Khamenei Funeral Directive – Analysis

The leaked “Top Secret” directive runs thirteen paragraphs. It reads like a clean specimen of security-state prose. Two registers sit inside it at once. One is sacred. It carries the basmala, the salawat, and the honorifics of martyrdom. The other is bureaucratic and vague. It hides its actors. Words such as monitoring, coverage, neutralize, psychological security. The essay’s strongest ground is that seam. Veneration wraps around surveillance, and the wrapping is the point.

Four bodies of thought anchor the analysis. The first is the lineage that runs from Klemperer to Orwell to Arendt on euphemism and thoughtless official language. The second is Critical Discourse Analysis, built by Fairclough, van Dijk, Wodak, and the Fowler and Kress school, which shows how nominalization and passive voice launder coercion into routine. The third is semiotics, where Peirce gives us icon, index, and symbol, Saussure gives us signifier and signified, and Bakhtin gives us heteroglossia and authoritative discourse. The fourth is closest to the document itself. Iran’s own doctrines of “soft war” (jang-e narm) and “psychological operations” (amaliyat-e ravani) show that the odd phrases are regime doctrine spoken plainly, translated word for word.
The hacktivist caption “Guest or Suspect?” does its own work. It reframes the document. A command text meant to speak in one voice, downward, gets pulled into an argument it never wanted. Bakhtin would call this double-voicing. An internal memo becomes a public charge sheet.

Key Findings

1. The phrasing tracks known doctrine.  Read the terms against Iranian security doctrine and they line up almost one to one. “Psychological security of society” is amniyat-e ravani. “Environmental monitoring” is rasad. The habit of casting mourners and dissenters as foreign-directed comes straight from jang-e narm, the soft-war doctrine. These are terms of art, not translation noise, and that fact does more for the analysis than any stylistic reading could.

2. The sacred and the coercive share the page.  This is the center of gravity. Look at the page. One line invokes “Hazrat Khatam al-Anbiya (PBUH).” Another orders surveillance of “families of victims of recent unrest.” Klemperer, Orwell, and Arendt hand us the words for how that trick works. Peirce and Bakhtin explain the signs underneath it.

3. The sender’s name is itself a sign.  Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters is an operational military command. It carries a title of the Prophet Muhammad, “Seal of the Prophets.” The name fuses worship and war-making in four words, before the memo says anything at all.

4. Forensic linguistics helps, within limits.  Register analysis, translationese markers, and the split between personal and institutional authorship all apply. One caution holds throughout. The question of whether the document is genuine sits outside this essay. The translation seams stay interesting either way.

The Analysis in Detail

Area 1. Persian bureaucratic and military register (edari)
Start with the most authoritative source. The Encyclopaedia Iranica entry “CORRESPONDENCE iii. Forms of opening and closing, address, and signature,” written by Hashem Rajabzadeh, lays out the shape of the formal Persian letter. That shape maps onto the directive almost cleanly.

The letter opens with a preamble, the matla’ or tashbib. Inside it sits the invocation, the tahmidiya, a phrase of praise to God set down before anything else and usually written in Arabic. The old formula was besmellah al-rahman al-rahim. Iranica adds a detail that matters here. Since the Revolution of 1357 (1978–79), official correspondence has favored the Arabic phrase besmeh ta’ala, “In His Name, may He be exalted.” A genuine post-revolutionary state document would open on exactly that note.
Then comes the superscription, the khetab, with the addressee’s name and titles, the alqab. Protocol governs all of it. Old manuals set out the right honorifics for dozens of ranks, somewhere between thirty-two and forty-seven of them. So the stacked honorifics in the directive are not decoration. The genre expects them. A blessing and a greeting follow, then the body, then a closing that offers service, says a prayer, and signs off.
The roots run deep. Iranica’s companion entry on correspondence in Islamic Persia traces the divan al-rasa’el, the office of correspondence, and the art of letter-writing, tarassol, back to the Umayyad and Abbasid chancery. That chancery borrowed in turn from Sasanian and Byzantine practice. Persian administrative writing is one of the oldest living bureaucratic traditions on earth. Its religious openings are an inheritance, older than the current state by a thousand years. The honorific Hazrat and the strings of praise that trail a name, mo’azzam for “glorified,” mo’alla for “exalted,” a’la for “highest,” are all documented. Present the directive’s honorifics as normal for the form.
One institutional note on the sender. Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters (KCHQ) is, by Wikipedia and United Against Nuclear Iran, the operational headquarters of Iran’s armed forces. It runs joint operations for the General Staff, sits above both the regular army and the IRGC in the chain of command, and answers to the Supreme Leader. Keep one distinction clear. The Central Headquarters is the operational command. A separate body, the Construction Headquarters (KAA, or GHORB), is the IRGC’s engineering and economic arm. Both carry the name Khatam al-Anbiya, “Seal of the Prophets,” a name of Muhammad.

