Treadstone 71 Cyber Intelligence Subscription Program

The Cyber Intelligence 12-Month Online Subscription Program is designed to guide organizations in their cyber and threat intelligence program builds through online lectures, demonstrations, and templates covering a wide range of topics. After years of teaching intelligence courses and delivering intelligence programs to clients, Treadstone 71 now offers the subscription-based, automated program guiding clients through the strategic planning process, goals and objectives creation, maturity assessment, SOP development, threat intelligence platform selection, collection planning, intelligence analysis, analytic writing, and dissemination non-inclusively.

The program includes instructional videos tied to content with periodic direct access to Treadstone 71 for client deliverable reviews. The reviews follow a standard cycle including comments, suggestions, recommendations, and examples of previously finished products. Treadstone71 also offers regular ‘professor’ office hours for Q&A.

The program follows proven methods established over the years while creating intelligence programs. Clients move at a regular pace that corresponds with their internal schedules that Treadstone 71 helps to establish with the client. Clients may choose the entire subscription package or choose modules ala-cart. The subscription also includes the standard Cyber Intelligence Tradecraft Certification training and adds a new module assisting clients with the creation of table-top exercises.

An overview of some of the subscription content follows:

  • Strategic Plan development, acceptance, and dissemination
  • Mission
  • Vision
  • Guiding Principles
  • Roles and Responsibilities
  • Goals and Objectives
  • Roadmap
  • Cyber Intelligence Capability Maturity Model Assessment
  • Standard operating procedures
  •               RACI(S)
  •               Process flow diagrams
  •               Associated metrics
  •               Peer Reviews
  • Intelligence Functions
  • Communications, Responsibilities, Methods
  • Practices and Activities
  • Organizational interfaces
  • SOC and IR
  • Other intelligence groups
  • CISO/CSO and CIO
  • C-Suite
  • Department leadership
  • External groups
  •                            Vendors
  • Cyber Intelligence Lifecycle definition
  • Stakeholder Analysis
  • Collection Planning
  • Production
  • Structured analytic techniques
  • Analysis
  • Analytic Writing
  • Reporting and Briefing
  • Dissemination
  • Intelligence Information Sharing
  •               Enterprise objectives
  •               Communities of Interest
  •               Your internal ISAC
  • Threat Intelligence Platforms
  •               RFP and Selection process
  •               Maturation
  •               Vendor data feeds
  • Training and Knowledge Transfer
  •               Cyber Intelligence Tradecraft Certification
  •                            In-person
  •                            8-week online
  • Treadstone 71 Onsite Assessment and Assistance

Clients subscribing to the program create program content undergoing Treadstone 71 review prior to leadership delivery. The intent is to share our vast expertise in cyber intelligence to assist organizations in the timely building of their programs. Clients may choose to extend their program beyond a year or accelerate their program based upon their acceptance of agreed upon assumptions and requirements. Clients have the ability to speed up or slow down their programs throughout the subscription.

Mixmatch

We see this model as an effective and efficient way to extend our knowledge, share our standards-based program information while setting up an industry model rooted in intelligence community tradecraft. That tradecraft follows the International Association for Intelligence Education Standards for Intelligence Analyst Initial Training, intelligence community directives (ICDs), content from the Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis and Mercyhurst University as well as boots on the ground experience.

What do you have at the end of the program?

As clients carefully follow the training, timelines, and execute to the deliverables internally, clients will have built a complete cyber threat intelligence program. The program definition, strategy, policies, procedures, process flow diagrams, roles, responsibilities, templates, models, methods, tactics, techniques, reports, dissemination models, briefings, table-top exercises, as well as certified Cyber Intelligence Tradecraft professionals are all core components of the what clients achieve.

Our pricing model will be a fixed price for the core modules with add-on modules priced separately. Treadstone 71 onsite work options will be clear and defined with the ability of clients to purchase onsite and online ‘office hours’ over and above hours provided in the core modules. Clients will have the choice of selecting from several options.

For more information about this new program, contact Treadstone 71 at 888.714.0071 or info@treadstone71.com. We will respond to all inquiries as long as they are from corporate and business accounts.

