Category: sabotage

Singapore – Cyber Intelligence Training

Cyber Intel – Brochure and Signup

Cheque: make payable to :
MaitreAllianz PteLtd
Mail to: 3 Queen’s Road, #10-163, Singapore 260003
Bank Transfer: MaitreAllianz PteLtd
United Overseas Bank Limited,
RochorRoad Branch
Account No: 147-3020-918
Swift Code: UOVBSGSG

Payment must be made in Singapore Dollars.
Payment is required within 5 working days on receipt of invoice.
Bookings received less than 14 working days –cash payment only
SUBSTITUTION, CANCELLATION, NO-SHOW, POSTPONEMENT POLICIES, CONTACT DETAILS, and EVENT CONFIRMATION
SUBSTITUTION is allowed up to 7 days before day of event. AdminCharge of S30.00 is required for substitution request received with less than 7 days advance notice.
CANCELLATION must be made in writing. Refunds are computed based on the date of receiving your notice.
Full Refund –28 days or more prior to the event
75% -21 to 27 days notice
50% -20 to 14 days notice
25% -7 to 13 days notice
NO REFUND or credit for 6 days or less notice
NO SHOW, Sick Leave, Urgent BusinessCallor Absent for any reason-the full course fee is due.
If we CANCEL or POSTPONE the event, full refund will be given.
FORCE MAJEURE CLAUSE: We shall assume no liability whatsoever if this event is altered, rescheduled, postponed or canceled due to a fortuitous event, unforeseen occurrence, or any other event that renders performance of this event inadvisable, illegal, impractical or impossible. For purpose of this clause, a fortuitous event shall include but not limited to: an Acts of God; governmental restrictions and / or regulations; war or apparent act of war; terrorism or apparent act of terrorism; disaster; civil disorder, disturbance and / or riots; curtailment, suspension, and/or restriction on transport facilities / means of transportation; any other emergency.
YOUR DETAILS: All details required for registration are mandatory. If you found errors, kindly notify us.
SPEAKER CHANGES: Speakers and topics were confirmed at the time of publishing, however, circumstances beyond the control of the organizers may necessitate substitution, alterations or cancellation of the speakers and/or topics. As such, we reserve the right to alter or modify the advertised speakers and/or topics if necessary. Any substitution or alteration will be reflected on our web page as soon as possible. All delegates or their representative will also be notified as soon as the changes are made.
Tel: 6100 0621
http://www.maitreallianz.com

Course Brochure and Signup

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Deception, Distortion, Dishonesty: The Real Story Behind the Hype – RSA Conference 2018 – San Francisco

Dr. Khatuna Mshvidobadze

In the summer of 2008, Russia attacked Georgia in the first-ever combined kinetic and cyberwar. Sure, the 1990-1991 Gulf War was dubbed the first information war—the use 226571794ecbc84a4232f3e9a42a7041-480x270of information in war is not new. What was new in 2008 was that Russia employed its cyber arm as an independent operational capability alongside its land, sea and air forces. The targets were critical infrastructure. The strategic objectives were to sap Georgia’s will to resist and to provide cover for Russia’s information campaign to deceive the west into believing that somehow little Georgia was the aggressor.

Operational security was paramount—Moscow had to keep everyone confounded about who was behind the cyber attacks. Just like the kinetic invasion, the cyber attacks were long and well-planned, but Russia did a great job covering its tracks. When the shooting stopped, well-meaning researchers investigated what had happened. However, coming from a profession that focuses on computer screens and a culture unaccustomed to the 2018-04-11_9-18-09kind of deception that is part of everyday Russian life, they foundered.

The attacks led us to Russia. We noted uncanny timing. Western experts were indeed confounded when the trail led to kids and criminals. I have been following that trail ever since. Insight into Russia, all-source intelligence and a keen understanding of denial and deception were needed.

Today, saying that the Russian state employs a network of cybercriminals to do its online dirty work is commonplace. One might just as well pretend not to know the identity of those little green men who seized Crimea. But when I started saying it in 2010, you would not believe the resistance I encountered.

Soon after, I met Jeff Bardin, my professor at Utica College, who became mentor and friend. Jeff brings an extraordinary expertise in all-source intelligence and the ways of denial and deception. At this year’s RSA Conference, it is my privilege to combine with him in a talk entitled Deception, Distortion, Dishonesty: The Real Story Behind the Hype.

