Russian View of Ukrainian Disinformation #Psyops

IN THEIR WORDS

METHODS OF INFORMATIONAL
PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE, INFORMATIONAL
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS USED BY UKRAINIAN UNITS AGAINST THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE NWO, THEIR
RELATIVES AND OTHER CITIZENS

METHODS OF INFORMATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE,
used by Ukrainian units of information and psychological operations against members of the SVO, their relatives and other citizens

CONTENT:

1. Introduction… 3
2. Methods of informational and psychological influence… 6
3. Staged videos (fakes) and how to recognize them… 38
4. Basic principles for detecting fake material… 40
5. Conclusion… 41

INTRODUCTION
“Any war is always and only informational. Battles are fought based on meanings ”(The film “ Idea ”)

War is not just about battles between infantry enhanced by technology. First of all, this is a cognitive confrontation in which the battlefield is the human mind. Its goal is to hack an individual for subsequent reformatting , creating a new one and using it for enemy purposes.
The enemy influences the psyche, relying on worldview, mentality, traditions, beliefs and habits, thereby selecting the key to the cognitive system in order to manipulate behavior, influencing decisions.
Not a single war has ever started or been waged without an informational impact on society on both sides of the front. Only the methods and technologies for delivering information have changed, but the goals have always been the same: to motivate and inspire one’s own, to demoralize and discredit the enemy.
Long before our century of information technology, the Chinese commander Sun Tzu, speaking about the information and psychological influence on the enemy, wrote in his treatise “The Art of War”:

• Decompose everything good that is in the country of your enemy.
• Undermine the prestige of the leadership of the enemy and expose it at the right time to public disgrace.
• Incite quarrels and clashes among the citizens of a country hostile to you.
• Incite the youth against the old.
• Bind the will of enemy warriors with songs and music.
• Do everything you can to devalue the traditions of your enemies and undermine their faith in their gods.

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A little later, in the era of Christianity, a host of examples of the confrontation between Good and Evil is displayed in another book – the Bible. And this confrontation is
primarily informational. Actually, the Bible itself, as a carrier of information, is an example of this.
Each new confrontation led to the improvement of old ones and creations. providing new means and methods of information warfare.
It is important to understand that the main task of the information war is the destruction of systems. The systems of the state, society, army – in other words, any social group, the size of which is not important. On the contrary, the size and complexity of the system does not make it more secure. It is easier to infiltrate a complex system, break numerous connections, rules, laws; destabilize it, make it work against itself, and finally destroy it. And the easiest way to do this is not in a frontal attack, but gradually, directing and manipulating its individual elements. This influence is hardly noticeable, low-cost (compared to classical military operations), difficult to eliminate and extremely effective. History knows quite a few examples of such influence – from the Troubles of the 16th century to the collapse of the Soviet Union and color revolutions. We live in the
era of information technology, in the era of total informatization of all spheres of society, and hence systems. All daily life is connected with information – every time we order goods online, including a smartphone or a navigator, we leave our mark, supplementing the already bottomless data arrays of corporations and government agencies. You have to pay for this comfort with vulnerability – as

his personal and public. In fact, we are all part of an information system that we know poorly and control even worse.
Statistically, at least 62.5% of the world’s population spend almost 7 hours daily on the Internet , that is, more than 40% of their life without sleep. In other words, almost half of the time two-thirds of the population is awake can be manipulated in one way or another – through social networks, advertising, video games or media content. And given that the huge flow of information, for which there are no state or social boundaries, has led to a significant decrease in the level of critical thinking, all of the above has become an ideal mechanism
for influencing any system. In the event of war, every citizen sitting with a smartphone in the subway is a mobilization resource
for the army, science, production or any other sphere. Ignoring this fact is dangerous, and not using it is stupid.

It must be recognized that the “Internet” and related technologies on a global scale are a battlefield created and controlled by the West. At the beginning of the NMD, with one click of a finger, the structure of the information confrontation of the Russian Federation abroad was destroyed – by blocking the Youtube accounts of all major Russian media and simultaneously launching a massive disinformation campaign on sites controlled by the West. Of course, this was a preparation, part of a planned but expected operation.
Information warfare is a war
for the minds of people, which means that it is necessary to make citizens immune to enemy information attacks and reduce the area of their implementation. Each new move of the enemy must be made ineffective, each of his rules must be bypassed, and then leave someone else’s battlefield, forcing him to switch to his own, prepared in advance. The textbooks give an extremely
general definition of war: “One subject of politics is trying to change the behavior of another by force, to force him to give up his freedom, ideology, property rights, to give away resources: territory, water area, and so on.” The key word here is “strength”. Military force in the classical
sense is the amount of manpower and equipment, adjusted for the qualifications and
experience of this manpower and the modernity of this equipment. However, often the most important factor on the battlefield is the motivation of soldiers and officers. No modern tank can win a war if its crew is demoralized or even left at home. Given modern technologies for the speed of delivery and the amount of information over any distance, modern warfare
has become, first of all, a war for minds. Human consciousness is the same, and maybe even more important resource, like territory or minerals. Today, the human mind is both an end, a means, and a battlefield. The information war is the war of meanings.
Convince an enemy soldier that his struggle and his sacrifice make no sense – and the enemy army will
become incapable of combat. At the same time, it is necessary to give your soldier the meaning to fight and win, protecting him from the information and psychological influence of the enemy. In order to strengthen positions in the information confrontation, it is
necessary to create a unified concept of confrontation, which will be based on knowledge of modern information technologies and practical experience in the field of information
and psychological operations, and then on its basis to create a new, modern methodological and regulatory legal base.

