Tag: russia

Gerasimov Doctrine in Full Swing against the US

The Gerasimov Doctrine is in use in the United States and will come to another crescendo in the near future as our 2018 elections come to bear. Learn how to identify some of the methods when they occur.  #education #cyber #training #intelligence #intel #analysis#collection #elections #analysts #doctrine #intelligencecollection#intelligenceanalysis #gerasimov #putin #russia #olgino

How to help identify propaganda coming from any source. Gerasimov Doctrine in action in the United States.

Where does the speaker or group get their funding? What is their background?

Who are their main supporters?

Does the content have a strong emotional aspect?

Do they provide or describe ominous, stirring, or patriotic images or music?

Do they associate a group, person, event, or idea with something hated or feared?

Do they use slogans of any type that have been heard before and repeated?

Do they use virtue words (e.g. peace, happiness, security, wise leadership, freedom, liberty)?

Is their reasoning poor?

·      Illogical or non-intuitive relationships between concepts

·      Sweeping conclusions from mere anecdotal evidence

·      Issues framed to favor one point of view while deflecting and pivoting

·      Irrelevant or questionable data

·      Vague, undefined terms and concepts

Do you see evidence of false or missing information (telling only half of the story)?

Is there oversimplification?

·      Simple answers to complex social and political questions

·      Blame assigned to an individual or group (scapegoating) without evidence

·      Misleading stereotypes or labels

·      Blanket statements

Is the aim of the article to persuade?

·      Cites or associates prominent figures to a position, idea, argument, or action

·      Repeats ideas until they are accepted as truth

·      Presents ideas as the view of the majority (so get on the bandwagon – wake up)

·      Implies that opposition (to the author’s premise) would be unpatriotic, undemocratic, or inhumane

Does it align information that is not objective and is used primarily to influence an audience and further an agenda? Are facts presented selectively to encourage a particular synthesis or perception or using loaded language to produce an emotional rather than a rational response to the information that is presented. Are the contents associated with material prepared by adversarial governments while ignoring the issues associated with those they support?

Influence operations are focused on affecting the feelings and behaviors of leaders, groups, or entire populations. Influence operations employ capabilities to affect behaviors, protect programs that support their intent, and project false information interspersed with some accurate data to achieve desired effects across the cognitive domain. Influence operations are the coordinated, integrated, and synchronized application of national diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and other capabilities in peacetime, crisis, conflict, and post-conflict to foster attitudes, behaviors, or decisions by US citizens driven by foreign entities bent on creating chaos.

Biases are systematic errors in judgment that human beings consistently make, and our adversaries continue to use against the US populace. Here are 10 that help explain why we will never stop falling for their propaganda and methods to ensure chaos in our society:

1.     Bias blind spot — the tendency not to compensate for one’s own cognitive biases. (This is why nobody thinks they’re biased)

2.     Third-person effect- Belief that mass communicated media messages have a greater effect on others than on themselves. (This is why propaganda is so effective. It does not affect me!)

3.     Authority bias — The tendency to attribute greater accuracy to the opinion of an authority figure (unrelated to its content) and be more influenced by that opinion. (This is why some of Trump’s supporters believe everything he says no matter what)

4.     Declinism – The belief that a society or institution is tending towards decline. Particularly, it is the predisposition to view the past favorably and future negatively. (This is why ‘Make America Great Again’ was such an effective message)

5.     Confirmation bias — the tendency to search for or interpret information in a way that confirms one’s preconceptions. (This is why people click on fake news they want to be true)

6.     Bandwagon effect — The tendency to believe things because many other people believe the same. (This is why people believe fake news shared by their friends)

7.     Availability cascade — A self-reinforcing process in which a collective belief gains more and more plausibility through its increasing repetition in public discourse. (This is why fake news become true the more it is shared)

8.     Continued influence effect — The tendency to believe previously learned misinformation even after it has been corrected. (This is why Hillary’s ‘formal accusation’ had such a big effect even after Comey dropped charges)

9.     Hostile media effect — the tendency to perceive news coverage as biased against your position on an issue. (This is why millions of voters don’t trust the mainstream media)

10. Backfire effect — The urge to do the opposite of what someone wants you to do out of a need to resist a perceived attempt to constrain your freedom of choice. (This is why the media ganging up on Trump completely backfired)

What to learn more?

www.planetreg.com/T71IntelTraining

www.cyberinteltrainingcenter.com

www.treadstone71.com

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Deception, Distortion, Dishonesty: The Real Story Behind the Hype – RSA Conference 2018 – San Francisco

Dr. Khatuna Mshvidobadze

In the summer of 2008, Russia attacked Georgia in the first-ever combined kinetic and cyberwar. Sure, the 1990-1991 Gulf War was dubbed the first information war—the use 226571794ecbc84a4232f3e9a42a7041-480x270of information in war is not new. What was new in 2008 was that Russia employed its cyber arm as an independent operational capability alongside its land, sea and air forces. The targets were critical infrastructure. The strategic objectives were to sap Georgia’s will to resist and to provide cover for Russia’s information campaign to deceive the west into believing that somehow little Georgia was the aggressor.

