Russian Cybersecurity Sorely Lacking

In Their Words - A roadmap for targeting RU Systems 10/2023Department of the Federal Service forHeads of organizationsFederal DistrictMerah0 security of the Federation's infrastructure to improve the Russian information. An analysis of information about threats to information security, carried out by specialists from the FSTEC of Russia in the current situation, shows that foreign hacker groups are exploiting software vulnerabilities when carrying out computer attacks on the information infrastructure of the Russian Federation. activelyIn order…

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When the threat actor and victim agree and other reports on Iranian Offensive Cyber

Iranian Offensive Cyber, and When the threat actor and victim agree The transfer of 50 TB data would not be possible remotely – and on a filtered network such as that of Iran. Iran's official news agency IRNA downplayed the attack, quoting the spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who denied the breach. Download the report Of note on the sheer size of this hack. The normal Internet download speed of Iranian is 11.8…

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When the Threat Actor and the Victim Agree

When the Threat Actor and the Victim Agree Iran has a longstanding history of engaging in cybersecurity attacks, and according to some statistics, ranks fifth among nations known for targeting their adversaries through cyber warfare. Over the years, Iran has unleashed hacker groups against various countries, with little regard to the potential risks to its own internal security systems. This paradox is evident: despite its aggressive cyber offense, Iran has failed to adequately safeguard its…

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Treadstone 71 Online Courses

Online Courses  (www.cyberinteltrainingcenter.com) Advanced Cyber Intelligence Tradecraft Advanced Strategic Intelligence Analysis Adversary Targeting Analytic Writing (Reporting and Briefs) Aspects of Disinformation Basic Cyber Intelligence Tradecraft Big Five in Cyber Intelligence Certified Cyber Counterintelligence Analyst Cialdini's Principles in Influence Operations Cognitive Warfare Definitions Part 1 Collection Management Color Revolutions - Cognitive Warfare Conspiracy Theories Critical Thinking and Cognitive Bias for Cyber Intelligence Cyber Cointelpro Dirty Tricks in CounterIntelligence and Deception Intelligence Requirements Intermediate Cyber Intelligence Tradecraft…

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Lab Dookhtegan Reconstitutes after IRGC / MOIS Lies are bought

The new Telegram site is: https://t.me/LabDookhtegan_Channel Sign up! Salam,In recent days, the bastards of the Islamic Republic tried to stop our activities and made our channel unavailable. All they did against us in the last 4 years of our activity was to remove our channel from reach 😂 but we do not hesitate. We, the LabDookhtegan group, will continue our activities with as much strength as possible for the purpose of overthrowing the Islamic Republic.If…

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Cyber war – large-scale destruction without the use of military force

Cyber war has the potential of large-scale destruction without the use of military force and can be used without an official declaration of war. As a strong current, the "soft" paradox is a good guide to dealing with hybrid threats and hybrid warfare and its responses and countermeasures, as well as resilience and vulnerability. https://cybershafarat.com/2023/02/18/cognitive-warfighter/ To achieve success, one cannot focus only on difficult defense or security issues and only look for war. This can…

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#Prigozhin tells tales of Perkov’s son’s #Wagner service

Continuing the Fractured Fairy Tale, the Chef positions himself as an 'everyman for the Motherland." Part of his plan for the Russian Presidency while including Peskov. Prigozhin about the service of Peskov's son in the Wagner PMC hoping to drive conscription. 1. I applied to Wagner for an attack aircraft. It was assigned to the Hurricane MLRS loaders of the artillery battalion of the Wagner PMC since my daddy did not want me on the…

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Limitations of the Cognitive Domain?

https://cybershafarat.com/2023/04/11/65021/ The cognitive domain should not be limited to influencing information operations, social engineering and the conceptual approach of "controlling hearts and minds," but should include all domains in which there is a possibility of ideological attacks. https://cybershafarat.com/2023/04/22/miami-cyber-cognitive-warfighter-training/ The corruption of the mind is not just the public but cyber functions since these groups are now on the front lines. One problem is the lack of realization by organizations that this is a fact. We…

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Cyber Cognitive Warfighter Training with Open AI / ChatGPT functions

Intelligence Tradecraft Operator - Cyber Cognitive Warfighter Training - New York City Jun 12-16 OPSEC methods, online anonymity, persona creation, secure browser configuration with no verified leaks. OSINT and Darknet searching, Social media searches and collection, Personality identification using Myers-Briggs, the Big 5, the Dark Triad/Pitch Black Tetrad, the Psychological Techniques of the Seven Radicals, and the Nine Enneagram Type. Methods and TTPs of cyber HUMINT tactics, campaign development, management, and execution. // Adversary targeting…

