Historical analysis
Military cunning, defined as the theory and practice of stealth and misleading an adversary, stands as a timeless element of military art. It consistently proves its worth as a force multiplier, enabling victory with minimal expenditure of resources and time. Historical accounts spanning from antiquity to modern conflicts affirm their pervasive influence on strategic and tactical outcomes. The report examines cunning’s theoretical underpinnings, distinguishing between secrecy and deception, and explores their practical application across diverse historical periods. It highlights how military leaders, from Sun Tzu to contemporary commanders, have adapted deceptive practices to meet the evolving needs of operational environments.
A central theme involves the inseparable relationship between cunning and suddenness. Cunning creates unexpectedness, catching an adversary off guard and paralyzing their will. Countering an adversary’s suddenness demands a proactive deployment of one’s cunning, emphasizing continuous intellectual development and adaptation in military leadership. The consistent emphasis on cunning as a “little-studied” but “universal” principle applied across all historical periods shows its fundamental, rather than merely tactical, importance. The pervasive nature of cunning across diverse historical contexts establishes its enduring necessity in military endeavors.
Military history provides abundant evidence of the profound impact of cunning on the course and outcome of conflicts. From ancient strategists like Sun Tzu to modern commanders, the ability to mislead an adversary and conceal true intentions has frequently determined success. The report systematically analyzes military cunning, exploring its theoretical constructs and historical applications. The discussion draws exclusively from the provided document, ensuring a focused and comprehensive analysis of stealth, deception, and their symbiotic relationship with suddenness in combat. Understanding these principles and their evolution remains paramount for contemporary military thought and practice. The document’s assertion that cunning has applied “at all times” and “evolved with time” indicates its dynamic nature, necessitating continuous adaptation rather than a fixed set of rules. The continuous adaptation demonstrates the cunning of a living, adaptive discipline within military science.
Principles and Methods of Military Cunning – Stealth and Deception
Military cunning represents the theory and practice of concealing one’s actions and misleading an adversary. It functions as a force multiplier, enhancing capabilities and enabling victory with reduced expenditure of force, time, and resources. When adversaries possess comparable strengths, cunning enables a more effective application of power, resulting in quicker victories with fewer casualties. Against a stronger adversary, cunning helps a weaker side overcome quantitative or other disadvantages. Military cunning stands as the antithesis of rigid patterns, fixed schemes, and stereotypical approaches in military art.
The conceptualization of military cunning as the “antithesis of rigid patterns” suggests a fundamental requirement for creative and flexible thinking in military leadership. Cunning, described as “creativity, art, not an exact science or even a craft,” demands intellectual agility and a departure from conventional approaches, making creative thinking a prerequisite for its effective application. The ability of cunning to function as an equalizer, leveling the playing field between numerically or technologically disparate forces, highlights its strategic utility. The document explicitly states that “in case of inequality of rivals, cunning helped the weaker side compensate for quantitative or other lag”. The direct statement establishes a causal link between cunning and overcoming numerical or technological disparity, positioning it as a strategic tool for balancing power.
The Pillars of Secrecy = Concealment, Vigilance, and Discipline
Secrecy, a fundamental form of military cunning, encompasses measures designed to conceal or neutralize signs revealing the development and implementation of new equipment, weaponry, and combat methods, as well as the presence, status, and activities of troops. Its purpose involves hindering or preventing detection, ensuring protection from adversary weapons, and creating conditions for swift action.
Maintaining secrecy during the preparation of combat operations remains paramount. Decision-making, operational planning, task assignment, and the formation and deployment of strike groups to initial positions demand reliable concealment from an adversary. While entirely hiding large-scale operations presents challenges given modern reconnaissance capabilities, commanders can effectively conceal the true scale of forces, the direction of planned activities, the overall operational plan, the main strike’s direction, and the commencement of active combat.
Methods for achieving secrecy include–
- Keeping plans, decisions, and intentions secret involves limiting information leakage sources and implementing preventive measures. It intertwines with vigilance, defined as a heightened sense of responsibility and active measures to maintain secrecy.
- Camouflage of troops, equipment, and weapons —a primary method for achieving secrecy —involves eliminating or weakening observable signs of development, presence, and location of military assets. Practitioners achieve this through the use of artificial masks, camouflage kits, natural shelters, and by exploiting weather conditions, time of year and day, terrain dispersion, and reducing optical, thermal, acoustic, and radar visibility via aerosols, thermal insulation, and the creation of radar and sound fields.
- Maintaining discipline of stealth requires increased rigor and control over camouflage measures and classified information procedures, alongside the prevention and suppression of information leaks.
Secrecy, while a part of cunning, also functions as a force protection measure. The definition of secrecy states that its goal is “to hinder or prevent detection and identification, to ensure protection from enemy weapons, and to create the necessary conditions for surprise.” The phrase “ensure protection from enemy weapons” links secrecy to survivability, extending its purpose beyond mere deception to active force protection.
The Instruments of Deception– Disinformation, Demonstration, Imitation, and Deformation
Deception, the second core component of military cunning, involves imposing false perceptions upon an adversary regarding the development and preparation of armed forces, command plans and intentions, the actual state of troops, their support, and the nature, forms, methods, techniques, and conditions of their actions. Historical experience shows that disinformation, demonstration, and imitation primarily serve to deceive. Deformation also plays a role.
Methods of deception include–
- Disinformation involves the deliberate dissemination of false information about one’s troops, their organization, composition, equipment, combat readiness, plans, and methods of action. Disinformation spreads through military communication channels, radio broadcasting, television, print media, false documents, rumors spread among local populations, and the deliberate disclosure of secrets. Effective disinformation requires high plausibility, prompt adjustments based on adversary reactions, and strict adherence to conspiracy during preparation and execution.
