Deception, Distortion, Dishonesty: The Real Story Behind the Hype – RSA Conference 2018 – San Francisco

Dr. Khatuna Mshvidobadze

In the summer of 2008, Russia attacked Georgia in the first-ever combined kinetic and cyberwar. Sure, the 1990-1991 Gulf War was dubbed the first information war—the use 226571794ecbc84a4232f3e9a42a7041-480x270of information in war is not new. What was new in 2008 was that Russia employed its cyber arm as an independent operational capability alongside its land, sea and air forces. The targets were critical infrastructure. The strategic objectives were to sap Georgia’s will to resist and to provide cover for Russia’s information campaign to deceive the west into believing that somehow little Georgia was the aggressor.

Operational security was paramount—Moscow had to keep everyone confounded about who was behind the cyber attacks. Just like the kinetic invasion, the cyber attacks were long and well-planned, but Russia did a great job covering its tracks. When the shooting stopped, well-meaning researchers investigated what had happened. However, coming from a profession that focuses on computer screens and a culture unaccustomed to the 2018-04-11_9-18-09kind of deception that is part of everyday Russian life, they foundered.

The attacks led us to Russia. We noted uncanny timing. Western experts were indeed confounded when the trail led to kids and criminals. I have been following that trail ever since. Insight into Russia, all-source intelligence and a keen understanding of denial and deception were needed.

Today, saying that the Russian state employs a network of cybercriminals to do its online dirty work is commonplace. One might just as well pretend not to know the identity of those little green men who seized Crimea. But when I started saying it in 2010, you would not believe the resistance I encountered.

Soon after, I met Jeff Bardin, my professor at Utica College, who became mentor and friend. Jeff brings an extraordinary expertise in all-source intelligence and the ways of denial and deception. At this year’s RSA Conference, it is my privilege to combine with him in a talk entitled Deception, Distortion, Dishonesty: The Real Story Behind the Hype.

Jeff will lead off, analyzing the types of D&D, its various dimensions and some tactics that can be employed online and offline. The planners, he will say, must have clear reasons for utilizing D&D based on their goals. They must define the strategic, operational and tactical goals of deception and the criteria for success.

I will point out that Russians do not see cyber warfare as distinct but regard it as just one tool of information war. Look at 2008. The cyber attacks aimed at hampering the Georgian government’s ability to communicate while Moscow’s propaganda machine painted Russia as the aggrieved party. “Information space opens wide asymmetrical possibilities for reducing the fighting potential of an enemy,” writes Valery Vasilyevich Gerasimov, Chief of the Russian General Staff. It’s a remarkable statement, but nothing new—Russian thinking on information warfare has been consistent since the 1980s.

Now, the Kremlin commands a vast network of online intelligence agencies, scientific organizations, academic institutions, criminals, and trolls. We’ll discuss how Russia deals with enemies, foreign and domestic, cyber players and organization, the growing role of the military, tactics, techniques, procedures and tools, vectors, false flags, troll factories and more. Come join us on Wednesday at the RSA Conference.

KM

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Coincidences Take A Lot of Planning – RSA Conference 2018 – San Francisco

The RSA Conference is soon upon us! The expectation to see old friends and make new rsa1800008-buckle-up_augacquaintances. The show will once again be great with new technologies displayed, new ideas bantered about, and phrases around AI used inappropriately and about 5-10 years too soon. The parties will crank at night and many will suffer the cocktail flu come the next morning. 40,000 strong is the estimated number for this event! Huge!

کنفرانس RSA 2018  rsa-конференция 2018  2018 RSA 회의  rsa 2018年会议  مؤتمر rsa 2018

But what of the undercurrent that occurs unmentioned every year? Just beneath the surface are a series of activities generated by scores of foreign agents looking to steal information, intellectual property, or gain an upper hand over someone of importance being caught doing illicit things. How many spies will blanket the city and the shop floor armed with various technologies used to extract information? Cyber and physical espionage activities run amuck at such events. This is common and expected. How will you know when your data is being pilfered? Will your hotel room be secure? Are your 2018-04-05_14-43-31mobile devices secure? What data have you given up already? Flight plans, hotel information, email addresses, phone numbers, social media data, car rental information, events you will attend, arrival and departure times, restaurant reservations, meeting information… Do you think your data is not in the wind already? Will a chance encounter lead to unexpected information sharing? Is the person next to you at the bar there just by coincidence?

