Russians want a nuclear war, but forget about a collective response. Digest of the Center for Strategic Communications
The ex-president of the Russian Federation, Medvedev, then fell into yet another nuclear exaltation, reflecting on the possibility of ending the war in Ukraine, recalling the “Hiroshima experience”.
Recently, this narrative has been promoted quite briskly in the Russian Federation. He is fueled by the hope that “full Europe” will not risk its well-being for the sake of Ukraine, and the USA, in turn, will not risk Boston for the sake of Poznań.
At the end of June, a sociological survey by the Russian Field company showed that almost every fifth Russian is not against a nuclear strike on Ukraine.
According to May data, almost a third (29%) of Russian citizens surveyed believed that the use of nuclear weapons against Ukraine is possible “if necessary.”
The only thing that the Russians forget is that the means of nuclear deterrence, prevention, and collective response have, to put it mildly, significantly strengthened since Hiroshima.