Area 2. The euphemism machine in security-state prose

Three books anchor this section. They form a line of descent.

George Orwell wrote “Politics and the English Language” in 1946. The core lines are easy to verify. Political speech, he said, is “largely the defence of the indefensible,” so it fills up with “euphemism, question-begging and sheer cloudy vagueness.” His examples still land. Villages bombed and cleared become pacification. Peasants stripped of their farms become a transfer of population or a rectification of frontiers. Jailing people without trial becomes the elimination of unreliable elements. His rule underneath it all: “The great enemy of clear language is insincerity.” When a writer’s real aim and stated aim pull apart, he reaches “instinctively” for long words and dead idioms, “like a cuttlefish spurting out ink.” Political language exists “to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable.” His image of Latin words settling “like soft snow” over the facts fits our phrases well. Neutralize enemy plots. Reassuring coverage. Environmental monitoring. Snow. All of it.

Victor Klemperer wrote LTI – Lingua Tertii Imperii: A Philologist’s Notebook in 1947. He taught Romance languages in Dresden and watched the language of the Third Reich seep into daily speech until it “colonized everyday thought.” Note his catalog of tricks. The regime leaned on euphemism, on superlatives, on metaphors from sport and machinery, and on a strain of mysticism. He argued that the language helped build the culture, not the other way around. He borrowed a line from Schiller to make the point. The regime’s language “thinks and writes for you,” a poison you drink without noticing. His method is the one this essay borrows. Read a regime through the words it can’t stop repeating.

Hannah Arendt wrote Eichmann in Jerusalem in 1963. Her key word is Amtssprache, officialese, the “only language” Eichmann said he knew. His speech ran on “stock phrases and clichés,” and Arendt read that as thoughtlessness, an inability to see from any position but his own. The official language did the moral work of not-seeing for him. She called the machine “the rule of Nobody,” a system where responsibility spreads so wide that no single person holds it. Agentless passive constructions in a directive do the same job. They order an act. No one acts. One caveat belongs here. Bettina Stangneth’s Eichmann Before Jerusalem (2014) argues he was a committed ideologue, far from banal, so the “banality” claim is contested. The point about officialese survives the argument intact.

Critical Discourse Analysis supplies the modern toolkit.

● Teun van Dijk frames CDA as the study of how “social-power abuse, dominance, and inequality” get made, kept, and justified through language. His “ideological square” is useful here. Discourse plays up the good in “us” and the bad in “them,” while playing down the reverse. Set the reverent in-group language beside the phrase “non-aligned extremist elements” and the square draws itself. Van Dijk also notes that even democracies reach for national security to justify censorship in a crisis.

● Norman Fairclough gives us the three-level model of text, discursive practice, and social practice, and a body of work on how language makes power look natural (Language and Power, 1989; Critical Discourse Analysis, 1995).

● Ruth Wodak adds the discourse-historical approach and her studies of how nations talk themselves into sameness.
● Roger Fowler, Gunther Kress, Bob Hodge, and Tony Trew wrote Language and Control in 1979, the founding text of critical linguistics. They named the mechanism directly. Nominalization turns a process into a noun.

Monitoring. Coverage. Polarization. Agentless passive voice then deletes whoever does it. That is the grammar under Arendt’s “rule of Nobody.”

Area 3. The semiotics of Shia martyrdom and state symbolism
Take the sign theory first.
● Charles Sanders Peirce split the sign three ways. An icon resembles its object, an index connects to it by cause or fact, and a symbol works by habit and convention. He also split the sign into representamen, object, and interpretant. The directive is thick with symbols. “PBUH” and the honorifics are pure convention. It also runs on an index. The martyrdom framing points back, by cause, to the assassination. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is the source to cite.