Military personnel and civil society need to be given knowledge about the methods of conducting information and psychological operations on the part of the enemy. In order to

The smoker could recognize this influence and not succumb to it.
It is necessary to increase the level of technical equipment of both individual units associated with information warfare, and the state as a whole.
But the most important thing is to ensure the mental security of the population.
In a broad sense, mentality is a set of mental, emotional, cultural characteristics, value orientations and attitudes, which makes us those who
we are.
In other words, mental security is a system of defensive structures and trained military units, only on the information battlefield. The stronger the defense, the greater the chances of withstanding any enemy attacks. In order to strengthen the mental defense of the country, it is
necessary to determine the development goal that is desirable, acceptable and feasible for the majority of the population, and the ways to achieve it – the image of the future.

METHODS
OF INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE

This list provides the most common methods of informational and psychological influence on the part of the enemy using the example of NWO. Taking into account the constant practical application, and hence the improvement of methods,
this list is constantly being updated and is limited only by the enemy’s imagination. Almost every day, new techniques appear and old ones are modernized. However, this material will allow you to see the principles of this influence, recognize manipulation , identify new methods of information and psychological attacks and not succumb to their influence.

1. Placement on popular websites, video hosting sites and other services as advertising in text, photo or video form of materials about the loss of personnel and military equipment of the Russian Federation, often with a demonstration of the corpses of dead soldiers.

It is carried out with the aim of intimidating and demoralizing Russian military personnel, their relatives and other citizens. It must be ignored, if possible, not viewed.

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2. Telephone terrorism:

• sending SMS-messages with threats, false information, prizes
  you to surrender, etc.;
• phone calls from anonymous numbers with threats;
• phone calls to blackmail and / or offer to ransom prisoners
  military personnel, as well as relatives captured by the special services of Ukraine;
• phone calls with false reports about the death of their close relatives –

METHODS OF INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE

nicknames in the NWO zone in order to exert psychological pressure;

• the above methods, but with the use of mailing in instant messengers, possibly using photo and video materials; – other similar actions;

The action is carried out for the purpose of manipulation. Must be ignored. Do not start a dialogue, do not listen and do not perceive what is written in the message. The enemy attracts professional psychologists who can find an approach to any person. It is necessary to immediately interrupt the contact, and finish the caller/
writer on the black list. After that, report to the commander or inform the competent authoriti

METHODS OF INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE

3. Public dissemination or threat of dissemination of personal data of both military personnel and civilians who actively express their patriotic position.

This action is carried out for the purpose of intimidation, inducement to cooperation or involvement in other illegal activities. Must be ignored. Remember that any interaction with the enemy is illegal. These facts must be reported to the commander or reported to the competent authorities.

4. Creation and popularization of various allegedly humane programs, with the distribution of instructions for surrender. The following methods are possible :

• distribution of leaflets (by dropping from an unmanned aerial vehicle
  rata or through the use of propaganda shells);
• the use of loudspeakers on the line of contact with a call to surrender;
• use of means of communication;
• publication of relevant materials in social networks.

METHODS OF INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE

It is carried out with the aim of inducing cooperation (treason to the Motherland), or convincing to surrender. Here you need to remember the main thing: the enemy will always deceive. It is necessary to ignore, and then report these facts to the commander or report to the competent authorities.

5. Hacking radio frequencies on the line of contact to broadcast unreliable information, as well as statements and calls to surrender to
   captivity.

It is carried out with the aim of influencing the morale and psychological state (MPS) of the personnel, misleading and making mistakes (direction finding of radio subscribers, disclosure of secret data, etc.), or
with the aim of inducing them to surrender. It must be ignored, reported to the commander. Also, it is necessary to deprive the enemy of the ability to carry out such manipulations (regular frequency change, use of digital, encrypted communication).

METHODS OF INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE

6. Creation and popularization of extremist organizations of pseudo- patriotic persuasion on the Internet. It is implemented through advertising, mailing messages, creating and distributing media content.

The action is aimed at involvement in illegal activities directly (participation in hostilities) or indirectly (gathering information or terrorist attacks, information support). Do not show any interest in such organizations , do not enter into dialogues with participants, do not view materials. The activities of these organizations are illegal, many of them are recognized as terrorist. They are only interested in you as a consumable. Interaction with them will end in a long prison term or your death. Such facts must be reported to the commander or reported to the competent authorities.

7. Messages on the Internet about the actions of the so-called. “Ukrainian underground” in the territories controlled by the Russian Federation (photos of leaflets with pro-Ukrainian content, placement of ribbons in the colors of the Ukrainian flag, photos of pro-Ukrainian or extremist graffiti on the walls of buildings, etc.; they are often fake – photo, video editing, location substitution).

METHODS OF INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE

It is carried out with the aim of intimidating the local population or distracting the security forces who serve in these territories. It can also be used to involve in illegal activities. Don’t react. Such facts must be reported to the commander or reported to the competent authorities.

8. Operations of the enemy’s special services aimed at involving
   lodges in illegal activities. Let’s take an example. An
   information resource is created and advertised on the Internet, which conducts city games, quests, etc. For example, according to the principle of Alternate Reality Games (ARG) – games in an alternative reality in which the story uses the real world as a platform.