Operational security was paramount—Moscow had to keep everyone confounded about who was behind the cyber attacks. Just like the kinetic invasion, the cyber attacks were long and well-planned, but Russia did a great job covering its tracks. When the shooting stopped, well-meaning researchers investigated what had happened. However, coming from a profession that focuses on computer screens and a culture unaccustomed to the 2018-04-11_9-18-09kind of deception that is part of everyday Russian life, they foundered.

The attacks led us to Russia. We noted uncanny timing. Western experts were indeed confounded when the trail led to kids and criminals. I have been following that trail ever since. Insight into Russia, all-source intelligence and a keen understanding of denial and deception were needed.

Today, saying that the Russian state employs a network of cybercriminals to do its online dirty work is commonplace. One might just as well pretend not to know the identity of those little green men who seized Crimea. But when I started saying it in 2010, you would not believe the resistance I encountered.

Soon after, I met Jeff Bardin, my professor at Utica College, who became mentor and friend. Jeff brings an extraordinary expertise in all-source intelligence and the ways of denial and deception. At this year’s RSA Conference, it is my privilege to combine with him in a talk entitled Deception, Distortion, Dishonesty: The Real Story Behind the Hype.

Jeff will lead off, analyzing the types of D&D, its various dimensions and some tactics that can be employed online and offline. The planners, he will say, must have clear reasons for utilizing D&D based on their goals. They must define the strategic, operational and tactical goals of deception and the criteria for success.

I will point out that Russians do not see cyber warfare as distinct but regard it as just one tool of information war. Look at 2008. The cyber attacks aimed at hampering the Georgian government’s ability to communicate while Moscow’s propaganda machine painted Russia as the aggrieved party. “Information space opens wide asymmetrical possibilities for reducing the fighting potential of an enemy,” writes Valery Vasilyevich Gerasimov, Chief of the Russian General Staff. It’s a remarkable statement, but nothing new—Russian thinking on information warfare has been consistent since the 1980s.

Now, the Kremlin commands a vast network of online intelligence agencies, scientific organizations, academic institutions, criminals, and trolls. We’ll discuss how Russia deals with enemies, foreign and domestic, cyber players and organization, the growing role of the military, tactics, techniques, procedures and tools, vectors, false flags, troll factories and more. Come join us on Wednesday at the RSA Conference.

KM

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Zapad Exercises – 2nd/3rd Order Effects

 

The recent Russian Zapad wargaming exercises included a plethora of electronic capabilities demonstration and potentially more. Russia is known to recently been involved in illegal immigration efforts in Sweden, Finland, and Norway along with hostile intent along its northern borders (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) including cell/communication tower tampering. Could the recent Zapad exercises be more than just wargaming?

Some What If thoughts on these non-linear actions:

– Testing capabilities, distance, strength, impacts
– Testing responses like a stone in pond
    – 2nd and 3rd order effects were measured to determine the impact on targets, targets responses, etc.
    – Russians had people in each target country assisting with target impacts
    – Russians monitored target government communications from within each country
    – Determine length of time for target government to respond and what methods were used and where to get communications back online (if at all) – the locations of the response represent capabilities unknown to Russia until such an exercise is performed
– Other possibles:
     – A cover for illegal activities that occurred during the exercise – a feint, a ruse
 – Testing a precursor to actual execution – that is why military exercises are performed
 – What capabilities are being left in the exercise areas; what is not being removed after the exercise using the exercise as a ruse to place assets close to Western borders that were not there before
 What do you think?
 https://uawire.org/news/media-belarusian-and-russian-militaries-are-jamming-mobile-communications-along-border-with-poland

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Valery Vasilevich Gerasimov – Валерий Васильевич Герасимов

Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation / First Deputy Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation, General of the Army._64031862_gerasimov

Валерий Васильевич Герасимов

Born      8 September 1955 (age 62)

Kazan, Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic

Married – one son

Russian hackers reportedly stole NSA data via Kaspersky Lab software

http://algo.fyi/5vhjug

Born on 8 September 1955 in the city of Kazan. In 1977, he graduated from the Kazan Higher Tank Command School named after the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar ASSR (Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic). He commanded platoon, company, battalion in the Northern Group of Troops and Far Eastern Military District.

