Kremlin messaging around this leak does not defend peace talks; Kremlin messaging attacks the information environment around those talks. Calling the exposure of a real conversation “hybrid warfare” functions as hybrid warfare and narrative control in its own right.
1. Weaponising the “hybrid warfare” label
Russian officials grab a Western term of art, strip it of meaning, and hurl it back as a political slur.
Yuri Ushakov brands the publication “unacceptable” and calls it “hybrid warfare,” while Sergei Ryabkov claims unnamed “media organisations” act as tools in an information war by European states. Kremlin language reframes a basic act of journalism—publishing leaks that expose real diplomatic manoeuvring—as an attack equivalent to covert hostile action.
Information operations doctrine loves this move. Analysts describe how hostile actors saturate an unconstrained information environment, then race to shape first impressions before facts settle. Russian practice follows that script: grab the microphone first, label the leak an assault, force every later discussion to orbit that frame.
Officials do not contest the key fact—that a call took place where a Trump envoy coached a Putin aide on how to sell a plan largely aligned with Russian demands. Officials contest the meaning of its exposure. That contest over meaning is the information battle.
2. Classic denial-and-deception pattern
Kremlin messaging around the leak tracks almost line-by-line with formal deception tradecraft.
Deception planners start from a simple checklist:
- deny own responsibility;
- attribute events to a hostile information attack;
- attack the credibility of channels that reveal inconvenient truths;
- push a cover story that explains away damaging signals.
Kremlin actors tick every box:
- Denial and compartmentalisation.
Ushakov insists encrypted government channels “rarely” leak and claims participants could not have done it. That statement quietly narrows the suspect set and steers attention away from Russian-side interception failures or intra-elite infighting. - Dismissal as “fake.”
Kirill Dmitriev brands Bloomberg’s second call transcript “fake,” without offering technical proof. That move inoculates Russian domestic audiences against any follow-up disclosures and builds a reflex: anything that embarrasses the Kremlin becomes “fake,” even when a senior aide already confirmed one call existed. - Reflexive projection.
Ryabkov asserts that Western states wage hybrid information war and use media as instruments. Russian doctrine openly treats information as a primary combat domain, with integrated propaganda, psychological operations, and cyber activity across strategic, operational, and tactical levels. When Kremlin spokesmen accuse others of information aggression, they project their own method in order to normalise it and blur responsibility.
That combination—denial, dismissal, projection—matches structured denial-and-deception checklists used to evaluate adversary information.
3. Objectives behind the outrage
Russian rhetoric does not react emotionally; Russian rhetoric pursues concrete information objectives.
a) Regain initiative over the peace narrative
The leak shows a Trump envoy effectively coaching Moscow on how to pitch a plan that locks in Russian territorial gains, blocks NATO membership, and caps Ukrainian rearmament. Exposure threatens the Kremlin line that Russia simply responds to Western proposals.
By branding the leak “hybrid warfare” and “an attempt to hinder negotiations,” Ushakov flips roles. Western publics see a covertly Russia-tilted deal; Kremlin messaging encourages Russian and some foreign audiences to see shadowy Western saboteurs trying to wreck pragmatic peace. That reversal shields Moscow from charges of manipulation while painting critics of the plan as reckless spoilers.
Structured foresight work in influence analysis stresses that actors fight hardest over early framing, because first narratives lock in and later corrections have less effect. Kremlin spokesmen clearly understand that dynamic and rush to set “hybrid warfare against peace talks” as the reference story.
b) Intimidate intermediaries and sources
Ushakov announces he will “raise the matter” with Witkoff. Russian coverage headlines “Who set up Steve Witkoff?” to suggest that some hostile actor tricked or betrayed Trump’s envoy.
That framing does two things at once:
- warns foreign intermediaries that any leak around talks brings personal risk and reputational damage;
- hints to domestic insiders that Kremlin security organs will hunt for culprits.
Cyber-psyops training materials highlight how authoritarian actors rely on intimidation narratives to keep channels closed and discourage whistleblowing. Kremlin messaging does exactly that: anyone who talks or records risks getting branded as part of a “hybrid attack.”
c) Discredit Western media as hostile assets
Bloomberg and others get cast as instruments in an anti-Russian operation. That portrayal dovetails with long-running Russian themes that independent outlets function as proxies of Western intelligence.