● Ferdinand de Saussure gave us signifier and signified, the sign as a two-sided thing in the mind. That is enough to read “martyred Leader” as a signifier doing political labor.
● Mikhail Bakhtin is the most useful of the three. His term heteroglossia names the way many social voices crowd into one utterance. The directive is heteroglossic to its core. The liturgical voice and the security voice share the same sentences. His other term, “authoritative discourse,” fits the memo’s posture exactly. Such discourse is “indissolubly fused with authority,” demands to be acknowledged, and allows no reply. His idea of double-voiced discourse is the key that opens Area 7.

Now the martyrdom itself, read as a sign-system. The word shaheed means witness. To die a martyr is to testify with your body. The Karbala paradigm, the martyrdom of Imam Husayn, is the master story of Shia political culture. Vali Nasr reads it as both solace and challenge, a source of comfort and a warrant to defy unjust rule. Ali Shariati sharpened it before 1979 and turned Husayn’s death into a conscious revolutionary act. Khomeini put martyrdom at the heart of the Republic, and the Iran–Iraq War turned the cult into an industry. See the Cambridge Review of Politics work on the subject, and the 2024 piece “Political Martyrdom Revisited” in the Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies

Here is the tension that gives the whole reading its charge. Since 2022, the protest movement has claimed the same word. The dead of “Woman, Life, Freedom” are mourned as martyrs too. So when the directive reveres a “martyred Leader” in one clause and orders surveillance of “families of victims of recent unrest” in another, it is standing on contested ground. Both sides fly the flag of shahada. That contest is the beating heart of “Guest or Suspect?”
On Khamenei in particular, the analysts are blunt. Sina Toossi of the Center for International Policy told CNN on 3 July 2026 that the killing made Khamenei “far more powerful symbolically in death than he was in life,” recast as a martyred authority “akin to revered Shia saints,” his worldview “vindicated by the manner of his death.” The funeral fell in Muharram, the mourning month for Husayn. The body’s route ran through Qom, Najaf, Karbala, and Mashhad. The route was an argument in itself, a line drawn from Khamenei to the Imams.

Read the funeral as staged politics. Alex Vatanka of the Middle East Institute told CNBC on 4 July 2026 that this was “basically a political event portrayed as a religious one,” built to project legitimacy at home and deterrence abroad. Tallha Abdulrazaq, writing through The Media Line, placed it in “a long pattern of political theater” that runs from Quds Day to the mass mourning for Qassem Soleimani. Marzieh Kouhi-Esfahani, in The Conversation, called the funeral a political and diplomatic tool for showing that the state can still fill a street.

Achille Mbembe supplies the capstone idea. In Necropolitics (2019), building on a 2003 essay, he defines sovereignty as the power to say who lives and who dies, and studies how states manage death, bodies, and “death-worlds.” He builds on Foucault’s biopower and on Schmitt’s friend-enemy line. The directive is necropolitical in two directions at once. It treats the sacred dead, the Leader, as a resource for legitimacy. It treats the mourned dead of the protests, and the families left behind, as a threat to be watched. Judith Butler describes Mbembe’s subject as “the lethal afterlife of sovereign power.” Her own work on grievable and ungrievable life pairs well with his.

Area 4. Forensic linguistics and the seams of translation
The methods below all come from academic work.
● Idiolect is the idea that each person uses language in a signature way, and forensic authorship analysis hunts for those signatures. One complication rules this case. The author is an institution, not a person. A directive is a genre product, so single-author stylometry mostly does not apply. Register and genre analysis are the right tools.

● Translationese is the term Martin Gellerstam coined in his 1986 study of Swedish novels translated from English. He found that translations carry “a systematic influence of the source language on the target language,” a statistical fingerprint rather than a sign of clumsy work (see Rabinovich and Wintner, ACL 2015). The documented markers, from Toury, from Baker and colleagues in 1993, and from Volansky and colleagues in 2013, include source-language interference, over-adherence to the target language, simplification, explicitation, and implicitation. Koppel and Ordan (2011) showed that these markers can even point back to the source language.

● Forensic translation, a term credited to Ali Darwish, analyzes translated evidence and warns that “vital clues in the original text are overlooked or mistranslated” when the work is careless.

Apply that to the directive’s English and a few seams show. A translator may have expanded “PBUH” and the salawat rather than trimming them, over-rendering the honorifics. Persian bureaucratic collocations may survive as calques. Persian solar (Hijri Shamsi) dates carry their own conversion problems. Names vary in spelling. Iran Watch alone records dozens of ways to romanize Khatam al-Anbiya, among them Khatam ol-Anbia, Ghorb Khatam, and Khatam-ul-Anbia. Every one of these seams tells you the text has passed through translation and redaction. None of them settles whether it is authentic.

