Gerasimov Doctrine in Full Swing against the US

The Gerasimov Doctrine is in use in the United States and will come to another crescendo in the near future as our 2018 elections come to bear. Learn how to identify some of the methods when they occur.  #education #cyber #training #intelligence #intel #analysis#collection #elections #analysts #doctrine #intelligencecollection#intelligenceanalysis #gerasimov #putin #russia #olgino

How to help identify propaganda coming from any source. Gerasimov Doctrine in action in the United States.

Where does the speaker or group get their funding? What is their background?

Who are their main supporters?

Does the content have a strong emotional aspect?

Do they provide or describe ominous, stirring, or patriotic images or music?

Do they associate a group, person, event, or idea with something hated or feared?

Do they use slogans of any type that have been heard before and repeated?

Do they use virtue words (e.g. peace, happiness, security, wise leadership, freedom, liberty)?

Is their reasoning poor?

·      Illogical or non-intuitive relationships between concepts

·      Sweeping conclusions from mere anecdotal evidence

·      Issues framed to favor one point of view while deflecting and pivoting

·      Irrelevant or questionable data

·      Vague, undefined terms and concepts

Do you see evidence of false or missing information (telling only half of the story)?

Is there oversimplification?

·      Simple answers to complex social and political questions

·      Blame assigned to an individual or group (scapegoating) without evidence

·      Misleading stereotypes or labels

·      Blanket statements

Is the aim of the article to persuade?

·      Cites or associates prominent figures to a position, idea, argument, or action

·      Repeats ideas until they are accepted as truth

·      Presents ideas as the view of the majority (so get on the bandwagon – wake up)

·      Implies that opposition (to the author’s premise) would be unpatriotic, undemocratic, or inhumane

Does it align information that is not objective and is used primarily to influence an audience and further an agenda? Are facts presented selectively to encourage a particular synthesis or perception or using loaded language to produce an emotional rather than a rational response to the information that is presented. Are the contents associated with material prepared by adversarial governments while ignoring the issues associated with those they support?

Influence operations are focused on affecting the feelings and behaviors of leaders, groups, or entire populations. Influence operations employ capabilities to affect behaviors, protect programs that support their intent, and project false information interspersed with some accurate data to achieve desired effects across the cognitive domain. Influence operations are the coordinated, integrated, and synchronized application of national diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and other capabilities in peacetime, crisis, conflict, and post-conflict to foster attitudes, behaviors, or decisions by US citizens driven by foreign entities bent on creating chaos.

Biases are systematic errors in judgment that human beings consistently make, and our adversaries continue to use against the US populace. Here are 10 that help explain why we will never stop falling for their propaganda and methods to ensure chaos in our society:

1.     Bias blind spot — the tendency not to compensate for one’s own cognitive biases. (This is why nobody thinks they’re biased)

2.     Third-person effect- Belief that mass communicated media messages have a greater effect on others than on themselves. (This is why propaganda is so effective. It does not affect me!)

3.     Authority bias — The tendency to attribute greater accuracy to the opinion of an authority figure (unrelated to its content) and be more influenced by that opinion. (This is why some of Trump’s supporters believe everything he says no matter what)

4.     Declinism – The belief that a society or institution is tending towards decline. Particularly, it is the predisposition to view the past favorably and future negatively. (This is why ‘Make America Great Again’ was such an effective message)

5.     Confirmation bias — the tendency to search for or interpret information in a way that confirms one’s preconceptions. (This is why people click on fake news they want to be true)

6.     Bandwagon effect — The tendency to believe things because many other people believe the same. (This is why people believe fake news shared by their friends)

7.     Availability cascade — A self-reinforcing process in which a collective belief gains more and more plausibility through its increasing repetition in public discourse. (This is why fake news become true the more it is shared)

8.     Continued influence effect — The tendency to believe previously learned misinformation even after it has been corrected. (This is why Hillary’s ‘formal accusation’ had such a big effect even after Comey dropped charges)

9.     Hostile media effect — the tendency to perceive news coverage as biased against your position on an issue. (This is why millions of voters don’t trust the mainstream media)

10. Backfire effect — The urge to do the opposite of what someone wants you to do out of a need to resist a perceived attempt to constrain your freedom of choice. (This is why the media ganging up on Trump completely backfired)

What to learn more?

www.planetreg.com/T71IntelTraining

www.cyberinteltrainingcenter.com

www.treadstone71.com

Iran to cyber-attack the US?

