The Russian-language presentation on electronic warfare titled Основы радиоэлектронной борьбы (Fundamentals of Electronic Warfare), produced by the Belarusian State University of Informatics and Radioelectronics, offers a dense, systematic review of foreign electronic warfare (EW) capabilities, particularly those of the United States and NATO allies. Structured as a military-educational module, it reveals more than technical pedagogy. It lays bare how Russian and Belarusian military-intelligence institutions perceive adversary systems, how they train personnel to counter them, and where they anticipate advantage or risk in future conflicts.
The document operates from a hostile posture, framing Western ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) capabilities as threats that require suppression or deception. While academic in tone, the underlying message is unambiguous: to achieve battlespace dominance, command structures must neutralize or degrade enemy C4ISR systems early and decisively. The focus is heavily skewed toward tactical-level threats—signal intercepts, radar emissions, telemetry, and battlefield reconnaissance—but with full acknowledgment of their strategic integration across joint force structures.
Capability analysis is exhaustive. The document dissects U.S. Army EW battalions, signal intercept teams, SIGINT payloads aboard UAVs and helicopters, mobile direction-finding platforms, radar reconnaissance systems, and jamming suites such as AN/TLQ-17A “Traffic Jam” and the AN/TSQ-114B “Trailblazer.” Each system is mapped not only for its frequency bands and range but also for its real-time operational use in suppressing enemy communications and command chains. Tactical drones such as the Outrider are examined as ISR platforms capable of laser target designation, thermal imagery, and side-looking airborne radar—indicators of concern over networked kill chains and precision-strike integration.
The assessment drills down into detailed specifications. For example, the AN/TRQ-32 “Team Mate” can locate and direction-find over 60 radio stations per hour. Trailblazer boasts a deployment time of just three minutes and range accuracy within one kilometer. Mobile radar units like AN/PPS-5B detect tanks at up to 10 kilometers and personnel at 5 kilometers. Combined, these statistics reveal deep reconnaissance into NATO’s platform-level operations. These are not general summaries, but rather precision assessments indicating access to or inference from restricted technical manuals, foreign military journals, or classified technical exchanges.
While framed as an academic curriculum, the true function of the presentation is operational preparation for counter-C4ISR targeting. It directs focus on Western reliance on EM-spectrum dominance and data fusion across platforms. The presentation points repeatedly to the need to blind, confuse, or jam ISR systems before they fuse into actionable fires. EW is framed as a first-strike capability, with primary effort allocated to identifying, direction-finding, jamming, deceiving, and even kinetically targeting enemy radars and communication nodes.
Targets of interest are clear. The training slides instruct students to focus on forward-deployed battalion-level assets and their dependencies—C2 posts, mobile radars, ISR drones, field artillery radars, and airborne EW helicopters. Focus is especially intense on UHF/VHF communication links and frequency bands under 500 MHz. Radar direction-finding and high-accuracy geolocation systems such as CHALS-X are singled out as high-priority threats. UAV-based EW platforms are viewed not as support elements but as command-destroying threats requiring dedicated counters.
Malicious intent permeates the operational logic. EW is not viewed as an enabler but as a battlespace-shaping weapon. There is no emphasis on de-escalation, proportionality, or EM deconfliction. Instead, the logic favors EM preemption, spoofing, GPS denial, and mass jamming. The analysis stresses centralized EW control structures at brigade and division level, direct lines to operational command, and integrated coordination between ground-based, airborne, and possibly space-linked jamming assets.
Systemic risks to NATO forces are inferred throughout. The document reveals that Russian analysts believe NATO’s overdependence on precision targeting, satellite navigation, and wireless communication makes it vulnerable to EW saturation. Western modularity and system diversity—framed by the authors as a liability—are noted for causing logistics and interoperability challenges. Moreover, NATO’s national command prerogatives over EW assets before full wartime integration are judged to delay reaction time in the event of a sudden Russian offensive.
The presentation suggests vulnerabilities within Russian and Belarusian forces as well. Its heavy reliance on foreign system knowledge, often sourced through reverse engineering or indirect observation, reveals potential gaps in real-time tactical adaptation. The absence of Russian-specific countermeasures or systems indicates that the curriculum is defensive, reactionary, and built on emulating or dismantling NATO doctrine rather than innovating independently. It also assumes NATO will remain technologically predictable and structured, a poor assumption in the context of autonomous, mesh-networked, and AI-assisted ISR emerging in Western arsenals.
Unique to the presentation is its emphasis on fusion between EW, kinetic, and reconnaissance elements. It signals a doctrinal shift in Russian and Belarusian thinking: electronic warfare must not stand alone as a support asset but must synchronize with fires, drone-based ISR, and cyber to disrupt kill chains in real time. This fusion reflects the broader Gerasimov-influenced belief in non-linear, multi-domain operations where electromagnetic dominance is essential for informational victory.
The training is also notable for its complete omission of legal or ethical considerations, reinforcing the offensive character of the doctrine. There is no discussion of EM collateral damage, civilian signal interference, or wartime rules of engagement regarding EW. The absence of defensive EMCON (emission control) strategies for own forces signals that the presentation’s primary function is to cultivate aggressors rather than defenders.
The presentation is not simply a survey of EW hardware. It is an operational blueprint designed to cultivate officer-level decision-makers fluent in degrading NATO C4ISR systems before and during active hostilities. It reflects deep technical study of Western systems, a systemic belief in electromagnetic preemption, and an urgent demand for synchronized strike capabilities across air, ground, and EM domains. Risks emerge both from the sophistication of Western ISR and from the rigidity and centralization of the Russian response model. That rigidity, if pressured by autonomous or distributed ISR networks, may collapse under its own control constraints. For now, the presentation remains a clear indicator of intent: Russian forces are training to blind, jam, spoof, and paralyze adversary C2 before a shot is fired.