Jeff will lead off, analyzing the types of D&D, its various dimensions and some tactics that can be employed online and offline. The planners, he will say, must have clear reasons for utilizing D&D based on their goals. They must define the strategic, operational and tactical goals of deception and the criteria for success.

I will point out that Russians do not see cyber warfare as distinct but regard it as just one tool of information war. Look at 2008. The cyber attacks aimed at hampering the Georgian government’s ability to communicate while Moscow’s propaganda machine painted Russia as the aggrieved party. “Information space opens wide asymmetrical possibilities for reducing the fighting potential of an enemy,” writes Valery Vasilyevich Gerasimov, Chief of the Russian General Staff. It’s a remarkable statement, but nothing new—Russian thinking on information warfare has been consistent since the 1980s.

Now, the Kremlin commands a vast network of online intelligence agencies, scientific organizations, academic institutions, criminals, and trolls. We’ll discuss how Russia deals with enemies, foreign and domestic, cyber players and organization, the growing role of the military, tactics, techniques, procedures and tools, vectors, false flags, troll factories and more. Come join us on Wednesday at the RSA Conference.

KM

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Coincidences Take A Lot of Planning – RSA Conference 2018 – San Francisco

The RSA Conference is soon upon us! The expectation to see old friends and make new rsa1800008-buckle-up_augacquaintances. The show will once again be great with new technologies displayed, new ideas bantered about, and phrases around AI used inappropriately and about 5-10 years too soon. The parties will crank at night and many will suffer the cocktail flu come the next morning. 40,000 strong is the estimated number for this event! Huge!

کنفرانس RSA 2018  rsa-конференция 2018  2018 RSA 회의  rsa 2018年会议  مؤتمر rsa 2018

But what of the undercurrent that occurs unmentioned every year? Just beneath the surface are a series of activities generated by scores of foreign agents looking to steal information, intellectual property, or gain an upper hand over someone of importance being caught doing illicit things. How many spies will blanket the city and the shop floor armed with various technologies used to extract information? Cyber and physical espionage activities run amuck at such events. This is common and expected. How will you know when your data is being pilfered? Will your hotel room be secure? Are your 2018-04-05_14-43-31mobile devices secure? What data have you given up already? Flight plans, hotel information, email addresses, phone numbers, social media data, car rental information, events you will attend, arrival and departure times, restaurant reservations, meeting information… Do you think your data is not in the wind already? Will a chance encounter lead to unexpected information sharing? Is the person next to you at the bar there just by coincidence?

All questions you should consider. All questions that are usually forgotten or ignored.

BEHIND ALL COINCIDENCES THERE IS A PLAN, AND BEHIND ALL PLANS THERE IS A COINCIDENCE – Malnar

I12149464887

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Africa – Where Counter-Terrorism and Modernization Meet

One more fascinating/outstanding effort by the new Kansas State Dragon Team. This time we researched the major powers’ use of Drones on bicoastal AOs in Africa. Many interesting conclusions and lots of resources involved. The false flag is counter-terrorism. The real agenda is resources: gold, diamonds, cotton. China continues it “Take and Talk strategy” in Africa and the Spratly Islands back in its home territory of the South China Seas.

We next intend to look at China’s interference with India and Pakistan. The next war will be by Drone proxy – as predicted. Too much UAS  investment by so many big players to leave them dormant.   Or it might be very subtle like disruption of GPS communications or replay of navigation bridge signals on US  naval assets.

REPORT in PDF HERE

  • Team Dragon
  • Kansas State University

ksu

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Treadstone 71 Selected to Deliver at the RSA Conference 2018 San Francisco

Foundations for a Strong Intelligence Program
April 18, 9AM-11AM RSA Conference
This Lab will explore key aspects of building a strong and long-lasting cyberthreat intelligence program. We’ll review methods of threat intelligence platform selection and bake-off techniques as well as cover stakeholder analysis and priority intelligence requirements. Additionally, we’ll practice collection planning and mission management as well as how to establish effective reporting and dissemination capabilities.

rsa2018
Cyber CounterIntelligence – Deception, Distortion, Dishonesty
April 18, 1:45PM-2:30PM RSA Conference
Deception, distortion, dishonesty are core to social media postings. Our adversaries use these methods concocting stories that create illusions that are meant to leave us divided. The talk will cover methods of countering their messaging while applying these tactics to protect your own organization and brand. Moving from intelligence to counterintelligence is the natural next step in our evolution.