Most all organizations knee-jerk responses to the sanctions as an immediate for Iranian cyber attacks against the US. This is not unusual for such organizations as it helps sell product and is solely based on a limited understanding of the area and a focus on so-called ‘threat intelligence.” A much larger geopolitical view is required. This is a standard response and not one based on evidence or fact but emotional responses to a US-initiated action. Iran has been targeting the United States since approximately 2002 with the formalization of certain digital security and hacking groups in Iran. Any Iranian attacks against the US would lead to exponentially more lethal attacks against Iranian targets by the US. Iran will most likely focus its efforts on suppressing any internal dissent, squashing any visible means of internal turmoil while censoring the ability of Iranian citizens to openly express their contrary viewpoints via the Internet. Treadstone 71 does not believe any attacks on US soil i.e., against critical infrastructures in the US would be productive for Iran at this time. We may see continued probes, scans, and methods of enumeration against these sites but direct attacks are not likely unless it is retaliatory (based upon other than sanction actions by the US). We may see increased cyber actions against US military capabilities in the Persian Gulf as methods of testing relative to war games in and around the Straits of Hormuz. With economic unrest and visibly upset people in Iran, Iran has more internal troubles and will likely focus their efforts there. We do not believe we will see any immediate, state-sponsored attacks against the US from Iran as a result of the sanctions at this time. This could shift and increased vigilance is still warranted.

Our Previous statement from May still holds

With more control over Iranian hackers now as opposed to the past, Rouhani may exhibit restraint thereby not playing into US hawk ‘I told you so’ pundits. Any hacks of substance coming from Iran at this time would be directed by the government but it is unlikely we will see an immediate uptick in activity based upon the already expected response from the current US Administration. Rouhani still has the ability to work China, Russia, and the EU over the existing agreement. If anything, this places the US further on the outside of global activities creating another vacuum where we once stood. Any Iranian overt and targeted hacking at this time against the US would be counterproductive to their aims.

Further to, it is possible that Rouhani detractors inside Iran could execute targeted attacks against the US as a method to discredit his administration while supporting the view from US hawks. Hardliners in Iran are not satisfied with the agreement and may do more beyond hacking to discredit Rouhani with remaining agreement members.

Additionally, adversaries of Iran could execute cyber false flag operations to make attacks look as if they originated from Iran in order to discredit the Iranian leadership as a pretext for increased sanctions and cyber actions.

Regardless, we should expect increases in reconnaissance, phishing, and social engineering actions in preparation for much larger actions. Monitoring of this activity, the locations from which they occur as well as any changes in adversary and payload speed, targeting, and maliciousness, should be increased in standard surveillance and warning actions. An increase in the ‘cyber defcon’ at least for vigilance is warranted.

Deception, Distortion, Dishonesty: The Real Story Behind the Hype – RSA Conference 2018 – San Francisco

Dr. Khatuna Mshvidobadze

In the summer of 2008, Russia attacked Georgia in the first-ever combined kinetic and cyberwar. Sure, the 1990-1991 Gulf War was dubbed the first information war—the use 226571794ecbc84a4232f3e9a42a7041-480x270of information in war is not new. What was new in 2008 was that Russia employed its cyber arm as an independent operational capability alongside its land, sea and air forces. The targets were critical infrastructure. The strategic objectives were to sap Georgia’s will to resist and to provide cover for Russia’s information campaign to deceive the west into believing that somehow little Georgia was the aggressor.

Operational security was paramount—Moscow had to keep everyone confounded about who was behind the cyber attacks. Just like the kinetic invasion, the cyber attacks were long and well-planned, but Russia did a great job covering its tracks. When the shooting stopped, well-meaning researchers investigated what had happened. However, coming from a profession that focuses on computer screens and a culture unaccustomed to the 2018-04-11_9-18-09kind of deception that is part of everyday Russian life, they foundered.

The attacks led us to Russia. We noted uncanny timing. Western experts were indeed confounded when the trail led to kids and criminals. I have been following that trail ever since. Insight into Russia, all-source intelligence and a keen understanding of denial and deception were needed.

Today, saying that the Russian state employs a network of cybercriminals to do its online dirty work is commonplace. One might just as well pretend not to know the identity of those little green men who seized Crimea. But when I started saying it in 2010, you would not believe the resistance I encountered.

