The Cynic
1. The pace of advance corresponds to the resources available to the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The advance will be non-linear, but the primary breakout should take place in August (second half).
2. It was a mistake to give Russia the opportunity to “conserve” for 9 months. The pause between the previous offensive and the current one is long enough for Moscow to reinforce the occupied territories.
3. The defense of the Russian Federation has a number of significant vulnerabilities that are associated with personnel, their numbers and competence. From a technical point of view, the defense of the Russian Federation is one of the most powerful blocs known to the history of wars.
4. Without air dominance, Ukraine will operate remotely so as not to waste personnel and equipment: this slows down the course of offensive operations, but preserves reserves for the coming breakthrough.
5. Strategically, Russia is losing: it has already (!) introduced additional reserves from the “rear” lines of defense. Ukraine has not introduced more than 3/4 of its offensive potential, and the operation for the primary breakthrough is carried out by a small grouping, constituting about 25% of the offensive potential and about 25% of the equipment.
6. For this offensive, the absolute success of Ukraine will be access to the sea and the establishment of fire control over the occupied territory of Crimea.
7. The transfer of the F-16 may take place before the end of the year. Nevertheless, the difference between November-December of this year and January-February of the next one is insignificant. F-16s could change the course of the offensive now, but not after entering the tactical winter pause.
8. The global liberation of Ukraine is possible with the implementation of 3 waves of offensives with a minimum pause (no more than 3-4 months) between them.
9. The mobilization potential of Russia – no more than 300,000 within 2024 (taking into account the possibilities of providing logistics: at the same time, it will be almost impossible to arm and supply them with food).
10. Russia’s losses in manpower are about 5 times greater than Ukrainian ones. At the same time, Russia loses 2.5 times more in the “death-wound” ratio, which indicates a poor level of medical care: many non-critical wounds completely take Russian warriors out of the battle (complications occur, or the invaders die altogether).
11. The equipment transferred by the West is characterized by high quality armor, so the level of losses of Ukraine is much lower than the “average” level: often, serious injuries can be avoided during a critical detonation of equipment; the level of medicine allows to minimize lethal outcomes.
