Reasons for the postponement of flight tests of the 15A28 missile of the Sarmat missile system,

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This is not the first time in the course of court proceedings, details of the development of advanced weapons have been disclosed. This time, in cases Nos. A56-8333 / 2020 and A56-46672 / 2021, one of the reasons for the postponement of flight tests of the 15A28 missile of the Sarmat missile system, also referred to under the codes “product 001” and “subject 001”, is indicated. Recall that despite the numerous statements of the highest officials, flight tests of this complex have not yet begun.

RS-28 “Sarmat” is a Russian prospective missile system for ground-based mine with a heavy liquid intercontinental ballistic missile. It has been developed since the 2000s by specialists of V.P. Makeyev State Rocket Center JSC (Miass, Chelyabinsk Region) as a replacement for the Voevoda R-36M2 complex. Weight – 200 tons, throw weight – about 10 tons.

From the materials of the cases it follows that the developer of the control system “Sarmat” is JSC “NPO Automatics named after academician N.A. Semikhatov “(hereinafter NPOA). In turn, NPOA ordered the Scientific Research Institute of Command Instruments JSC (hereinafter NII KP) to carry out R&D for the manufacture of a complex of command devices (KKP) and a block of angular rate sensors (RCS), about which the parties entered into an agreement No. 2 / 2-1030 -15 / 787 / Yur. 765 dated 06/02/2015.

This agreement is divided into 12 stages, stages Nos. 1,3,5,7,9,11 provide for the manufacture and delivery of KKP; Nos. 2,4,6,8,10,12 – production and delivery of the ODUS. Thus, NII KP was supposed to manufacture and supply 6 sets of KKP and BDUS for missiles for flight tests (LI products). Some initial dates are mentioned:
stage 5 – 12/31/2016;
for stage 6 – 12/31/2016;
for stage 7 – 03/31/2017;
for stage 8 – 03/31/2017;
for stage 9 – 06/30/2017;
for stage 10 – 06/30/2017.

The original deadlines for the delivery of stages were repeatedly disrupted and postponed by additional agreements to the contract. So, by additional agreement No. 14 of 04.24.2019, the deadline for the execution of stage 5 was postponed to August 2019, the deadline for the execution of stage 6 was postponed to September 2019, and these dates were also disrupted – the shipment of the PSC for the 5th stage occurred on November 16, 2019, but the delivered PAC did not pass the entrance control at NPOA and was not accepted by it. The files mention a lot of letters, research reports and conclusions about the need to revise and restore the CCP. As a result, NII KP fulfilled its obligations under stage 5 only on 04/12/2020, and the deadline for stage 6 was once again postponed by additional agreement No. 18 from 02/03/2020, now to 02/26/2020, by the same agreement the deadline for stage 11 was postponed to 11/15/2020.

At the time of the court proceedings, the Research Institute of KP manufactured 3 sets of command devices for completing items LI No. 1,2,3 (stages No. 6,7,8) and a backlog was formed for LI items No. 4,5,6 (stages No. 9,10,11 ). As one of the reasons for the postponement, NII KP refers to the fact that when testing electronic products after the development of design documentation, it became necessary to purchase additional elements of the electronic base (i.e., it was necessary to replace part of the elements – note of the channel). Given the lack of competition in the market for these elements (including due to the imposed sanctions against the Russian Federation), their acquisition required significant time costs, which ultimately led to a delay in the execution of work.

Due to the unsatisfactory progress of work, the parties on 06/09/2020 agree on a joint decision:
“In the course of developing a set of command devices for the gearbox INAYA.402113.130 according to the technical task for the midrange of the ROC” Development of a complex of command devices for the control system equipment on the topic “001”, the accuracy characteristics were achieved with deviations from individual requirements of the technical specifications for the complex of command devices.
Deviations of the achieved characteristics from the requirements of the technical specifications for the complex of command devices are due to the lack of a domestic element base with the necessary characteristics.
Bringing these characteristics to the specified technical specifications for the development of a complex of command devices is possible subject to the development and implementation of an improved domestic element base no earlier than 2022. “- in other words, if the improvement of the domestic element base does not happen, then the characteristics of the control gear will not be brought to the specified the original TK neither in 2022 nor later.