- Demonstration– A deliberate display of troop activity through movement, concentration, dispersion, and diversionary combat actions. A demonstration intends to distract the enemy from real troop movements and plans. Methods include intensifying reconnaissance, moving troops in false directions, preparing and conducting combat operations in diversionary areas, concentrating troops in false locations, constructing decoys, and undertaking fortification work far from actual troop positions.
- Imitation —This involves creating false objects and replicating characteristics inherent to troops, military equipment, and weaponry. Practitioners achieve this through mock-ups, radio-technical, radio-electronic, pyrotechnic, light, sound, smoke, and engineering means, alongside constructing various structures such as command posts, trenches, and positions. The goal involves imposing a false understanding of the operational situation, troop grouping, deployment, and object status upon the adversary.
- Deformation– Deformation involves the deliberate distortion of military objects, equipment, and weaponry configurations to create a false impression about their true purpose and condition. Practitioners achieve deformation by changing weapons and equipment through the addition or removal of structures and devices.
The effectiveness of deception methods such as disinformation and demonstration relies heavily on the adversary’s intelligence collection and analysis capabilities. The document states that disinformation requires a “high degree of plausibility and persuasiveness.” For demonstration, it mentions “attract the enemy’s attention and divert it from the true actions”. For imitation, it looks “to impose a false perception on the enemy”. All these methods implicitly depend on the adversary observing, collecting, and then misinterpreting the presented false information. A sophisticated adversary with robust intelligence might detect inconsistencies, while a less capable one might fall for simpler deceptions. The highlights the interplay between the deceiver’s art and the deceived’s perception.
Table 1 provides a structured overview of Sun Tzu’s foundational principles of deception, categorized for clarity and analytical utility.
Table 1– Sun Tzu’s Principles of Deception (Categorized by N.I. Konrad)
| Category (N.I. Konrad’s classification) | Sun Tzu’s Principle | Brief Explanation/Effect |
| Masking | Feigning weakness when strong | Concealing true strength to lure an adversary into complacency or attack. |
| Concealing true actions | Hiding preparations and movements to prevent adversary awareness. | |
| Distorting distances | Making close positions appear far, or distant positions appear near, to mislead on approach. | |
| Masking false defense | Feigning a defensive posture to lull an adversary’s vigilance before a surprise attack. | |
| Precautions | Avoiding confrontation with superior forces | Evading decisive engagement when an adversary possesses overwhelming strength. |
| Exhausting fresh forces | Wearing down an adversary’s fresh troops through maneuvers before engaging them. | |
| Exploiting Weaknesses/Errors | Attacking an unprepared adversary | Striking when an adversary lacks material or psychological readiness. |
| Striking when unexpected | Launching attacks at times or places an adversary does not anticipate. | |
| Exploiting adversary’s general unpreparedness | Capitalizing on an adversary’s lack of readiness across various aspects. | |
| Exploiting adversary’s weakened vigilance | Taking advantage of an adversary’s reduced alertness. | |
| Exploiting adversary’s carelessness | Benefiting from an adversary’s lack of caution. | |
| Internal Disruption | Causing disarray | Instigating confusion or panic within an adversary’s ranks. |
| Sowing discord among adversary ranks | Creating internal strife, separating allies, or turning commanders against each other. | |
| Psychological Impact | Provoking anger to induce rash actions | Inciting an adversary to lose composure and make ill-considered, risky decisions. |
| Feigning humility to foster overconfidence | Presenting a meek appearance to make an adversary overconfident and careless. |
Table 2 summarizes the core methods of military cunning, providing a quick reference for the report’s theoretical framework.
Table 2– Core Methods of Military Cunning
| Form of Cunning | Method | Brief Description | Purpose/Effect |
| Secrecy | Concealing Plans | Limiting access to information and preventing leaks regarding intentions and decisions. | To prevent adversary knowledge of true objectives and operations. |
| Vigilance | Heightened responsibility and active measures to maintain classified information security. | To ensure sustained secrecy and prevent inadvertent disclosures. | |
| Camouflage | Eliminating or weakening observable signs of military assets through various means. | To hinder detection, ensure protection, and create conditions for surprise. | |
| Secrecy Discipline | Strict control over camouflage measures and classified information procedures. | To prevent and suppress information leaks, maintain operational security. | |
| Deception | Disinformation | Deliberate dissemination of false information about forces, plans, or actions. | To impose false perceptions and mislead the adversary about true intentions. |
| Demonstration | Deliberate display of troop activity (movement, concentration, diversionary actions). | To attract adversary attention and divert it from actual troop movements. | |
| Imitation | Creating false objects and replicating characteristics of military assets with mock-ups. | To impose a false understanding of the operational situation or troop disposition. | |
| Deformation | Deliberate distortion of military object configurations. | To create a false impression about the true purpose or condition of assets. |
Historical Manifestations– Cunning Across Eras – Early Strategic Deceptions
Military cunning has a rich, storied history, with examples dating back to ancient times. The ancient thinker Jammadapa (5th century BC) observed that a “falsely directed thought” could inflict greater harm than a direct enemy action. The Greek historian Thucydides (460-400 BC) considered the most effective military leader to be one who possessed military cunning. Roman rhetorician Polyaenus (2nd century AD) compiled nearly 900 stratagems, or examples of military cunning, in his work “Military Cunning,” while Frontinus analyzed 563 in his four-volume treatise. Vegetius (5th century AD), a Roman military theorist, advocated overcoming adversaries through cunning, emphasizing that “unexpectedness, suddenness causes fear and panic”. The consistent emphasis on “surprise” and “unexpectedness” across ancient military thinkers reveals a foundational, universal principle of warfare that transcends specific cultures or technologies. Sun Tzu’s core assertion that “all wars are based on cunning” and Vegetius’s observation directly connect cunning to surprise, indicating that while methods evolve, the psychological impact of unexpectedness is still a constant objective.
