Russian SVR appeal for information. Use of Tor, Tails, and PGP advised. “InformBuro-Southern Federal District”
If you become aware of the facts of crimes committed or being prepared not only on the territory of the Russian Federation, namely:
– about terrorism and related acts (assistance, calls for terror, etc.);
– on the taking of hostages or preparations for the capture;
– about an illegal armed formation;
– about the hijacking of an aircraft, watercraft or railway transport or preparation for hijacking;
– on illegal actions with nuclear and radioactive materials;
– about preparation for encroachment or encroachment on the life of a statesman or public figure;
– about the violent seizure of power or preparation for it;
– about preparing for a military mutiny;
– on preparations for an attack on diplomatic missions;
– any other activity related to international terrorism
If necessary, we will assist in proper and timely informing the responsible employees of the competent services and departments
If you have any information about impending terrorist attacks on the territory of the Russian Federation, you can contact the FSB of Russia by phone:
+7 (495) 224-22-22
8 (800) 224-22-22
If you have any other valuable (important, useful) information about the events and circumstances listed above and/or others, and are ready to share this information while in a hostile environment, please use the secure channel of communication with the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service.
Anonymity and confidentiality are guaranteed in all cases of appeals.
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN COMMUNICATION
On the website of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation there is an inconspicuous link – Report Information (“report information”), this is the only phrase in English on the main page of the site.
NOTE: THE LINK BELOW IS TO THE SVR
The link leads to instructions for sending an appeal to the “virtual reception” of the SVR, located on the darknet (“shadow Internet”).
If you are outside Russia and have important information regarding urgent threats to the security of the Russian Federation, you can safely and anonymously share it with us via the virtual reception system (VRS) of the SVR over the TOR network. Our onion address is:
If you are located outside of Russia and have important information about threats to the security of the Russian Federation, you can send it to us in a secure and anonymous way through the Service’s virtual reception in the TOR network at:
Sites in the .onion domain zone are not accessible through regular browsers and are not indexed by popular search engines.
This is the first darknet reception among all European intelligence agencies.
The reception is intended for those who “are outside of Russia and have important information about threats to the security of the Russian Federation.”
Sending information is offered in a “secure and anonymous way” according to “simple instructions”:
first download the Tor browser (if the resource is blocked, use a VPN) or the Tails operating system (you can even use a flash drive).
These solutions encrypt Internet traffic and pass it through three random nodes, which can be located anywhere in the world.
Next, the visitor is invited to go to the reception site in the .onion zone, enter a verification code (to exclude calls from bots – programs that imitate human actions) and copy five random words in English: they will be a verification phrase for further interaction with the special service. They are best memorized, not written down.
Following this, a form opens for sending files with a total volume of no more than 15 megabytes and text of almost any length.
The virtual reception, in case of success, will inform the sender with phrases in English, the translation of which is: “Success! Thank you for sending us this information. Please check the answers later” (this is what the verification phrase is for).
If you know how to work with PGP, then as an additional security measure, we recommend that you encrypt your message to the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service using the following public PGP key (see paragraph 5 of the Instructions)
—-BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK—–
—–END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK—–
Third parties will not be able to read the correspondence, even if for some reason they get access to it.
The legitimate addressee – in this case, the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation – on the contrary, will be able to decrypt the letter using their cryptographic key.
In the materials of the US National Security Agency, published by its former employee Edward Snowden in 2014, it was claimed that letters encrypted with PGP were invulnerable.
If you are in a hostile environment and are afraid for your safety, then do not use smartphones, computers and other electronic devices associated with you or your friends to access the network and maintain communication with the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service.
Correlate the importance of the information you transmit with the measures taken to ensure your safety!
If you are in a hostile environment and/or have reasons to worry about your security, do not use a device (smartphone, computer) registered to you or associated in any way with you or people from your personal settings for network access.
Relate the importance of information you want to send us with the security measures you are taking to protect yourself!
Please do not send information regarding media inquiries, press releases, archival research or other such matters through this channel.
Please do not send information concerning media inquiries, press releases, archival research and other similar issues through this channel.