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An order is an order

There is information that the #Russians are trying to become more active in the “Donetsk triangle” in order to attack #Bakhmut (Where Nazi #Wagner PMC hangs)

But at the moment, Russia does not have a grouping that is capable of conducting an offensive in this direction. There is a group that can fight defensive battles, but there is no numerical and tactical superiority that can turn the existing relative parity into an overwhelming offensive potential.

Intelligence knows that the Kremlin, after a large-scale failure in the Kharkiv direction, ordered “to gnaw out victory anywhere at any cost.” It seems that this zone is the Donetsk direction, where the Russians have been trying to concentrate their forces lately.

They clearly do not have enough strength for the offensive, so the Russians have the “opportunity” (through the broken infrastructure) to transfer reserves from the Southern Front.

But even if you are not a military specialist, you may object: this is nonsense. After all, the Russians fell down in the southern direction, which means that with the continuation of the pull of forces from the South to the East, all the lines of the Southern Front will begin to erode.

There is an option to transfer a grouping that escaped from the “Kharkiv arc” to the Donetsk direction, but this grouping was left without equipment, and the reactivation of a new one is still in question, therefore, a grouping that has lost morale in principle (after a grandiose withdrawal of troops – a special “wisdom” to leave temporarily mentally unbalanced (in view of the retreat) soldiers to a strategic “military crossroads” from the point of view of the Russian Federation) will have to go into battle not only with a shaken psychological and moral state, but also without the necessary equipment. #Forced #Mobilization

This is how Putin’s system works, which at the beginning of the war prepared victories according to dates, and not as they were ready. This is how it works even now – it does not know how to draw conclusions at all – it needs a victory “here and now.” And do not care that this victory is impossible.

A successful positional war can last for months. Ukraine is unlikely to enter the winter with an attack on the Donetsk Oblast, which means that the Kremlin would have time to keep a sluggish defense, along the way preparing a reserve for an offensive attempt.

But the Kremlin is not interested in that. After the Kharkiv failure, a victory is needed. And that means it’s time to try to attack.

Here’s just a nuance: the failure of the offensive does not lead to the beginning of defensive actions, but to a retreat, since the failure of the “offensive grouping” makes effective defense impossible.

So the Kremlin has 2 options:


1. Abandon a losing offensive, trying to create the basis for an effective defensive line, taking into account the need to minimize human and technical losses in order to then use a temporary funnel to prepare an offensive (actually a variant of the “Kharkov mirror”, but it is unlikely, since the Russian Federation fights only with fire shafts , not understanding defensive strategies at all)

2. Go for broke, throwing groups from other fronts, prisoners and mobilized meat into the Donetsk triangle; make a minor breakthrough, go on the defensive again, which will turn into a quick retreat, since the level of losses from such a blunt attack in the forehead will be incomparable.

And the retreat will begin at the moment of Armed Forces of Ukraine preparation cutting off the unstable occupied territories with a banal “domino” effect.

An order is an order. And what about some military-strategic patterns? If they don’t do it, they’ll lose their jobs.

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Treadstone 71

@Treadstone71LLC Cyber intelligence, counterintelligence, Influence Operations, Cyber Operations, OSINT, Clandestine Cyber HUMINT, cyber intel and OSINT training and analysis, cyber psyops, strategic intelligence, Open-Source Intelligence collection, analytic writing, structured analytic techniques, Target Adversary Research, cyber counterintelligence, strategic intelligence analysis, estimative intelligence, forecasting intelligence, warning intelligence, threat intelligence
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By Treadstone 71

@Treadstone71LLC Cyber intelligence, counterintelligence, Influence Operations, Cyber Operations, OSINT, Clandestine Cyber HUMINT, cyber intel and OSINT training and analysis, cyber psyops, strategic intelligence, Open-Source Intelligence collection, analytic writing, structured analytic techniques, Target Adversary Research, cyber counterintelligence, strategic intelligence analysis, estimative intelligence, forecasting intelligence, warning intelligence, threat intelligence