Copyright 2018 Treadstone 71 LLC

Gerasimov Doctrine in Full Swing against the US

The Gerasimov Doctrine is in use in the United States and will come to another crescendo in the near future as our 2018 elections come to bear. Learn how to identify some of the methods when they occur.  #education #cyber #training #intelligence #intel #analysis#collection #elections #analysts #doctrine #intelligencecollection#intelligenceanalysis #gerasimov #putin #russia #olgino

How to help identify propaganda coming from any source. Gerasimov Doctrine in action in the United States.

Where does the speaker or group get their funding? What is their background?

Who are their main supporters?

Does the content have a strong emotional aspect?

Do they provide or describe ominous, stirring, or patriotic images or music?

Do they associate a group, person, event, or idea with something hated or feared?

Do they use slogans of any type that have been heard before and repeated?

Do they use virtue words (e.g. peace, happiness, security, wise leadership, freedom, liberty)?

Is their reasoning poor?

·      Illogical or non-intuitive relationships between concepts

·      Sweeping conclusions from mere anecdotal evidence

·      Issues framed to favor one point of view while deflecting and pivoting

·      Irrelevant or questionable data

·      Vague, undefined terms and concepts

Do you see evidence of false or missing information (telling only half of the story)?

Is there oversimplification?

·      Simple answers to complex social and political questions

·      Blame assigned to an individual or group (scapegoating) without evidence

·      Misleading stereotypes or labels

·      Blanket statements

Is the aim of the article to persuade?

·      Cites or associates prominent figures to a position, idea, argument, or action

·      Repeats ideas until they are accepted as truth

·      Presents ideas as the view of the majority (so get on the bandwagon – wake up)

·      Implies that opposition (to the author’s premise) would be unpatriotic, undemocratic, or inhumane

Does it align information that is not objective and is used primarily to influence an audience and further an agenda? Are facts presented selectively to encourage a particular synthesis or perception or using loaded language to produce an emotional rather than a rational response to the information that is presented. Are the contents associated with material prepared by adversarial governments while ignoring the issues associated with those they support?

Influence operations are focused on affecting the feelings and behaviors of leaders, groups, or entire populations. Influence operations employ capabilities to affect behaviors, protect programs that support their intent, and project false information interspersed with some accurate data to achieve desired effects across the cognitive domain. Influence operations are the coordinated, integrated, and synchronized application of national diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and other capabilities in peacetime, crisis, conflict, and post-conflict to foster attitudes, behaviors, or decisions by US citizens driven by foreign entities bent on creating chaos.

Biases are systematic errors in judgment that human beings consistently make, and our adversaries continue to use against the US populace. Here are 10 that help explain why we will never stop falling for their propaganda and methods to ensure chaos in our society:

1.     Bias blind spot — the tendency not to compensate for one’s own cognitive biases. (This is why nobody thinks they’re biased)

2.     Third-person effect- Belief that mass communicated media messages have a greater effect on others than on themselves. (This is why propaganda is so effective. It does not affect me!)

3.     Authority bias — The tendency to attribute greater accuracy to the opinion of an authority figure (unrelated to its content) and be more influenced by that opinion. (This is why some of Trump’s supporters believe everything he says no matter what)

4.     Declinism – The belief that a society or institution is tending towards decline. Particularly, it is the predisposition to view the past favorably and future negatively. (This is why ‘Make America Great Again’ was such an effective message)

5.     Confirmation bias — the tendency to search for or interpret information in a way that confirms one’s preconceptions. (This is why people click on fake news they want to be true)

6.     Bandwagon effect — The tendency to believe things because many other people believe the same. (This is why people believe fake news shared by their friends)

7.     Availability cascade — A self-reinforcing process in which a collective belief gains more and more plausibility through its increasing repetition in public discourse. (This is why fake news become true the more it is shared)

8.     Continued influence effect — The tendency to believe previously learned misinformation even after it has been corrected. (This is why Hillary’s ‘formal accusation’ had such a big effect even after Comey dropped charges)

