We See What Others Cannot
Defeat of the heavy cyber attack of the Revolutionary Guards and the intelligence of the Mojahid website at 14:30 on Wednesday, 22 September 1402 This attack, which was organized with a density of 3 million requests per second and from about 100 countries, was crushed and failed in the face of the Mujahid site's firewall. 165 serious cyber attacks on Mujahid's website since 1401#خبر
At the request of the Iranian government, the Albanian police raided camp Ashraf 3, the headquarters of exiled PMOI. The MEK has been headquartered in Albania since its exile from Iran and Iraq. According to the organization, over 1000 police officers raided the camp and arrested its members, with several being wounded and one person being killed.
Today, the National Council of Resistance of Iran will provide you with information obtained inside Iran by the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) organization about the Quds Force, as the IRGC’s extraterritorial arm for terrorism, recruiting mercenaries for newly created, armed, and trained terrorist units to attack ships and maritime targets in the region. After the elimination of Qassem Soleimani in January 2020, which weakened the Quds Force’s ability to directly encroach in the countries of the region, the IRGC’s capacity to intrude…
Revolutionary Guards Intelligence Organization following the violation of norms, sabotage and actions against national security in the broadcasting of TV/radio programs, try to save face. https://cybershafarat.com/2022/01/27/hack-of-iranian-channel-one-pictures-of-massoud-rajavi-and-ms-rajavi-with-the-slogan-death-to-khamenei/ The head of the Radio and Television Security Organization was summoned to the National Security Organization to explain the failure of security. https://youtu.be/ZDhh_NUduBU This is following the hack of the IRGC intelligence network. Iran claims to have identified those responsible. The main person fled Iran to Europe and other…
Iranian hacker perspective Following the series of attacks that took place in Iran in the past year, this time the radio and television were targeted, and we will briefly discuss its technical aspects. First of all, because it is political, it can be defined in terms of previous attacks. Second, because several networks have been attacked, it can not be said that only a human error or a human factor was involved, because the conductor…
A few minutes ago, a group tried to hack several radio and television networks. Channel One TV, Radio Tehran, Radio Javan, Radio Eqtesad and Radio Talawat in state and international media A few minutes ago, a picture representing the Mojahedin e Khalq and Maryam Rajavi was published. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ud61OHBZZw4 Investigations have begun into the source of the sabotage. Additional news will be sent later. Meanwhile, the telegram channel of Khorasan Razavi Radio wrote; The image of…
Influence operations shift as Iran adopts Russian techniques
Treadstone 71 reports on Iranian influence operations, cyber operations, persona generation, Basij Cyber Battalions, and targeted adversary analysis (see the links below). Iranian intelligence operations demonstrates fear of dissident and opposition activities abroad and an effort to control and eliminate any potential counter narrative to the official revolutionary line, including assassinations. Iran controls internal communications with Dezhfa.
Iranian Influence Operations - IRGC, MOIS, Basij joint campaign The annual Free Iran World Summit is from July 10-12, 2021 - Is @Twitter ready this year to stop the influence operations by the Iranian Regime? DOWNLOAD BRIEF A dozen years ago, Treadstone 71 shifted adversary targeting from strictly cyber jihadist activity to include Iran. We tracked movements of the earliest hacking groups following their activities from low-level defacements to repurposing Stuxnet to become a recognized…
Since the Treadstone 71 Report release - Original IRGC/MOIS/RGCU/Basiji Twitter accounts New IRGC/MOIS/RGCU/Basiji Twitter accounts
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