Background: Yemen Strike and Tehran Turmoil
In early June 2025, Israel dramatically expanded its conflict beyond Gaza, targeting the Iran-aligned Houthi rebels in Yemen and even striking inside Iran’s capital. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched an airstrike in Sanaa, Yemen, attempting to assassinate Houthi Chief of Staff Mohammed Abd al-Karim al-Ghamari. This came after the Houthis had fired ballistic missiles at Israel in “solidarity” with Gaza, including a strike near Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion Airport in May. Almost simultaneously, mysterious fires and explosions erupted in Tehran, as Israel carried out unprecedented air raids on Iranian soil, including a strike on a major oil depot near Tehran that set the night sky ablaze. These events prompted a flurry of Israeli official statements, social media posts, and media commentary — many laden with psychological messaging, covert hints, and targeted appeals to audiences across the Middle East.
Official Israeli Statements and Threats
Israeli leaders quickly went on record to frame and amplify these operations. Defense Minister Israel Katz issued stark warnings after the Yemen strikes, explicitly threatening to “hunt down and eliminate” the Houthi leadership. “As we said: If the Houthis continue to fire missiles toward the State of Israel, they will suffer painful blows — and we will also target terror leaders as we have done with [Mohammed] Deif and the Sinwars in Gaza, Nasrallah in Beirut, and Haniyeh in Tehran. We will hunt down and eliminate Abd al-Malik al-Houthi in Yemen as well,” Katz declared. This statement not only vowed to kill the Yemeni Houthi leader Abd al-Malik al-Houthi, but significantly hinted at Israel’s hand in past covert assassinations of Hamas chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, Hamas commander Yahya Sinwar in Gaza, and even Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut. Indeed, Katz publicly acknowledged for the first time that Israel had “beheaded” Haniyeh – who was killed by a mysterious strike in Tehran in July 2024 – and vowed the Houthis would “also be struck a severe blow”. By listing enemies supposedly already eliminated in different capitals, the Defense Minister’s message was a veiled admission of covert operations and a warning that no foe is out of Israel’s reach.
Israeli Air Force F-15 fighters on the tarmac (May 2025) before counterstrikes on Yemen. Israeli officials vowed to strike Houthi targets and leadership in Yemen after Houthi missiles hit Israel.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu echoed this hard line, saying the strikes in Yemen were “just the beginning” and that Israel *“will strike them much harder, including their leadership and all the infrastructure that enables them to harm us.”* Netanyahu explicitly tied the Houthi threat to their patron Iran, noting that Tehran *“provides them support, guidance, and approval.”* In doing so, Israel messaged that the real adversary is Iran, with the Houthis as merely Iran’s pawns. Notably, an Israeli military source confirmed to journalists that the IDF had indeed “conducted strikes in Yemen… in an attempted targeted attack” on al-Ghamari, the Houthi military chief, adding confidently, *“We will soon know if it succeeded.”*. As of that update, the outcome was still unconfirmed, but the very admission of the operation signaled a new openness by Israel about actions far beyond its borders.
Israeli communications also projected an air of justification and legal/moral high ground. In an official statement, the IDF said it is *“determined to continue operating and striking forcefully against anyone who poses a threat to… Israel, at any distance necessary.”*. In other words: geography is no barrier to Israel’s self-defense. This broad mandate implicitly covered strikes as far as Yemen and Iran. The IDF’s Arabic-language spokesman, Lt. Col. Avichay Adraee, underscored this after the Houthi port strikes by posting a pithy Arabic proverb on Twitter: “لقد أعذر من أنذر” – **“He who warns is excused.”**. Adraee’s meaning was clear: Israel had given fair warning, so any ensuing Houthi pain was self-inflicted. Indeed, prior to bombing three Houthi-controlled Red Sea ports, Adraee issued urgent evacuation notices in Arabic, urging all civilians at Hodeidah, Salif, and Ras Isa ports to leave immediately *“for your own safety”*. By publicizing these warnings, Israel not only sought to reduce civilian harm but also to undercut Houthi claims and project an image of ethical high ground – a message aimed both at Western and Arab audiences (highlighting a contrast with Houthi/Iranian “terrorism”). Notably, Adraee pointedly referred to the “terrorist Houthi regime” in those Arabic posts, aligning Israel’s narrative with that of many Sunni Arabs who view the Iran-backed Houthis as a hostile sectarian militia.