One of the basic principles of ARG is TINAG (from the English. This is not a game – “This is not a game”). This principle suggests that the game does not behave like a game: for example, the phone numbers mentioned in the game must actually exist. Participants do not receive a special playing space or an explicit list of rules. The creators and leaders of ARG are behind the curtain, their very existence is in question to the end. The game character of what is happening should also be under question to the end . This distinguishes ARG from a similar phenomenon – urban role-playing games, where players know exactly which game they are participating in, although the enemy also uses city quests. ARG participants learn the rules gradually, by trial and error.

The course of such games in an alternate reality is controlled by the enemy, and not by artificial intelligence, as in computer or console video games. Players directly interact with the characters in the game through online communication, helping them solve various tasks and puzzles. Although the main platform for such games is the Internet, ARGs often cross over into the real world. For example, players may be asked to gather in a certain place to obtain some information.
You can become a player by paying attention to some kind of riddle in reality (the entrance to the game, which in slang is called the “rabbit hole”, referring to the adventures of Alice in Wonderland), by starting to solve the puzzle proposed by the masters of the game, who are called “puppeteers” in ARG “.
The enemy spends large amounts of money on the activities of IPSO units, so often such games are held with real material reward.

METHODS OF INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE

fence.
In the “games” that the enemy has already played, a role-playing system is provided, player profile ratings are increased by gaining points for completed tasks and material rewards.
In particular, a similar operation was carried out in the Donbass under the name “ Youth Movement “Rave”. At the beginning, the tasks for the participants were different, mostly harmless. Photograph the dawn near the Donbass-Arena stadium or the Avoska store, then a Ural car (and they are only army cars in the Donbass ), the location of a military unit in your area, allegedly to show that the Armed Forces of Ukraine are not shelling her, but peaceful houses, etc. The players sent these photos to the organizers of the “game”, thereby committing serious crimes without realizing it.

Then, the “puppeteers” chose the highest rated players and tried to recruit them , threatening to leak their data to the local state security agency for sending those same photos. If among the players there was a child or a relative of a serviceman , then they blackmailed and tried to recruit the serviceman himself. For those who agreed under pressure, the tasks were already more complex, dangerous, in fact, being sabotage.

It is necessary to take into account such methods and warn young people about this danger. If such facts are discovered, it is necessary to report to the commander or inform the competent authorities.

9. Sending to the wife or other family member of the SVO participant photographs of the school where the child is studying, or photographs of the house, the front door of the apartment where the family lives, or any other similar photo/video materials. The materials are allegedly proof that the “saboteurs” have found the soldier’s family and are usually accompanied by threats to kill his relatives if he refuses to desert or surrender.

METHODS OF INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE

In this case, it is necessary to immediately report to the commander and inform the competent authorities about what happened. It is also necessary to remember that these photos were most likely taken by a resident of your city, participating in the quest, following the example of what is indicated in paragraph 8, or by a person who was subjected to other effects from paragraphs. 2.3.

10. When capturing a senior officer or special forces officer, they may be inclined to cooperate through various methods of influencing the body and psyche in order to make them participants in the staged materials
    information and psychological impact. For example, a captured officer in a video message reports that his capture is a fake and, moreover, he himself captured enemy soldiers, and then indicates the name of the settlement in which he is located and asks for support.

It is carried out in order to misinform the command in its own or neighboring area of responsibility, as well as to lure into an ambush. When identifying such materials, it is necessary to take into account the likelihood of such an operation, urgently report to the command or inform the competent authorities.

11. Creation and promotion of information resources and bloggers
    ostensibly from among the locals.

METHODS OF INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE

The enemy creates information resources that must be trusted by the local population in order to publish misinformation aimed at creating panic, increasing social tension, intimidating or discrediting local authorities and security forces. It is necessary to take this into account, remain vigilant and use trusted sources of information. Such facts must be reported to the commander or reported to the competent authorities.

12. Creation of fake accounts of war correspondents, journalists and public figures, dissemination of unreliable information with their help.

It is created with the aim of publishing disinformation aimed at creating panic , increasing social tension, intimidating, or discrediting local authorities and security officials. It is necessary to take this into account, remain vigilant and use trusted sources of information. Such facts must be reported to the commander or reported to the competent authorities.

13. Creation and distribution of videos on behalf of the rating media of the Russian Federation.

METHODS OF INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE

It is created with the aim of publishing disinformation aimed at creating panic , increasing social tension, intimidating, or discrediting local authorities and security forces. It is necessary to take this into account, remain vigilant and use trusted sources of information. In case of detection of this, it is necessary to report to the commander or inform the competent authorities.

14. Creation of websites and telegram bots to collect information about the military personnel of the Russian Federation on behalf of the special services of Ukraine with an appeal to the pro-Ukrainian public. It is possible to masquerade as Russian state and public resources (for example, sites of memorials to veterans of the Northern Military District, fake telegram bots of the DPR army or other units, sites of assistance to military personnel of the Northern Military District and their families or legal advice to illegally mobilized people).

They are created for the purpose of gathering intelligence, psychologically influencing the audience , manipulating behavior, inciting illegal activities, obtaining funds, etc. It is necessary to take this into account, remain vigilant and use trusted sources of information. If such a resource is identified, it is necessary to report to the commander or inform the competent authorities.