Sun Tzu’s “Art of War” remains a cornerstone of military theory, with his views on military cunning forming a coherent system. He considered caution and cunning as supreme principles, asserting that “all wars are based on cunning”. Sun Tzu advocated winning without direct engagement, prioritizing the disruption of an adversary’s plans and alliances over direct military confrontation. He stressed the importance of keeping an adversary completely ignorant of battle locations and concealing even the smallest details. Sun Tzu’s commentators further elaborated on his principles. Cao Gong stated, “In war there is no permanent form; the art of war consists in deception.” Mei Yao-chen added, “Without deception it is impossible to apply tactical maneuver.” Wang Zhe declared, “Deception is a means to achieve victory over the enemy.” Zhang Yu concluded, “The basis of war is humanity and justice, but to achieve victory, deception is indispensable”. Sun Tzu outlined thirteen specific deception techniques, which N.I. Konrad categorized into five groups– camouflage, precautions, exploiting adversary weaknesses, internal disruption, and psychological manipulation.
Ancient Greek mythology offers examples, such as Bacchus’ forces creating loud noises amplified by echoes to scare off a stronger adversary. Homer’s account of the Trojan War highlights ambushes and the famous Trojan Horse, a classic example of deception in which hidden Greek soldiers gained entry to Troy, thereby opening the gates for their army. The Old Testament also records cunning, such as Joshua’s siege of Jericho, where rhythmic marching and trumpet blasts, interpreted as divine intervention, caused the city walls to collapse. A more rational explanation suggests a combination of psychological warfare and the potential exploitation of structural weaknesses. Joshua’s attack on Ai involved feigned retreat to lure the garrison out, allowing a hidden force to capture and burn the city, then encircle the pursuing enemy.
Early military cunning involved relatively simple methods, such as ambushes, with short-lived suddenness effects and minimal material costs. As productive forces and weaponry evolved, cunning’s significance grew, enabling victories against numerically superior forces. The evolution of cunning from simple ambushes to complex strategic deceptions, such as those used by the Hittites and Alexander, mirrors the increasing scale and complexity of warfare itself. Early examples show individual ingenuity; however, later instances involved more intricate planning and coordination across larger forces. The progression indicates that as armies grew and conflicts expanded, so too did the sophistication and scope of deceptive practices, moving from purely tactical tricks to operational and strategic levels.
The Battle of Kadesh (1274 BC) involved the Hittites using captured spies to mislead Pharaoh Ramesses II about the location of their main forces, leading to a surprise attack on the unsuspecting Egyptian army. Philip II of Macedon (338 BC) employed deceptive maneuvers and a false letter to distract Athenian and Theban forces, making a forced night march to appear in their rear. A feigned retreat then lured them into a trap, securing Macedonian dominance over Greece. Alexander the Great’s crossing of the Hydaspes River (326 BC) against King Porus involved repeatedly feigning river crossings to desensitize the adversary, then secretly crossing at night during a storm near a wooded island. Hannibal consistently sought advantageous battle conditions, as exemplified at the Trebia River. Byzantine Emperor Maurice, in “Strategikon,” noted the Slavs’ preference for fighting in dense forests and ravines, employing ambushes, sudden attacks, and various cunning methods, including unique underwater breathing techniques using hollow reeds. Slavs also feigned retreats, abandoning spoils to lure pursuers into ambushes. Byzantine commanders adopted these methods, as seen when Belisarius’s bodyguard, Trojan, lured Goths into an ambush near Rome.
The Russian Empire’s Campaigns– Ingenuity in Imperial Warfare
Russian military leaders, from Peter the Great to Suvorov and Kutuzov, extensively employed military cunning. Peter I emphasized decisive battles with minimal losses, encouraging initiative and adaptability over rigid adherence to regulations. He relocated border residents and employed uniform deception at Poltava (1709), where new recruits wore green, while the Novgorod Regiment wore grey, thereby misleading the Swedes about troop strength and composition. He also lured Swedish forces into artillery fire by feigning a cavalry retreat.
General-Field Marshal P.S. Saltykov continued these traditions. At Paltzig (1759), he outflanked Prussian forces, occupying their rear through a secret night march, achieving complete surprise. He also pioneered firing artillery over his troops, a novel tactic. At Kunersdorf (1759), Saltykov deviated from linear formations, creating a mobile reserve and secretly regrouping artillery to deliver unexpected blows.
P.A. Rumyantsev, an expert in deception, advocated immediate offensive action upon contact, a departure from the defensive norms of his predecessors. His 1770 campaign demonstrated hidden troop and artillery reserves, decisive in the Battle of Kagul River against a numerically superior Turkish force. Rumyantsev introduced Jaeger battalions to counter cavalry and a mobile artillery reserve for shifting fire. His “separate to march, together to fight” principle at Ryabaya Mogila (1770) involved dispersed, covert marches converging for a concentric attack, surprising the Turks who anticipated only a retreat.
A.V. Suvorov, renowned for his cunning, created an impression of weakness at Girsowo (1773) to lure Turkish forces into a devastating crossfire and surprise counterattack. His appearance at Focșani and Rymnik (1789) surprised the Turks due to his rapid, covert marches and the placement of Austrian allies at the vanguard, which concealed the Russian presence. The storming of Izmail (1790) involved simultaneous, multi-directional attacks to disperse Turkish defenses, secret troop preparation, and false siege batteries. At Novi (1799), Suvorov feigned withdrawal to lure the French into open terrain, then attacked their weakened flank. His Swiss Campaign (1799) featured secret movements under fog and deep flanking maneuvers, forcing the French to retreat.