9.     Hostile media effect — the tendency to perceive news coverage as biased against your position on an issue. (This is why millions of voters don’t trust the mainstream media)

10. Backfire effect — The urge to do the opposite of what someone wants you to do out of a need to resist a perceived attempt to constrain your freedom of choice. (This is why the media ganging up on Trump completely backfired)

What to learn more?

www.planetreg.com/T71IntelTraining

www.cyberinteltrainingcenter.com

www.treadstone71.com

Singapore – Cyber Intelligence Training

Cyber Intel – Brochure and Signup

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Course Brochure and Signup

Deception, Distortion, Dishonesty: The Real Story Behind the Hype – RSA Conference 2018 – San Francisco

Dr. Khatuna Mshvidobadze

In the summer of 2008, Russia attacked Georgia in the first-ever combined kinetic and cyberwar. Sure, the 1990-1991 Gulf War was dubbed the first information war—the use 226571794ecbc84a4232f3e9a42a7041-480x270of information in war is not new. What was new in 2008 was that Russia employed its cyber arm as an independent operational capability alongside its land, sea and air forces. The targets were critical infrastructure. The strategic objectives were to sap Georgia’s will to resist and to provide cover for Russia’s information campaign to deceive the west into believing that somehow little Georgia was the aggressor.

Operational security was paramount—Moscow had to keep everyone confounded about who was behind the cyber attacks. Just like the kinetic invasion, the cyber attacks were long and well-planned, but Russia did a great job covering its tracks. When the shooting stopped, well-meaning researchers investigated what had happened. However, coming from a profession that focuses on computer screens and a culture unaccustomed to the 2018-04-11_9-18-09kind of deception that is part of everyday Russian life, they foundered.

The attacks led us to Russia. We noted uncanny timing. Western experts were indeed confounded when the trail led to kids and criminals. I have been following that trail ever since. Insight into Russia, all-source intelligence and a keen understanding of denial and deception were needed.

Today, saying that the Russian state employs a network of cybercriminals to do its online dirty work is commonplace. One might just as well pretend not to know the identity of those little green men who seized Crimea. But when I started saying it in 2010, you would not believe the resistance I encountered.

Soon after, I met Jeff Bardin, my professor at Utica College, who became mentor and friend. Jeff brings an extraordinary expertise in all-source intelligence and the ways of denial and deception. At this year’s RSA Conference, it is my privilege to combine with him in a talk entitled Deception, Distortion, Dishonesty: The Real Story Behind the Hype.

Jeff will lead off, analyzing the types of D&D, its various dimensions and some tactics that can be employed online and offline. The planners, he will say, must have clear reasons for utilizing D&D based on their goals. They must define the strategic, operational and tactical goals of deception and the criteria for success.

I will point out that Russians do not see cyber warfare as distinct but regard it as just one tool of information war. Look at 2008. The cyber attacks aimed at hampering the Georgian government’s ability to communicate while Moscow’s propaganda machine painted Russia as the aggrieved party. “Information space opens wide asymmetrical possibilities for reducing the fighting potential of an enemy,” writes Valery Vasilyevich Gerasimov, Chief of the Russian General Staff. It’s a remarkable statement, but nothing new—Russian thinking on information warfare has been consistent since the 1980s.

Now, the Kremlin commands a vast network of online intelligence agencies, scientific organizations, academic institutions, criminals, and trolls. We’ll discuss how Russia deals with enemies, foreign and domestic, cyber players and organization, the growing role of the military, tactics, techniques, procedures and tools, vectors, false flags, troll factories and more. Come join us on Wednesday at the RSA Conference.

