Russian Armed Forces and the Troika Compendium

Russia adapts under fire, shifts to UAV-driven “fire then maneuver,” and blends EW, rail mobility, and joint strike networks—yet corruption, NCO gaps, and logistics frictions keep forcing costly gains, not quick wins.

Russian Armed Forces and the Troika Compendium authors—former U.S. Army FAOs—observing Russian combat behavior in Ukraine from 24 Feb 2022 through mid-2024.

A systematic account of Russian command, movement, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection that shows steady learning in UAV-enabled targeting, “networked fires,” glide-bomb CAS, and rapid rail redeployment, alongside persistent failures in small-unit leadership, training, and clean logistics.

Adversaries face a thinking opponent that now hunts air defenses, HIMARS, and depots in the operational rear, often with pattern-of-life and long-reach observation UAVs that cue Iskander, Tornado-S, Lancet, and UMPK bombs. Weaknesses remain exploitable—especially the lack of a true NCO corps, chronic corruption, and over-centralized control that invites attrition traps.

Field behavior since Avdiivka (early 2024) confirms a shift to fog-window infiltration, dismounted closes, and relentless glide-bomb pressure while artillery groups reach 100–120 km with UAV-observed kills and faster tasking across “joint” menus. Ukrainian rear targets no longer enjoy sanctuary by default.

Russian forces regain initiative episodically, not decisively. Tactical success rides on reconnaissance constellations and EW cover. Cost in leaders, armor, and convicts remains high. Logistics survives through dispersal, rail depth, and civil-society backfill, yet remains vulnerable to deep strikes and chokepoints.
Strategic foresight — Expect more range, more redundancy, more night fighting, and more joint cue-to-shoot speed. Expect renewed pressure on air defenses with Kh-35U plus ground missiles, expanded glide-bomb kits, and denser EW. Expect rail-enabled surprise shifts to plug crises. Expect continued friction from leadership churn and graft. Prepare for “long grind learning,” not sudden maneuver overmatch.

Analysis and storyline
Russian adaptation patterns — Russian forces learn under contact, then lock gains through procedure. Early failures around Kyiv yielded tighter direction, repeatable rail moves, and a decisive pivot to UAV-centric collection. Orlan-30, ZALA 421-16E2, and Supercam S350 moved from scarce assets to layered constellations. Those constellations now run pattern-of-life cycles, map heat signatures, and track mobile targets to service with the “menu” of Lancet, Krasnopol, Tornado-S, Iskander-M, and UMPK. Fires coordination rose from stove-piped branches to combined-arms army artillery groups that can request the right shooter on the right timeline. Russian air moved from risky CAS to standoff UMPK drops, increasingly guided by ground UAVs.

Command and control — Leaders still centralize decisions, favor the “science of control,” and trust decision maps. Learning at the edge comes slower. Chiefs of Staff act as second-in-command and as integrators. Lack of empowered NCOs stretches lieutenants, pushes generals forward, and inflates officer losses. Corruption erodes readiness and supply while periodic purges change faces, not incentives.

Movement and maneuver — Rail gives strategic interior lines. Divisions and naval infantry reappear across fronts within days. Operations still read as “fire, then maneuver,” especially where mines or EW deny tempo. Avdiivka marked a turn—dismounted infiltration under morning fog, tunnel use, and denial of UAV reconnaissance through weather windows. That turn succeeded tactically, yet drained formations and did not resolve structural issues.

Fires and EW — Artillery dominance now depends on UAV survival and EW cover. Russian units disperse tubes, fire brief volleys, and scoot. AAGs extend reach to 100–120 km, conduct BDA, and retask within one cycle. Glide bombs pressure front-edge logistics and defenses daily. Strela-10 hunts and counters UAVs; Russian units also target Ukrainian Strela-10s to clear the air picture. EW arrays (Palantin and others) jam comms and GPS, yet face agile Ukrainian counter-EW and weapon updates. Advantage swings by sector and week.

Sustainment — Rail hubs, ferries, and dispersed forward caches keep ammunition flowing after deep-strike shocks. Truck shortages and bridge strikes still slow tempo. Civil groups supply optics, FPV kits, and comms to fill gaps. Fuel theft, poor maintenance, and weak heavy transport recur. Russian industry accelerates glide-kit and UAV output while reactivating older armor. Sustained output offsets losses; quality mismatches remain.