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Kim Zetter Post on Zarya

We have seen Zarya discuss critical infrastructure hacks as well as confirm control over ICS. In their own words from November 2022: https://zetter.substack.com/p/leaked-pentagon-document-claims-russian This is not a shift in their actions as Radware states. This is only the awareness of their full capabilities Treadstone 71 Russian Cyber Warfare Actors and Groups-Class-SignDownload Russian hackers gained access to several factories, power plants and providers in Ukraine. They also penetrated the networks of critical infrastructure facilities and can…

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How Russia Sees It – Information Diversions Ukraine

INFORMATION DIVERSIONS IN THE CONFLICT IN UKRAINE To identify and classify the forms and methods of information warfare in the modern conflict in Ukraine (in the context of the war in Ukraine). Procedures and methods. The study was carried out using the methods of analysis, synthesis, generalization and interpretation of the results. Results. The forms and methods of conducting information warfare in Ukraine under the conditions of the war (strategic information operations, special propaganda, fakes…

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OPSEC for OSINT The Cyber Cognitive Warfighter Training Course

Intelligence Tradecraft Operator – OPSEC for OSINT, The Cyber Cognitive Warfighter US dates and locations WashingtonMay 1-5 MiamiMay 15-19 New York City June 12-16 ChicagoJuly 17-21 SeattleAugust 7-11 Los AngelesSeptember 11-15 Dallas October 30-November 3 Orlando December 4-8 Cognitive Warfare Training The weaponization of information influences your thoughts and how you perceive content. Learn to recognize it and prevent it. Unlike conventional wars where the invading army can be seen in different streets and passages, preparation for a…

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Cogito ergo vinco: I think, therefore I win – Treadstone 71 Referenced in Russian KCPN Conference

Treadstone 71 Cognitive Warfare Training - Recognized by Russian philosophers, political technologists, media managers, producers, journalists and TV presenters, military correspondents, bloggers, volunteers and organizers of assistance to the front, designers and artists, writers, poets and musicians, sociologists and psychologists.On March 11, 2023, the Skolkovo Technopark will host a forum dedicated to information and cognitive warfare technologies.The organizers of the event are the Novorossia Aid Coordination Center (KCPN), Alexander Lyubimov and Alexei Chadayev , a…

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OPSEC a Critical Requirement for Open-Source and Dark Net Collection

HALF MOON BAY, Calif., March 7, 2023 (SEND2PRESS NEWSWIRE) — Treadstone 71, LLC, the source for cyber intelligence, counterintelligence, hybrid, and cognitive warfare, announces new courses and services. “Targeted adversary data collection creates significant risk when seeking relevant information not available from threat intelligence feeds. Our operational security (OPSEC) training courses reduce risk to negligible levels that risk and legal departments find acceptable,” asserted Jeff Bardin, Chief Intelligence Officer at Treadstone 71. “We assess and…

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Cognitive Warfare

In some, closed jurisdictions have developed very effective ways to impose and maintain persistent forms of "informational dominance" to gain the upper hand in digital penetration wars. In some closed regimes, authoritarian leaders ensure that their preferred narrative dominates public perceptions by dominating the media, censoring and silencing independent voices, and eliminating political dissent. Coercion and judicial injunctions are created, resulting in a nationally coordinated filter bubble in which the government decides what information its…

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Prigozhin Speaks Q&A

#1258 We publish a request from journalist Ekaterina Lushnikova and the answer: Hello,According to the US government, about 30,000 fighters have died in the ranks of the Wagner PMC since the beginning of the JMD.How could you comment on this information, is it true?If not, how many dead and wounded in the ranks of the PMC "Wagner" really?How many were shot or beaten with a sledgehammer for treason and desertion? https://cybershafarat.com/2023/02/22/lack-of-artillery-shells-determines-squabbles-and-capabilities-prigozhin-wagner/ We publish the commentary…

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Lack of artillery shells determines squabbles and capabilities #Prigozhin #Wagner

The conflict between Shoigu and Yevgeny Prigozhin only confirms that the situation with artillery ammunition near the ROV is getting worse and worse every day. At the same time, they leak information about deliveries and short deliveries in quite detail to assess this situation ... the Marine Corps reported that PMC "Wagner", in the Bakhmut area, from February 18 to 20 received 1660 rockets, 10171 shells for cannon artillery and mortars and 980 rounds for…