METHODS OF INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE

15. Creation and dissemination of fake materials about war crimes and other illegal actions by military personnel:

• about domestic crimes in the form of looting and theft of property of civilians (cars, plumbing, washing machines, televisions, etc.);
• about war crimes (abductions, murders, torture, rape, beatings of civilians in the territory controlled by the RF Armed Forces, deliberate shelling of civilian facilities and critical infrastructure);
• statements by Ukrainian officials with false information about the alleged rape of minors by Russian servicemen or other war crimes;
• accusations of severe torture of Ukrainian prisoners of war and civilians of Ukraine; – the use of
  “language of hatred” – the spread in the Ukrainian media of derogatory nicknames in relation to citizens of the Russian Federation and people of Russian nationality – “quilted jackets”, “colorados”, “colorado larvae”, “colorado females”, “rusnya”, “orcs”, ” goblins”, “monkeys”, “subhumans”, etc.;
• dissemination of publications and statements about the alleged cowardice of Russian military personnel and their unwillingness to fight (primarily from among the mobilized persons), as well as about the alleged stampede of units of the RF Armed Forces in the event of the slightest offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

METHODS OF INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE

It is carried out with the aim of discrediting the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, cultivating hatred on the part of the Ukrainian population and dehumanizing Russian military personnel in the eyes of the world community. Such materials should be ignored. When such materials are found, it is necessary to report to the commander or inform the competent authorities.

16. Information-psychological military special operations associated with the actual use of weapons against the civilian population (artillery shelling of settlements, civilian and critical infrastructure, executions of civilians, etc.).

They are carried out with the aim of accusing the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation of committing war crimes, cultivating hatred on the part of the local population towards the military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, inciting contempt and criticism from the citizens of Ukraine, cultivating so-

METHODS OF INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE

opinions in the correctness in the ranks of the military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, etc. It is necessary to take this into account and ignore such information. In case of detection of such material, it is necessary to report to the commander or inform the competent authorities.

17. False reports from eyewitnesses about the shelling of settlements by the RF Armed Forces.

They are carried out with the aim of accusing the RF Armed Forces of committing war crimes, cultivating hatred on the part of the local population towards military personnel of the RF Armed Forces, inducing contempt and criticism from citizens of Ukraine, cultivating doubts about the rightness of the ranks of military personnel of the RF Armed Forces, etc. It is necessary to take this into account and ignore such information. If such material is discovered, it must be reported to the commander or the competent authorities.

18. Messages or fake visuals about supposedly prepared ke Russia’s nuclear strike on Ukrainian settlements.

METHODS OF INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE

They are carried out with the aim of accusing the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation of committing war crimes, cultivating hatred on the part of the local population towards the military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, inciting contempt and criticism from the citizens of Ukraine, cultivating doubts about the correctness of the ranks of the military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, etc. It is necessary to take this into account and ignore such information. In case of detection of such material, it is necessary to report to the commander or inform the competent authorities.

19. Messages or fake visual materials about preparations for blowing up strategic critical infrastructure facilities in the liberated territories (for example, blowing up the ZNPP).

They are carried out with the aim of accusing the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation of committing war crimes, cultivating hatred on the part of the local population towards the military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, inciting contempt and criticism from the citizens of Ukraine, cultivating doubts about the correctness of the ranks of the military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, etc. It is necessary to take this into account and ignore such information. In case of detection of such material, it is necessary to report to the commander or inform the competent authorities.

METHODS OF INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE

20. Distribution of publications in which the opinion is expressed that resonant murders and attempts on the territory of the Russian Federation are organized by Russian special services.

They are carried out with the aim of discrediting the leadership of the Russian Federation and the security forces in the eyes of the population and the world community, destabilizing civil society, and increasing social tension within the country. It is necessary to take this into account and ignore such information. In case of detection of such material, it is necessary to report to the commander or inform the competent authorities.

21. Distribution of fake materials about heavy losses of the RF Armed Forces and a huge number of prisoners. Materials can be obtained not only with the help of staged shooting, but also by changing angles during real shooting from the scene, when the same destroyed column of equipment is filmed from different angles and issued as unrelated cases.

METHODS OF INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE

It is carried out both with the aim of intimidating and demoralizing the military personnel of the RF Armed Forces and the civilian population, as well as to increase the morale of the Ukrainian military personnel and society. It is necessary to take this into account and ignore such information. In case of detection of such material, it is necessary to report to the commander or inform the competent authorities.

22. Publication and distribution of footage of the killing of captured Russians or wounded Russian soldiers on the battlefield, as well as the demonstrative mutilation of the bodies of dead Russian soldiers.

It is carried out with the aim of intimidating and demoralizing military personnel, increasing social tension within the country. It often has the opposite effect. I do not recommend viewing such materials, they are not aimed at informing, but at causing mental, mental damage. In case of detection of such material, it is necessary to report to the commander or inform the competent authorities.

23. Distribution of fake ratings and distorted statistics about social processes, socially significant events or political leaders.

METHODS OF INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE

It is carried out with the aim of misleading the society and discrediting the leadership of Russia, or vice versa, increasing the popularity of the leadership of Ukraine. It is necessary to ignore and trust only trusted sources. In case of detection of such material, it is necessary to report to the commander or inform the competent authorities.