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Plague of the Cyber RATS

How a toxic computer code delivered by ‘Remote Access Trojans’ is an invisible army able to take over a petrochemical plant and blow it to pieces

Ironically, said Bardin, it was Stuxnet that led Iran to enhance its offensive capability: ‘If Stuxnet had happened to the US or UK, it would have been seen as an act of war. In Iran, it made them invest heavily in offensive cyber operations.’

He revealed that 18 per cent of Iranian university students are studying computer science – a cyber warfare talent pool.

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5404055/How-hackers-using-RAT-malware-seized-petrochemical-site.html

No guns. No bombs. No conventional weapons of any kind. An invisible army able take over a petrochemical plant like this and blow it to pieces. That’s the power of a toxic computer code delivered by RATs – ‘Remote Access Trojans’ – that’s making UK security experts VERY nervous indeed

‘Fixing this takes political will, and business is always pushing back, because good cyber security adds costs,’ said Bardin. ‘Ultimately, something is going to blow up.’

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واکسنی به اسم فیلترینگ

💉 واکسنی به اسم فیلترینگ

دهم دی ماه سال 1396 محبوب ترین پیام رسان خارجی در ایران به دستور” شورای عالی امنیت ملی ” فیلتر و 14 روز بعد در تاریخ 23 دی ماه رفع فیلتر شد. پیام رسانی که به نقل قول های متعدد بیش از 40% کاربران آن را مشترکان ایرانی تشکیل می دهند.

این درحالی‌ است که به گفته رئیس انجمن صنفی کسب و کارهای اینترنتی “حدود نیم میلیون فرصت شغلی که وارد این شبکه‌های مجازی شده‌اند و همچنین چند شرکت دانش بنیان خدمات تخصصی در این زمینه، پس از فیلترینگ معلق شدند”.

همچنین به گفته سید مرتضی موسویان رئیس مرکز توسعه فناوری اطلاعات و رسانه‌های دیجیتال وزارت ارشاد، در آمار رسمی این سازمان ۱۹ هزار کانال شامددار به ثبت رسیده که از این تعداد ۹۰۰۰ کانال مرتبط با فروش کالا یا خدمات بوده‌اند.

همه شما عزیزان به اهمیت فعالیت این پیام رسان در ایران، از همه جهات واقف هستید و مضرات فیلتر شدن تلگرام را بطور کامل می دانید ولی تا بحال به مزایای این فیلترینگ دقت کرده اید؟ به نظر شما 2 هفته فیلتر شدن تلگرام چه بازخوردهای مثبتی به همراه داشت؟ آیا پیش از فیلترینگ این پیام رسان به مزایای آن فکر شده بود ؟ در ادامه به نکاتی در این رابطه بصورت کاملا مختصر اشاره خواهیم کرد.

1. یکی از مهمترین مزایای این دوره طلایی افزایش سواد عمومی جامعه در حوزه IT در درک تفاوت بین پروتکل های مختلف، آشنایی مختصر با مفاهیم امنیتی و درک پورت و آی پی و استفاده از انواع و اقسام فیلتر شکن ها بود.بطوری که خیلی از مردم عزیز نحوه استفاده از سرورهای شخصی بعنوان فیلترشکن را یاد گرفته و به دست عموم رساندند و خیلی از عزیزان نحوه استفاده از این فیلترشکن ها را فراگرفتند.

2. از دیگر مزایای این طرح می توان به افزایش امنیت کاربران اشاره کرد بطوری که در این مدت هیچ یک از کاربران ایرانی به هیچ عنوان با استفاده از آدرس آی پی حقیقی خود از تلگرام استفاده نکرده و عملا احتمال امکان ردیابی کاربران در مصادیق مجرمانه در این دوهفته ، به شرط استفاده از شماره های مجازی نزدیک به صفر شد.

3. نکته حائز اهمیت دیگری که باعث متضرر شدن اپراتورهای همراه شد آشنا شدن مردم با نحوه استفاده از تماس صوتی بود تلگرام بود که مدت هاست بخاطر جلوگیری از ضرر به اپراتورهای همراه، بسته شده بود.

