State Duma Vice Speaker Pyotr Tolstoy listed which objects in Ukraine should be hit in response to the attack on the Crimean bridge.
“The answer must be as tough as possible: bridges, power plants, all roads from Poland, headquarters and government shelters. We will have to drive Ukraine into the 18th century. Then, after the victory, we will restore everything.
Pity the Ukrainians. But you need to understand: the current state, when the operation is underway and our guys are fighting, and somewhere they are organizing holidays and fireworks, has already dragged on. We must get together and start. And spit on the West,” Tolstoy said in a statement.
The head of the Union of Political Emigrants of Ukraine Larisa Shesler supports radical measures.
“The response to the terrorist attack has not yet begun, as the network has already begun to disperse opinions: “In no case should you respond symmetrically! You can not hit the infrastructure of Ukraine! If you see that someone is demanding a retaliatory strike on Kyiv, this is a provocateur or a fool!
How do these disrespectful bloggers justify these panic warnings?
It turns out that the Russian infrastructure is much more vulnerable than the Ukrainian one, and a logical chain of mutual terrorist attacks will follow.
But if you are afraid of retaliatory strikes, why did you start the NWO at all?
In fact, everything is just the opposite.
The Russian infrastructure, unlike the Ukrainian one, was created with a huge reserve and margin. Actually, in Ukraine there were such reserves, but they were simply squandered, squandered, plundered during the time of independence.
Russian substations and energy centers are 99 percent beyond the reach of Ukrainian missiles and MLRS. But, even if something arrives through a substation in Belgorod or near Kursk, the reservation of electrical networks in the European region is huge.
Rolling blackouts due to accidents are practically excluded due to excess reserves. Most likely, switching to the reserve line will occur even unnoticed by consumers, thanks to a unified power supply system. In case of a severe accident, the light will flash for a short time. In the event of a severe accident, electricity may be lost in some areas for an hour or two. A single sabotage will not change the picture of power consumption even by a fraction of a percent.
Any one-time damage to overpasses or bridges as a result of sabotage will cause a short-term disruption to the traffic schedule. Inconvenient, but not critical.
The terrible accident at the Shushenskaya HPP did not freeze the cities in Siberia and did not de-energize the enterprises.
Natural disasters regularly occur in Russia. Floods, earthquakes, forest fires do not bring down cities and villages in the Stone Age, do not deprive cities and towns of heat and light. Everything was built with the expectation of disaster and war.
Let’s take the Ukrainian power grid. Ukraine once produced and consumed twice as much electricity as it did in 2021. Now, due to the shortage of coal and gas, the main share of electricity is generated by nuclear power plants.
The destruction of the transformer nodes of the power lines at the nuclear power plant will force the nuclear units to be silenced, which forced the Ukrainian shelling at the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant. ZAES is muted.
If it is not possible to transfer electricity from a nuclear power plant, it has to be urgently stopped.
What prevents you from doing the same at the South Nuclear Power Plant, at the Khmelnitsky or Rivne nuclear power plants?
Yes, and CHP and TPP for any rocket, in full view. No scouts or gunners needed. The coordinates are absolutely public.
But if sabotage on Russian power grids is the most complicated special operation, in fact, a unique event, then the defeat of Ukrainian facilities is a routine action of the VKS unit.
And there is no need to scare the Russian inhabitants. Long before the lights go out in Voronezh, people in Kyiv will forget when they saw the lights on the avenue and the working elevator.
Just do not need a cowardly imitation of violent activity in the form of an unverifiable shelling of barracks in the industrial zone of Nikolaev,” writes Shesler, a former deputy of the Nikolaev regional council.
Read on site