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We bring to your attention another consensus analysis from our partners from the Institute of Conflict Studies and Analysis of Russia for January 17-24, 2023

⚡️The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation directly and indirectly announces a new major offensive against Ukraine

This key Russian narrative at the beginning of 2023 performs several tasks at once.

⚡️ The first task is to support the positive agenda of “your” for Russian society, even without any progress on the front or even if it is necessary to retreat in some areas.
After the tactical success in Soledar, the Russian command is unable to offer the Russian society significant successes at the front. In addition, the capture of a small town cannot be an equal response to the Kharkiv and Kherson operations conducted by the Armed Forces.
The constant reference to the preparation of a major offensive gives the Russian Defense Ministry arguments that now is not the time to criticize, preparations are underway to seize the strategic initiative in this war.

⚡️The second task, also aimed at the internal audience, is the justification of the need for a second wave of open mobilization, like the autumn one.
The lack of a strategic plan of “svo” after the autumn failures became a red thread due to the criticism of “patriotic” layers of Russian society. Minor successes after the first wave of partial mobilization do not provide strong arguments for the second wave. While the new mass mobilization will be presented as a component of the new final offensive.

⚡️The third task is informational and psychological impact on Ukrainian society, official Kyiv and the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
The offensive is presented as what happened at the end of February, when Russian troops broke through from several directions at once and came close to Kyiv, and in the South captured an entire regional center.
In addition to maintaining the necessary level of anxiety among civilians in Ukraine, these practically open plans and timely “showers” are designed to maintain the reserves of the Armed Forces simultaneously in the North and the South in anticipation of the resumption of full-scale hostilities there. While the main battles are now taking place in the East.

⚡️Finally, the fourth task is to reposition the Ministry of Defense of Russia as the main driving force of the war.
Significant media activity and tactical successes of the “Wagner” PMK pushed their regular army and “svo” commanders into the background for Russian citizens. The major offensive and preparations for it are designed to return the traditional military to the main role in the war instead of paramilitary formations that do not have a clear legal status.
In addition to the institutional conflict, it is also worth noting the personal conflict between the non-systemic field commander Yevgeny Prigozhin and the Minister of Staff Serhii Shoigu.

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Treadstone 71

@Treadstone71LLC Cyber intelligence, counterintelligence, Influence Operations, Cyber Operations, OSINT, Clandestine Cyber HUMINT, cyber intel and OSINT training and analysis, cyber psyops, strategic intelligence, Open-Source Intelligence collection, analytic writing, structured analytic techniques, Target Adversary Research, cyber counterintelligence, strategic intelligence analysis, estimative intelligence, forecasting intelligence, warning intelligence, threat intelligence
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By Treadstone 71

@Treadstone71LLC Cyber intelligence, counterintelligence, Influence Operations, Cyber Operations, OSINT, Clandestine Cyber HUMINT, cyber intel and OSINT training and analysis, cyber psyops, strategic intelligence, Open-Source Intelligence collection, analytic writing, structured analytic techniques, Target Adversary Research, cyber counterintelligence, strategic intelligence analysis, estimative intelligence, forecasting intelligence, warning intelligence, threat intelligence