Meanwhile in Tehran, Israeli officials struck a triumphalist tone about the escalating covert/overt campaign against Iran. Defense Minister Katz leveled a personal threat at Iran’s supreme leader, saying in a June 14 statement: *“The Iranian dictator is turning the citizens of Iran into hostages… If [Ayatollah Ali] Khamenei continues to fire missiles toward the Israeli home front – Tehran will burn.”*. This chilling warning – essentially promising to set Iran’s capital ablaze if attacks persisted – was a deliberate piece of psychological warfare. Katz was sending a dual message: to Iran’s leadership, that Israel is prepared to exact a dire price in their very homeland; and to Iran’s populace, that their own rulers would bring ruin upon them. He emphasized that Tehran’s residents “will pay a heavy price because of the criminal attacks on Israeli civilians” if Khamenei persists. By shifting blame onto Khamenei’s decisions, Israeli officials aimed to sow doubt among Iranians about their regime’s adventurism.
“Tehran is Ablaze”: Messaging Amid Iran Strikes and Fires
As Israel’s campaign expanded into Iran, its communications mixed operational boasting with psychological impact. In mid-June, Israeli warplanes struck multiple targets in Iran, including an oil storage facility at Tehran’s Shahran oil depot, triggering a massive inferno. Rather than keep ambiguity, Israel Katz took to X (Twitter) to blatantly gloat over the blaze: “Tehran is ablaze,” he posted, as footage of the fire spread on social media. The phrasing was triumphant, signaling to the world (and particularly to Iran and its adversaries) that Israel had literally “lit up” the Iranian capital. Israeli media, quoting defense officials, confirmed the IDF strike on the Tehran oil facility, underscoring that “sources confirmed” Israel was behind the explosion and that the “situation [in Tehran] was under control” from Iran’s perspective. In effect, Israel wanted it known that the fires raging in Tehran were no accident – they were the result of Israeli action.
“Tehran is ablaze”: Flames and smoke billow from a fuel depot near Tehran after an Israeli strike in June 2025. Defense Minister Israel Katz shared such images on social media, celebrating the successful strike and warning Iran’s leaders of worse to come.
Israeli military briefings hammered home the message of unprecedented reach and dominance. An IDF spokesperson announced that overnight *“70 fighter jets struck Tehran… targeting over 40 sites. Initial strikes enabled free operations, securing air dominance. Tehran is no longer untouchable.”* This bold statement – “Tehran is no longer untouchable” – carries enormous psychological weight. It tells Iranians (and observers worldwide) that what was once unthinkable – Israeli jets over Tehran – is now a reality. The IDF even publicized on its official channels (in Hebrew and likely other languages) the remarks of IAF Commander Maj. Gen. Tomer Bar, who called the strikes over Tehran “operationally and nationally significant”, executed with *“professionalism, determination and precision… against an existential threat.”*. The IDF’s social media shared video of these strikes, with footage of explosions in Tehran and boasts about dozens of targets hit. By disseminating this, Israel intended to shock Iran’s military and populace, while reassuring its own public that the threat from Iran was being aggressively neutralized.
At times, Israeli officials have virtually named the “shadow war” victories that previously went unacknowledged. Israeli sources told the press that the Mossad deployed agents on the ground in Iran to assist the air raids – sabotaging air defense systems and missile sites in tandem with the strikes. This is a remarkable semi-admission of covert action: “Mossad agents sabotaged air-defense nodes and missile depots deep inside the Islamic Republic,” as Israeli assessments later detailed. By leaking or announcing such details, Israel is telegraphing to Tehran that “we were inside your territory, weakening you from within”, a potent psychological blow. It also serves to bolster Israel’s deterrent image in the eyes of regional audiences (especially Sunni Gulf states hostile to Iran), showcasing unparalleled intelligence and cyber capabilities. Indeed, Katz had earlier bragged that Israel “blinded Iran’s defense systems” during these operations – a phrase suggesting electronic warfare or cyberattacks that crippled Iran’s radars and early warning. Every such statement is meant to rattle the Iranian leadership’s sense of security.
Crucially, Israeli messaging has sought to drive a wedge between Iran’s regime and its people. The strikes and ensuing damage in Tehran were accompanied by explicit commentary aimed at Iranians. Katz portrayed Khamenei as endangering Iran’s citizens, saying the supreme leader was “bringing about a reality in which… the residents of Tehran will pay a heavy price” for his actions. The Jerusalem Post, often seen as reflecting strategic thinking, ran an editorial titled *“Israel acted – now it’s time for the Iranian people to rise.”* This op-ed argued that the fear had shifted to “the men in Tehran’s palaces” and that Israel’s offensive “gave ordinary Iranians a once-in-a-generation opening” to topple their oppressors. It reminded readers that Iran’s regime had delivered nothing but isolation and economic misery, and exhorted, *“Rise up. Seize this moment… We are not at war with the Iranian people; we are at war with the regime.”*. Such rhetoric, while coming from media and not an official government spokesperson, aligns with Israel’s strategic narrative: encouraging internal unrest and highlighting Khamenei’s vulnerability. By amplifying any sign of protest or discontent in Tehran (for instance, sharing footage of demonstrators or angry social media reactions when they occur), Israeli outlets and social accounts aim to resonate with Sunni and international audiences who would welcome regime instability in Iran. It’s psychological warfare at the strategic level – suggesting that Iran’s leaders are weak and under siege not only from Israeli might but from their own people.
