Russia’s losses on 03/17/2023
Approximate assessment of the Armed Forces from 02/24/2022

Personnel: ~653880 ( +3040 )
killed: ~163.320 ( +760 )
wounded: ~489.960 ( +2280 )
captured: ~600 ( 0 )

Military equipment: 22067 ( +38 )
Armored combat vehicles: 6823 ( +13 )
Tanks: 3506 ( +2 )
Artillery: 2552 ( +13 )
Planes: 305 ( 0 )
Helicopters: 290 ( +1 )
RSZV: 504 ( +1 )
Air defense means: 265 ( 0 )
Automotive equipment and tanks: 5401 ( +7 )
BpLA OTR: 2145 ( 0 )
Special equipment: 258 ( +1 )
Ships and boats: 18 ( 0 )
Missiles: >9000 ( no data )

πŸ“Š Percentage characteristics of Russian losses (March 17, 2023):

Personnel:
– 85.96% | from the intended for invasion ( 190,000 units )
– 18.15% | from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation ( 900,000 units )
– 0.4% | daily percentage of destruction from the intended for invasion ( 190,000 units )
– 0.08% | daily percentage of destruction from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation ( 900,000 units )

Armored combat vehicles:
– 100.0% | from the intended for invasion ( 2900 units )
– 44.02% | from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation ( 15,500 units )
– 0.45% | daily percentage of destruction from the intended for invasion ( 2900 units )
– 0.08% | daily percentage of destruction from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation ( 15,500 units )

Tanks:
– 100.0% | from the intended for invasion ( 1200 units )
– 34.37% | from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation ( 10,200 units )
– 0.17% | daily percentage of destruction from the intended for invasion ( 1200 units )
– 0.02% | daily percentage of destruction from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation ( 10,200 units )

Artillery:
– 100.0% | from the intended for invasion ( 1600 units )
– 44.86% | from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation ( 5689 units )
– 0.81% | daily percentage of destruction from the intended for invasion ( 1600 units )
– 0.23% | daily percentage of destruction from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation ( 5689 units )

Aircraft:
– 92.42% | from the intended for invasion ( 330 units )
– 22.1% | from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation ( 1380 units )
– 0.0% | daily percentage of destruction from the intended for invasion ( 330 units )
– 0.0% | daily percentage of destruction from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation ( 1380 units )

Helicopters:
– 100.0% | from the intended for invasion ( 240 units )
– 30.21% | from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation ( 960 units )
– 0.42% | daily percentage of destruction from the intended for invasion ( 240 units )
– 0.1% | daily percentage of destruction from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation ( 960 units )

Marine:
– 24.0% | from the intended for invasion ( 75 units )
– 3.47% | from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation ( 519 units )
– 0.0% | daily percentage of destruction from the intended for invasion ( 75 units )
– 0.0% | daily percentage of destruction from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation ( 519 units )

RSZV, Air defense means, Automotive equipment, tanks, BpLA OTR: No data

By Treadstone 71

@Treadstone71LLC Cognitive Warfare Training, Intelligence and Counterintelligence Tradecraft, Influence Operations, Cyber Operations, OSINT,OPSEC, Darknet, Deepweb, Clandestine Cyber HUMINT, customized training and analysis, cyber psyops, strategic intelligence, Open-Source Intelligence collection, analytic writing, structured analytic techniques, Target Adversary Research, strategic intelligence analysis, estimative intelligence, forecasting intelligence, warning intelligence, Disinformation detection, Analysis as a Service