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After his graduation from the Military Academy of Armored Troops named after Marshal of the Soviet Union R.Ya. Malinovsky in the year of 1987, he served as the chief of headquarters and commander of tank regiment, the chief of headquarters of motorized rifle division in the Baltic Military District. From 1993 to 1995 — the commander of motorized rifle division in the North-Western Group of Troops.

After graduating from the Kazan Higher Tank Command School Gerasimov was the commander of a platoon, company, and battalion of the Far Eastern Military District. Later he was chief of staff of a tank regiment and then of a motorized rifle division in the Baltic Military District. From 1993 to 1995 he was the commander of the 144th Guards Motor Rifle Division in the Baltic Military District and then the North-Western Group of Forces.

After he graduated from the General Staff’s academy he was First Deputy Army Commander in the Moscow Military District and commander of the 58th Army in the North Caucasus Military District during the Second Chechen War. His involvement in the arrest of Yuri Budanov led to praise from journalist Anna Politkovskaya.

g3In 2006, he became commander of Leningrad Military District and moved to be the commander of Moscow Military District in 2009 and Central Military District in April 2012. On 23 December 2010, he became deputy Chief of the General Staff

In 1997 after his graduation from the Military Academy of the RF Armed Forces’ General Staff, he served as the First Deputy Commander of Army in the Moscow Military District, the Deputy Commander, Chief of Staff and Commander of the 58th Army in the North Caucasian Military District.

From 2003 to 2005 — the Chief of Staff of the Far Eastern Military District. From 2005 — the Chief of the Main Administration of Combat Training and Troops’ Service of the RF Armed Forces, and from December 2006 — the Chief of Staff of the North Caucasian Military District.vg4.png

In December 2006, he was assigned as the Commander of the Leningrad Military District, and in February 2009 — as the Commander of the Moscow Military District.

From December 2010 — the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

From 26 April 2012 — the Commander of the Central Military District.

Gerasimovs-linjal

03-02By the RF Presidential Decree of 9 November 2012, he has been appointed the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation / First Deputy Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation. He was appointed by President Vladimir Putin on 9 November 2012. Some authors credit Gerasimov as the person behind a so-called “Gerasimov doctrine” – currently prevalent in Russian military strategy – combining military, technological, information, diplomatic, economic, cultural and other tactics, which are then deployed towards one set of strategic objectives. This “political warfare” is preferred due to its comparatively low cost.

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The previous Chief of General Staff, Army General Nikolay Makarov, was seen as close to Serduykov and was seen by commentators as likely to be replaced by new Defence Minister Sergey Shoygu. It has been reported that Makarov resigned, but he was formally dismissed by President Vladimir Putin. Other changes were the dismissal of Alexander Sukhorukov from the position of First Deputy Defence Minister and his replacement by Colonel General Arkady Bakhin, formerly commander of the Western Military District. Aerospace Defence Forces commander Colonel General Oleg Ostapenko was also promoted to Deputy Defence Minister. He was promoted to the highest rank in the Russian Army, General of the Army as of 2014. On September 15, 2016, he and Turkish chief of staff General Hulusi Akar conducted a

03-03

meeting on the future of Syria in the Ankara headquarters of the army. That meeting will result in tightened dealings between Russia and Turkey.

There is an old Soviet-era rhetorical device that a ‘warning’ or a ‘lesson’ from some other situation is used to outline intent and plan. The way that what purports to be an after-action take on the Arab Spring so closely maps across to what was done in Ukraine is striking. Presenting the Arab Spring–wrongly–as the results of covert Western operations allows Gerasimov the freedom to talk about what he may also want to talk about: how Russia can subvert and destroy states without direct, overt and large-scale military intervention. However, the assumption that this is a Western gambit primarily does appear genuinely-held. https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war/

image_f02f46e5-5865-43de-957e-a19b266b57fb20170903_133742

VPK_08_476

In April 2014 Gerasimov was added to the list of persons against whom the European Union introduced sanctions “in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence of Ukraine.”

Hero of the Russian Federation.

Personal decorations: Order for Military Merits, Order for Merits to the Fatherland 4th grade, Order for Service to the Homeland in the USSR’s Armed Forces 3rd grade, Order of St. George 4th grade, Order for Merits to the Fatherland with Swords 3rd grade, Order for Honor.

The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness.

For me, this is probably the most important line in the whole piece, so allow me to repeat it: The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness. In other words, this is an explicit recognition not only that all conflicts are actually means to political ends–the actual forces used are irrelevant–but that in the modern realities, Russia must look to non-military instruments increasingly. https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war/

 https://warontherocks.com/2016/03/russian-hybrid-warfare-and-other-dark-arts/

 

 

 

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Dru’a al-Waaqiah lil-Bedoon – Syrian Sanctions Busting with Russian Help

Past report on Syrian Government collusion with Russia to bypass sanctions against Syria. This instance involves acquiring materials and machines to manufacture their own body armor in Latakia by way of the UAE where a Syrian soldier working with a female FSB agent centralize the acquisitions.