Protection — Air defenses defend cities and critical hubs while some S-300/400 missiles switch to ground attack roles. Russian forces harden depots, move radars, and mix decoys with real launchers. Ukrainian strikes keep forcing relocation and dispersal. The survivability race continues under persistent UAV surveillance.

Disinformation, MISO, cognitive manipulation, and deception
Narrative framing — “Россия учится—Russia learns” functions as a resilience slogan and a persuasion anchor. The phrase reduces setbacks to tuition costs and reframes attrition as progress. Russian military media, mil-bloggers, and official channels echo adaptation vignettes—“long-range precision,” “UAV supremacy,” “rail surprise”—to maintain domestic support and to shape foreign risk calculus. Semiotics of competence—decision maps, technical panels, and clean UAV feeds—signal method over chaos. Phrase choice narrows culpability; corruption and waste appear as temporary noise, not structural rot.

Target audiences and MISO effects — Domestic audiences receive stories of precision and learning to blunt grief and normalize costs. Ukrainian audiences receive strikes timed for public moments—funerals, depots, symbolic sites—to sow doubt about sanctuary. Western audiences encounter “inexhaustible Russia” and “inevitable glide bombs,” a nudge toward fatigue. Messaging pairs with visible effects—glide-bomb footage, depot blasts, HIMARS kills—to close the persuasion loop.

Deception and counterdeception — Russian units now conduct pattern-of-life before major strikes, then use decoys and fog windows to protect own movements. Ukrainian decoys still draw fire at times; Russian analysts post “lessons learned” to refine filters. Semiotic cues—fuel trucks at odd hours, heat signatures, unique crane silhouettes—enter checklists. Forensic linguistics on Russian channels shows tighter technical lexicon and fewer grand claims after visible blunders, a sign of moderation to retain credibility.

Link, technical, and semiotic indicators

Leadership and ethics Officers forward, NCO void persists Public arrests for graft, visible beatings in units Culture resists empowered sergeants
Bias checks and alternative hypotheses

Confirmation bias guardrail — Casual video count alone misleads; adversaries publish successes, not misses. Pattern-of-life claims need corroboration across UAV types and days. Rail surprise depends on free corridors; single disruption changes timelines. Attrition accounting needs multi-source methods; open-source visual tallies undercount soft-skinned losses and overcount repeat angles.

Competing theory — A manpower-first surge could swamp defended sectors without smarter targeting. Evidence argues against that pathway long-term; Russian units keep investing in targeting range, night optics, and BDA discipline. A pure maneuver revival remains unlikely without NCO reform and logistics mass.

Countermeasures and opportunities
Disrupt the constellations — Target repeaters, not just shooters. Deny morning fog windows with time-shifted surveillance and acoustic cueing. Seed decoy heat cycles that waste glide bombs. Blind pattern-of-life with randomized unloading rhythms and false traffic. Complicate rail with interdiction campaigns against repair kits, not only bridges. Press graft fault lines—fuel, tires, and optics—for cascading readiness failures.


Summary
Russian forces learned to see farther, shoot faster, and move quicker by rail. Observation UAVs now stitch fires, EW, and glide bombs into a single kill chain that reaches deep into rear areas. Artillery doctrine shifted from volume to verification—find, strike, assess, and strike again. Leadership and logistics still drag. Lack of NCOs bleeds initiative; corruption bleeds supply; over-centralization bleeds time. Messaging hides cost through the “learning” story while selective footage proves effect. Future combat will feature thicker UAV layers, brisker joint tasking, persistent night action, and repeated rail shuffles. Gaps stay open—small-unit leadership, ethical rot, transport limits. Opponents who break the UAV constellations, scramble patterns, and stress rails will slow the learning curve and reopen operational space.


References — APA
United States Army Europe and Africa. (2025). How Russia Fights—A Compendium of Troika Observations on Russia’s Special Military Operation (1st ed.). Wiesbaden: USAREUR-AF.

Gerasimov, V. (2013). The value of science is in foresight. Voenno-Promyshlennyi Kurier.

Zaluzhnyi, V. (2023). Modern positional warfare and how to win it. Kyiv: General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Baluyevsky, Y. (2024). On contemporary warfare and adaptation. Moscow: Army Standard.