KM

Treadstone 71 Selected to Deliver at the RSA Conference 2018 San Francisco

Foundations for a Strong Intelligence Program
April 18, 9AM-11AM RSA Conference
This Lab will explore key aspects of building a strong and long-lasting cyberthreat intelligence program. We’ll review methods of threat intelligence platform selection and bake-off techniques as well as cover stakeholder analysis and priority intelligence requirements. Additionally, we’ll practice collection planning and mission management as well as how to establish effective reporting and dissemination capabilities.

rsa2018
Cyber CounterIntelligence – Deception, Distortion, Dishonesty
April 18, 1:45PM-2:30PM RSA Conference
Deception, distortion, dishonesty are core to social media postings. Our adversaries use these methods concocting stories that create illusions that are meant to leave us divided. The talk will cover methods of countering their messaging while applying these tactics to protect your own organization and brand. Moving from intelligence to counterintelligence is the natural next step in our evolution.

Plague of the Cyber RATS

How a toxic computer code delivered by ‘Remote Access Trojans’ is an invisible army able to take over a petrochemical plant and blow it to pieces

Ironically, said Bardin, it was Stuxnet that led Iran to enhance its offensive capability: ‘If Stuxnet had happened to the US or UK, it would have been seen as an act of war. In Iran, it made them invest heavily in offensive cyber operations.’

He revealed that 18 per cent of Iranian university students are studying computer science – a cyber warfare talent pool.

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5404055/How-hackers-using-RAT-malware-seized-petrochemical-site.html

No guns. No bombs. No conventional weapons of any kind. An invisible army able take over a petrochemical plant like this and blow it to pieces. That’s the power of a toxic computer code delivered by RATs – ‘Remote Access Trojans’ – that’s making UK security experts VERY nervous indeed

‘Fixing this takes political will, and business is always pushing back, because good cyber security adds costs,’ said Bardin. ‘Ultimately, something is going to blow up.’

Zapad Exercises – 2nd/3rd Order Effects

 

The recent Russian Zapad wargaming exercises included a plethora of electronic capabilities demonstration and potentially more. Russia is known to recently been involved in illegal immigration efforts in Sweden, Finland, and Norway along with hostile intent along its northern borders (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) including cell/communication tower tampering. Could the recent Zapad exercises be more than just wargaming?

Some What If thoughts on these non-linear actions:

– Testing capabilities, distance, strength, impacts
– Testing responses like a stone in pond
    – 2nd and 3rd order effects were measured to determine the impact on targets, targets responses, etc.
    – Russians had people in each target country assisting with target impacts
    – Russians monitored target government communications from within each country
    – Determine length of time for target government to respond and what methods were used and where to get communications back online (if at all) – the locations of the response represent capabilities unknown to Russia until such an exercise is performed
– Other possibles:
     – A cover for illegal activities that occurred during the exercise – a feint, a ruse
 – Testing a precursor to actual execution – that is why military exercises are performed
 – What capabilities are being left in the exercise areas; what is not being removed after the exercise using the exercise as a ruse to place assets close to Western borders that were not there before
 What do you think?
 https://uawire.org/news/media-belarusian-and-russian-militaries-are-jamming-mobile-communications-along-border-with-poland

Drone Wars! Threats, Vulnerabilities and Hostile Use

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Adamy, D. (2009) EW 103 Tactical Battlefield Communications Electronic Warfare, Boston: Artech House.

Adamy, D. (2015) EW 104 EW against a New Generation of Threats, Boston: Artech House.

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Anonymous, (9/8/2017) Innovation: Simulating GPS Signals, GPS World, http://gpsworld.com/simulating-gps-signals/

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Atayero, A.A, Luka, .K. & Alatishe, A.A (8/2011) Satellite Link Design: A Tutorial, International Journal of Electrical & Computer Sciences, IJECS-IJEND Vol: 11 No: 04.

Balduzzi, M., Wilhoit, K., & Pasta, A. (2014) A Security Evaluation of AIS, Trend Micro Forward-Looking Threat Research

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Buesne, G & DeSanto, D. (2017) GNSS Receivers and the Cyber-Threat: Lessons from the Information Security Community, Spirent Communications, Baltimore, MD

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Crosby, J. (12/16/2017) here’s What USNS Bowditch Does, Inverse Innovation, https://www.inverse.com/article/25346-usns-bowditch-underwater-drone-stolen-china

Demchak, C., Patton, K, T. & Tangredi, S.J. (8/25/2017) why are our Ships Crashing? Competence, Overload, and Cyber Considerations, Center for International Maritime Security. https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/08/25/why_are_our_ships_crashing_competence_overload_and_cyber_considerations_112152.html

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Gaertner, U (2013) UAV Swarm Tactics: An Agent-Based Simulation and Markov Process Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School Thesis.