4. آمادگی بیش از پیش تلگرام برای جلوگیری از فیلتر شدن مجدد با راه اندازی شبکه باز تلگرام یا TON در فصل اول سال 2018 میلادی به گفته پاول دوروف، مدیر عامل و بنیان گذار تلگرام و همچنین کاهش بازه زمانی تکمیل این پروژه از سه ماه به یک ماه و تقریبا غیرقابل فیلتر شدن تلگرام از مزایای دیگر این طرح بود.

علاوه بر نکات بالا بازخوردهایی نیز در این میان کاملا محسوس بود که بعنوان مثال می توان به شکست سنگین پیام رسان های ایرانی حتی با اعمال فیلترینگ در رقابت با تلگرام، ناتوانی دولت در فیلتر کردن کامل یک شبکه اجتماعی، وابستگی اقتصادی و معیشتی مردم به شبکه های اجتماعی، ناکارآمد بودن طرح شامد در جلوگیری از فعالیت های غیر متعارف کانال های تلگرامی، افزایش اعتماد مردم به رعایت حریم شخصی کاربران توسط تلگرام و … اشاره کرد.

=-=-=-=-=-=-=

مطالب بیشتر :

تیم امنیتی ایران

@IrSecTeam_Org

 

تلگرام اره ای که امکان جابه جایی ان دیگر نیست: تلگرام دیگه برای یک ایرانی یک پیام رسان نیست، بلکه همه چیزی است که از اینترنت نیاز داره . خوبی ها و بدی های خودشو داره ولی مهمترین ضرری که تلگرام به ما میزنه به نظر من بسته بودن تلگرامه و جلوگیری اون از رشد اینترنت فارسی و تولید محتوی ، امروزه حتی افرادی که تلگرام دارن یک ایمیل ساده ندارن و نیازی هم نمیبینن که داشته باشن. دیگه وبلاگ نویس نمیبینید و همه یه کانال میزنن و مطالبشون رو اونجا مینویسن. مطالبی که هیچ وقت در اینترنت واقعی منتشر نمیشن و اگر شما لینک کانال یا اون گروه رو نداشته باشید هیچ وقت بهشون نمیرسید. مطمئنا این خوب نیست. یعنی فاجعه است . چرا این شد چرا تلگرام برای ما همه چی شد؟ جوابش ساده است به لطف فیلترینگ داسی سالهای پیش همه نیاز ها به سمت تلگرام کشیده شد. در فضایی که حتی یک وبلاگ با ۵ کاربر ماهانه بر روی بلاگفا تحمل نمیشد و مدیران وب سایت ها بابت یک کامنت بازداشت میشدن و سایت ها که همه چیز یک فرد بودن به راحتی فیلتر میشد مردم که خود عقل و شعور دارن ، اینجا احساس آرامش بیشتری داشتن. ولی آیا میشه تلگرام رو فیلتر کرد؟ جوابش ساده است : خیر. وقتی بیش از نیم میلیون شغل به گفته خود آقایان در تلگرام به وجود اومده دیگه شما فقط با تفریح یا خبر سر و کار ندارید بلکه دارید تصمیم مهتری میگیرید اینجا به سفره مردم هم وصل شده. البته قابل پیشبینی بود که ممکنه تلگرام فیلتر بشه ولی حوادث این روزها نشون داد که دیگه حتی تصمیم به فیلتر تلگرام از تصمیم به جهت دادن مردم به رفتن به سمتش غلط تر بود. چرا؟ جوابش در دانلود روزی ۷۰۰ هزار فیلترشکنه . باور کنید اگر رتبه بدترین کشور رو برای بدافزار های موبایل داریم دلیلش اینه که از ۱ بالاتر در این جدول دیگه جایگاهی نیست . من با حرف های سردار جلالی ریاست محترم پدافند غیر عامل موافقم بله تلگرام ایران رو اشغال کرده ولی دلیلش فقط شمایید که تنوع استفاده از سرویس های جهانی رو بروی ایرانی ها بستید و به امید اینکه شاید تلگرام شاید شاید به حرفتون گوش کنه با طنابش رفتید ته چاه و ملت رو هم بردید با خودتون. دیدید که در شرایط بحرانی قطعا تلگرام کانال هایی رو که لیست میکنید نمیبنده و فقط فیلتر تلگرام تاثیر حداکثر ۲ روزه بر روی مخاطبینش داره . ولی جالب تر از فیلتر تلگرام در این کشور استفاده همین مسئولین از سرویس های درست دنیا مثل تویتره . در همین شرایط تریبون وزرای محترم در حالی تویتره که سالهاست تویتر در ایران فیلتره !!. و جالب تر از اون اینه که حتی در شرایطی که تلگرام فیلتر نیست شما کانال رسمی یا گروه رسمی دولتی در اون نمیبینید ولی همزمان میتونید همه رو در تویتر پیدا کنید . برای کی توویت میکنن من نمیدونم :grin:. اگر دیوونه خونه نیست به منم بگید من بدونم کجاست. حالا باید دید رویکرد بعدی دولت محترم چیه و چطور این فاجعه اینترنت ایران که هر روز هم عمیق تر میشه رو مدیریت میکنه مطمئن باشید پاول برای همه ما خواب های رنگی تری هم دیده . پیشنهاد من باز کردن هر چه سریعتر سرویس های مهم دنیا به روی همه ایرانی هاست از جمله تویتر و فیسبوک و یوتیوب و تغییر نگرش داسی فیلترینگ به نگرش تعامل با دنیا و یا تبدیل نگرش داسی به ساتوری و بستن مطلق همه چی از تلگرام و فیلتر شکن ها گرفته تا هر چیزی که جدید میاد برای همیشه فقط مشکلش اینه که هر روز یه چیزی میاد تقریبا :joy: یا اینکه ببندیم اینترنت و راحت کنیم همه رو /// البته تجربه ثبات کرده حتما این اتفاقها نمیفته و همین مسیر شل کن و سفت کن رو میریم متاسفانه . جرجندی @webamoozir