Influential Social Media Narratives (Defense & Intel Affiliates)
Beyond formal statements, a cadre of Israeli military communicators and unofficial influencers amplified these messages on social platforms. Col. Avichay Adraee, the IDF’s Arabic spokesman, is a prime example. With a large following across the Arab world, Adraee often crafts posts to appeal to Arabic-speaking Sunni audiences. During this conflict, he engaged in open taunting of Israel’s enemies. When a senior Houthi official condemned Israel’s Yemen strikes as “atrocities,” Adraee shot back on X: *“He hit me and cried, then ran away to complain.”* – essentially mocking the Houthis for attacking Israel and then whining about the response. Adraee’s tone (“ ضربني وبكى ” in Arabic, a common taunt) was aimed at eroding the Houthis’ image among Arabs, casting them as both aggressors and cowards. Likewise, Adraee’s frequent use of the hashtag #الحوثي_الإرهابي (“#Terrorist_Houthi”) reinforces a narrative palatable to Sunni publics (who largely dislike the Shi’ite Houthis). By branding Houthi missile launches as Iranian-orchestrated terror, Israel seeks to align itself with Sunni Arab interests. Gulf Arab media have indeed echoed these Israeli messages; for example, Saudi-owned outlets like Al-Hadath and Arab News prominently reported Katz’s quote that “Tehran will burn” if Khamenei persists, and detailed the damage Israeli strikes inflicted on Iran. The synergy is notable: Israeli and Saudi narratives converging against a common foe (Iran and its proxies).
Some Israeli social media influencers with intelligence or defense backgrounds have also been very active. For instance, Edy Cohen – an Israeli Arab-affairs commentator and reportedly a former intelligence operative – often tweets in Arabic to antagonize Iran and its allies. During the conflict, such figures have circulated dramatic (if sometimes misleading) visuals of explosions in Iran. In one case, Cohen shared a sensational photo claiming to show an IRGC warehouse blowing up, which turned out to be old footage from a prior incident. While fact-checkers debunked that particular image as *“misleading”*, the intent behind these posts is clear: to magnify perceptions of chaos and sabotage inside Iran. By flooding Arabic social channels with images (real or not) of Iran in flames, these influencers feed into the anger that many Sunni Arabs feel toward Tehran’s regime, possibly hoping to incite greater opposition or at least schadenfreude. It’s a form of psy-op via social media: exaggerating the success of covert operations and the instability in Iran to demoralize Iranians and energize Iran’s enemies. Israeli security commentators on X (Twitter) like Yossi Melman have also emphasized the psychological blows dealt to Iran. After an Iranian nuclear scientist was assassinated (an operation widely attributed to Israel), Melman tweeted that it was a *“major psychological and professional blow for Iran.”* Such commentary, especially coming from well-known intelligence correspondents, often blurs the line between analysis and deliberate signal. It reassures the Israeli public (and anti-Iran audiences) that Israel’s covert capabilities are crippling the enemy, while sending an unnerving message to Tehran that “we can reach you and you won’t even see it coming.”
Another influential channel is the Hebrew-language Telegram (and website) Abu Ali Express, believed by many to be run by Israeli intelligence insiders. Abu Ali Express provides rapid information on Middle East events, often ahead of official announcements. During Iran’s recent unrest (like the 2022 protests and current war escalation), it has highlighted protests in Tehran and even anti-Khamenei chants. By disseminating such content, Israeli-affiliated outlets amplify Iranian internal dissent, implicitly urging it on. While not explicitly an Israeli government voice, the effect is to bolster the narrative that “the Iranian people are fed up and the regime is crumbling from within.” All of this complements Israel’s overt calls for Iranian citizens to rise up.