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Hodge, H. (8/23/2017) why are Navy Ships colliding in the Pacific? Experts Weigh In, Military.com

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Hurley, M. (9/2017) Beyond the Iron Triad: The Future of Airborne C2ISR, Arlington, VA: Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies.

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Humphreys, T.E, (7/18/2012) Statement on the Vulnerability of Civil Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Other Systems to Civil GPS Spoofing, Submitted to the Subcommittee on Oversight., Investigations, and Management of the House Committee on Homeland Security.

Kao, Lee, Chang, and Ko. (2007) A Fuzzy Logic Method for Collision Avoidance in Vessel Traffic Service, Journal of Navigation, 60, 17-31.

John, E.N & Schrage, D.P (2017) System Integration and Operation of a Research Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, Atlanta GA: School of Aerospace Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology.

LaGrone, S. (8/21/2017) Chain of Events Involving U.S Navy Warships in the Western Pacific Raise Readiness, Training Questions, USNI News

LaGrone, S. (1/31/2017) Cruiser USS Antietam Runs Aground in Tokyo Bay, Spills Oil, USNI News.

Mccaslin, I.B. (2017) Red Drones Over Disputed Seas: A Field Guide to Chinese UAVs/UCAVs Operating in the disputed East and South China Seas. Project 2049 Institute.  http://project2049.net/documents/Red%20Drones%20Over%20Disputed%20Seas_PLA_Project2049.pdf

News Correspondent, (8/22/2017) USS McCain crash is 4th Navy Accident in Pacific this Year, The Washington Post, AP.

News Correspondent, (8/31/2017) DDG 51 Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer, Military.com

News Correspondent, (8/21/2017) CNO Orders Operational Pause, Review After Latest Ship Collision, Military.com

News Correspondent, (8/21/2017) 10 Sailors Missing, 5 injured after Destroyer Collides with Tanker, Military.com

News Correspondent, (8/22/2017) Remains of Navy Sailors found on USS John S McCain, Military.com

News Correspondent, (8/17/2017) Navy Fires Commander, XO from USS Fitzgerald for Fatal Collision, Military.com

News Correspondent, (7/21/2017) Investigation Faults Navy in Fitzgerald Collision Report, Military.com

News Correspondent, (6/20/2017) Stories of Fitzgerald Sailors Killed in Destroyer – Container Ship Crash, Military.com

News Correspondent, (6/16/2017) US Navy Destroyer Collides with Japanese Merchant Ship, Military.com

News Correspondent, (5/09/2017) US Navy Ship Collides with South Korean Fishing Boat, Military.com

News Correspondent, (1/31/2017) Oil Spill in Tokyo Bay After Navy Cruiser Runs Aground, Military.com

Nichols, R.K (8/31/2017) Stand By for a whole slew of military short articles on the Navy Collisions (my students only), Private memo to COT799 & CMST 455.

Nichols, R.K. & Lekkas, P.L. (2002) Wireless Security: Threats, Models, Solutions, New York, McGraw Hill.

O’Donnell, W. (2017) Interview with Navy Captain. http://inmilitary.com/real-reason-us-navy-keeps-hitting-merchant-vessels/

Ranganathan, A, et.al, SPREE A Spoofing Resistant GPS Receiver, Department of Computer Science, ETH Zurich, Switzerland, Zurich Information Security and Privacy Center.