All questions you should consider. All questions that are usually forgotten or ignored.

BEHIND ALL COINCIDENCES THERE IS A PLAN, AND BEHIND ALL PLANS THERE IS A COINCIDENCE – Malnar

I12149464887

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Confuser and Oilrig – Iranian Hacks

This is a bit disjointed at this time and is raw data. This is not intelligence, has not been analyzed but does tie directly to Oilrig.

A powerful program to pack your apps. With this program, you can pack programs in C # and VB.Net

Confuser – Confuser program zipped. For download and analysis

a1ir3z4-HK Frequently found on anonysec.org, c-cracking.org, formerly of the Kalli Hack Team (kallihack), http://haraji.8tag.ir

Others in the mix: XVII_Hacker, #XVII_Roman & #BlackErroR1 & #sorblack

BTC BRUTER v.3.0 By UNKNOWN-KILLER

Bitcoin Cracker Performance Test via Telegram: @ a1ir3z4HK @ a1ir3z4_HK_bot
Using temp emails here: http://www.emeil.ir/
Sprinkle the effort with a bit of Russian for flavoring

Cʏʙᴇʀ Cʀᴀᴄᴋɪɴɢ | سایبر کرکینگ

61.155.153.21:3389@SZCN2003X-5984\administrator;1qaz@WSX3edc
123.206.72.128:3389@10_221_112_104\administrator;1qaz@WSX3edc
123.207.139.51:3389@10_10_123_100\administrator;1qaz@WSX3edc
113.108.144.211:3389@ZK\administrator;1qaz@WSX
218.13.56.118:3389@HEGII\administrator;1qaz@WSX
218.17.182.99:3389@DTC-S01\administrator;1qaz@WSX
58.213.155.42:3389@SQL\administrator;1qaz@WSX
218.90.154.154:3389@DHT1FDC2\administrator;1qaz@WSX
218.94.38.222:3389@WIN-3EGCECLJQ5J\administrator;1qaz@WSX
180.107.198.6:3389@HAMBER\administrator;1qaz@WSX
117.89.141.232:3389@DELL-R710\administrator;1qaz@WSX
58.221.10.142:3389@WIN-QUO7ORFGR99\administrator;123qwe!@#
180.112.122.235:3389@HP-SERVER\administrator;123qwe!@#
219.136.229.194:3389@BMYWEB\administrator;1234qwer!@#$
121.9.14.146:3389@WIN-90NIL448CQ4\administrator;1qaz!QAZ
119.145.72.210:3389@WINDOWS-M89UCHU\administrator;1qaz!QAZ
218.93.123.171:3389@USER-A4G6BL8T0O\administrator;1qaz!QAZ
61.160.112.76:3389@NWERPDB\administrator;1qazXSW@
117.80.229.78:3389@KSBOMAN\administrator;1qazXSW@
119.29.157.222:3389@10_135_48_44\administrator;1qazXSW@
61.145.180.174:3389@TEDU-LH\administrator;!QAZ2wsx
113.108.146.83:3389@WIN-QIO2J4TRCMJ\administrator;!QAZ2wsxЧитать полностью…

