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We came across interesting statistics based on open sources, in which instead of the absolute values of the number of Russian soldiers killed by region, the number of dead per 100,000 inhabitants was used. The result looks unexpected.

As of October 20, the ten regions with the maximum number of established dead per 100,000 population look like this:
1. Republic of Buryatia 30.86
2. Republic of Tuva 30.60
3. The Republic of North Ossetia-Alania 19.06
4. Trans-Baikal region 17.73
5. Altai Republic 17.07
6. Pskov region 16.69
7. Kostroma region 16.35
8. Jewish Autonomous Region 15.95
9. Sakhalin Region 12.43
10. Ulyanovsk Region 11.28

Dagestan, which leads the lists with absolute values of the number of dead, ranks 14th in this statistic, and Chechnya has completely dropped to 21st. Only North Ossetia remains in the top ten of the North Caucasian republics.

Next, the author tried to find a correlation between the number of people killed and various parameters of the regions. The dependence on average and median income is -0.28 and -0.27. The strongest correlation was found with the level of poverty (0.55) and the level of extreme poverty (0.56). Poverty seems to be the main factor that drove people to go to war to mobilize. If you rank the regions by poverty, half of the members of the top ten coincide with the “leaders” in terms of deaths. However, the other five regions break out of the trend and, despite being poor, do not differ in the high percentage of those killed. These are (in order of increasing relative number of dead) Karachay-Cherkessia, Ingushetia, Kalmykia, Kurgan Oblast and Chechnya. There can be several explanations here – for example, a high share of shadow business, due to which the real income of the population is higher than the official one. Or simply the reluctance of people to give their lives for Putin.

Russia’s losses on 10/27/2022
Approximate assessment of the Armed Forces from 02/24/2022

Personnel: ~277480 (+1280)
killed: ~69,220 (+320)
injured: ~207,660 (+960)
captured: ~600 (0)

Military equipment: 16418 (+43)
Armored combat vehicles: 5364 (+13)
Tanks: 2631 (+3)
Artillery: 1690 (+4)
Aircraft: 271 (0)
Helicopters: 249 (+1)
RSZV: 379 (0)
Air defense means: 192 (0)
Automotive equipment and tanks: 4078 (+2)
BpLA OTR: 1398 (+19)
Special equipment: 150 (+1)
Ships and boats: 16 (0)
Missiles: >3000 (no data

 Percentage characteristics of Russian losses (October 27, 2022):

Personnel:
– 100.0% | from the intended for invasion (190,000 units)
– 30.83% | from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (900,000 units)
– 0.67% | daily percentage of destruction from the intended for invasion (190,000 units)
– 0.14% | daily percentage of destruction from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (900,000 units)

Armored combat vehicles:
– 100.0% | from the intended for invasion (2900 units)
– 38.99% | from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (13,758 units)
– 0.45% | daily percentage of destruction from the intended for invasion (2900 units)
– 0.09% | daily percentage of destruction from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (13,758 units)

Tanks:
– 100.0% | from the intended for invasion (1200 units)
– 79.73% | from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (3,300 units)
– 0.25% | daily percentage of destruction from the intended for invasion (1200 units)
– 0.09% | daily percentage of destruction from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (3,300 units)

Artillery:
– 100.0% | from the intended for invasion (1600 units)
– 29.71% | from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (5,689 units)
– 0.25% | daily percentage of destruction from the intended for invasion (1600 units)
– 0.07% | daily percentage of destruction from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (5,689 units)

Aircraft:
– 82.12% | from the intended for invasion (330 units)
– 19.65% | from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (1,379 units)
– 0.0% | daily percentage of destruction from the intended for invasion (330 units)
– 0.0% | daily percentage of destruction from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (1,379 units)

Helicopters:
– 100.0% | from the intended for invasion (240 units)
– 25.91% | from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (961 units)
– 0.42% | daily percentage of destruction from the intended for invasion (240 units)
– 0.1% | daily percentage of destruction from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (961 units)

Marine:
– 21.33% | from the intended for invasion (75 units)
– 3.08% | from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (519 units)
– 0.0% | daily percentage of destruction from the intended for invasion (75 units)
– 0.0% | daily percentage of destruction from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (519 units)

RSZV, Air defense means, Automotive equipment, tanks, BpLA OTR: No data

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Treadstone 71

@Treadstone71LLC Cyber intelligence, counterintelligence, Influence Operations, Cyber Operations, OSINT, Clandestine Cyber HUMINT, cyber intel and OSINT training and analysis, cyber psyops, strategic intelligence, Open-Source Intelligence collection, analytic writing, structured analytic techniques, Target Adversary Research, cyber counterintelligence, strategic intelligence analysis, estimative intelligence, forecasting intelligence, warning intelligence, threat intelligence
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By Treadstone 71

@Treadstone71LLC Cyber intelligence, counterintelligence, Influence Operations, Cyber Operations, OSINT, Clandestine Cyber HUMINT, cyber intel and OSINT training and analysis, cyber psyops, strategic intelligence, Open-Source Intelligence collection, analytic writing, structured analytic techniques, Target Adversary Research, cyber counterintelligence, strategic intelligence analysis, estimative intelligence, forecasting intelligence, warning intelligence, threat intelligence