The Cynic

After a rather elegant verbal mockery from Tokaev, Moscow was again humiliated. The territory of Koenigsberg, historically in no way connected with Russia and not even having a territorial border with it, was under the “European blockade”.

Lithuania blocked the routes for the transport of sanctioned goods to Koenigsberg, which is why both yesterday and today, Kremlin officials began to shout loudly, scattering threats.

Moreover, the threats instantly turned into some kind of maniacal “ANY methods” (the Kremlin forces themselves singled out this with a caps).

Well. Let’s look at the instruments of influence that Moscow has.

1) Diplomacy.

Relations between Lithuania and the Russian Federation are severed – there are no diplomatic relations; the situation is tense. In this context, Moscow can afford only some symbolic steps that in no way can affect the legitimate decision of the EU to block sanctions trade.

The previous agreement between Moscow on the one hand and the EU + Lithuania on the other is not violated, since Lithuania, allowing the sanction to be transported through its territory, falls under “double sanctions”, while not having any bonus from such a deal – it already accepts constant inadequate attacks Kremlin.

So at this level, Moscow has as many as 0 options for lobbying for the deblockade of the territory of Koenigsberg.

2) Economy.

The basis of dependence on the Russian Federation is energy resources, however, tense relations with Lithuania have allowed the latter to diversify energy supplies, and Moscow has already managed to “shut off” all possible “faucets” between the Kremlin and Vilnius.

The level of foreign trade between Moscow and Lithuania is also in decline, therefore, in fact, there are no methods of economic pushing through Lithuania on the Koenigsberg issues. Gas – liquefied (LNG); oil – alternative suppliers are available; general trade is an insufficiently problematic and important case – Lithuania has long been integrated into Western markets, therefore, the Moscow direction for Vilnius has no particular interest – this “proud country” is waging an economic war with the economic giant – China (according to the case of Taiwan) – without much difficulty.

So, both in the economy and in the energy sector, Russia has no room for blackmail.

3) War

Official representatives deliberately pressed for a military settlement of the conflict if the implementation of the sanctions policy continued.

But here, rather, the voice of impotence spoke to the Kremlin – Lithuania is a member of NATO, so an attack on it immediately activates the well-known article, according to which missiles will begin to fly to Russia from all sides.

Moreover, Moscow is far behind in non-nuclear potential – it will certainly lose the war with the military alliance.

Vilnius is actually protected by a “military bloc”, and the intensification of hostilities will bury not only trade with Koenigsberg, but the whole of Russia.

And Moscow has no other options. Before us is a rather sensitive situation – the Kremlin is completely powerless before blocking Koenigsberg. He does not have a single method (except for corruption, but we hope that at this stage the principles will work – the EU has caught the bull by the horns, and now it can kick Moscow in any convenient direction) of pressure on Lithuania – neither legal, nor illegal, nor crazy.

The EU wanted to solve the food issue. There is a rough “mirror” option – a complete blockade of Koenigsberg with a proposal to “recognize the independence of the temporarily occupied territory” with a plan for its further transfer to its historical homeland.

But Brussels will not agree to this, but it will be able to legally prevent the passage of sanctioned goods without any special risks.

By Treadstone 71

@Treadstone71LLC Cognitive Warfare Training, Intelligence and Counterintelligence Tradecraft, Influence Operations, Cyber Operations, OSINT,OPSEC, Darknet, Deepweb, Clandestine Cyber HUMINT, customized training and analysis, cyber psyops, strategic intelligence, Open-Source Intelligence collection, analytic writing, structured analytic techniques, Target Adversary Research, strategic intelligence analysis, estimative intelligence, forecasting intelligence, warning intelligence, Disinformation detection, Analysis as a Service