A Russian view of information operations

To effectively neutralize the consequences of media attacks, it is necessary to change the very approach to working with the Internet space. It is not enough to occasionally post press releases and interviews, even if it is in top publications. It is not enough to quickly notice the release of negative material and immediately release positive material. You need to work ahead of the enemy.

But in order to understand why it is not enough and what needs to be done, put yourself in the place of your opponent, look at what is happening on the Internet through his eyes. Here, your opponent sees some publication with your mention. How will he take it? How will he react? What can be done? For example, he saw that there was an interview with your boss in Forbes, where the boss shares achievements and talks about threats to business. Can anything from this interview evoke strong emotions in an opponent? How can he answer? And what from the interview can he use to create negative material? It is a look at future events from this perspective that underlies the overall media planning and not just what, where, when, and how to place it.

Timely adjustment
In the process of monitoring the information field, two types of negative information about the protected Object will be revealed:

  • general negative background -self-distribution of what is already there;
  • new drafts and overclocking

To correct self-distribution, it is necessary to publish on equivalent sites about three times more materials of a neutral or positive nature (it was said a little higher). As you understand, “three times” is a very, very approximate value, which varies greatly from the specifics of each specific project.

Neutralizing the impact of stuffing is possible in different ways, but based on generalized ideas, at least five times more publications on comparable sources are needed, but on neutral-positive topics that differ from stuffing. This is in addition to the “work” with the stuffing itself. In the event of such stuffing (attacks), you need to make “preparations” of content so that at hour X, you don’t waste time creating content but repel the attack.

On the basis of their action plan (speeches, interviews, opening of facilities, negotiations, participation in events, trips, meetings …) a threat plan is drawn up. This is a estimate of how the enemy can use such news to harm you. What arguments or unfounded accusations can he voice, where can he write to, who can he complain to, what other actions can he take. That is how an opponent can use this informational occasion.

The easiest way to do this is in the form of a table. In the left column is your planned action. To the right of your action – how the enemy can use this information. There may be several options here. In the third column, opposite each enemy action option, is a brief description of what must be done to neutralize. There may be preventive measures and actions after the activity of the enemy.

The result will be a schedule of significant events with a list of possible negative scenarios for the opponent’s response to each event. Such a forecast is not static. As the general situation changes, it should also change – changes are made to it, additional options for the opponent’s reactions, and other necessary changes.

Overclocking is a project that shows the inner workings of creating comedy material. 

Comedians come with ideas, sketches, and stories and help each other by throwing on funny ideas born in improvisation. The result is a kind of humorous warm-up, and in the case of “Acceleration,” a separate comedic product. Perhaps the ideas from “Running” will someday fall into their stand-up performances or become the basis for the script, but you can laugh at them already now

Mistakes in planning information operations and ways to overcome them. Series-3.

After drawing up a schedule of scenarios, at least two options for neutralization are prepared for each variant of possible reactions of the opponent:

  • what can be opposed if the opponent does this;
  • what can be done in advance so that the opponent does not have the opportunity to use the informational occasion or the effectiveness of such use is minimal.

When preparing options for countering the possible reactions of the opponent, the proposed scenarios are recorded in the form of abstracts, which will allow them to quickly compose a temnik for copywriters on their basis. Further, a complete material is created for each scenario (article, news, picture, video …). Now, in the event of a negative reaction of the opponent to some event related to you, you have ready-made content for instant publication and abstracts (possibly with minor adjustments) for compiling a task for copywriters who will quickly write new materials.

When working ahead of the curve, options for the opponent’s possible response are taken and worked out from the point of view of “what can be announced in advance so that the opponent does not have arguments”. This is the first level of resistance. On it, we, as it were, deprive the opponent of the opportunity to speak negatively in advance. But then the opponent will speak about something else. Therefore, it is more interesting, though, to prepare a “trap” for the enemy. You assume how your opponent will react and post materials in advance on the Internet that show him not being right but rather incompetent. But don’t advertise them.

By Treadstone 71

@Treadstone71LLC Cognitive Warfare Training, Intelligence and Counterintelligence Tradecraft, Influence Operations, Cyber Operations, OSINT,OPSEC, Darknet, Deepweb, Clandestine Cyber HUMINT, customized training and analysis, cyber psyops, strategic intelligence, Open-Source Intelligence collection, analytic writing, structured analytic techniques, Target Adversary Research, strategic intelligence analysis, estimative intelligence, forecasting intelligence, warning intelligence, Disinformation detection, Analysis as a Service