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The total combat losses of the enemy from 24.02 to 11.09 were approximately:

personnel / about 52,650 (+400) persons were liquidated / persons were liquidated,
tanks ‒ 2154 (+18) units,
armored fighting vehicles / APV ‒ 4617 (+33) units,
artillery systems – 1263 (+4) units,
RSZV / MLRS – 311 (+0) units,
anti-aircraft warfare systems ‒ 162 (+0) units,
aircraft – 242 (+3) units,
helicopters – 213 (+1) units,
UAV operational-tactical level – 902 (+4),
cruise missiles ‒ 216 (+1),
ships / boats / warships / boats ‒ 15 (+0) units,
vehicles and fuel tanks – 3445 (+19) units,
special equipment ‒ 117 (+1).

The enemy suffered the greatest losses in the Kharkiv and Donetsk directions.


Percentage characteristics of Russia’s losses (10.09.2022):

Personnel:
– 100.0% | from the intended for invasion (190,000 units)
– 23.29% | from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (900,000 units)
– 0.74% | daily percentage of destruction from the intended for invasion (190,000 units)
– 0.16% | daily percentage of destruction from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (900,000 units)

Armored combat vehicles:
– 100.0% | from the intended for invasion (2900 units)
– 33.32% | from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (13,758 units)
– 0.31% | daily percentage of destruction from the intended for invasion (2900 units)
– 0.07% | daily percentage of destruction from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (13,758 units)

Tanks:
– 100.0% | from the intended for invasion (1200 units)
– 64.73% | from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (3,300 units)
– 1.17% | daily percentage of destruction from the intended for invasion (1200 units)
– 0.42% | daily percentage of destruction from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (3,300 units)

Artillery:
– 78.69% | from the intended for invasion (1600 units)
– 22.13% | from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (5,689 units)
– 1.38% | daily percentage of destruction from the intended for invasion (1600 units)
– 0.39% | daily percentage of destruction from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (5,689 units)

Aircraft:
– 72.42% | from the intended for invasion (330 units)
– 17.33% | from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (1,379 units)
– 0.0% | daily percentage of destruction from the intended for invasion (330 units)
– 0.0% | daily percentage of destruction from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (1,379 units)

Helicopters:
– 88.33% | from the intended for invasion (240 units)
– 22.06% | from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (961 units)
– 0.42% | daily percentage of destruction from the intended for invasion (240 units)
– 0.1% | daily percentage of destruction from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (961 units)

Marine:
– 20.0% | from the intended for invasion (75 units)
– 2.89% | from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (519 units)
– 0.0% | daily percentage of destruction from the intended for invasion (75 units)
– 0.0% | daily percentage of destruction from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (519 units)

RSZV, Air defense means, Automotive equipment, tanks, BpLA OTR: No data

About Post Author

Treadstone 71

@Treadstone71LLC Cyber intelligence, counterintelligence, Influence Operations, Cyber Operations, OSINT, Clandestine Cyber HUMINT, cyber intel and OSINT training and analysis, cyber psyops, strategic intelligence, Open-Source Intelligence collection, analytic writing, structured analytic techniques, Target Adversary Research, cyber counterintelligence, strategic intelligence analysis, estimative intelligence, forecasting intelligence, warning intelligence, threat intelligence
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By Treadstone 71

@Treadstone71LLC Cyber intelligence, counterintelligence, Influence Operations, Cyber Operations, OSINT, Clandestine Cyber HUMINT, cyber intel and OSINT training and analysis, cyber psyops, strategic intelligence, Open-Source Intelligence collection, analytic writing, structured analytic techniques, Target Adversary Research, cyber counterintelligence, strategic intelligence analysis, estimative intelligence, forecasting intelligence, warning intelligence, threat intelligence