Such framing aims at two layers:
- Russian domestic audiences receive a simple takeaway: “foreign outlets publish leaks to hurt Russia and block peace; ignore them.”
- sympathetic foreign audiences, including Trump’s base, get an excuse to attack the leak as a “deep state hit,” not as evidence of collusion around a lopsided peace plan.
That multi-audience structure reflects modern PSYOP practice in unconstrained environments: one narrative, tuned differently for each segment, repeated through multiple channels until it becomes ambient noise.
4. Hybrid warfare as cover word, not concept
Kremlin officials treat “hybrid warfare” less as a doctrinal concept and more as a rhetorical club.
Hybrid warfare in professional literature describes integration of military, cyber, information, economic, and proxy tools into a coordinated campaign. Russia’s own multi-year campaign against Ukraine fits that pattern:
- armed invasion and occupation;
- massive disinformation and PSYOPS efforts targeting both Ukrainian populations and foreign audiences;
- continuous cyber campaigns against Ukrainian infrastructure and Western networks.
Against that backdrop, “hybrid warfare” in Kremlin mouthpieces’ statements about a leak simply functions as a smokescreen. Russian officials fold a journalistic act into the same category as sabotage, espionage, and psychological attack. That move lets them:
- inflate victimhood;
- justify counter-measures against media and sources as “defence”;
- obscure their own hybrid actions while accusing others.
Analysts of Russian doctrine describe this as reflexive control: shape the adversary’s interpretation of events so the adversary responds in ways that benefit Russia. Kremlin use of “hybrid warfare” here invites Western commentators to argue over process—who intercepted, who leaked, whether that action crosses some line—instead of dwelling on content: a pro-Russian plan quietly shepherded through Trump’s circle.
5. Narrative technique inside the quotes
A close read of the quotes shows layered narrative engineering, not off-the-cuff indignation.
- “Unacceptable.”
That word sets a moral boundary and implies a right to retaliate without specifying what retaliation. Ambiguity creates deterrence value: journalists and insiders must guess how far Moscow intends to go. - “Hinder discussions between Russia and the United States.”
Phrase selection pushes a subtle false premise: that the principal axis of peace runs through Kremlin–Trump contacts, not through Ukrainian agency or multilateral formats. Anyone who questions that channel supposedly sides with war, not with Kyiv’s security concerns. - “Fake.”
Dmitriev’s flat label attacks the second call without evidence, yet the simplicity seeks to anchor scepticism. Hybrid operators understand that repeated, confident denial influences low-information audiences more than nuanced explanation. - Vagueness around channels.
Ushakov mentions WhatsApp and encrypted lines, speaks about how interception “rarely” happens unless someone intends a leak. That technical gloss has two jobs: - create an aura of sophistication and victimhood (“even secure Russian systems face exotic Western attacks”);
- seed doubt about any future recordings (“someone must have manipulated or planted them”).
Deception handbooks stress this tactic: provide just enough technical detail to sound expert, then pivot to a narrative that benefits the planner. Kremlin spokesmen follow that pattern line-for-line.
6. Net effect: offensive cognitive warfare under a victim mask
Kremlin rhetoric around the Witkoff leak does three things at once:
- corrupts the information space around Ukraine negotiations;
- shields a lopsided peace concept from democratic scrutiny;
- threatens those who expose inconvenient facts.
Information-operations scholars talk about cognitive operations that “affect attitudes and behaviors by influencing, protecting, or disrupting cognition over time.” Kremlin behaviour in response to this leak fits that definition perfectly. Russian officials seek to:
- influence audiences to view the leak as an anti-peace plot;
- protect their preferred back-channel architecture from oversight and accountability;
- disrupt the ability of publics and policymakers to reason clearly about who benefits from the proposed plan.
Hybrid warfare, in Russian hands, does not just involve tanks and missiles alongside trolls and hackers. Hybrid warfare, in Russian hands, lives in the language officials use when reality slips out. Kremlin spokesmen step to the podium, shout “hybrid warfare” at an unwelcome leak, and in that moment conduct a fresh information strike.