Richardson, J. Adm., (8/31/2017) No Evidence of Hacking in McCain and Fitzgerald Collisions, Military.com

Rudow, l. (2014) Where to Mount a Radome for best Performance, Boat US, http://www.boatus.com/magazine/2014/june/mounting-a-radome.asp

Schallhorn, K., (9/1/2017) US Military crashes, collisions in the Pacific, FoxNews. http://www.foxnews.com/us/2017/08/28/us-military-crashes-collisions-in-pacific.html

Schmidt, D.et.al., (5/2016) A Survey and Analysis of the GNSS Spoofing Threat and Countermeasures, ACM Computing Surveys, Vol 48, No 4, Article 64

Sickle, J.V. (8/25/2017) GEOG 862 GPS and GNSS for Geospatial Professionals, Lessons 1-10 complete, Penn State University, College of Earth and Mineral Sciences  https://www.e-education.psu.edu/geog862/node/1407 [ Superb Course on the subject]

Sterling, J. 8/21/2017) A Spate of US Navy warship accidents in Asia since January, CNNNEWS. http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/21/politics/navy-ships-accidents/index.html

Tucker, P., e. al. (9/2017) Beyond GPS: Upgrading the Military’s Navigation-and-timing Backbone, Defense One, e-Book.

Volpe, J.A, (8/29/2001) Vulnerability Assessment of the Transportation Infrastructure Relying on the Global Positioning System, Final Report, Office of Assistant Secretary for Transportation Policy, U.S. Department of Transportation, John A Volpe Transportation Systems Center.

Warner, J.S. % Johnson, R.G. (2013) A Simple Demonstration That the Global Positioning System (GPS) is Vulnerable to Spoofing, Journal of Security Administration, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/8ddb/89f56dd3e2ae265047822bc47cfb06815d9a.pdf, LAUR-03-6163.

Warner, J.S. % Johnson, R.G. (2003) GPS Spoofing Countermeasures, Journal of Security Administration, LAUR-03-2384, Los Alamos, NM:  Los Alamos National Laboratory

Weise, E. (8/23/2017) Could Hackers Be Behind The U.S. Navy Collisions? USATODAY.

Patents

Berry, R. & Cook, C. (2016) Detection of wireless data jamming and spoofing, US 9466881 B1

 

Blogs

Banggood Blog (9/14/2017) Whats the difference between RHCP and LHCP antennae?     https://blog.banggood.com/rhcp-and-lhcp-whats-the-difference-29046.html

King Blog (9/14/2017) what is the difference between Azimuth and Elevation? https://kingconnect.com/what-is-the-difference-between-azimuth-and-elevation/

Mike Willis Blog (9/13/2017) Propagation. http://www.mike-willis.com/Tutorial/propagation.html

Law and Cyber Warfare Blog. Groll, E. (2017) Investigating if Destroyer Crash was Caused by a Cyber Attack, http://www.jlcw.org/u-s-navy-investigating-if-destroyer-crash-was-caused-by-cyberattack/

Wikipedia

Editor (8/31/2017) GPS Block IIIA, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GPS_Block_IIIA

Editor (9/14/2017) Circular polarization, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Circular_polarization

Editor (9/19/2017) Electromagnetic Spectrum, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electromagnetic_spectrum

Editor (9/19/2017) Continuous-wave Radar, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Continuous-wave_radar

Valery Vasilevich Gerasimov – Валерий Васильевич Герасимов

Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation / First Deputy Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation, General of the Army._64031862_gerasimov

Валерий Васильевич Герасимов

Born      8 September 1955 (age 62)

Kazan, Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic

Married – one son

Russian hackers reportedly stole NSA data via Kaspersky Lab software

http://algo.fyi/5vhjug

Born on 8 September 1955 in the city of Kazan. In 1977, he graduated from the Kazan Higher Tank Command School named after the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar ASSR (Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic). He commanded platoon, company, battalion in the Northern Group of Troops and Far Eastern Military District.

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After his graduation from the Military Academy of Armored Troops named after Marshal of the Soviet Union R.Ya. Malinovsky in the year of 1987, he served as the chief of headquarters and commander of tank regiment, the chief of headquarters of motorized rifle division in the Baltic Military District. From 1993 to 1995 — the commander of motorized rifle division in the North-Western Group of Troops.

After graduating from the Kazan Higher Tank Command School Gerasimov was the commander of a platoon, company, and battalion of the Far Eastern Military District. Later he was chief of staff of a tank regiment and then of a motorized rifle division in the Baltic Military District. From 1993 to 1995 he was the commander of the 144th Guards Motor Rifle Division in the Baltic Military District and then the North-Western Group of Forces.