24. Phone fraud. Calls to military personnel, their relatives or other citizens of Russia. Attackers may pose as employees of a bank, police, pension fund, housing office, etc. The purpose of such promotions is to obtain personal data about you or your relatives, information about your accounts and bank cards. In the worst case, under incitement to commit illegal activities (terrorist attacks, arson, bodily harm to third parties, etc.). For example, setting fire to a car, the building of the military registration and enlistment office or the district police department. The pretext may be the destruction of the victim’s property, so that when registering this incident, the police establish the owner of the car and find that he is wanted, etc. It should be borne in mind that if you perform any such action at least once, it will become a violation of the law, which the enemy will take advantage of , forcing you to perform further tasks.

It is carried out in order to obtain information that is of operational importance for the enemy, to seize the victim’s money, to carry out terrorist attacks , to increase social tension, to involve the civilian population of the Russian Federation in criminal activities. Such calls must be ignored and the phone number from which the call was made should be immediately blacklisted, after which it should be reported to the commander or reported to law enforcement agencies.

25. Creation and distribution of fake materials about the victories of the Armed Forces of Ukraine:

• statements by officials from among the Ukrainian leadership (both military and civilian);
• numerous publications with deliberately biased or unreliable
  information of pro-Ukrainian bloggers in social networks.

METHODS OF INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE

It is carried out in order to increase the morale of the military personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the Ukrainian civilian population. An attempt to demoralize the military
personnel of the RF Armed Forces and increase social tension within the country. Must be ignored.

26. Creation and distribution of fake video materials on behalf of the military personnel of the RF Armed Forces with statements about the deplorable situation at the front, the attitude of command, supplies and requests to gather for a rally against the NVO.

It is carried out with the aim of discrediting the military-political leadership of the country, demoralizing and discrediting the military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, increasing social tension in Russia; raising the morale of the military personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Such materials should be ignored. Trust only trusted sources. In case of detection of such material, it is necessary to report to the commander or inform the competent authorities.

METHODS OF INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE

27. The enemy has the ability to gain access to any radio communications over unsecured communication channels, including telephone, as well as SMS and instant messengers. Thus, the enemy receives information about the victim and can use it in psychological processing. For example, you may receive messages from close people, colleagues, superiors with various questions or requirements for action.

Before answering questions that may be of value to the enemy or performing any actions (leave the trench, go to the village, transfer ammunition, etc.), make sure that you are talking to the person who the subscriber introduces himself to. Use personal smartphones very carefully , in compliance with security measures, use only the secret chat of the Telegram messenger as a messenger , if there are no other ways to establish a secure connection.

28. Information campaigns that deny the facts of the withdrawal of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from specific settlements.

METHODS OF INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE

They are carried out in order to prevent the demoralization of Ukrainian military personnel and civil society as a whole. Worth ignoring. Trust only trusted sources of information.

29. Denial of forced mobilization in Ukraine.
    It is carried out in order to prevent the demoralization of Ukrainian military personnel and civil society as a whole. Worth ignoring. Trust only trusted sources of information.

METHODS OF INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE

30. Dissemination of messages and visual materials about the preparation of a large- scale offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine by forces that are superior in number, more equipped and trained than the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation:

• video and photo showing the movement of military equipment and units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine towards the line of combat (or the border zone);
• statements of Ukrainian officials;
• publications in the Ukrainian media and information platforms of the global Internet;
• publications in foreign press.

It is carried out in order to demoralize the military personnel of the Russian Federation, as well as to indicate the false direction of the main strike, to mislead. These factors must be taken into account and only trusted intelligence should be trusted.

31. Dissemination of unreliable information about the high level of losses of personnel and equipment of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, as well as about the large
    number of wounded military personnel of the Russian Federation, overcrowding of hospitals and other me

METHODS OF INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE

statements (statements by officials and bloggers, dissemination of false photo and video materials about mass burial sites, publication of falsified documents about losses, publication of so-called “journalistic investigations” about alleged concealment of a high level of losses, reports of the covert use of mobile crematoria and etc.). Fake correspondence (both from messengers in social networks and via SMS) between military personnel of the RF Armed Forces about a high level of casualties, a breakthrough in defense, a shortage of personnel and / or weapons, etc.

It is carried out with the aim of demoralizing the military personnel of the Russian Federation and civil society , increasing the morale of the military personnel of the Armed
Forces of Ukraine and Ukrainian society. It is necessary to ignore and trust only trusted sources of inform

32. Fake official statements on behalf of the leadership of the Russian Federation.

METHODS OF INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE

It is carried out with the aim of misleading for further manipulation of the conduct of citizens of the Russian Federation. It is necessary to take this into account and double-check the information on official information resources.

33. Dissemination of messages about evacuation from populated areas, incl . using fake video materials with sound warning signals for the population (sirens, loudspeakers, etc.).

It is carried out in order to spread panic and demoralize the local population , as well as to suppress the resistance of the military personnel of the RF Armed Forces in a given area. It is necessary to ignore and trust only trusted sources of information. In case of detection of such material, it is necessary to report to the commander or inform the competent authorities.

34. Distribution of unreliable reports about the withdrawal of Russian military units from the frontline or border settlements of the Russian Federation.

METHODS OF INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE

It is carried out with the aim of spreading panic and demoralizing military personnel of the Russian Armed Forces, creating the illusion of encirclement, and suppressing resistance in a given area. It is necessary to ignore, trust only the orders of the command and trusted sources of information. If such material is discovered, it must be reported to the commander or the competent authorities.

35. Creation and dissemination of information materials about the alleged capture by Ukrainian units (DRG) of Russian settlements in the border areas.