Visas, passports, military IDs, fake names, bills of lading and more for your reading and review.

The Treadstone 71 Report (pdf) – Treadstone 71 – drua-alwaaqiah-lilboodoon

Treadstone 71 acquired supporting files and documents (30MB zip) – drua-rawfiles-treadstone71

https://treadstone71llc.files.wordpress.com/2014/10/hatem-deeb-_-vk.pdf 

https://treadstone71llc.files.wordpress.com/2014/10/zain-deeb-_-vk.pdf

https://cybershafarat.com/?p=524

http://www.treadstone71.com

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Full Suite of Cyber-Threat Intelligence and Counterintelligence Courses Ready for Global Delivery

HALF MOON BAY, CA (PRWEB) JANUARY 25, 2017

Treadstone 71 today announced a full suite of Cyber and Threat Intelligence and CounterIntelligence training courses. The courses drive the expansion of Treadstone 71’s accelerated, academically validated, intelligence training to global markets. Treadstone 71 delivers courses in California, Virginia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands and is set to expand to the Middle East and Asia later this year. (www.planetreg.com/T71IntelTraining)

Treadstone 71 offers a compelling business model that delivers rapid cyber and threat intelligence strategic planning, program build, and targeted training in sectors such as financial services, government, healthcare, energy, and other critical infrastructure verticals. Treadstone 71’s format, curriculum, and instruction model are helping meet critical global demand for cyber and threat intelligence and analysis expertise. Treadstone 71 training provide graduates with an attractive pathway to compensation increases, career progression, and much-needed attention to intelligence. The organization has been teaching cyber intelligence at the Master’s level and commercially for seven years. New courses include a focus on campaign management, the use of Tor, Tails, I2P, and Maltego as well as covering persona development and management. Students create a series of identities, character development, and dimensions, storyline, plot synopsis, story drive and limit, story weaving, applicability, scope, tools to be used, methods of interaction with other identities, engaging secondary characters, refining targeting while developing a campaign to gain street credentials.

“Our courses provide academic instruction combined with real-world, hands-on collection, analysis, analytic writing, dissemination, and briefings that many liken to an apprenticeship,” said Jeff Bardin, Chief Intelligence Officer for Treadstone 71. “Our curriculum follows the teachings of Sherman Kent and Richards Heuer giving students the tools necessary to perform targeted collection, structured analysis while authoring reports modeled after intelligence community standards. We teach methods of cyber infiltration, information and influence operations, counterintelligence strategies, mission based counterintelligence, denial and deception, and counter-denial and deception.”

Treadstone 71 courses are validated and proven by intelligence professionals creating job-ready threat intelligence professionals for global organizations suffering a talent shortage. “Intelligence analysis as an inherently intellectual activity that requires knowledge, judgment, and a degree of intuition,” continued Bardin. “Treadstone 71’s intelligence, counterintelligence, and clandestine cyber HUMINT training and services help organizations transform information into intelligence pertinent to their organization.”

Analysis includes integrating, evaluating, and analyzing all available data — which is often fragmented and even contradictory — and preparing intelligence products. Despite all the attention focused on the operational (collection) side of intelligence, analysis is the core of the process to inform corporate stakeholders. Analysis as more than just describing what is happening and why; identifying a range of opportunities… Intelligence Analysis is the key to making sense of the data and finding opportunities to take action. Analysis expands beyond the technical focus of today providing organizations with core capabilities for business, competitive, cyber, and threat intelligence.

Treadstone 71’s Cyber Intelligence Tradecraft Certification is the gold standard in the industry today derived from both academia and from Treadstone 71’s experience in building cyber intelligence programs at Fortune 500 organizations worldwide.

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Igor Valentinovich Korobov, the current chief of a military intelligence agency Игорь Валентинович Коробов

korobov-bio

Игорь Валентинович Коробов

Treadstone 71 2017 Intelligence Training Courses – Sign up now or inquire about how to have us come onto your site to training.

Glavnoje Razvedyvatel’noje Upravlenije
ГРУ ГШ ВС РФ
Главное Разведывательное Управление

Agency overview
Formed May 7, 1992
Preceding agencies
Jurisdiction President of Russia
Headquarters Grizodubovoy str. 3, Moscow
Minister responsible
Agency executive
  • Igor Korobov, Chairman
Parent agency Ministry of Defense
Child agencies
  • Svyazinformsoyuz Company
  • Directorate for Space Intelligence

440px-generalstaff_central_dep-svg

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