The deepfake-focused document attributed to Alter.Academy is a methodically structured disinformation narrative cloaked in the language of analytical threat assessment. While it provides technically accurate descriptions of deepfake capabilities—such as face-swapping, voice synthesis, and lip-syncing—its intent is not informational transparency but psychological manipulation of domestic Russian audiences. The core archetype embedded in this narrative asserts that artificial intelligence-powered media manipulation is not merely a technological threat but a weaponized instrument of Ukrainian hybrid warfare, allegedly targeting Russian soldiers, civilians, and institutions. This framing is not coincidental; it reflects an evolving Russian information operation that reconfigures emerging technologies like GANs into emotionally charged tools of national victimhood.
The text repeatedly emphasizes that the threshold for creating deepfakes is low, suggesting that nearly anyone with minimal computer knowledge can generate deceptive media. This assertion, though partially grounded in technical reality, is exaggerated and placed within a larger framework of distrust—one in which no digital voice, face, or message can be trusted. Within this context, Ukrainian call centers are transformed into hostile psychological warfare units. They are described not just as fraud networks but as criminal-military complexes allegedly protected by the Ukrainian SBU and lawmakers. This transformation is critical: it elevates common fraud into a national security threat, giving the Russian state rhetorical space to portray any cross-border digital engagement as enemy action.
The emotional architecture of the text is deliberate. It warns of synthetic videos in which the wife of a soldier falsely claims that their child has been injured. It describes AI-generated pornography used for blackmail. It suggests that such attacks are designed to mentally destabilize Russian troops prior to Ukrainian offensives. These narratives follow a well-established Russian disinformation playbook: isolate the target emotionally, strip away trust in communication channels, and assert the state as the sole reliable source of truth. Throughout the document, the deepfake is framed less as a technological tool and more as a psychological assault vector, one that merges themes of betrayal, family, and moral outrage into a singular operational motif.
Critically, the document also attributes this supposed deepfake campaign to systemic Ukrainian infrastructure. It claims Ukrainian call centers function as AI content farms capable of generating massive volumes of targeted psychological manipulation. This is reinforced by repetitive emphasis on the idea that these centers are criminally and politically shielded, a claim designed to portray Ukraine not just as an adversary but as a fundamentally corrupt, rogue entity. In this framing, the creation of fake videos, voices, and calls becomes not just malicious but existential, providing justification for heightened counterintelligence activities and surveillance domestically.
The deeper purpose of this narrative is twofold. First, it preconditions the Russian public to disbelieve any digital media that undermines the state, especially media depicting military, political, or institutional failures. Second, it offers the Kremlin narrative flexibility: any video that circulates showing misconduct or dissent can now be dismissed as a Ukrainian deepfake. This strategy inoculates the domestic information space by wrapping emerging AI threats in patriotic trauma.
The fusion of emerging technology with legacy disinformation tactics—particularly the victim-savior motif and foreign criminal conspiracy narrative—marks this document as an archetype within Russia’s psychological operations framework. Its strategic function is not to inform but to polarize, not to educate but to pre-emptively discredit, and not to protect the public but to manage their perceptions through a digitally-upgraded script of fear and nationalism.