61.155.153.21:3389@SZCN2003X-5984\administrator;1qaz@WSX3edc
123.206.72.128:3389@10_221_112_104\administrator;1qaz@WSX3edc
123.207.139.51:3389@10_10_123_100\administrator;1qaz@WSX3edc
113.108.144.211:3389@ZK\administrator;1qaz@WSX
218.13.56.118:3389@HEGII\administrator;1qaz@WSX
218.17.182.99:3389@DTC-S01\administrator;1qaz@WSX
58.213.155.42:3389@SQL\administrator;1qaz@WSX
218.90.154.154:3389@DHT1FDC2\administrator;1qaz@WSX
218.94.38.222:3389@WIN-3EGCECLJQ5J\administrator;1qaz@WSX
180.107.198.6:3389@HAMBER\administrator;1qaz@WSX
117.89.141.232:3389@DELL-R710\administrator;1qaz@WSX
58.221.10.142:3389@WIN-QUO7ORFGR99\administrator;123qwe!@#
180.112.122.235:3389@HP-SERVER\administrator;123qwe!@#
219.136.229.194:3389@BMYWEB\administrator;1234qwer!@#$
121.9.14.146:3389@WIN-90NIL448CQ4\administrator;1qaz!QAZ
119.145.72.210:3389@WINDOWS-M89UCHU\administrator;1qaz!QAZ
218.93.123.171:3389@USER-A4G6BL8T0O\administrator;1qaz!QAZ
61.160.112.76:3389@NWERPDB\administrator;1qazXSW@
117.80.229.78:3389@KSBOMAN\administrator;1qazXSW@
119.29.157.222:3389@10_135_48_44\administrator;1qazXSW@
61.145.180.174:3389@TEDU-LH\administrator;!QAZ2wsx
113.108.146.83:3389@WIN-QIO2J4TRCMJ\administrator;!QAZ2wsxЧитать полностью…

182.71.201.2:3389@TECHNOPAK\administrator;p@ssw0rd
150.242.254.98:3389@WINWORLD\administrator;Pass@word1
115.112.155.95:3389@APOLLOHOSPITALS\administrator;P@ssw0rd
221.135.143.132:3389@DMSSERVER\administrator;P@ssw0rd
220.225.210.91:3389@CTL\administrator;P@ssw0rd
45.64.195.147:3389@UNISRV\administrator;P@ssw0rd
125.22.73.198:3389@NAVGGL\administrator;P@ssw0rd
125.22.73.196:3389@NAVGGL\administrator;P@ssw0rd
59.144.162.8:3389@DELLSERVER\administrator;Admin@123
27.54.170.204:3389@DCPLHO\administrator;Admin@123
180.151.71.42:3389@FOURDTECH\administrator;Admin@123
202.47.116.201:3389@JAYAIR\administrator;Admin@123
118.185.53.18:3389@JBBROTHERS\administrator;Admin@123
27.251.117.6:3389@WIN-6T4QFMCPVE8\administrator;Admin123
103.230.152.172:3389@WIN-PMCSC1KVLPH\administrator;admin@123
219.65.58.58:3389@BIOTECH\administrator;admin@123
124.123.99.31:3389@WIN-RJTS2DUSFC1\administrator;admin@123
122.15.47.237:3389@ADMINISTRATOR\administrator;admin@123
125.63.94.107:3389@LAT039010002\administrator;admin@123
103.50.152.53:3389@BIOTECH\administrator;admin@123
117.252.2.69:3389@ADMINISTRATOR\administrator;admin@123
119.226.187.124:3389@WINDOWS-LJLRPML\administrator;admin@123
125.21.48.42:3389@WINDOWS-LJLRPML\administrator;admin@123
223.30.104.27:3389@WIN-ANRHQC2VF3Q\administrator;admin@123
125.20.83.199:3389@DSKE-1\administrator;admin@123
223.30.126.218:3389@CKHO\administrator;admin@123
59.90.244.200:3389@TEEPARAM-SERVER\administrator;Passw0rd1
14.102.15.38:3389@LAB01\administrator;password@123
124.124.70.194:3389@BRIGADEGROUP\administrator;password@123
220.227.9.77:3389@SCINDIASCHOOL\administrator;password@123
122.200.19.58:3389@ASHTE-RFID\administrator;P@ssw0rd@123
61.12.1.3:3389@WINDOWS-CYMSTZH\administrator;password@1234
182.74.185.140:3389@BIBAAPPARELS\administrator;abc@123
180.211.99.2:3389@GCPL\administrator;
112.196.8.202:3389@LIBRARYSERVER\administrator;
118.185.4.242:3389@SRI01\administrator;
Capture
Beast Trojan Builder – (change to .rar to unzip) Use at own risk.
57c4d9a0-63da-46d3-9e16-b720d27b0f6a
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Treadstone 71 Selected to Deliver at the RSA Conference 2018 San Francisco