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Dragonfly 2.0? Delta Elektroniks and Pre-embedded Malware

Delta Elektroniks highly likely supported by the Russian government and a direct threat to energy sector supply chain operations

Treadstone 71 asserts with high confidence that Delta Elektroniks (DE) is likely a front company directly associated with Energetic Bear (Dragonfly). The equipment purchased from DE is vulnerable to supply chain threats due to malware embedded in the Taiwanese Delta Electronics (T-DE) programmable logic controller (PLC) software. T-DE is not aware of the infections allowing customers to download and install infected PLC software for the initial purposes of cyber espionage. Long-term intentions include possible physical sabotage operations and the potential to manipulate markets through false accidents (real but not due to human error or technology failure) to artificially drive up stocks (or down). Speculation of oil prices targeted to drive revenue when the price per barrel is too low to sustain economic plans. The PLCs appear to be genuine production parts with malware introduced post-production. Verification of Oleg Vladimirovich Strekozov’s identity is incomplete; the name is likely fictitious and probably state-sponsored. Evidence that suggests this outcome:

+++++++++++++++++++++++UPDATE+++++++++++++++++++ 1/4/2018+++++++++

https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-16-348-03

https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-18-004-01

Purely a Treadstone 71 effort

+++++++++++++++++++++1/4/2018++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Malware Targets SCADA Devices

  • TTPs are like Dragonfly (Strekozov as defined) or Energetic Bear (B2)
  • Targeting SCADA devices is consistent with espionage practices (B2)
    • Provides hackers a foothold into US critical infrastructure via trusted downloads – Delta Website in Taiwan (as one of many)
  • A copycat website in Russia is suspicious and consistent with masquerade techniques (C3)
  • A legitimate Russian business would not conduct themselves in such a way (C2)
  • Multiple other sites deliver the same software (C3) …

NOTE: It is possible that the T-DE PLC software is poorly written and vulnerable by default. Scans from the T-DE website indicate website vulnerabilities including SQL injection weaknesses.