Aiming at Sunni Audiences and Psychological Impact
A striking feature of these communications is how tailored they are to resonate with Sunni Arab populations angry at Iran. Israel’s strategists recognize that the Iran-led “axis” (including Houthis, Hezbollah, etc.) is viewed with deep hostility by many Sunni governments and communities. Thus, Israeli messaging frequently emphasizes the sectarian and regional angle: Iran is a dangerous common enemy, and Israel’s actions benefit not just Israelis but Arabs too. For example, when Netanyahu and Katz compare the Houthis to Hamas and Hezbollah, labeling all as parts of an “axis of evil” supported by Tehran, they appeal to the Gulf Arab narrative of containing Iran’s meddling. By attacking the Houthis (who have also fought a war with Saudi Arabia), Israel is implicitly positioning itself as aligning with Sunni Arab interests. This can be a powerful message to quietly win approval in places like Riyadh or Abu Dhabi. Indeed, after Israel’s Yemen strikes, some Arabic social media users (even in enemy states) expressed satisfaction. One monitor noted “‘Thank you, uncle Netanyahu’: some Iranians praise Israeli strikes” and Sunni commentators highlighted that Israel was doing what Arab leaders could not – directly punishing the Iranian regime.
Psychologically, Israeli communications leverage veiled threats and triumphant tone to unnerve adversaries. The repeated references to assassinating leaders (e.g. *“we did it in Tehran, Gaza, Beirut… we’ll do it in Sanaa”*) serve to put enemy leaders on notice that they may be next. Even if some claims (like Nasrallah’s supposed killing) were exaggerated or premature, the perception Israel wants is that “no one is safe from us.” This can sow paranoia among enemy ranks – for instance, Houthi chiefs now must worry if there’s a Mossad drone or agent stalking them. Similarly, boasting about sabotage and cyber warfare (blinding air defenses, jamming systems) is meant to intimidate Iran’s security apparatus, making them question their own preparedness and sparking internal witch-hunts for moles.
Israeli officials have also signaled cyber-intent in more subtle ways. When critical Iranian infrastructure mysteriously fails or catches fire (be it nuclear facilities, refineries, or airports), Israeli commentators often drop coy remarks hinting at involvement without outright admission. This technique keeps Iran guessing. For example, after a blaze at an Iranian airbase, an IDF spokesperson swiftly denied Iranian media’s “fake claims” of shooting down an Israeli jet, while another Israeli official quipped that if Iran expands its attacks, *“Tehran will burn”* – implying Iran’s own actions would invite devastating (possibly covert) retaliation. The careful ambiguity – neither confirming nor denying specific sabotage incidents – combined with open-ended threats maximizes the psychological effect. It forces Iran’s leadership to wonder which accidents were orchestrated by Israel’s cyber or spy units.
Finally, it’s important to note how different platforms carry different tones in this Israeli influence campaign. Official statements and press releases maintain a statesmanlike framing of legitimate defense (“we will not allow harm to our citizens”), while social media channels (especially in Arabic) deploy more sarcasm, local idioms, and visual bravado to engage the street-level audience. This multi-pronged approach is summarized in the comparison below:
Israeli Narrative / Message Platform & Source Primary Target Audience Purpose & Implications
“We will assassinate your leaders” – Katz threatening Houthi and other enemy chiefs by name, citing past hits (Deif, Sinwar, Haniyeh, Nasrallah). Official speeches and statements (Defense Minister, PM). Also covered in Israeli and international media. Houthi leadership, Iranian & proxy leaders; Sunni Arab governments (quietly approving); Israeli public. Deterrence & intimidation: Signals that enemy commanders are marked men and will share the fate of those killed before. Builds Israeli public confidence and tells Sunni allies that Israel is actively confronting Iran’s proxies.
“Tehran will burn” – Direct threat to hit Iran’s capital if Khamenei persists. Official statement by Defense Minister Katz, circulated via media and X/Twitter. Iranian top leadership (Khamenei), IRGC; Iranian public; regional audience (Sunni states, Western allies). Psychological warfare: Conveys a lethal red line to Iran’s rulers, aiming to deter further missile attacks. Simultaneously plants fear in Tehran’s populace that their own regime is endangering them, potentially stoking internal pressure on Khamenei. Also reassures Iran’s regional foes that Israel is standing up to Tehran.
Publicizing covert successes – e.g. admitting Israel killed Haniyeh in Tehran, boasting Mossad sabotage of Iranian defenses. Speeches (Katz at Defense Ministry event); leaks to Israeli press; military briefings. Domestic Israeli audience; Iran’s security establishment; international observers (incl. Sunni intelligence communities). Strategic signaling: Demonstrates Israel’s far-reaching capabilities and intelligence dominance. Bolsters morale at home (“axis of evil has been dealt a blow”) and warns Iran that its sensitive programs and high-profile figures are thoroughly penetrated. Also shows Gulf intelligence partners that Israel can strike inside Iran, encouraging closer tacit cooperation.