M.I. Kutuzov, praised by Suvorov for his cunning, demonstrated strategic brilliance. In 1805, he repeatedly outmaneuvered Napoleon, rapidly shifting his army across the Danube and destroying Mortier’s corps while Napoleon remained on the opposite bank. The Battle of Slobodzeia (1811) involved luring the Turkish army into open terrain, then executing a bold and risky withdrawal across the Danube to entice them to cross, followed by a secret flanking maneuver to encircle and destroy their main force. The Tarutino maneuver (1812) exemplifies Kutuzov’s strategic deception. He kept his plan in deep secrecy, with most officers unaware. Night marches, strict discipline, and a strong rearguard feigning movement in a false direction concealed the Russian army’s disappearance from Napoleon. Napoleon’s ensuing effort to deceive Kutuzov through a deceptive peace proposal and covert troop maneuvers was uncovered, enabling Kutuzov to anticipate and counter the French strategy.
M.I. Platov, the Don Cossack Ataman, frequently used “spigovka” (all-round pursuit) and feigned river crossings. He set ambushes and lit false campfires to exaggerate the presence of his forces. His “venter” tactic at Mir involved luring the enemy with a feigned retreat into a prepared ambush, striking from front and flank. The capture of Namur (1814) involved setting numerous fires at night to simulate reinforcements, which led the French commandant to surrender, believing a larger army had arrived.
The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 saw extensive cunning. The Danube crossing at Zimnitsa (1877) involved secret reconnaissance, feigned crossings at multiple points, and strict media control to mislead the Turks about the location of the central crossing. The night assault on Kars (1877) involved lulling Turkish vigilance with nightly raids, then launching a surprise assault under darkness, after spreading a false rumor of a morning attack.
The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, despite Russia’s defeat, saw resourceful tactics. The defense of Port Arthur involved searchlights to blind and demoralize Japanese night attacks. The creation of mortars and the first use of concealed firing positions for artillery marked significant innovations. Night attacks, including bayonet charges and the use of hand grenades, gained widespread use, allowing for silent approaches and surprising the enemy.
The Russian Empire’s military leaders consistently adapted cunning to overcome numerical inferiority or fortified positions, demonstrating a deep understanding of psychological warfare. Numerous examples illustrate this —Saltykov’s victories against Frederick II, Rumyantsev’s defeat of a 150,000-strong Turkish force with 38,000 men, Suvorov’s storming of Izmail with a 1:26 casualty ratio, and Kutuzov’s outwitting of Napoleon. In each case, the cunning involved not just physical maneuver and manipulating the enemy’s perception, such as feigned retreats, false strength, or lulling vigilance, to create psychological disarray and exploit their assumptions. The increasing sophistication of deception, from simple feints to complex multi-layered operations, such as Izmail and Tarutino, reflects a growing institutionalization and theoretical understanding of military cunning within the Russian military. Early examples show individual ingenuity. However, by the time of Suvorov and Kutuzov, operations involved coordinated deception across multiple units and phases, requiring meticulous staff work and strict discipline, including secrecy of plans, controlled information flow, and coordinated false movements suggesting a shift from ad-hoc cunning to a more formalized and integrated component of military planning, indicating a deeper theoretical grasp and systematic application.
World War I and Interwar Rearmament– Adapting Cunning to Modern Conflict
World War I marked the further evolution of military cunning, as it adapted to the challenges of trench warfare and continuous fronts. The Gorlice-Tarnów breakthrough (1915) by Austro-German forces exploited Russian weakness in labor and ammunition. The Germans achieved surprise through strict secrecy in troop transfer, disguised reconnaissance, and a diversionary gas attack at Ypres. Russian command’s carelessness contributed to their success. The Brusilov Offensive (1916) showcased Russian cunning. General A.A. Brusilov planned simultaneous attacks on multiple secondary directions to mislead the enemy about the main thrust. He created numerous false earthworks across the front, making it impossible for the enemy to discern the actual attack point. Troops trained in the rear on mock enemy positions, and artillery prepared fire data in advance for specific targets. The comprehensive deception and preparation allowed Russian artillery to suppress enemy fire with minimal losses to attackers. The Battle of the Somme (1916) marked the unexpected introduction of tanks, a new weapon that shocked German forces, showing the power of novel technology in achieving suddenness.
The interwar period saw Germany’s extensive use of cunning to circumvent the Treaty of Versailles. From 1918 to 1919, Germany “demonstratively disarmed” while secretly preserving its industrial capacity. Krupp diversified into civilian goods, maintaining skilled labor for future arms production. Tony Fokker secretly dismantled and hid his aircraft factory assets, then obtained export licenses by arguing that their transfer to neutral Holland would save them, transporting them via bribed railway officials and camouflaging the aircraft as scrap metal.
Between 1920 and 1926, the Reichswehr secretly operated as a General Staff through the “Troop Office,” created a small reserve through short-term recruitment, and expanded police forces with paramilitary training. The “Abwehr” intelligence department was disguised, and a secret “Cipher Center” was established. Germany secretly funded paramilitary groups and exploited a treaty loophole to transfer weapons. Secret aviation development occurred through disguised “armament schools” and international cooperation, with aircraft designed in Germany, assembled in Sweden, and tested under Swedish markings. U-boat prototypes were covertly designed and developed in the Netherlands. Tank development occurred in secret, with field tests conducted in Russia. Germany’s Foreign Ministry prolonged negotiations to end the Control Commission’s activities. Krupp misled foreign correspondents by exposing their film. The Abwehr infiltrated the Control Commission, providing warnings of inspections.
Between 1927 and 1935, following the dissolution of the Control Commission, Germany’s “black production” of armaments increased. Hitler, upon becoming Chancellor, rapidly increased steel production and integrated paramilitary organizations into the military structure. German pilots secretly trained in Italy, and the “National Labor Service” served as a military reserve. Göring cited “Foreign Aircraft over Berlin” propaganda to justify rearmament, and covertly conducted reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union and other countries under the guise of commercial aviation. Hjalmar Schacht devised a complex financial scheme to fund rearmament secretly.