By the same decision, the parties established a number of measures and joint actions for the earliest possible completion of work:
“1. To allow the set of command devices with the achieved characteristics up to GLI 1-3, for which JSC” GRTs Makeeva “, JSC” NPO avtomatiki “, JSC” Research Institute of Command Devices “correct the terms of reference for the set of command devices and the corresponding documentation.
2. JSC “Research Institute of Command Devices” to develop and agree with JSC “NPO Avtomatiki”, JSC “GRTs Makeeva”, Federal State Unitary Enterprise “4TSNII” MO and DOGOZ, a schedule for introducing a complex of command devices to the level specified by the technical assignment for the development of the KKP.
3. JSC NPO Avtomatiki, JSC GRTs Makeeva, JSC Scientific Research Institute of Command Devices, together with FSUE 4TSNII MO and DOGOZ, make a separate decision on finalizing the complex of command devices and the necessary methods in terms of confirming the main characteristics based on the results of the implementation of cl. 2 of this solution and the results of GLI 1-3.
4. Work on this decision shall be carried out without increasing the cost of the development work. “

Further, JSC “GRTs Makeeva”, the main executor of the state contract for “Sarmat”, sends the NII KP letter No. 147/1131 dated 04/26/2021 with an attachment in the form of a decision on the procedure for ground-based experimental testing of on-board equipment of the control system. In accordance with the specified decision, the products supplied under the contract are approved for flight tests, taking into account the achieved characteristics (i.e., with a KKP that does not fully meet the initial requirements of the technical specification – approx. Channel). For this reason, the position of the NII KP is as follows: it is not possible to carry out work on stage 11 of the contract until the completion of flight tests. Moreover, according to the additional agreement No. 30 of 08/13/2021, concluded by the parties, the work on stages No. 9 and No. 10 is excluded from the scope of work under contract No. 1118187311572010101000282/2 / 2-1030-15 / 787 / legal 765 dated 06.02.2015 and included in the scope of work under contract No. 1118187311572010101000282/24 / 2-1030-21 / 785 / jur.2051 dated 13.08.2021 under stages No. 1 and No. 2.

On the question of electronic components

Today, no country in the world can provide a complete set of electronic components (electronic component base) for weapons and military equipment (weapons, military and special equipment) at the advanced level only with its own production. However, the level of dependence on IP EEE (foreign production) in Russia is significantly higher than in countries that have designated the Russian Federation as their adversary. But we also know the “pain points” of our opponents, which we can apply in the event of a hot conflict.

It is unrealistic to completely replace EKB IP with domestic products. But it is quite possible to reduce dependence in the field of CI (critical infrastructure). This is a rather lengthy and costly process.

It should be understood that foreign electronic components of categories MIL, HIREL, SPACE (approximate domestic analogues – “VP”, “OS”, “OSM”) relies on mass commercial production. That is, the special category selects products from a commercial “conveyor” that have passed special tests and strict control.

Of course, there are unique products (such as multispectral arrays of American optical-electronic reconnaissance satellites), small-scale, with staggering cost. But the overwhelming majority of electronic components for foreign weapons and military equipment come from the commercial market.

In Russia, the situation is reversed. For import substitution of ECB KI, it is necessary to create unique small-scale production, which sharply increases the cost of the final product.
The procedure for using the EEE IP in the domestic AME is rather complicated (see the picture below).

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Treadstone 71

@Treadstone71LLC Cyber intelligence, counterintelligence, Influence Operations, Cyber Operations, OSINT, Clandestine Cyber HUMINT, cyber intel and OSINT training and analysis, cyber psyops, strategic intelligence, Open-Source Intelligence collection, analytic writing, structured analytic techniques, Target Adversary Research, cyber counterintelligence, strategic intelligence analysis, estimative intelligence, forecasting intelligence, warning intelligence, threat intelligence
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  • @Treadstone71LLC Cyber intelligence, counterintelligence, Influence Operations, Cyber Operations, OSINT, Clandestine Cyber HUMINT, cyber intel and OSINT training and analysis, cyber psyops, strategic intelligence, Open-Source Intelligence collection, analytic writing, structured analytic techniques, Target Adversary Research, cyber counterintelligence, strategic intelligence analysis, estimative intelligence, forecasting intelligence, warning intelligence, threat intelligence

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