After he graduated from the General Staff’s academy he was First Deputy Army Commander in the Moscow Military District and commander of the 58th Army in the North Caucasus Military District during the Second Chechen War. His involvement in the arrest of Yuri Budanov led to praise from journalist Anna Politkovskaya.

g3In 2006, he became commander of Leningrad Military District and moved to be the commander of Moscow Military District in 2009 and Central Military District in April 2012. On 23 December 2010, he became deputy Chief of the General Staff

In 1997 after his graduation from the Military Academy of the RF Armed Forces’ General Staff, he served as the First Deputy Commander of Army in the Moscow Military District, the Deputy Commander, Chief of Staff and Commander of the 58th Army in the North Caucasian Military District.

From 2003 to 2005 — the Chief of Staff of the Far Eastern Military District. From 2005 — the Chief of the Main Administration of Combat Training and Troops’ Service of the RF Armed Forces, and from December 2006 — the Chief of Staff of the North Caucasian Military District.vg4.png

In December 2006, he was assigned as the Commander of the Leningrad Military District, and in February 2009 — as the Commander of the Moscow Military District.

From December 2010 — the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

From 26 April 2012 — the Commander of the Central Military District.

Gerasimovs-linjal

03-02By the RF Presidential Decree of 9 November 2012, he has been appointed the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation / First Deputy Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation. He was appointed by President Vladimir Putin on 9 November 2012. Some authors credit Gerasimov as the person behind a so-called “Gerasimov doctrine” – currently prevalent in Russian military strategy – combining military, technological, information, diplomatic, economic, cultural and other tactics, which are then deployed towards one set of strategic objectives. This “political warfare” is preferred due to its comparatively low cost.

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The previous Chief of General Staff, Army General Nikolay Makarov, was seen as close to Serduykov and was seen by commentators as likely to be replaced by new Defence Minister Sergey Shoygu. It has been reported that Makarov resigned, but he was formally dismissed by President Vladimir Putin. Other changes were the dismissal of Alexander Sukhorukov from the position of First Deputy Defence Minister and his replacement by Colonel General Arkady Bakhin, formerly commander of the Western Military District. Aerospace Defence Forces commander Colonel General Oleg Ostapenko was also promoted to Deputy Defence Minister. He was promoted to the highest rank in the Russian Army, General of the Army as of 2014. On September 15, 2016, he and Turkish chief of staff General Hulusi Akar conducted a

03-03

meeting on the future of Syria in the Ankara headquarters of the army. That meeting will result in tightened dealings between Russia and Turkey.

There is an old Soviet-era rhetorical device that a ‘warning’ or a ‘lesson’ from some other situation is used to outline intent and plan. The way that what purports to be an after-action take on the Arab Spring so closely maps across to what was done in Ukraine is striking. Presenting the Arab Spring–wrongly–as the results of covert Western operations allows Gerasimov the freedom to talk about what he may also want to talk about: how Russia can subvert and destroy states without direct, overt and large-scale military intervention. However, the assumption that this is a Western gambit primarily does appear genuinely-held. https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war/

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In April 2014 Gerasimov was added to the list of persons against whom the European Union introduced sanctions “in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence of Ukraine.”

Hero of the Russian Federation.

Personal decorations: Order for Military Merits, Order for Merits to the Fatherland 4th grade, Order for Service to the Homeland in the USSR’s Armed Forces 3rd grade, Order of St. George 4th grade, Order for Merits to the Fatherland with Swords 3rd grade, Order for Honor.

The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness.

For me, this is probably the most important line in the whole piece, so allow me to repeat it: The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness. In other words, this is an explicit recognition not only that all conflicts are actually means to political ends–the actual forces used are irrelevant–but that in the modern realities, Russia must look to non-military instruments increasingly. https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war/

 https://warontherocks.com/2016/03/russian-hybrid-warfare-and-other-dark-arts/

 

 

 

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