Area 5. The rhetoric of the numbered order

● Speech-act theory, from J. L. Austin and John Searle, treats the directive as a bundle of orders, what they call directive illocutionary acts. Austin’s point that language can do things, not just describe them, sits under both this section and the securitization idea in Area 6.

● Deontic modality is the grammar of duty, need, and permission. It differs from epistemic modality, the grammar of what is known or likely. Georg Henrik von Wright formalized it in 1951. Radden and Dirven (2007) define it as “the speaker’s directive attitude towards an action to be carried out.” Watch how the directive spreads obligation. It uses plain modal verbs, must, shall, is to. It also buries commands inside nouns. “Environmental monitoring shall be conducted” erases the officer who orders and the officer who obeys. Both vanish into the task.

The numbered list is a rhetorical form of its own. Counting from one to thirteen tells the reader that the whole field has been carved up and handled, that nothing was missed. Paul Portner’s work on discourse describes how imperatives add items to a listener’s “To-Do List.” A numbered directive is that list, made official. It rewrites the world as a set of jobs to be done. Fold in the agentless passives from Area 2 and you get the rule of Nobody again. Every item is a duty. No item names the one who owes it.

Area 6. “Guest or Suspect” and the watching of mourners

The pattern is documented. The Washington Post ran an investigation in 2023, “How funerals for protesters became a target for Iran’s security forces,” built on eighteen cases of state violence at mourning events. It quotes Shahin Milani of the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center. The forces, he said, “want to scare the population” and to send one message: “we won’t let you rest even if you’re dead.” The report tracks the Shia calendar of grief, the third day, the seventh, and the fortieth, the chehellom, and shows each becoming a flashpoint met with live fire. It notes the irony the regime cannot have missed. In 1978, those same forty-day mourning cycles powered the revolution against the Shah. The state knows what public grief can do.
The United Nations Fact-Finding Mission (OHCHR, September 2023) recorded the harassment of families, including the Amini family, and damage to Mahsa Amini’s grave. It affirmed a plain right. Families may mourn, in public, in ceremony. The Stimson Center reported in 2025, in work by Emily Blout, on how far the watching has gone. AI-enabled cameras. Facial recognition. Drones over Tehran. The “Behnama” surveillance software that hacktivists exposed in 2023.

Paragraph 8 turns on a paradox. The state welcomes foreign guests and watches them at the same time. It performs mehmān-navāzi, the hospitality that Persian culture holds dear, while treating the guest as a possible threat. If the essay wants a theoretical flourish, Derrida’s “hostipitality” names the way hospitality and hostility are tangled at the root. The plainer frame is securitization.

Securitization theory comes from the Copenhagen School, from Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde in Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1998). Security, they argue, is a speech act. An actor names something an existential threat and, by naming it, claims the right to use extraordinary means against it. The directive is a securitizing text. It casts mourners, families, and guests as threats to one referent object, the “psychological security of society,” and licenses surveillance as the emergency answer. Wæver put it simply. “Something is a security problem when the elites declare it to be so.”

Area 7. The leak as a counter-voice
The releasing channel is “Edaalate Ali” (Edalat-e Ali, “Ali’s Justice”). RFE/RL, Iran International, and CyberScoop have all documented it. The group has breached Iranian state systems more than once, from the Evin and Ghezel Hesar prison CCTV in 2021 to some three million judiciary files in 2024, among them National Security Council minutes recorded after Mahsa Amini’s death. It releases through Telegram and says it is made up of Iranians inside the country working to expose abuses. One caveat belongs in the record. Analysts, including Simin Kargar at Johns Hopkins, note that such channels may have ties to the MEK, and that file-naming habits raise questions about whether non-native handlers do the packaging. That thread ties back to the translation seams in Area 4, and to plain honesty about where the document came from.

The mechanism is Bakhtin’s double-voicing. The caption “Guest or Suspect?” and epithets like “executioner Khamenei” wrap the bureaucratic text inside a new, accusing frame. The memo was authoritative discourse, a voice that spoke down and expected silence. The leak makes it dialogic. Now it is answered, now mocked, now turned back on the office that wrote it. The interrogative caption turns the document’s own paragraph 8 into a weapon, quoting the state’s euphemism back as a charge.

Call it securitization in reverse. The state’s directive names mourners and guests as the threat. The leak names the watching itself. It points the accusation back at the apparatus.