Foundations for a Strong Intelligence Program
April 18, 9AM-11AM RSA Conference
This Lab will explore key aspects of building a strong and long-lasting cyberthreat intelligence program. We’ll review methods of threat intelligence platform selection and bake-off techniques as well as cover stakeholder analysis and priority intelligence requirements. Additionally, we’ll practice collection planning and mission management as well as how to establish effective reporting and dissemination capabilities.

rsa2018
Cyber CounterIntelligence – Deception, Distortion, Dishonesty
April 18, 1:45PM-2:30PM RSA Conference
Deception, distortion, dishonesty are core to social media postings. Our adversaries use these methods concocting stories that create illusions that are meant to leave us divided. The talk will cover methods of countering their messaging while applying these tactics to protect your own organization and brand. Moving from intelligence to counterintelligence is the natural next step in our evolution.

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Dragonfly 2.0? Delta Elektroniks and Pre-embedded Malware

Delta Elektroniks highly likely supported by the Russian government and a direct threat to energy sector supply chain operations

Treadstone 71 asserts with high confidence that Delta Elektroniks (DE) is likely a front company directly associated with Energetic Bear (Dragonfly). The equipment purchased from DE is vulnerable to supply chain threats due to malware embedded in the Taiwanese Delta Electronics (T-DE) programmable logic controller (PLC) software. T-DE is not aware of the infections allowing customers to download and install infected PLC software for the initial purposes of cyber espionage. Long-term intentions include possible physical sabotage operations and the potential to manipulate markets through false accidents (real but not due to human error or technology failure) to artificially drive up stocks (or down). Speculation of oil prices targeted to drive revenue when the price per barrel is too low to sustain economic plans. The PLCs appear to be genuine production parts with malware introduced post-production. Verification of Oleg Vladimirovich Strekozov’s identity is incomplete; the name is likely fictitious and probably state-sponsored. Evidence that suggests this outcome:

+++++++++++++++++++++++UPDATE+++++++++++++++++++ 1/4/2018+++++++++

https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-16-348-03

https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-18-004-01

Purely a Treadstone 71 effort

+++++++++++++++++++++1/4/2018++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Malware Targets SCADA Devices

  • TTPs are like Dragonfly (Strekozov as defined) or Energetic Bear (B2)
  • Targeting SCADA devices is consistent with espionage practices (B2)
    • Provides hackers a foothold into US critical infrastructure via trusted downloads – Delta Website in Taiwan (as one of many)
  • A copycat website in Russia is suspicious and consistent with masquerade techniques (C3)
  • A legitimate Russian business would not conduct themselves in such a way (C2)
  • Multiple other sites deliver the same software (C3) …

NOTE: It is possible that the T-DE PLC software is poorly written and vulnerable by default. Scans from the T-DE website indicate website vulnerabilities including SQL injection weaknesses.

The full report: Treadstone 71Intelligence Games in the Power Grid PDF

The associated PPTX: Treadstone 71 Intelligence Games in the Power Grid

Our defenses are built for outside in. This is already in. Anti-virus scanners do not detect any of this only sandbox analysis. ‘Trusted’ software is being downloaded from multiple different sites in multiple different languages covering multiple different industries. Data centers, buildings, power plants, hospitals, public safety, dams, nuclear facilities, financial services data centers, oil pipelines, military facilities, hotels, industrial automation, building automation, energy and ICT infrastructure, embedded power, automotive electronics (ships/boats), embedded power, various components thereof, merchant and mobile power, telecom energy, and renewable energy non-inclusively.