From 1935 to 1939, Hitler openly annulled the Versailles Treaty, renaming the Reichswehr to Wehrmacht and formalizing the General Staff. Abwehr’s aerial photography units transferred to the Luftwaffe as a special reconnaissance squadron. Propaganda created the myth of the Luftwaffe’s sudden appearance to instill fear and intimidation. Hitler’s political cunning shifted to diplomatic deception, with Göring disseminating false information about air strength before dramatically announcing the Luftwaffe’s capabilities. Hitler bluffed about Germany’s non-aggressive intentions while secretly achieving military parity. Germany highlighted military might through media and exhibitions, presenting models of powerful aircraft. The Spanish Civil War served as a testing ground for new weapons and tactics. Hitler employed cunning tactics for territorial expansion, reoccupying the Rhineland with a single division while threatening “6 additional divisions,” which led Allied intelligence to vastly overestimate German forces vastly. Germany consistently exceeded naval tonnage limits, building larger warships than declared. Allied intelligence shortcomings were ascribed to political factors, insufficient funding, and the proficiency of German counterintelligence operations.
The interwar period shows a shift from purely military-tactical cunning to a state-level, systemic application of deception, integrating economic, industrial, diplomatic, and propaganda elements. The document details how Germany, under the Versailles Treaty, systematically employed cunning across multiple domains– industrial, intelligence, financial, and diplomatic. The rearmament effort was not a series of isolated tricks, but a coordinated national strategy involving multiple government and private entities, indicating that cunning had evolved beyond the battlefield to become a tool of grand strategy and statecraft, reflecting a deeper, more integrated understanding of its potential. The political and intelligence failures of the Allied powers significantly aided Germany’s success in circumventing the Versailles Treaty through cunning. The document explicitly states that Allied intelligence “often underestimated the true extent of German rearmament” due to “political considerations, a lack of funding for intelligence services, and effective German counterintelligence and disinformation campaigns”. The Control Commission’s error in allowing Germany to form its coordination committee and the League of Nations being “blind” and “helpless” without inspectors further illustrate Allied shortcomings, showing cunning’s effectiveness is not solely dependent on the deceiver’s skill, and on the deceived’s susceptibility, which can stem from political expediency or intelligence complacency.
World War II– Grand Deception and Concealment Operations
World War II saw military cunning applied on an unprecedented scale, influencing strategic and operational outcomes. The German invasion of the Soviet Union (Operation Barbarossa) involved extensive deception from February to June 1941. The German command prioritized secrecy during troop redeployments to the Soviet borders. Large-scale false operations, such as “Isabella” (Gibraltar), “Attila” (Southern France), and “Harpoon” (Norway-England invasion), diverted attention from the true eastward concentration. Hitler ordered the cessation of British invasion preparations while simultaneously simulating them to conceal the Barbarossa operation.
German preparatory measures were strictly covert, with operational documents restricted to a narrow circle and marked “Top Secret. State Importance.” Strategic deployment of strike groups in the east maintained meticulous camouflage. Recognizing the impossibility of entirely hiding massive troop concentrations, German leadership implemented political and military diversions. A directive from February 1941 explicitly stated the goal of disinformation was to “conceal the preparation for Operation Barbarossa,” with measures conducted in two phases– initial concealment of all preparations not involving mass troop regrouping, followed by more active deception.
The Soviet Union also employed extensive cunning. In the Far East (1945), General A.M. Vasilevsky used pseudonyms for commanders, such as Maximov for Vasilevsky, to mislead Japanese intelligence. The tactic, using pseudonyms for high-ranking commanders, had been applied earlier in Stalingrad, with Zhukov as Konstantinov and Vatutin as Fedorov, and in Kursk, with Zhukov as Yuriev and Stalin as Ivanov. The use of pseudonyms for high-ranking commanders reflects a deep understanding of the importance of protecting command integrity and preventing targeted intelligence gathering against specific leaders. The practice extends beyond general troop concealment; it is intended to explicitly deny the enemy the ability to identify, track, or target key decision-makers, thereby preserving the continuity and secrecy of strategic leadership.
Strict secrecy governed the planning of operations for fronts, armies, and the Pacific Fleet, with limited access to information. Troop concentration, regrouping, and deployment to initial positions maintained absolute stealth. Strategic railway transport secrecy involved limiting access to documents, numbering unloading stations, controlling movement reports, prohibiting phone calls on these matters, and conducting night movements and unloading near borders. Troop movements near the Japanese border were presented as “training exercises.” The local population stayed in their locations, and regular garrison activities were simulated, such as the use of haymaking teams. Officers took local vacations to maintain the illusion of a peaceful time.
The Battle for the Dnieper (1943) involved a major deception. Following a staged transfer of the 3rd Guards Tank Army to the Bukrin bridgehead, dummy tanks, artillery, and active radio stations mimicking headquarters activity were left behind. Actual tanks were transported to the Lyutezh bridgehead with stringent measures for light and sound concealment. German aviation bombed the abandoned positions for a week. General A.V. Gorbatov’s 3rd Army successfully crossed the Sozh River (1943) by exploiting a German deception, which involved showing the same battalion repeatedly, to infer enemy weakness. Gorbatov then secretly withdrew his three divisions from a larger bridgehead, while a neighboring army demonstratively reinforced it, leading the enemy to believe that the main attack would come from that direction.
The Bobruisk Operation (1944) saw General P.I. Batov’s original solution for tank breakthrough through a swamp. Germans considered the swamp impassable, so they concentrated their forces elsewhere. Batov’s sappers secretly built a wooden causeway (gati) across the swamp, camouflaging the preparation of logs and working in complete secrecy. The surprise attack from this unexpected direction broke the German defense. Tactical cunning in the Great Patriotic War focused on deceiving the enemy about one’s true intentions and concealing preparations for combat, thereby seeking victory with minimal losses. Radio silence and camouflage remained crucial for sudden attacks. River crossings often involved cunning. The Dnieper crossing near Zaporizhzhia (1943) involved secret training, nighttime concentration of crossing means, and simultaneous imitation of force concentration north of the city, accompanied by active reconnaissance and artillery strikes. Smoke screens further concealed the actual crossing points.