Outreach in Arabic – “terrorist Houthis” & warnings – Framing Houthis/Iran as evildoers and warning Arab civilians of impending strikes. IDF Arabic Spokesperson social media posts (Twitter/X); Arabic media interviews. General Arab public (especially in Yemen/Gulf); Houthi rank-and-file and Yemeni civilians; Arab opinion-makers. Winning hearts and minds (and propaganda): Attempts to isolate Iran’s proxies by calling them “terrorists” in the Arab lexicon. The evacuation warnings serve dual purposes: reduce civilian harm and show Arab audiences that Israel differentiates between regimes and people. This softens Arab public opinion toward Israeli actions. It also encourages resentment against Houthis (portraying them as the cause of Yemenis’ suffering when ports are attacked).
Celebrating Tehran’s turmoil – “Tehran is ablaze” posts, sharing images of fires/explosions, highlighting protests. Social media (Katz on X; IDF channels; pro-Israel influencers on Twitter/Telegram); Israeli media footage. Iranian public (opposition-minded citizens); Sunni social media sphere (who relish Iran’s pain); global media. Psychological impact & narrative shaping: Projects an image of Iran literally “on fire” and in chaos, implying the regime’s weakness. Encourages Iranian public to question their leadership’s strength and perhaps to protest or panic (“the mighty regime can’t even protect the capital”). Also feeds into Sunni Arab gratification seeing Iran humbled. However, sometimes unverified imagery is used, which can undermine credibility if exposed, so Israeli communicators balance excitement with plausible deniability.
“We are not at war with Iranian people” – Encouraging Iranians to overthrow the regime. Israeli officials’ comments (implied) and Israeli media editorials; Farsi-language Israeli social accounts. Iranian civilians, protest movement; international human rights audience; Sunni audiences (to show Israel distinguishes Iranians from their regime). Stoking internal dissent: Aims to amplify Iranian frustrations with their government by highlighting regime failures (economic woes, high executions, costly foreign adventures). This narrative seeks to separate the people from the regime, ideally to spur revolt or at least reduce hatred for Israel among ordinary Iranians. It also positions Israel on the moral high ground – as if siding with the Iranian people – which can play well globally and in the Middle East.
Israel’s messaging strategy is multi-layered. Officialdom maintains a posture of firm defense and direct threat to enemy leaders, while military spokespeople and aligned influencers adopt more colloquial or hard-edged tones to land specific points with various audiences. The overarching goal is the same: to demoralize and destabilize Israel’s adversaries (Iran and its proxies) while bolstering Israel’s deterrence and rallying regional support (or at least acquiescence). By invoking successful hits on enemy commanders, highlighting Iranian weakness, and speaking in the idioms of the region, Israeli communications blend traditional military psy-ops with savvy social media tactics.
In the wake of the Houthi chief assassination attempt and the fiery strikes in Tehran, Israel’s communications have been as important as the operations themselves. Through carefully crafted statements, social media posts, and media leaks, Israel broadcast a message of daring and dominance: that it can strike its enemies **“anywhere, anytime”**, even in the heart of Tehran, and that those enemies’ leaders are “hostages” to their own aggressive policies. The psychological and cyber dimensions of this conflict are laid bare in these communications – from literal threats to burn down Tehran, to boasts of blinding Iranian defenses and infiltrating their territory. Importantly, Israel has tailored much of this messaging to resonate with audiences beyond its borders. By framing Iran and its proxies as a shared threat to the region’s stability (a sentiment echoed by many Sunni Arabs), Israeli officials and influencers seek to erode the Iranians’ morale while subtly encouraging Iran’s many adversaries.
The information offensive appears designed to complement the kinetic offensive. Veiled admissions of covert ops (like assassinations and sabotage) serve to enhance the deterrent effect, leaving Iran guessing how far Israel’s reach truly extends. And appeals to the Iranian populace – urging them to see the regime’s vulnerability and *“seize the moment”* – indicate an intent to spark internal pressure that might achieve what airstrikes alone cannot. Whether these Israeli psychological efforts will succeed in inciting change is uncertain, but they undeniably add a potent layer to the conflict. In the meantime, the imagery of “Tehran ablaze” and the blunt promise that “Tehran will burn” if provoked have set the tone: Israel wants its enemies, and the world, to know that it is unafraid to carry the fight directly to Iran’s doorstep – and to trumpet that fact loudly in the court of public opinion.