It is carried out with the aim of disorganizing the work of government bodies, destabilizing the situation, and increasing social tension. It is necessary to ignore and trust only trusted sources. If such material is discovered, it is necessary to report to the commander or to
inform the competent authorities.

36. Dissemination of unreliable information about the breakthrough of the defense of the Russian troops and the successful offensive operations of the Armed Forces
    of Ukraine on the line of contact .

METHODS OF INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE

It is carried out with the aim of spreading panic and demoralizing the military personnel of the RF Armed Forces, creating the illusion of encirclement, and suppressing resistance in a given area. It is necessary to ignore, trust only the orders of the
command and trusted sources of information. In case of detection of such material, it is necessary to report to the commander or inform the competent authorities.

37. Dissemination of false information (publications, statements by bloggers, as well as false photo and video materials) about panic among the Russian population as a result of sabotage, provocations, etc.

It is carried out with the aim of increasing social tension in society. Distracting Russian servicemen from combat work by creating emotional experiences for relatives in the rear, etc. It is necessary to ignore and trust only verified sources of information. In case of detection of such material, it is necessary to report to the commander or inform the competent authorities.

38. Distribution of unreliable reports about the preparation of referendums on the withdrawal of subjects of the Russian Federation from the state.

METHODS OF INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE

It is carried out with the aim of increasing social tension in society, provoking separatist sentiments, demoralizing military personnel and the civilian population, and increasing social tension in the country. It is necessary to ignore and trust only official sources of information. If such material is discovered, it is necessary to report to the commander or to inform the competent authorities.

39. Reports on the defeat of significant military facilities, military equipment
    nicknames both in the main territory of the Russian Federation and in the combat zone.

It is carried out with the aim of destabilizing public life, demoralizing military personnel and the civilian population, and increasing social tension in the country. At the same time, in order to increase the morale of the military personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and Ukrainian civil society. It is necessary to ignore and trust only official sources of information.

40. Reports of alleged shortages in liberated settlements
    food, fuel, etc.

METHODS OF INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE

It is carried out with the aim of discrediting local authorities and increasing social tension in society. It is necessary to ignore and trust only trusted sources of information.

41. Dissemination of false information about the full mobilization in the Russian Federation:

• publication of unreliable reports about “hidden” forced mobilization ;
• publication of unreliable information about the impending “new wave” of mobilization ;
• applications with unreliable information about the “census” of the male population in the regions;
• Sending fake letters with subpoenas to e-mail.

It is carried out with the aim of increasing social tension and creating an atmosphere of distrust towards the country’s leadership. It is necessary to ignore and trust only official sources of information.

42. Calls for the organization of illegal rallies, meetings and protests in order to discredit the SVO.

METHODS OF INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE

It is carried out with the aim of destabilizing civil society, involving citizens in illegal activities, distracting the security forces from their daily work , creating an information product to demonstrate to the world community the lack of support for the SVO. Must be ignored. If such a fact is discovered, it is necessary to report to the commander or inform the competent authorities.

43. The use of sound broadcasting equipment in the vicinity of the line of contact for the propagation of the sounds of a moving large column of military equipment in the dark .

It is carried out with the aim of intimidating and demoralizing the military personnel of the Russian Federation. It is necessary to take into account such methods of the enemy, report to the commander, conduct observation and conduct reconnaissance with available means.

44. Inciting close relatives of NWO participants to organize a rally or apply to the media with statements about the plight of husbands and sons in the NWO zone. Keep in mind that the enemy can force them to take such actions both by blackmail and by tricks – having personal data of relatives of military personnel, mislead them using correspondence on behalf of a
    military personnel (including using real phone numbers, accounts in social networks and keeping the style of a loved one). During such an action, the enemy may use means of suppressing communications so that relatives do not have the opportunity to contact the serviceman to
    clarify information.

It is necessary to take this fact into account and not rush to carry out such actions. In the event of such a fact, it is necessary to report to the commander or notify the competent authorities. I also recommend that you warn your relatives about the possibility of such an impact on them and agree in advance on countering the enemy, for example, on control questions to each other.

45. Dissemination of information about hostility, enmity, hazing from
    worn between military personnel or units of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

METHODS OF INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE

It is carried out with the aim of discrediting the command and personnel of the RF Armed Forces. It is necessary to ignore such information and trust only trusted sources. In case of discovery of such material, it is necessary to report to the commander or inform the competent authorities.

46. Dissemination of information about radioactive, chemical or other contamination of the combat area.

It is carried out with the aim of demoralizing the military personnel of the Russian Federation. Such information must be ignored . Use only trusted sources and common sense. If such material is discovered, it is necessary to report to the commander or inform the competent authorities.

METHODS OF INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE

47. Dissemination of information about the creation of barrage detachments.

It is carried out with the aim of discrediting and demoralizing the military personnel of the RF Armed Forces. Such information must be ignored. Use only trusted sources and common sense.

48. Fake statements by the leadership of the country or regions (for example, an unreliable statement by the Head of the DPR Pushilin D.V. with an order for urgent evacuation during the period of an imaginary counter-offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine).

METHODS OF INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE

It is carried out in order to demoralize the servicemen of the RF Armed Forces and create a sense of the risk of being surrounded. It is necessary to ignore or double-check on official sources of information.

49. Staged, filmed under pressure from the enemy, video appeals of captured Russians to the servicemen of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation with calls to stop hostilities or surrender.

