Friedman reports : A curious feature is that reports of the Jeddah conference focus a lot on China’s constructive position, but there is no mention of Beijing’s desire to bring Moscow into the talks (Brazil came up with this proposal).
It looks like the PRC today is quite happy to negotiate issues that directly affect the interests of Moscow, without the participation of the Kremlin.
👆But this feature has been formed quite clearly from the moment when the Russian Federation failed the plan of war and the redivision of the world in favor of the PRC.
After that, the concept of political subjectivity of the Russian Federation was significantly limited: the Kremlin was left with tactical actions of a geopolitical nature, while China manages the global Kremlin processes (nuclear case, the concept of post-war settlement, etc.).
So, Russia is actually not a subject in determining its own future, but – and this is more important – the future of the Russian Federation is not in the hands of an ally interested in the political existence of Russia.
China does not need Russia as a state: China needs Russia as a proxy zone:
1. resource nature;
2. “Drone-kamikaze”, which reconnoiters the readiness of the West to respond to extraordinary actions.
And as this “kamikaze” Russia (on its own initiative, but with the case of Taiwan in the Chinese head) embarked on the occupation of Ukraine.
Thus, Russia has become a taster of the “Chinese leader’s” food: it tries whether a particular political move will be “poisoned” or not.
We See What Others Cannot
