
All CIOs must have a CISSP, CISM, and at least 2 technical information security certifications and have been thoroughly trained and qualified to be a CIO. No more cronyism.
CISOs will never report to the CIO – conflict of interest and a recipe for … what we have now.
If you are the administrator for a device, you secure that device (servers, routers, appliances, etc.). You are responsible and accountable – Secure what you own. Secure what you manage.
CIOs and their leadership will be held liable for deploying vulnerable systems.
All new products (IoT and beyond) must be certified secure before public release. No more figure it out as we go and bolt it on after we have consumers hooked.
All root access / administrative rights for production, critical, supporting, etc., systems and devices are removed and granted only for approved changes and incidents.
All written code and script must be written properly. There is no such thing as secure code, only code the works correctly and does not create vulnerabilities.

Treadstone 71 2017 Intelligence Training Courses – Sign up now or inquire about how to have us come onto your site to training.

9. All operating systems will be shipped closed and installed closed with a risk rating system for each port, protocol, and/or service. Each modification reduces the security posture of the operating system providing a risk score while automatically offering advice on how to remediate that score with other controls.

10. New regulations to enforce security and privacy, demanding disclosure of breaches, fining companies and individuals for negligence are put in place, at once.

11. Vendors posting adversary IoCs, TTPs, and other methods that would normally be seen as ‘telling the enemy what we know, i.e., sedition’ will be fined for such activity.

12. You will tell yourselves over and over again that contracting with Treadstone 71 to build your cyber intelligence strategy and program is the absolute right thing to do (repeat after me …).

Merry Cyber Christmas from Treadstone 71

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