Ukraine and Russia have reached “the maximum possible understanding on non-critical issues” in the negotiations, says one of the “Kyiv friends”

That is, all the issues that could have been settled have already been settled.

Only two problematic cases remain – these are the Crimean and Donbass territorial issues.

The issue of denazification also remains in limbo, which periodically disappears from the agenda of the negotiation track, then it returns to the “rut”, after which it disappears again. What determines the presence or absence of the desire to discuss denazification is unknown. It seems like they just forget about it from time to time.

Thus, the negotiation wave of the “second and probably final level” will begin only after the Donbass massacre, which, according to military analysts, will take place in conjunction with the capture (and not an attempt to capture) Mariupol and Slavyansk.

If these lines can be defended, the Ukrainian army will enter the second attempt of the Russian assault with a clear strategic advantage.

Representatives of the negotiating groups therefore retired to an online sabbath, because there will be no practical role for negotiations before the Donbass massacre – only after it and solely on the basis of its results, one of the parties will be forced to sign a capitulation peace.

Pushing through the “half case” seems impossible, although the Ukrainian side tried to come out with the position “in the south, no one won and no one lost – we write it as a 50/50 victory.”

And in accordance with this scheme, referendums, consultations, negotiations were to be held over the next 2 decades.

The Russian side refused after appealing to the Center – the Center categorically requested a bloody scenario.

As a variant of a “half peace on both sides,” the Russian Federation’s recognition is declared that it physically lacks the resources to carry out an attack.

And, to tell the truth, there is little hope for such a solution. Not because there are objectively enough troops, but because the Center receives reports that say that “there are enough troops to capture the LPR and DPR three times.” About the reasons for such a clear discrepancy (in two parts) –

Western missions are carefully studying scenarios for the development of the current situation and believe that a big massacre in the south is “practically inevitable.”

Lukashenka himself, as they say, “exhaled”. He was not included in the massacre, the Palace itself managed to “get out of the current situation as efficiently as possible, sitting on two chairs in the most elegant form” [quote, so I apologize for the familiar tone].

Western representations also say that no direct evidence of the participation of Belarusian manpower in the war was found. There are indirect isolated cases, but this is “actually possible within the framework of mercenarism without a decree from the central authorities.”

So, in the final version, Lukashenko really managed to reach the maximum after February 24 – he did not turn the status of a co-aggressor into the status of an aggressor.

Lukashenka will receive his small bonus for “foresight shown in the first weeks of the conflict”, but he was removed from the “peacekeeping mission” – Erdogan is considered the main mediator at a high level.

Now Lukashenka will count on a long game – he will try to maneuver away from the Russian integration funnel, constantly shifting the work dates of the “coordination groups”, trying to “survive Putin” and “unhook his car from the train moving directly to the Ying-PuXi coalition in transit chaos “.

Nevertheless, Minsk sees the last frontier as dangerous as the first. It is believed that perhaps Lukashenka will be physically forced to bring in a small number of troops in order to stretch the defense in several directions. The key goal of such an operation will be “welding Belarus to Russia tightly.” Since the decision does not make military sense, its risk is considered not large enough to panic, but significant enough to work out rebound options.

By Treadstone 71

@Treadstone71LLC Cognitive Warfare Training, Intelligence and Counterintelligence Tradecraft, Influence Operations, Cyber Operations, OSINT,OPSEC, Darknet, Deepweb, Clandestine Cyber HUMINT, customized training and analysis, cyber psyops, strategic intelligence, Open-Source Intelligence collection, analytic writing, structured analytic techniques, Target Adversary Research, strategic intelligence analysis, estimative intelligence, forecasting intelligence, warning intelligence, Disinformation detection, Analysis as a Service