The full report: Treadstone 71Intelligence Games in the Power Grid PDF

The associated PPTX: Treadstone 71 Intelligence Games in the Power Grid

Our defenses are built for outside in. This is already in. Anti-virus scanners do not detect any of this only sandbox analysis. ‘Trusted’ software is being downloaded from multiple different sites in multiple different languages covering multiple different industries. Data centers, buildings, power plants, hospitals, public safety, dams, nuclear facilities, financial services data centers, oil pipelines, military facilities, hotels, industrial automation, building automation, energy and ICT infrastructure, embedded power, automotive electronics (ships/boats), embedded power, various components thereof, merchant and mobile power, telecom energy, and renewable energy non-inclusively.

Recent reports from Symantec (outside in):

http://www.eweek.com/security/dragonfly-2.0-hackers-targeting-the-energy-sector-symantec-finds

https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/dragonfly-western-energy-sector-targeted-sophisticated-attack-group

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-energy/u-s-warns-public-about-attacks-on-energy-industrial-firms-idUSKBN1CQ0IN RELEASED OCTOBER 20/21

1

Twitter Brute Force – Iranian hack

Iranian password cracking for twitter – within the last 72 hours

 

#!/usr/bin/env python

###################################

# Password cracking twitter V 1.0 #

# #

# : # # #

###################################

import os

import time

import twitter

import json

import random

from datetime import datetime

from hashlookup.LookupTable import LookupTable

CONSUMER_KEY = “”

CONSUMER_SECRET = “”

ACCESS_TOKEN_KEY = “”

ACCESS_TOKEN_SECRET = “”

POLL = 60

WORDLIST = ‘./crackstation-dist/crackstation.txt’

W = “\033[0m” # default/white

R = “\033[31m” # red

P = “\033[35m” # purple

C = “\033[36m” # cyan

bold = “\033[1m”

INFO = bold + C + “[*] ” + W

WARN = bold + R + “[!] ” + W

MONEY = bold + P + “[$] ” + W

TIME = lambda: str(datetime.now()).split(‘ ‘)[1].split(‘.’)[0]

print INFO+”%s: Logging into Twitter API …” % TIME()

api = twitter.Api(consumer_key=CONSUMER_KEY, consumer_secret=CONSUMER_SECRET, access_token_key=ACCESS_TOKEN_KEY, access_token_secret=ACCESS_TOKEN_SECRET)

indexes = {

‘md5’: ‘./crackstation-dist/crackstation-md5.idx’,

}

if os.path.exists(‘processed.pkl’):

with open(‘processed.pkl’, ‘r’) as fp:

processed = json.loads(fp.read())

print INFO+”%s: Loaded %d processed IDs” % (TIME(), len(processed))

else:

processed = []

def crack_hashes(algorithm, hashes):

results = []

if 0 < len(hashes):

lookup_table = LookupTable(

algorithm=algorithm,

index_file=indexes[algorithm],

wordlist_file=WORDLIST,

)

results = lookup_table[hashes]

return results

def process_request(mention):

hashes = filter(lambda word: len(word) == 32, mention.text.split(‘ ‘))

if len(hashes):

print INFO+”%s: Canidate hashes: %s” % (TIME(), hashes)

results = crack_hashes(‘md5’, hashes[0]) # Limit one hash atm

if results[hashes[0]] is not None:

message = “@%s I cracked your hash, the password is ‘%s'” % (

mention.user.screen_name, results[hashes[0]]

)

else:

message = “Sorry @%s but I couldn’t crack that hash :(” % mention.user.screen_name

else:

print WARN+”%s: No hashes found in request.” % TIME()

message = None

if message:

print INFO + “%s: Posting update \”%s\”” % (TIME(), message)

message += ” (%d)” % random.randint(0, 9999)

api.PostUpdate(message)

def poll_twitter():

mentions = filter(lambda m: m.id not in processed, api.GetMentions())

print INFO + “%s: %d new mention(s) to process” % (TIME(), len(mentions))

for mention in mentions:

process_request(mention)

processed.append(int(mention.id))

def run_forever():

while True:

time.sleep(POLL)

print INFO + “%s: Polling twitter API …” % TIME()

try:

poll_twitter()

except twitter.TwitterError as error:

print WARN+”%s: Error from API %s, sleeping for 5mins” % (TIME(), str(error))

if __name__ == ‘__main__’:

try:

run_forever()

except KeyboardInterrupt:

with open(‘processed.pkl’, ‘wb’) as fp:

fp.write(“%s” % json.dumps(processed))

print INFO+”%s: Saved processed to processed.pkl” % TIME()

 

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