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Losses of Russia on January 12, 2023
Approximate assessment of the Armed Forces from 02/24/2022

Personnel: ~454160 (+1720)
killed: ~113,390 (+430)
wounded: ~340.170 (+1290)
captured: ~600 (0)

Military equipment: 19443 (+10)
Armored combat vehicles: 6159 (0)
Tanks: 3094 (0)
Artillery: 2082 (+4)
Aircraft: 285 (0)
Helicopters: 276 (+1)
RSZV: 437 (0)
Air defense means: 218 (+1)
Automotive equipment and tanks: 4826 (0)
BpLA OTR: 1865 (+3)
Special equipment: 184 (0)
Ships and boats: 17 (+1)
Missiles: >9000 (no data)

Percentage characteristics of Russian losses (January 12, 2023):

Personnel:
– 59.68% | from the intended for invasion (190,000 units)
– 12.6% | from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (900,000 units)
– 0.23% | daily percentage of destruction from the intended for invasion (190,000 units)
– 0.05% | daily percentage of destruction from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (900,000 units)

Armored combat vehicles:
– 100.0% | from the intended for invasion (2900 units)
– 44.77% | from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (13,758 units)
– 0.0% | daily percentage of destruction from the intended for invasion (2900 units)
– 0.0% | daily percentage of destruction from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (13,758 units)

Tanks:
– 100.0% | from the intended for invasion (1200 units)
– 93.76% | from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (3,300 units)
– 0.0% | daily percentage of destruction from the intended for invasion (1200 units)
– 0.0% | daily percentage of destruction from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (3,300 units)

Artillery:
– 100.0% | from the intended for invasion (1600 units)
– 36.6% | from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (5,689 units)
– 0.25% | daily percentage of destruction from the intended for invasion (1600 units)
– 0.07% | daily percentage of destruction from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (5,689 units)

Aircraft:
– 86.36% | from the intended for invasion (330 units)
– 20.67% | from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (1,379 units)
– 0.0% | daily percentage of destruction from the intended for invasion (330 units)
– 0.0% | daily percentage of destruction from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (1,379 units)

Helicopters:
– 100.0% | from the intended for invasion (240 units)
– 28.72% | from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (961 units)
– 0.42% | daily percentage of destruction from the intended for invasion (240 units)
– 0.1% | daily percentage of destruction from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (961 units)

Marine:
– 22.67% | from the intended for invasion (75 units)
– 3.28% | from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (519 units)
– 1.33% | daily percentage of destruction from the intended for invasion (75 units)
– 0.19% | daily percentage of destruction from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (519 units)

RSZV, Air defense means, Automotive equipment, tanks, BpLA OTR: No data

Map of combat operations
Application time: 05:57:40 01/13/2023

WARNING! The map is dangerous and forbidden to use for planning evacuation routes. It has inaccuracies and is updated with a delay

The number of forced refugees as of January 12, 2023
Estimated estimate of UNHCR from 24.02.2022

Total number of forced refugees: 16.6 million (January 12, 2023)

Returned to Ukraine: 8.71 million (12.01.2023)

Hungary:
– 11.63% | 1,929,514 (12/20/2022)

Belarus:
– 0.1% | 16,705 (12/20/2022)

Poland:
– 50.31% | 8,349,746 (12/20/2022)

Moldova:
– 4.38% | 726,676 (12/20/2022)

Romania:
– 10.22% | 1,695,870 (18.12.2022)

Russian Federation ⃰:
– 17.19% | 2,852,395 (October 3, 2022)

Slovakia:
– 6.17% | 1,024,101 (12/20/2022)

⃰ The number of refugees recorded in the country is approximate, as potential further movements or returns cannot currently be taken into account

About Post Author

Treadstone 71

@Treadstone71LLC Cyber intelligence, counterintelligence, Influence Operations, Cyber Operations, OSINT, Clandestine Cyber HUMINT, cyber intel and OSINT training and analysis, cyber psyops, strategic intelligence, Open-Source Intelligence collection, analytic writing, structured analytic techniques, Target Adversary Research, cyber counterintelligence, strategic intelligence analysis, estimative intelligence, forecasting intelligence, warning intelligence, threat intelligence
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By Treadstone 71

@Treadstone71LLC Cyber intelligence, counterintelligence, Influence Operations, Cyber Operations, OSINT, Clandestine Cyber HUMINT, cyber intel and OSINT training and analysis, cyber psyops, strategic intelligence, Open-Source Intelligence collection, analytic writing, structured analytic techniques, Target Adversary Research, cyber counterintelligence, strategic intelligence analysis, estimative intelligence, forecasting intelligence, warning intelligence, threat intelligence