dense, technically advanced guide for military personnel operating communications systems, unmanned aerial systems (UAS), electronic warfare (EW), and signals intelligence (SIGINT).
The Russian document titled “Памятка для военнослужащих, обслуживающих связь, БПЛА, РЭБ, РЭР и др.” from February 28, 2025, provides a dense, technically advanced guide for military personnel operating communications systems, unmanned aerial systems (UAS), electronic warfare (EW), and signals intelligence (SIGINT). Framed in a practical advisory format, the document conveys operational, technical, tactical, and even strategic thinking behind the Russian employment of EW and UAS, and reveals embedded capabilities, targets, risks, and intent. The document outlines emerging threats to adversaries, how the systems function, and where vulnerabilities lie.
Threats to Adversaries
The document identifies drones, radio-electronic suppression (REB), and signal reconnaissance (RER) as primary vectors to degrade adversary command and control, ISR, and UAS operations. It details methods for interrupting control links, suppressing signals across broad and narrow frequency bands, and establishing electronic dominance through saturation or pinpoint targeting. It references direct attacks on radio links between adversary command centers and tactical echelons, particularly when adversary UAS rely on frequency bands between 300 MHz and 6.1 GHz. It also mentions signal manipulation against optical fiber-based drones—a platform the document describes as a growing headache. Furthermore, it proposes the prepositioning of drones acting as REB emitters into contested zones to establish denial bubbles in advance of operations. These methods reflect offensive electronic attack posture.
Capabilities
The document describes layered REB deployments across infantry, mechanized, and armored formations. Small-scale REB units cover 300–600 meters for frontline infantry, vehicle-mounted systems cover up to 500 meters, and larger tactical systems can project effects up to 900 meters. Signal suppression is based on frequency-specific power density calculations derived from Friis’ transmission equations, with spectrum coverage divided into logical frequency ranges. Power outputs required for complete signal denial are calculated for each band. For example, to jam the 300–600 MHz band at 300 meters, approximately 39.3 watts is needed; higher bands require significantly more. The full suppression system would demand up to 14.8 kW, indicating industrial-grade power infrastructure is required for large-scale operations. Specific emphasis is placed on antenna placement, phasing, polarization, field geometry, Fresnel zone management, and spatial distribution to increase operational efficiency and minimize friendly interference. Special attention is paid to impedance matching, signal isolation, suppression of harmonics, and elimination of side-channel emissions.
Functions
Systems are designed to fulfill roles ranging from signal intelligence to jamming, to retransmission, to UAS countermeasures. One role is degrading adversary RF communication through SNR disruption. Another is intercepting and geolocating adversary emitters. Yet another is the physical defense of units from enemy drones, including those guided by fiber-optic systems that evade traditional jamming. Several technical configurations for antennas and amplification systems are outlined to support each function, including directional and omnidirectional variants, vertically and horizontally polarized arrays, and canted or hybrid configurations for varied environments (urban, forested, open terrain). The systems are modular and scalable depending on the unit echelon.
Risks
Numerous risks are acknowledged. Electromagnetic fratricide is one, where overlapping REB systems collapse friendly networks and disrupt tactical operations. Improper antenna placement, polarization mismatches, insufficient frequency isolation, and harmonics are also flagged. Extended exposure to REB energy—particularly in high-power bands above 1 GHz—is warned to produce lasting cognitive, visual, reproductive, and endocrine damage. The document references Russian sanitary standards and details safe exposure distances for emitters ranging from 2 W to 100 W. Risks from counter-REB actions by adversaries are not directly mentioned, but technical sections emphasize survivability through dispersion, redundancy, and low power profiles.
Targets
The systems target UAS command links, RF beacons, tactical radio systems, wireless data networks, satellite uplinks, and enemy EW systems. It emphasizes the value of defeating reconnaissance drones before they complete their targeting cycles and recommends overlapping REB coverage to prevent gap exploitation. It further discusses the targeting of opposing frequencies and SNR thresholds required to corrupt or saturate receivers. High-altitude UAS and EO/IR platforms are prioritized targets, as well as fiber-tethered drones that are described as difficult to detect or jam. For those, physical methods such as nets, shotguns, or explosive-laced projectiles are described.
Lethality
REB systems described are not physically lethal, but the lethality of their indirect effects is emphasized. Suppressing adversary command and control can result in the collapse of coordinated action, leading to attritional loss. Jamming UAS control links reduces precision and opens adversary formations to direct fires. The document notes that even 10 percent of adversary systems evading REB coverage still present threats—suggesting lethality is not total, but degradation of effectiveness is the goal. Jamming failure is linked directly to combat losses, especially when drones guide indirect fires or loitering munitions.
Maliciousness
The document reflects a systematic and deliberate intent to degrade, disrupt, and deny adversary operations through tailored application of electronic effects. It treats all RF space as a contested domain and advocates preemptive electronic suppression of neutral or friendly systems to preserve Russian force protection. Its tone shows pragmatism but also institutional cynicism: commercial off-the-shelf REB gear is criticized for marketing-driven deception, and commanders are warned not to rely on flashy, untested systems. Civilian volunteers are advised to strip uniforms before entering warzones to avoid lawful targeting, suggesting awareness of international humanitarian law but readiness to exploit gray areas.
Assessment
The document reflects an advanced understanding of the physical and technical underpinnings of RF propagation, and uses analytic methods—including energy density equations, antenna theory, and electromagnetic field modeling—to define EW application in granular terms. Its strategic implications are clear: Russia seeks to contest the electromagnetic spectrum across the tactical edge and deny adversary use of space for command and ISR. The advice is practical, reflecting lessons from Ukraine and prior conflicts. Overall, the document supports a vision of EW as a central pillar of future combined arms warfare. It further implies Russian forces are attempting to adapt dynamically to Western UAS and communications superiority by reducing reliance on legacy REB systems in favor of distributed, scalable jamming cells integrated into frontline formations.