Recent reports from Symantec (outside in):

http://www.eweek.com/security/dragonfly-2.0-hackers-targeting-the-energy-sector-symantec-finds

https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/dragonfly-western-energy-sector-targeted-sophisticated-attack-group

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-energy/u-s-warns-public-about-attacks-on-energy-industrial-firms-idUSKBN1CQ0IN RELEASED OCTOBER 20/21

Zapad Exercises – 2nd/3rd Order Effects

 

The recent Russian Zapad wargaming exercises included a plethora of electronic capabilities demonstration and potentially more. Russia is known to recently been involved in illegal immigration efforts in Sweden, Finland, and Norway along with hostile intent along its northern borders (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) including cell/communication tower tampering. Could the recent Zapad exercises be more than just wargaming?

Some What If thoughts on these non-linear actions:

– Testing capabilities, distance, strength, impacts
– Testing responses like a stone in pond
    – 2nd and 3rd order effects were measured to determine the impact on targets, targets responses, etc.
    – Russians had people in each target country assisting with target impacts
    – Russians monitored target government communications from within each country
    – Determine length of time for target government to respond and what methods were used and where to get communications back online (if at all) – the locations of the response represent capabilities unknown to Russia until such an exercise is performed
– Other possibles:
     – A cover for illegal activities that occurred during the exercise – a feint, a ruse
 – Testing a precursor to actual execution – that is why military exercises are performed
 – What capabilities are being left in the exercise areas; what is not being removed after the exercise using the exercise as a ruse to place assets close to Western borders that were not there before
 What do you think?
 https://uawire.org/news/media-belarusian-and-russian-militaries-are-jamming-mobile-communications-along-border-with-poland

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Drone Wars! Threats, Vulnerabilities and Hostile Use

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Fessenden, F. & Watkins, D. (6/18/2017) the Path of the Container Ship that Struck a U.S. Destroyer, NYT. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/18/world/asia/path-ship-hit-uss-fitzgerald.html?mcubz=3

Gaertner, U (2013) UAV Swarm Tactics: An Agent-Based Simulation and Markov Process Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School Thesis.

Haider, Z. & Khalid, S. (8/2016) Survey on Effective GPS Spoofing Countermeasures, 6th International Conference on Innovative Computing Technology (INTECH 2016), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/313543601_Survey_on_effective_GPS_spoofing_countermeasures

Heath, T. (5/7/2015) How to Hack a Military Drone Parts I & II, Technology-Hackers, www.cybersecurityintelligence.com/blog/

Hodge, H. (8/23/2017) why are Navy Ships colliding in the Pacific? Experts Weigh In, Military.com

Homeland Security (2017) Improving the Operation and Development of Global Positioning System (GPS) Equipment Used by Critical Infrastructure, NCIC/NCC Unclassified report.

Hurley, M. (9/2017) Beyond the Iron Triad: The Future of Airborne C2ISR, Arlington, VA: Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies.

Humphreys, T.E, e. al. (1/1/2009) assessing the Spoofing Threat: Development of a Portable Civilian GPS Spoofer, https://gps.mae.cornell.edu/humphreys_etal_iongnss2008.pdf, Cornell University

Humphreys, T.E, (7/18/2012) Statement on the Vulnerability of Civil Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Other Systems to Civil GPS Spoofing, Submitted to the Subcommittee on Oversight., Investigations, and Management of the House Committee on Homeland Security.

Kao, Lee, Chang, and Ko. (2007) A Fuzzy Logic Method for Collision Avoidance in Vessel Traffic Service, Journal of Navigation, 60, 17-31.

John, E.N & Schrage, D.P (2017) System Integration and Operation of a Research Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, Atlanta GA: School of Aerospace Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology.

LaGrone, S. (8/21/2017) Chain of Events Involving U.S Navy Warships in the Western Pacific Raise Readiness, Training Questions, USNI News

LaGrone, S. (1/31/2017) Cruiser USS Antietam Runs Aground in Tokyo Bay, Spills Oil, USNI News.