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Signposts Increase

News from the Zaporozhye direction. Many settlements of the occupied part of the Zaporozhye region (including Melitopol and the Melitopol district) not a single institution is working from tomorrow. The Russians have closed everything since February 22. Poland has closed the last border crossing point for trucks with Belarus. Intelligence that shows Russian Federation is preparing to Capture the International Airport in the Moldavian Capital of Chișinău. Russia is preparing to select full-time students for…

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OSINT and Darknet Risk Reduction Through OPSEC

Treadstone 71 developed a course that greatly reduces corporate exposure and risk during passive collection operations. Shrink your threat intelligence feed costs and remove non-relevant data before it clutter your TIP and inbox. The course focuses on reducing your exposure & risk. #OPSEC #Browser configurations, container builds, extension/add-in selection and use, leak testing, #Darknet and #OSINT discovery, data provenance, and passively collection. Reduce your data feed costs dramatically. Get the data and information you need.…

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Artificial intelligence on guard of Russian borders Radar-IQ

Russian programmers have created the first and so far the only security system in the world that works with the help of a neural network. According to the idea of the creators of the system, HD-cameras will stand on the border with Ukraine and, in a matter of seconds, calculate the drones of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and saboteurs. https://cybershafarat.com/2023/02/20/osint-and-darknet-risk-reduction-through-opsec/ According to the developers, Radar-IQ is not afraid of extreme and disgusting weather, works…

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Cognitive Warfighter

OPSEC methods, online anonymity, persona creation, secure browser configuration with no verified leaks. OSINT and Darknet searching, Social media searches and collection, Personality identification using Myers-Briggs, the Big 5, the Dark Triad/Pitch Black Tetrad, the Psychological Techniques of the Seven Radicals, and the Nine Enneagram Type. Methods and TTPs of cyber HUMINT tactics, campaign development, management, and execution. // Adversary targeting with cyber D3A/F3EAD, PIRs, OSINT, Darknet. // Information warfare, counterintelligence deception methods, Russian/Chinese/Iranian Cyber…

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Certification – Cyber Cognitive Warfare – Washington DC Dulles March 20-24

Cyber Cognitive Warfighter Training March 20-24 // Monday-Thursday 7:45-5 PM, Friday 7:45-3 PM. Washington Dulles Airport Marriott Students must maintain operational security of their Internet searches (Internet and Darknet) since we perform extensive research during class time. VPNs are needed and we do provide preferred VPN lists. We cover persona creation, alignment to intelligence requirements, rules of engagement for passive collection, persona character archetypes, and AI content fillers. Course lectures demonstrate browser setup (extensions/plug-ins/add-ins) for operational…

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FSB Members data UPDATED Again April 25, 2023

New files for download Full name, Date of birth, Place of birth, Passport, Date of issue, Issuing authority, Authority code, Registration address, Authority, Previous address, Special marks, SIGNATURE, Debts, Air tickets, Credits, Sim-cards, modems , Motor transport, System number, Sign "sold earlier" https://anonfiles.com/jb4ex6nbzb/FSB_ziphttps://anonfiles.com/jb4ex6nbzb/FSB_zip https://cybershafarat.com/2023/04/24/putin-appoints-tucker-carlson-chief-of-the-general-staff/ PW: RUdataantiZ https://anonfiles.com/Mc86x4n7z5/RU_7zhttps://anonfiles.com/Mc86x4n7z5/RU_7z wp-1681405748044Download wp-1681405748078Download wp-1681405748070Download ФСБ_listDownload https://cybershafarat.com/2023/02/20/osint-and-darknet-risk-reduction-through-opsec/ База_номеров_руководства_и_элиты_РФ_5000Download wp-1681305812929Download wp-1681305812946Download wp-1681305812962Download wp-1681305812890Download wp-1681305812835Download wp-1681305812857Download wp-1681305812872Download wp-1681305812911Download wp-1681305838148Download Ф.И.О., Дата рождения, Место рождения, Паспорт, Дата выдачи, Орган выдачи, Код органа, Адрес…

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FSB Data Dump – IPs, Email, Names, Phones