It is carried out with the aim of discrediting and demoralizing the military personnel of the Russian Federation. Must be ignored. In case of detection of such material, it is necessary to report to the commander or inform the competent authorities.

50. Publication of false official documents that contain malicious information. For example, lists with an inflated number of dead, wounded, missing and captured.

It is carried out with the aim of demoralizing the military personnel of the RF Armed Forces and the civilian population. It is necessary to ignore and trust only official sources with such information. In case of detection of such material, it is necessary to report to the commander or inform the competent authorities.

51. News stories about regular visits by Western politicians to
    Ukraine and return visits of Ukrainian politicians to Western countries.

Imitation of universal support for Ukraine. Must be ignored.

METHODS OF INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE

Terrorism is the ideology of violence and the practice of influencing public consciousness , decision-making by state authorities, local governments or international organizations, associated with the use of force , intimidation of the civilian population and / or other forms of illegal violent actions. Synonyms for the word “terror” (lat. Terror – fear, horror) are the words “violence”, “intimidation”, “intimidation”. To achieve the goals of terror in a particular city in a particular country, having modern information technology, the
enemy does not even need to organize a bomb explosion in a crowded place or send a suicide bomber tied with grenades. For the Ukrainian subdivisions of the IPOC, it is enough to analyze information resources in a specific region and wait for a fire, an explosion of domestic gas, or any other man-made disaster to occur there. The main condition is the presence of human victims. Let us recall how many information and terrorist attacks were made by the Ukrainian side after the fire in the Zimnyaya Vishnya shopping center in 2018 in the city of Kemerovo, as a result
of which more than 60 people died. Or after the household gas explosion in a multi
-storey building in Magnitogorsk in the same 2018, which killed 39 people. The main narrative spread by the enemy was that this

METHODS OF INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE

tragedy is not an accident, but a terrorist attack. There were versions that this was not an accident, but an unsuccessful attempt to eliminate it by the Russian special services.
While the local authorities were sorting out what was happening in order to make an official statement about the reasons for the incident, the Ukrainian divisions of the IPOC began to intimidate the local residents. Information terrorists are always ahead of the
official sources of information in time, because they do not need the truth, they need the fact itself.
Such information-psychological actions are carried out by the enemy with
purpose to intimidate the local population, to cause distrust in the authorities of the local Samoan government and the leadership of the country as a whole through the formation of public opinion about the inability of the authorities to ensure security in the region. At the same time, social tension is rising. In addition, law enforcement agencies are discredited, which allegedly are not able to prevent terrorist attacks. It is necessary to take into account this method of IPsV and in case of detection of publications that have signs of information terrorism, it is necessary to report this to law enforcement agencies.

53. Fraudulent materials of various nature aimed at inciting ethnic or religious hatred. For example, staged appeals of military personnel of the RF Armed Forces from the central regions of the country about conflicts on ethnic grounds with military personnel from the southern regions. Or the appeals of military personnel who profess Islam about the prohibition of commanders from performing namaz.
    It is carried out with the aim of discrediting and demoralizing the military personnel of the RF Armed Forces. Such information must be ignored. Use only trusted sources and common sense.
54. The enemy chooses a specific official necessary for his plan , first collects all possible information on him and establishes contact through the WhatsApp or Telegram messenger. At the same time, it uses a hidden number under a unique user account name (for example: @vasya1978 or @ZOV2022). In rare cases, the number of a Russian mobile operator. It seems to be a classmate from a military school, a course 2-3 years younger or older. Preliminary data has already been collected about this school, and the enemy even knows what the canteen looks like and what nicknames the cadets gave to the teaching staff.

The enemy easily operates with this data during communication. Communication can be not only in the form of text correspondence, but also voice messages. If the contact is successfully established, then at a certain stage the communication can be supplemented by video communication to enhance the trusting effect, where the enemy contactee can even be dressed in the uniform of the RF Armed Forces with the
insignia necessary for the legend. Also, to enhance the trusting effect, the enemy contactee will sometimes send photos / videos from the destroyed or during the
destruction of APU equipment that are not online, telling that this is the work of his unit, etc.
It is carried out by the enemy in order to obtain information, mislead , provoke a mistake, which, within the framework of the enemy’s plan, should entail serious consequences for the Russian side. Or for the purpose of recruitment , especially if the official at least once gives the enemy any information or, as a boast, a photo / video. In the event that such actions of the enemy are detected, it is necessary to immediately notify the command or inform the competent authorities.

METHODS OF INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE

STAGED VIDEOS (FAKE) AND HOW TO RECOGNIZE THEM

We live in an era of fast information with rapidly developing information technologies. The fast flow of information and the variety of sources for obtaining it have instilled in people clip thinking (from the English. Clip, “ text fragment”, “clipping”) – a type of thinking in which a person perceives information in fragments, in short pieces and vivid images.

In other words, any video material, even fake, if it is well- made, without obvious signs of absurdity and which is published as news, is automatically perceived by
the audience as reliable. In my practice, I divide such materials into two categories:
bathrooms and unreasonable.
Substantiated fakes are the most effective because of their believability . Such material is based on a real event, the veracity of which is easy to verify – they are created on the basis of a suitable information occasion or available visual material, with the introduction of corrections necessary for the enemy.