Mccaslin, I.B. (2017) Red Drones Over Disputed Seas: A Field Guide to Chinese UAVs/UCAVs Operating in the disputed East and South China Seas. Project 2049 Institute.  http://project2049.net/documents/Red%20Drones%20Over%20Disputed%20Seas_PLA_Project2049.pdf

News Correspondent, (8/22/2017) USS McCain crash is 4th Navy Accident in Pacific this Year, The Washington Post, AP.

News Correspondent, (8/31/2017) DDG 51 Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer, Military.com

News Correspondent, (8/21/2017) CNO Orders Operational Pause, Review After Latest Ship Collision, Military.com

News Correspondent, (8/21/2017) 10 Sailors Missing, 5 injured after Destroyer Collides with Tanker, Military.com

News Correspondent, (8/22/2017) Remains of Navy Sailors found on USS John S McCain, Military.com

News Correspondent, (8/17/2017) Navy Fires Commander, XO from USS Fitzgerald for Fatal Collision, Military.com

News Correspondent, (7/21/2017) Investigation Faults Navy in Fitzgerald Collision Report, Military.com

News Correspondent, (6/20/2017) Stories of Fitzgerald Sailors Killed in Destroyer – Container Ship Crash, Military.com

News Correspondent, (6/16/2017) US Navy Destroyer Collides with Japanese Merchant Ship, Military.com

News Correspondent, (5/09/2017) US Navy Ship Collides with South Korean Fishing Boat, Military.com

News Correspondent, (1/31/2017) Oil Spill in Tokyo Bay After Navy Cruiser Runs Aground, Military.com

Nichols, R.K (8/31/2017) Stand By for a whole slew of military short articles on the Navy Collisions (my students only), Private memo to COT799 & CMST 455.

Nichols, R.K. & Lekkas, P.L. (2002) Wireless Security: Threats, Models, Solutions, New York, McGraw Hill.

O’Donnell, W. (2017) Interview with Navy Captain. http://inmilitary.com/real-reason-us-navy-keeps-hitting-merchant-vessels/

Ranganathan, A, et.al, SPREE A Spoofing Resistant GPS Receiver, Department of Computer Science, ETH Zurich, Switzerland, Zurich Information Security and Privacy Center.

Richardson, J. Adm., (8/31/2017) No Evidence of Hacking in McCain and Fitzgerald Collisions, Military.com

Rudow, l. (2014) Where to Mount a Radome for best Performance, Boat US, http://www.boatus.com/magazine/2014/june/mounting-a-radome.asp

Schallhorn, K., (9/1/2017) US Military crashes, collisions in the Pacific, FoxNews. http://www.foxnews.com/us/2017/08/28/us-military-crashes-collisions-in-pacific.html

Schmidt, D.et.al., (5/2016) A Survey and Analysis of the GNSS Spoofing Threat and Countermeasures, ACM Computing Surveys, Vol 48, No 4, Article 64

Sickle, J.V. (8/25/2017) GEOG 862 GPS and GNSS for Geospatial Professionals, Lessons 1-10 complete, Penn State University, College of Earth and Mineral Sciences  https://www.e-education.psu.edu/geog862/node/1407 [ Superb Course on the subject]

Sterling, J. 8/21/2017) A Spate of US Navy warship accidents in Asia since January, CNNNEWS. http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/21/politics/navy-ships-accidents/index.html

Tucker, P., e. al. (9/2017) Beyond GPS: Upgrading the Military’s Navigation-and-timing Backbone, Defense One, e-Book.

Volpe, J.A, (8/29/2001) Vulnerability Assessment of the Transportation Infrastructure Relying on the Global Positioning System, Final Report, Office of Assistant Secretary for Transportation Policy, U.S. Department of Transportation, John A Volpe Transportation Systems Center.