Soon after, I met Jeff Bardin, my professor at Utica College, who became mentor and friend. Jeff brings an extraordinary expertise in all-source intelligence and the ways of denial and deception. At this year’s RSA Conference, it is my privilege to combine with him in a talk entitled Deception, Distortion, Dishonesty: The Real Story Behind the Hype.

Jeff will lead off, analyzing the types of D&D, its various dimensions and some tactics that can be employed online and offline. The planners, he will say, must have clear reasons for utilizing D&D based on their goals. They must define the strategic, operational and tactical goals of deception and the criteria for success.

I will point out that Russians do not see cyber warfare as distinct but regard it as just one tool of information war. Look at 2008. The cyber attacks aimed at hampering the Georgian government’s ability to communicate while Moscow’s propaganda machine painted Russia as the aggrieved party. “Information space opens wide asymmetrical possibilities for reducing the fighting potential of an enemy,” writes Valery Vasilyevich Gerasimov, Chief of the Russian General Staff. It’s a remarkable statement, but nothing new—Russian thinking on information warfare has been consistent since the 1980s.

Now, the Kremlin commands a vast network of online intelligence agencies, scientific organizations, academic institutions, criminals, and trolls. We’ll discuss how Russia deals with enemies, foreign and domestic, cyber players and organization, the growing role of the military, tactics, techniques, procedures and tools, vectors, false flags, troll factories and more. Come join us on Wednesday at the RSA Conference.

KM

Treadstone 71 Selected to Deliver at the RSA Conference 2018 San Francisco

Foundations for a Strong Intelligence Program
April 18, 9AM-11AM RSA Conference
This Lab will explore key aspects of building a strong and long-lasting cyberthreat intelligence program. We’ll review methods of threat intelligence platform selection and bake-off techniques as well as cover stakeholder analysis and priority intelligence requirements. Additionally, we’ll practice collection planning and mission management as well as how to establish effective reporting and dissemination capabilities.

rsa2018
Cyber CounterIntelligence – Deception, Distortion, Dishonesty
April 18, 1:45PM-2:30PM RSA Conference
Deception, distortion, dishonesty are core to social media postings. Our adversaries use these methods concocting stories that create illusions that are meant to leave us divided. The talk will cover methods of countering their messaging while applying these tactics to protect your own organization and brand. Moving from intelligence to counterintelligence is the natural next step in our evolution.

Zapad Exercises – 2nd/3rd Order Effects

 

The recent Russian Zapad wargaming exercises included a plethora of electronic capabilities demonstration and potentially more. Russia is known to recently been involved in illegal immigration efforts in Sweden, Finland, and Norway along with hostile intent along its northern borders (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) including cell/communication tower tampering. Could the recent Zapad exercises be more than just wargaming?

Some What If thoughts on these non-linear actions:

– Testing capabilities, distance, strength, impacts
– Testing responses like a stone in pond
    – 2nd and 3rd order effects were measured to determine the impact on targets, targets responses, etc.
    – Russians had people in each target country assisting with target impacts
    – Russians monitored target government communications from within each country
    – Determine length of time for target government to respond and what methods were used and where to get communications back online (if at all) – the locations of the response represent capabilities unknown to Russia until such an exercise is performed
– Other possibles:
     – A cover for illegal activities that occurred during the exercise – a feint, a ruse
 – Testing a precursor to actual execution – that is why military exercises are performed
 – What capabilities are being left in the exercise areas; what is not being removed after the exercise using the exercise as a ruse to place assets close to Western borders that were not there before
 What do you think?
 https://uawire.org/news/media-belarusian-and-russian-militaries-are-jamming-mobile-communications-along-border-with-poland

Valery Vasilevich Gerasimov – Валерий Васильевич Герасимов

Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation / First Deputy Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation, General of the Army._64031862_gerasimov

Валерий Васильевич Герасимов

Born      8 September 1955 (age 62)

Kazan, Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic

Married – one son

Russian hackers reportedly stole NSA data via Kaspersky Lab software

http://algo.fyi/5vhjug

Born on 8 September 1955 in the city of Kazan. In 1977, he graduated from the Kazan Higher Tank Command School named after the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar ASSR (Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic). He commanded platoon, company, battalion in the Northern Group of Troops and Far Eastern Military District.

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After his graduation from the Military Academy of Armored Troops named after Marshal of the Soviet Union R.Ya. Malinovsky in the year of 1987, he served as the chief of headquarters and commander of tank regiment, the chief of headquarters of motorized rifle division in the Baltic Military District. From 1993 to 1995 — the commander of motorized rifle division in the North-Western Group of Troops.