Normandy landings (Operation Overlord) involved extensive Allied deception. The “Fortitude” operation created a false First US Army Group (FUSAG) in southeast England, commanded by General Patton, with dummy camps, equipment, and a false radio network broadcasting simulated traffic. They convinced the Germans that an invasion was imminent at Pas-de-Calais, holding back forces from Normandy. Agents, prisoners, and media circulated false documents and rumors.
German command also issued directives on deception. Operation “Panther” (1943) involved continued preparations in Army Group South, including demonstrative reconnaissance, tank movements, and false radio traffic to mislead the Soviets. In Army Group Center, all means were to conceal the true situation, including troop withdrawals and false transfers. The defense of Berlin (1945) emphasized street fighting, characterized by “fanaticism, fantasy, and the application of all means of misleading the enemy, military cunning, and perfidy.”
World War II elevated military cunning to a grand strategic level, where deception operations became as complex and resource-intensive as actual military campaigns. Operations like Barbarossa’s concealment and Allied Fortitude involved not just tactical feints but the creation of entire “phantom armies” with fabricated logistics, communications, and public personas. These needed significant resources, specialized units, and meticulous coordination across vast geographical areas and multiple intelligence disciplines. This indicates a qualitative leap in the scale and integration of deception into overall war planning, moving beyond operational surprise to strategic misdirection.
Post-World War II Local Conflicts– Cunning in Asymmetric and Modern Engagements
Military cunning continued to adapt in post-World War II local conflicts, particularly in asymmetric and technologically advanced environments.
Korean War (1950-1953) — The Korean People’s Army (KPA) achieved initial surprise through “mini-invasions” disguised as routine actions, thereby dulling the adversary’s vigilance. They encircled the 24th American Infantry Division using secret nighttime movements in mountainous terrain. KPA forces crossed rivers covertly at night using improvised means. A significant element of cunning was involved in their counterattack on November 25, 1950, in the evening, surprising Americans accustomed to daytime combat. KPA also formed “aircraft hunter” groups with machine guns and anti-tank rifles to ambush low-flying aircraft, simulating vehicle movement to lure planes. Defensive tunnels reduced losses from air attacks. American forces, in turn, used strict secrecy for the Inchon landing (1950), with diversionary air strikes and feigned landings. Their Pusan Perimeter counteroffensive involved covert troop movements, strict military police control, and the concealment of equipment by burying it.
Vietnam War (1960s)– American and Saigon forces, alongside the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLF SV), extensively applied cunning. American directives included disinformation, demonstration, imitation, and secrecy. Diversionary actions lured NLF SV units into traps, where hidden US units would then attack. The “Direct Hit” tactic involved demonstrative attacks followed by sudden changes of course to encircle areas. New weaponry, such as riverine amphibious forces and airmobile operations, were prepared covertly and deployed suddenly. Special reconnaissance and sabotage groups operated secretly at night, conducting surveillance and ambushes. The American invasion of Cambodia and Laos (1970) was prepared with maximum secrecy for a sudden offensive. NLF SV strategic offensives achieved surprise through secretly prepared operations by dispersed groups, combining regular and partisan forces. They skillfully used the rainy season and nighttime to their advantage, thereby hampering their adversary’s air operations. Main attacks focused on less effective Saigon forces, forcing the adversary to shift its reserves constantly. The DRV air defense used mobile anti-aircraft systems as “roaming” units, moving after each engagement, and placing ambushes in the gaps between engagement zones. New weapons were tested, including “geographical warfare” with missile and bomb strikes on dams.
Middle East Conflicts– Cunning acquired a distinct military-political dimension. The Suez Crisis (1956) saw Israeli planners mask preparations against Egypt with actions against Jordan, including a false mobilization and rumors of an Iraqi invasion, achieving strategic and political surprise in Sinai. The Six-Day War (1967) involved political, diplomatic, and military deceptions, such as Moshe Dayan’s disinformation interview, feigned soldier leave, and delayed mobilization. The destruction of the Egyptian air force on the ground involved precisely calculated takeoffs, covert low-altitude approaches, active radio jamming, and false orders transmitted by Israeli radio stations. The US Navy ship “Liberty” reportedly transmitted false coded orders to disrupt Arab troop control. The Yom Kippur War (1973) saw Arab success attributed to their active cunning and Israeli/American self-deception, as adversaries underestimated Arab capabilities due to a “false alarm” syndrome from repeated mobilizations. Israelis used cunning on the Golan front with mobile defense and covert deployment of reserves for counterattacks. They also achieved a “microscopic success” by crossing the Suez Canal with a few tanks and penetrating Egyptian lines. Electronic warfare, including “Shrike” and “Standard ARM” missiles, decoys, and jamming pods, disorganized Arab command. Syrian forces used inflatable, camouflaged decoys of tanks and missile systems in defense. The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) began with a surprise Iraqi armored invasion, and Iraq lured Iranian tanks into “fire traps”. Iraqi forces achieved rapid, covert troop movement using tank trailers and air cover. The Gulf War (1990-1991) saw Iraq hide command posts and missile launchers in civilian buildings, create false positions, and frequently change troop locations. Multinational forces (MNF) used mass media for disinformation, broadcasting exaggerated force data to intimidate Iraq and prevent attacks during deployment. They spread false information through fake radio networks. The MNF successfully deceived Iraq about the timing of the ground offensive and a feigned amphibious landing.
Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989)– Cunning applied extensively in combined-arms operations and tactical actions. The 40th Army concealed preparations and misled the Mujahideen to lure them into traps. The Panjshir Operation (1982) involved a deceptive diversion in the Gorband province to mislead about the main attack direction, causing the Mujahideen to redeploy. Surprise frontal attacks and feigned deep air assaults were executed. Tactical air assaults targeted objectives directly. Raids, blocking, sweeping, ambushes, and convoy protection were everyday tactical actions. Mujahideen lured a Soviet unit into a gorge in Farah (1980). Soviet forces counter-deceived in a raid near Herat (1980) by deliberately revealing preparations to lure the enemy into an ambush. Airborne assaults blocked Mujahideen, with helicopters disguised as cargo carriers. Ambushes were frequent near Pakistani and Iranian borders. Desert ambushes were challenging due to the unpredictable caravan routes and the warnings of shepherds. A complex ambush near the Pakistani border (1987) involved overcoming mountain ranges under surveillance, timed for the Muslim New Year for lower adversary vigilance. Convoy protection required significant cunning due to the vulnerability of vehicles and the adversary’s use of mines and ambushes. Mujahideen attacked convoys’ head and tail, targeting fuel tankers and commanders. Soviet forces created two echelons of reconnaissance and security to counter “distraction groups”. Engineer troops employed cunning in mine warfare, camouflaging false positions and using diverse types of mines. Mujahideen marked mine locations, providing clues for Soviet sappers. Fortifications were adapted and camouflaged.
The post-World War II conflicts illustrate a clear trend towards increasingly sophisticated, multi-domain cunning, particularly in asymmetric warfare and against technologically advanced adversaries. The examples move beyond traditional battlefield maneuvers to incorporate electronic warfare, media manipulation, and exploitation of cultural or psychological factors. Adversaries in these conflicts often lacked conventional military parity, forcing them to rely more heavily on cunning. That rating becomes even more pronounced and innovative when confrontation is disadvantageous, pushing its boundaries beyond purely physical deception to include information and psychological warfare. The repeated instances of “false alarm” syndrome and the successful exploitation of adversary assumptions, such as in the Korean War and the Yom Kippur War, highlight a psychological vulnerability that cunningly targets. The document explicitly mentions the “false alarm” syndrome in the Yom Kippur War, where repeated Arab mobilizations were dismissed as routine. Similarly, the KPA’s initial “mini-invasions” were dismissed, showing that a cunning adversary can systematically exploit human cognitive biases and established patterns of expectation. The effectiveness of deception, therefore, depends on the quality of the false information and on the adversary’s predisposition to believe it or dismiss repeated warnings.
Cunning and Suddenness in Combat
Military cunning forms the fundamental basis for achieving suddenness in military actions. The core of military cunning lies in the unexpected nature of military operations, achieved through the secrecy of their preparation and misleading an adversary about these actions. Without concealing preparations and misleading an adversary, suddenness stays unattainable. Furthermore, without sudden, swift, and decisive actions, victory becomes elusive.
Military cunning does not arise spontaneously. It results from deliberate creative activity by commanders and staff, grounded in a comprehensive understanding of the situation, the adversary, and the readiness and intentions of one’s troops. Cunning functions as the instrument through which suddenness manifests, and without suddenness, victory remains questionable. Suddenness is effective only when troop details, intentions, and timing are hidden from the enemy and the enemy is misled.
Cunning generates unexpectedness by presenting an adversary with a situation that significantly deviates from their predictions and expectations. The discrepancy between the adversary’s forecast and the operational reality constitutes unexpectedness. A greater discrepancy leads to stronger unexpectedness and more effective suddenness.
The mechanism through which military cunning creates suddenness relies on a comprehensive set of knowledge, skills, and abilities termed “subjective orientation.” The encompasses–
- Deep knowledge of the adversary– their methods of military cunning, combat tactics, weaponry, morale, training, and national characteristics.
- Thorough knowledge of one’s forces– the morale and combat qualities of personnel, especially commanders, their capacity to conceal plans, forces, and means, and their ability to mislead an adversary.
- Maximizing combat capabilities– effectively employing one’s weapons and military equipment.
- Environmental factors– considering terrain, time of day, and weather conditions.
- Forecasting– the ability of commanders and staff to predict the likely development of the situation for both sides.
A higher level of subjective orientation correlates with more sophisticated military cunning and a greater probability of achieving suddenness. Cunning manifests when one side, relying on subjective orientation, displays innovation and introduces novelty into established confrontation schemes. The novelty applies to individual components or the entire scheme.
“Subjective orientation” represents a holistic intelligence framework that emphasizes the psychological and cognitive aspects of warfare, in addition to material capabilities. The document defines “subjective orientation” as encompassing knowledge of the enemy’s “thinking,” “morale,” and “national characteristics,” alongside their military capabilities. It also includes understanding one’s forces’ “morale and combat qualities” and the ability to “forecast” the situation. The extends beyond a purely technical assessment of military strength to encompass the psychological and intellectual dimensions of both friendly and enemy forces, suggesting that true intelligence analysis for cunning requires understanding the human element and predicting cognitive responses. The dialectical relationship between cunning and suddenness implies a continuous, dynamic interplay where one side’s success in achieving suddenness forces the other to develop counter-cunning, leading to an arms race of deception. The document states, “Military cunning itself is a necessary condition for preventing unexpectedness… the side preventing unexpectedness must create suddenness through its military cunning, “establishing a reciprocal relationship. Success in achieving suddenness through cunning forces the adversary to either adapt their cunning or suffer defeat. The constant need to “outsmart” creates a perpetual cycle of innovation in deceptive practices, making military cunning a continually evolving discipline.
Countering Adversary Suddenness– Proactive Measures and Preparedness
Countering an adversary’s suddenness remains a natural and necessary process. The core concept involves opposing an adversary’s military cunning, which generates suddenness, with one’s own military cunning, which prevents unexpectedness. The term “outsmart” encapsulates this dynamic.
Effective counteraction against adversary suddenness and prevention of unexpectedness demand several crucial approaches–
- Impacting the Adversary’s Potential —The most direct method involves physically and morally influencing the adversary’s capacity for suddenness, targeting its source. Suppressing or destroying the material basis of suddenness, such as weapons, military equipment, especially weapons of mass destruction and precision-guided munitions, and main troop formations, proves most effective.