Warner, J.S. % Johnson, R.G. (2013) A Simple Demonstration That the Global Positioning System (GPS) is Vulnerable to Spoofing, Journal of Security Administration, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/8ddb/89f56dd3e2ae265047822bc47cfb06815d9a.pdf, LAUR-03-6163.

Warner, J.S. % Johnson, R.G. (2003) GPS Spoofing Countermeasures, Journal of Security Administration, LAUR-03-2384, Los Alamos, NM:  Los Alamos National Laboratory

Weise, E. (8/23/2017) Could Hackers Be Behind The U.S. Navy Collisions? USATODAY.

Patents

Berry, R. & Cook, C. (2016) Detection of wireless data jamming and spoofing, US 9466881 B1

 

Blogs

Banggood Blog (9/14/2017) Whats the difference between RHCP and LHCP antennae?     https://blog.banggood.com/rhcp-and-lhcp-whats-the-difference-29046.html

King Blog (9/14/2017) what is the difference between Azimuth and Elevation? https://kingconnect.com/what-is-the-difference-between-azimuth-and-elevation/

Mike Willis Blog (9/13/2017) Propagation. http://www.mike-willis.com/Tutorial/propagation.html

Law and Cyber Warfare Blog. Groll, E. (2017) Investigating if Destroyer Crash was Caused by a Cyber Attack, http://www.jlcw.org/u-s-navy-investigating-if-destroyer-crash-was-caused-by-cyberattack/

Wikipedia

Editor (8/31/2017) GPS Block IIIA, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GPS_Block_IIIA

Editor (9/14/2017) Circular polarization, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Circular_polarization

Editor (9/19/2017) Electromagnetic Spectrum, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electromagnetic_spectrum

Editor (9/19/2017) Continuous-wave Radar, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Continuous-wave_radar

Featured post

Valery Vasilevich Gerasimov – Валерий Васильевич Герасимов

Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation / First Deputy Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation, General of the Army._64031862_gerasimov

Валерий Васильевич Герасимов

Born      8 September 1955 (age 62)

Kazan, Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic

Married – one son

Russian hackers reportedly stole NSA data via Kaspersky Lab software

http://algo.fyi/5vhjug

Born on 8 September 1955 in the city of Kazan. In 1977, he graduated from the Kazan Higher Tank Command School named after the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar ASSR (Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic). He commanded platoon, company, battalion in the Northern Group of Troops and Far Eastern Military District.

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After his graduation from the Military Academy of Armored Troops named after Marshal of the Soviet Union R.Ya. Malinovsky in the year of 1987, he served as the chief of headquarters and commander of tank regiment, the chief of headquarters of motorized rifle division in the Baltic Military District. From 1993 to 1995 — the commander of motorized rifle division in the North-Western Group of Troops.

After graduating from the Kazan Higher Tank Command School Gerasimov was the commander of a platoon, company, and battalion of the Far Eastern Military District. Later he was chief of staff of a tank regiment and then of a motorized rifle division in the Baltic Military District. From 1993 to 1995 he was the commander of the 144th Guards Motor Rifle Division in the Baltic Military District and then the North-Western Group of Forces.

After he graduated from the General Staff’s academy he was First Deputy Army Commander in the Moscow Military District and commander of the 58th Army in the North Caucasus Military District during the Second Chechen War. His involvement in the arrest of Yuri Budanov led to praise from journalist Anna Politkovskaya.

g3In 2006, he became commander of Leningrad Military District and moved to be the commander of Moscow Military District in 2009 and Central Military District in April 2012. On 23 December 2010, he became deputy Chief of the General Staff

In 1997 after his graduation from the Military Academy of the RF Armed Forces’ General Staff, he served as the First Deputy Commander of Army in the Moscow Military District, the Deputy Commander, Chief of Staff and Commander of the 58th Army in the North Caucasian Military District.

