Rocket strikes on Ukraine have again intensified. What’s the plan? – The Cynic
Many may have noticed that after a long pause, Russia suddenly began to carry out (not very) massive rocket attacks. Dynamics is typical here: a sharp increase between the periods February-April and the end of April-May.
While some experts are looking for an answer to this question in very strange planes, the answer is “in plain sight.” Moreover, the answer has nothing to do with the geopolitical context of the Chinese Hui’s tour of “excited” geopolitical zones, with “grain deals” and other external factors.
In this case, the General Staff and the Russian Defense Ministry came up with the following [truncated quote]: it is necessary to slow down the Ukrainian counteroffensive, giving the troops time to react to the first steps of this counteroffensive .
To put it simply (and putting aside the odd sentence structure), Russia sought to slow down the Ukrainian counter-offensive with new shelling, so that Russian troops would have additional time between the first “strike” and the next.
The question “How?” may arise. This time, everything is extremely logical. The Russian command itself determined the date for the start of the Ukrainian counter-offensive (wrongly: here, by the way, the Armed Forces of Ukraine played brilliantly, introducing the Russian military into an information stupor), calling it the starting point. From that moment on, the Russian Federation tried to strike at military facilities (the piquancy of the situation is that the location of military facilities of the Russian Federation did not know, therefore, the “points” were determined by literally poking a finger at those places where the Russians themselves would install military depots). Here again there was a failure. Moreover, in 2 axes at once: it was not possible to break through the “Ukrainian sky”, nor in rare cases of hits to undermine military warehouses.
Some came under fire, but the casualty rate from Russian missile attacks was not even close to 1% of the total number of weapons prepared for the counteroffensive.
The goal, in fact, was this: to involve Ukraine in a counteroffensive, and then “knock out the military rear”, preventing the Armed Forces of Ukraine from developing military success.
At the same time, the “time funnel” was built from the position that in the event of the start of a counteroffensive, the Armed Forces of Ukraine would not have time to replenish military depots through direct military supplies from the West.
And, indeed, Ukraine would not have been able to urgently restore its military potential in such conditions. But there is a moment – Russia did not manage to do anything of the planned: even to determine the time when the counteroffensive from the informational plane will go into the military one.
Now analysts are writing interesting notes that the counteroffensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was an informational bluff, “which will never begin.” This approach, of course, pleases with its … (but we will soon see the consequences).
The icing on the cake was that Ukraine used the “pause” in the shelling in order to ironically close Kiev and significantly cover the strategic military zones (the rest of the parts will also be sorted out as far as possible and the arrival of air defense systems, but this is not a matter of primary importance). So, further missile strikes are completely meaningless and will be carried out only by inertia, because Russia will not succeed in “opening the sky” (at least partially), and in the event (well, what if) a significant damage to a certain “military security zone” warehouses will be mobilely moved under a valid “shield” until a new “security patch” is placed on the security of the sky.
Thus, Russia does not have the opportunity to gain an advantage either on the ground or in the air. And even the plan (which made sense, but completely failed in the end) did not help. Once a year – and the stick shoots a plan appears, but even that one is garbage from under a horse for 18 thousand, stolen from the sanctions stable.