- Impacting the Adversary’s Subjective Orientation– Military cunning itself serves as a necessary condition for preventing unexpectedness. The party planning the abrupt application of force must also take measures to guard against unforeseen responses from the adversary targeted by this strategy. Conversely, the side preventing unexpectedness must generate suddenness through its military cunning. The highlights the dialectical relationship between cunning that ensures suddenness and cunning that prevents unexpectedness.
- Minimizing One’s Subjective Disorientation– The most radical means of preventing unexpectedness involves minimizing one’s subjective disorientation. The complex task includes–
- Training and professional development of command personnel.
- Training and education of personnel, including physical and psychological conditioning.
- Operational and combat training of staff and troops.
- Development of military theory and strengthening its connection with practice.
- Readiness for Unexpectedness– Acknowledging the unlikelihood of 100% effectiveness in preventing unexpectedness, one must prepare to perceive it, leading to the problem of counteracting unexpectedness, which involves combating one’s subjective disorientation and psychological unpreparedness for various forms of unexpectedness from adversaries.
Military cunning should permeate all combat activities of troops. Commanders at all levels must possess expertise in military cunning, its methods, and techniques. The remains crucial for achieving victory with minimal expenditure of forces, means, and time.
Countering cunning requires a multi-layered defense that addresses both the physical and cognitive aspects of warfare. The document outlines strategies ranging from destroying the enemy’s material capabilities, such as suppressing or destroying the material basis of suddenness, to influencing their subjective orientation and minimizing one’s disorientation. The comprehensive approach recognizes that cunning operates on multiple levels, and a successful defense must address all of them, from physical assets to psychological preparedness and intelligence. The concept of “readiness for unexpectedness” implies that military organizations must cultivate an adaptive and resilient culture, recognizing that perfect intelligence and prevention remain unattainable. The document states, “It is unrealistic to expect 100% effectiveness in preventing unexpectedness, so one must be prepared to perceive it”. The is a profound admission that intelligence failures or the cunning of our enemies are inevitable. Therefore, a military force must strive to prevent deception and build internal resilience, adaptability, and psychological fortitude to react effectively when caught off guard.
The Continuous Evolution of Military Cunning
Military cunning, far from a relic of past conflicts, remains an indispensable element of contemporary warfare. Cunning represents the foundation of military creativity, enabling the generation of qualitatively new and original approaches in military art. Victory with minimal expenditure of forces, time, and resources consistently results when one side employs creativity and novelty in preparing and conducting armed struggle.
This involves identifying and implementing the latest combat methods while simultaneously concealing them and deceiving an adversary regarding their development, existence, and deployment. The idea of deceiving an adversary should organically permeate every element of a battle or operation plan. Military cunning allows for surprising an adversary, forcing them into unprepared combat, overwhelming them, paralyzing their will, and depriving them of organized resistance. It stands as the “zest” of military art that ultimately leads to victory. Military cunning demands application in all conditions, on all battlefields, and against any adversary. Any reliance on stereotypes, old schemes, or a lack of creative ingenuity proves detrimental to military art, with military cunning serving as the antithesis of such rigid approaches. The rapid development of information structures and systems will increase the possibilities and role of political cunning, directly impacting military activities and necessitating continuous adaptation and development in military strategy to keep pace with evolving warfare.
The post-World War II period witnessed a regrettable neglect in generalizing and systematizing the accumulated experience of military expertise, resulting in a decline in its theoretical development and practical application in troop training. Marshal G.K. Zhukov’s 1955 observations, noting the loss of skills in organizing and implementing deception and suddenness measures, confirm this oversight. The neglect of military cunning in post-World War II military training, despite its historical efficacy, reveals a systemic vulnerability to complacency and a failure to integrate lessons learned from past conflicts. Without continuous institutional emphasis and integration into doctrine and training, even a historically proven and effective military art can degrade, leaving a force unprepared for future challenges where cunning remains a relevant factor.
Military leaders of all ranks must learn and teach the art of covert concentration, masking preparations for combat operations, strict discipline in radio communications, and maintaining vigilance. These remain indispensable for successfully preparing and conducting both defensive and offensive operations. Military cunning does not arise spontaneously. It results from deliberate creative activity by commanders and staff, based on knowledge of the situation, the adversary, and their troops’ readiness and intentions. This require commanders to understand that knowledge and skillful application are essential for achieving military cunning.
Understanding an adversary’s culture, language, thinking, methods, and traditions, alongside their strengths and weaknesses, remains crucial for developing effective deception plans. The ability to apply military cunning depends on the level of general and military knowledge of commanders and military leaders, their creative thinking, their ability to foresee events, organize troop actions, and skillfully employ weapons, combat equipment, and tactics, while considering the time and place of operations. Military cunning must become a subject of study in military schools and academies, integrated into troop training. A mindset and approach that enables successful command in maneuverable and fast-paced combat operations, skillful concealment of intentions, deception of the adversary, and achieving suddenness must be formed in military leaders during their peaceful training. In addition, diverse forms and techniques of military strategy should be systematically developed and integrated into personnel training prior to engagement, in order to counteract potential adversary tactics from the outset of operations. The call for integrating military cunning into military education and training, from academies to field exercises, implies a recognition that intellectual development and adaptability are as important as technological superiority in modern warfare. The moves beyond simply teaching tactics emphasizes cultivating a cognitive framework for deception and counter-deception. This suggests that in an era of rapidly evolving technology, the human element—intellectual agility, creative thinking, and psychological preparedness—remains paramount for effective military leadership.
Military cunning represents a science essential for all military leaders, commanders, and ordinary soldiers, particularly when human lives are at stake and victory demands a minimal cost. It stands as a classic form of achieving victory with the least expenditure of forces, means, and time.