For example, the following news is published: “Donetsk police are looking for unknown men who robbed a pensioner in the Kirovsky district.” On the basis of this news, the Ukrainian divisions of the IPOC, in order to discredit Russian servicemen in the eyes of the public, create a staged video, allegedly filmed on the phone by a passerby or a surveillance camera, in which two men in the military uniform of the Russian Armed Forces take away a bag from some old woman. This video is published together with links to Russian official media, which previously had this news, but with their own commentary: “The criminals who robbed a pensioner have been discovered. They turned out to be servicemen of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.” Against the background of official news reports about this incident, this video will be perceived by the audience as objective, real, and not staged. Regular injections of such materials in one segment, for a long time, form a negative attitude towards the military and security forces among the local population. Such stuffing generates not only a lack of assistance to the Russian army from civil society, but also fertile ground for the creation of an enemy intelligence network in the rear. Which in the future will lead at least to a total “drain” of information about the places of deployment of military personnel and their movement, and, as a maximum, to sabotage activities.

This also includes information terrorism, which I wrote about above – any man-made disaster, fire or explosion of domestic gas, will be presented by the enemy as a terrorist attack or even a mistake by the security forces when handling ammunition . And in the future, detailed events will be perceived with distrust of the official version, even without the participation of the enemy.
Now let’s look at an example of a fake created on the basis of the existing video material. The enemy uses a video in which Russian servicemen congratulate local residents on
the New Year or say that they are firmly standing on the lines of defense of the Russian Federation. The audio track is removed and a new one is added: “Our unit is taking heavy casualties. The commanders abandoned us. The Armed Forces of Ukraine broke through the defenses. We
were forced to retreat.” When shooting in balaclavas, articulation is not visible, and if the shooting was done with open faces, you can always lower the quality
the video is so long that it will be difficult for the viewer to match the text with the picture.
It makes no sense to disassemble fake photographic materials. Everyone has long
known about the existence of Photoshop and similar applications for video materials. But now

METHODS OF INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE

There are serious programs that make it possible to put the face of any person on the face of a participant in any staged video. The level of the video will be such that only an expert will be able to detect the forgery.
Unfounded fakes are created for a specific task. For example, there is a section of the front on which the enemy decided to develop an offensive. To do this, it is necessary to weaken the Russian defense, demoralize the Russian soldiers or force them to surrender. Let’s say this site is located in the village of Glorious. On the left and right flanks are the villages of Glubokoe and Vysokoe. The enemy makes road signs with indicators of settlements – “Glubokoye ” and “Vysokoye” and installs them somewhere on a country road near Kiev, and then shoots how columns of Ukrainian military equipment are moving against the background of these road signs and soldiers are taking selfies APU. These materials are published in the social networks of Ukrainian servicemen on closed accounts so that the uninitiated do not see and do not refute ahead of time. After some time, when the operation begins, links to the publications of these materials will be sent to Russian soldiers with an offer to surrender or retreat so as not to be surrounded (the enemy has the ability to send targeted, geo-referenced). After the message is read, the enemy will try to jam communications on this sector of the front with electronic warfare forces so that the Russian troops cannot receive real information about the enemy’s advance.

Of course, this example is unlikely unless there is a very fortunate combination of many circumstances, but it clearly shows that the IPOC is not just pictures on the Internet, but a very effective tool.

METHODS OF INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE

BASIC PRINCIPLES FOR DETECTING FAKE MATERIAL
1) It is necessary to determine which of the parties benefits from the publication of this material.
2) It is necessary to establish and pay attention to the primary source – the information resource on which this material appeared initially. More often than not, fakes are published by anonymous sources, information resources without a history, faceless or fake social media accounts , openly hostile information resources or resources that are disguised as Russian. Sometimes enemy official media become primary sources, but this is extremely rare. Even more rarely, enemy fakes may appear on some Russian information resources whose administrators did not properly check the received material.

3) Fake materials are created in such a way that their refutation is impossible, difficult or time consuming more than the dissemination and implementation of a fake. Therefore, the characters in the video are filmed in masks, otherwise hide their faces from the camera, or their faces simply cannot be recognized (angle, poor video quality, etc.). It is very rare that such materials are prepared with open faces, but this is possible. Also, the enemy avoids characteristic features and landmarks that may indicate the location of the shooting (power lines, a recognizable building, a bottle of Ukrainian mineral water in the background, etc.).
4) It is necessary to turn to logic. Ask yourself the question: “Is what I see logical?”. For simplicity, you can put yourself in the place of the actors and imagine your behavior in a similar situation. 5) Very rarely,
professional actors are involved in the filming of staged materials. This makes it possible to recognize a fake by unnatural or simulated phrases and movements of characters.
6) Often, additional background sounds are used in staged videos (shooting from small arms, explosions, the sounds of breaking dishes or glass,
the noise of vehicles, the movement of columns of military equipment, children’s crying, etc.). Without skills and equipment, this forgery can be recognized by
the difference in sound volume.

METHODS OF INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE

CONCLUSION
This training manual indicates a limited number of methods of information
-psychological influence. However, now, after a careful reading, you will definitely be able to recognize both the listed and any other methods.
such influence.
Remember that you always need to maintain information hygiene, vigilance and maintain critical thinking. Look for logic and common sense in the information you receive. Any informational materials on the part of the enemy, in whatever form they are presented, are aimed only at getting information from you, provoking you to make mistakes, encouraging you to take actions favorable to the enemy, and most importantly, always to harm you, yours. relatives and your country.

“I express my gratitude to my friends from the law enforcement agencies of the Republic of Belarus, who
asked me to write this educational and methodological manual and
assisted in its design”