After graduating from the Kazan Higher Tank Command School Gerasimov was the commander of a platoon, company, and battalion of the Far Eastern Military District. Later he was chief of staff of a tank regiment and then of a motorized rifle division in the Baltic Military District. From 1993 to 1995 he was the commander of the 144th Guards Motor Rifle Division in the Baltic Military District and then the North-Western Group of Forces.

After he graduated from the General Staff’s academy he was First Deputy Army Commander in the Moscow Military District and commander of the 58th Army in the North Caucasus Military District during the Second Chechen War. His involvement in the arrest of Yuri Budanov led to praise from journalist Anna Politkovskaya.

g3In 2006, he became commander of Leningrad Military District and moved to be the commander of Moscow Military District in 2009 and Central Military District in April 2012. On 23 December 2010, he became deputy Chief of the General Staff

In 1997 after his graduation from the Military Academy of the RF Armed Forces’ General Staff, he served as the First Deputy Commander of Army in the Moscow Military District, the Deputy Commander, Chief of Staff and Commander of the 58th Army in the North Caucasian Military District.

From 2003 to 2005 — the Chief of Staff of the Far Eastern Military District. From 2005 — the Chief of the Main Administration of Combat Training and Troops’ Service of the RF Armed Forces, and from December 2006 — the Chief of Staff of the North Caucasian Military District.vg4.png

In December 2006, he was assigned as the Commander of the Leningrad Military District, and in February 2009 — as the Commander of the Moscow Military District.

From December 2010 — the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

From 26 April 2012 — the Commander of the Central Military District.

Gerasimovs-linjal

03-02By the RF Presidential Decree of 9 November 2012, he has been appointed the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation / First Deputy Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation. He was appointed by President Vladimir Putin on 9 November 2012. Some authors credit Gerasimov as the person behind a so-called “Gerasimov doctrine” – currently prevalent in Russian military strategy – combining military, technological, information, diplomatic, economic, cultural and other tactics, which are then deployed towards one set of strategic objectives. This “political warfare” is preferred due to its comparatively low cost.

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The previous Chief of General Staff, Army General Nikolay Makarov, was seen as close to Serduykov and was seen by commentators as likely to be replaced by new Defence Minister Sergey Shoygu. It has been reported that Makarov resigned, but he was formally dismissed by President Vladimir Putin. Other changes were the dismissal of Alexander Sukhorukov from the position of First Deputy Defence Minister and his replacement by Colonel General Arkady Bakhin, formerly commander of the Western Military District. Aerospace Defence Forces commander Colonel General Oleg Ostapenko was also promoted to Deputy Defence Minister. He was promoted to the highest rank in the Russian Army, General of the Army as of 2014. On September 15, 2016, he and Turkish chief of staff General Hulusi Akar conducted a

03-03

meeting on the future of Syria in the Ankara headquarters of the army. That meeting will result in tightened dealings between Russia and Turkey.

There is an old Soviet-era rhetorical device that a ‘warning’ or a ‘lesson’ from some other situation is used to outline intent and plan. The way that what purports to be an after-action take on the Arab Spring so closely maps across to what was done in Ukraine is striking. Presenting the Arab Spring–wrongly–as the results of covert Western operations allows Gerasimov the freedom to talk about what he may also want to talk about: how Russia can subvert and destroy states without direct, overt and large-scale military intervention. However, the assumption that this is a Western gambit primarily does appear genuinely-held. https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war/

image_f02f46e5-5865-43de-957e-a19b266b57fb20170903_133742

VPK_08_476

In April 2014 Gerasimov was added to the list of persons against whom the European Union introduced sanctions “in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence of Ukraine.”

Hero of the Russian Federation.

Personal decorations: Order for Military Merits, Order for Merits to the Fatherland 4th grade, Order for Service to the Homeland in the USSR’s Armed Forces 3rd grade, Order of St. George 4th grade, Order for Merits to the Fatherland with Swords 3rd grade, Order for Honor.

The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness.

For me, this is probably the most important line in the whole piece, so allow me to repeat it: The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness. In other words, this is an explicit recognition not only that all conflicts are actually means to political ends–the actual forces used are irrelevant–but that in the modern realities, Russia must look to non-military instruments increasingly. https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war/

 https://warontherocks.com/2016/03/russian-hybrid-warfare-and-other-dark-arts/

 

 

 

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