From 2003 to 2005 — the Chief of Staff of the Far Eastern Military District. From 2005 — the Chief of the Main Administration of Combat Training and Troops’ Service of the RF Armed Forces, and from December 2006 — the Chief of Staff of the North Caucasian Military District.vg4.png

In December 2006, he was assigned as the Commander of the Leningrad Military District, and in February 2009 — as the Commander of the Moscow Military District.

From December 2010 — the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

From 26 April 2012 — the Commander of the Central Military District.

Gerasimovs-linjal

03-02By the RF Presidential Decree of 9 November 2012, he has been appointed the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation / First Deputy Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation. He was appointed by President Vladimir Putin on 9 November 2012. Some authors credit Gerasimov as the person behind a so-called “Gerasimov doctrine” – currently prevalent in Russian military strategy – combining military, technological, information, diplomatic, economic, cultural and other tactics, which are then deployed towards one set of strategic objectives. This “political warfare” is preferred due to its comparatively low cost.

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The previous Chief of General Staff, Army General Nikolay Makarov, was seen as close to Serduykov and was seen by commentators as likely to be replaced by new Defence Minister Sergey Shoygu. It has been reported that Makarov resigned, but he was formally dismissed by President Vladimir Putin. Other changes were the dismissal of Alexander Sukhorukov from the position of First Deputy Defence Minister and his replacement by Colonel General Arkady Bakhin, formerly commander of the Western Military District. Aerospace Defence Forces commander Colonel General Oleg Ostapenko was also promoted to Deputy Defence Minister. He was promoted to the highest rank in the Russian Army, General of the Army as of 2014. On September 15, 2016, he and Turkish chief of staff General Hulusi Akar conducted a

03-03

meeting on the future of Syria in the Ankara headquarters of the army. That meeting will result in tightened dealings between Russia and Turkey.

There is an old Soviet-era rhetorical device that a ‘warning’ or a ‘lesson’ from some other situation is used to outline intent and plan. The way that what purports to be an after-action take on the Arab Spring so closely maps across to what was done in Ukraine is striking. Presenting the Arab Spring–wrongly–as the results of covert Western operations allows Gerasimov the freedom to talk about what he may also want to talk about: how Russia can subvert and destroy states without direct, overt and large-scale military intervention. However, the assumption that this is a Western gambit primarily does appear genuinely-held. https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war/

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In April 2014 Gerasimov was added to the list of persons against whom the European Union introduced sanctions “in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence of Ukraine.”

Hero of the Russian Federation.

Personal decorations: Order for Military Merits, Order for Merits to the Fatherland 4th grade, Order for Service to the Homeland in the USSR’s Armed Forces 3rd grade, Order of St. George 4th grade, Order for Merits to the Fatherland with Swords 3rd grade, Order for Honor.

The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness.

For me, this is probably the most important line in the whole piece, so allow me to repeat it: The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness. In other words, this is an explicit recognition not only that all conflicts are actually means to political ends–the actual forces used are irrelevant–but that in the modern realities, Russia must look to non-military instruments increasingly. https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war/

 https://warontherocks.com/2016/03/russian-hybrid-warfare-and-other-dark-arts/

 

 

 

Featured post

Dru’a al-Waaqiah lil-Bedoon – Syrian Sanctions Busting with Russian Help

Past report on Syrian Government collusion with Russia to bypass sanctions against Syria. This instance involves acquiring materials and machines to manufacture their own body armor in Latakia by way of the UAE where a Syrian soldier working with a female FSB agent centralize the acquisitions.

Visas, passports, military IDs, fake names, bills of lading and more for your reading and review.

The Treadstone 71 Report (pdf) – Treadstone 71 – drua-alwaaqiah-lilboodoon

Treadstone 71 acquired supporting files and documents (30MB zip) – drua-rawfiles-treadstone71

https://treadstone71llc.files.wordpress.com/2014/10/hatem-deeb-_-vk.pdf 

https://treadstone71llc.files.wordpress.com/2014/10/zain-deeb-_-vk.pdf

https://cybershafarat.com/?p=524

http://www.treadstone71.com

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