Atlantis Cyber Army & RoughSec Cyber Squad denis_romanchenko@yahoo.de (Денис Сергеевич Романченко) socialka777@gmail.com (Наталья Николаевна Зубарева) guggaa@gmail.com (Роман Масалёв )phone: 7(911)4023284 shaboldin@gmail.com ( Алексей Алексей ) helenka070186@gmail.com (Елена Владимировна Дюбилина) pavel.v.baranov@gmail.com (Павел Владимирович Баранов) dmitro.gadomskiy@Arzinger.ua (Дмитрий Гадомский) pwwebb@debevois.com (Филипп Вильям Вэбб) mkaarbitr7@gmail.com (Александр Владимирович Панюшов) olga.korneeva@hp.com (Ольга Николаевна Корнеева) m.semenyako@hlbprime.com (Максим Евгеньевич Семеняко) Anton.Klyachin@salomons.com (Антон Борисович Клячин) kolosov.e.s@gmail.com (Евгений Колосов) dn.fremm@gmail.com (Дмитрий Сергеевич Некрестьянов) ava.heta@gmail.com (Сергей Иванович Илларионов) lawgroup@i.ua (Вадим Петрович Шпачук) rom.work@yahoo.com (Роман Олегович Кузнецов)…

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Cuban mercenaries appeared at the positions of Russian troops – #passports #Ukraine

Cuban mercenaries appeared at the positions of Russian troops, who signed a contract with the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation through the Military Commissariat of Tula and other cities. InformNapalm wrote about the hacking of mailboxes of the Tula military commission with documents of a whole group of Cuban mercenaries in September, and the second part - in October. After the public outcry, the Cuban authorities announced that they had allegedly blocked the…

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Maxim Okks, “civilian” commander of IL-76 aircraft of sanctioned airline Aviakon Cytotrans

The international intelligence community InformNapalm conducted an investigation into the contents of the mailbox of Maxim Okks, the former military and now "civilian" commander of the IL-76 aircraft of the sanctioned airline Aviakon Cytotrans, hacked by the Cyber Resistance team. Ukrainian hacktivists of the Cyber Resistance group handed over to InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community exclusive data from the mailbox of Maxim Okss, a former air force officer and now a “civilian” pilot in command of…

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"ATESH" conducted a raid on the rear of the Rashists in the Saki region During the reconnaissance, several hidden places of temporary enemy deployment, engineering structures, and air defense deployments were discovered. Near the village Vitino and Molochnoe are the bases of the occupiers. A lot of Russian personnel and equipment were discovered. Fortifications are being built along the coast. The perimeter of the territory is patrolled by armed soldiers. Coordinates: 45.218544, 33.140802 45.20157, 33.15314…

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Chamrosh vertical launch drone 4

During the visit of Major General Mousavi, the commander in chief of the army, to the exhibition of scientific and technological achievements of the Air Force, the Chamrosh 4 vertical launch drone was unveiled. This drone with vertical launch capability can easily fly from all types of naval vessels and carry out assigned missions.

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Unmanned aerial vehicle of the army navy – Iran

Unmanned aerial vehicle of the army navyThis unmanned and remote-controlled vessel has the ability to identify, discover, and destroy anchor and sleeper mines, and it also has the ability to carry cargo to clear and destroy mines.The ROV float can operate up to 200 meters deep and also has 24 hours of continuous navigation and is used to destroy all kinds of sea mines.

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Russian Losses

Losses of Russia on 02.12.2023Approximate assessment of the Armed Forces from 02/24/2022🪖 Personnel losses: 331110 ( +1,070 )injured: ~990.120* ( +3210 )captured: ~600* ( 0 )🚛 Military equipment: 42486 ( +60 )Armored combat vehicles: 10385 ( +13 )Tanks: 5571 ( +7 )Cannons: 7941 ( +10 )Airplanes: 323 ( 0 )Helicopters: 324 ( 0 )RSZV: 913 ( +1 )Air defense means: 602 ( 0 )Automotive equipment and tanks: 10410 ( +11 )BpLA OTR: 5994 ( +18…

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10 SHAHEDS AND ONE X-59 DESTROYED

On the night of December 2, 2023, the enemy attacked with 11 "Shahed" type UAVs from Cape Chauda (Crimea) and a guided air missile from the airspace of the occupied Zaporizhzhia region. As a result of combat operations, the air defense of the Defense Forces of Ukraine destroyed 10 "Shahed-136/131" attack UAVs within the Odesa region and one Kh-59 guided air missile in the Dnipropetrovsk region.

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