The Iranian Doctrinal Layer

This is the move that lifts the essay above generic discourse analysis. The strangest phrases in the directive are not fumbled translation. They are doctrine, set down in the regime’s own words.

Soft war (jang-e narm). 

The doctrine holds that Iran faces a Western war of culture and psychology, aimed at hollowing out the Republic from inside. Khamenei introduced the idea around 2006, by the İRAM Center’s dating, with the related “Cultural NATO” line appearing in a speech on 9 November 2006, per the Hoover Institution. The 2009 Green Movement pushed it into the mainstream. Soon after the disputed 2009 election, Khamenei said countering the soft war was “the main priority for us today,” because in a soft war the enemy uses “cultural and communication tools to spread lies and rumors” (quoted in Blout, SAIS Review 2015). The scholarly anchor is E. L. Blout’s “Soft War: Myth, Nationalism, and Media in Iran,” in The Communication Review 20:3 (2017). Blout reads soft war as the newest form of an old conspiracy myth, a Manichean picture in which foreign powers work without pause to violate Iranian sovereignty by cultural means. Its root is gharbzadegi, “Westoxification,” from Ahmad Fardid and Jalal Al-e Ahmad. The İRAM Center, in work by Çağatay Balcı, lays out a five-part scheme of psychological, political, intellectual, cultural, and cognitive warfare, and reaches a sharp conclusion. The soft-war story lets the state securitize almost anything, so that a popular uprising is rarely read as real grievance and almost always as a foreign plot. That is precisely how the directive treats “expressions of discontent and calls to action” and “families of victims of recent unrest.”
Psychological security and psychological operations (amniyat-e ravani, amaliyat-e ravani).  The security establishment even publishes a doctrinal journal on the subject, the Scientific-Research Quarterly on Psychological Operations, tied to Imam Hussein Comprehensive University, the IRGC’s officer academy. “Psychological security of society” recasts rumor, information, and dissent as attacks on the public mind, and by doing so it licenses censorship and surveillance. Public trust becomes a security asset the state must defend. Western monographs on the exact term are thin. The firmest anchors are the primary Iranian literature and Golkar, below.

Environmental monitoring (rasad, rasad-e meydani).  This is the surveillance term for watching society, the streets, and social media. The anchor is Saeid Golkar’s Captive Society: The Basij Militia and Social Control in Iran (Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Columbia University Press, 2015). Golkar’s chapters on surveillance describe the Basij’s “vast network of informants” and its neighborhood intelligence files. “Environmental monitoring” is the polite English mask over rasad. For more, see Afshon Ostovar’s Vanguard of the Imam and the work of Narges Bajoghli.

The IRGC Intelligence Organization (Sazman-e Ettela’at-e

Sepah).  Khamenei built it into its current form in 2009, though a proto-unit dates to 1979 and GlobalSecurity marks 1997. It reports straight to the Supreme Leader, outside elected oversight. The New York Times called it the “more ideological counterpart” that now “overshadows” the Ministry of Intelligence. Its head since June 2022, Mohammad Kazemi, sits under US sanctions. OFAC’s press release JY1048 (26 October 2022) says the body is responsible for “thwarting perceived political subversion,” for running the repression of protests, for throttling the internet, and for arresting dissidents. That is the institution behind the phrase “proactive intelligence operations.”
Pull the thread and the whole document’s stance makes sense. Under soft-war logic, mourners and foreign guests are possible carriers of the enemy’s campaign. So “environmental monitoring” and “neutralize enemy plots” stop looking like paranoia. Inside the regime’s own frame, they are simply doctrine at work.

فرماندهی کل قوا
ستاد کل نیروهای مسلح

طبقه بندی: خیلی محرمانه
تاریخ: ۱۴۰۵/۰۴/۰۶

از: فرمانده قرارگاه مركزى حضرت خاتم الانبياء (ص) – معاونت اطلاعات و امنيت
به: فرماندهى محترم كل سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامى
موضوع: اشراف اطلاعاتی در برگزارى مراسم وداع و تشييع امام و قائد شهيد

سلام علیکم , با صلوات بر محمد و آل محمد,

با احترام; با توجه به برنامه ريزی هاى انجام شده برای برگزارى مراسم وداع و تشييع رهبر و قائد شهيد امت حضرت امام خامنه اى (قدس سره) در ايام پيش رو و نظر به برآوردهاى اطلاعاتى مبنى بر احتمال توسعه جنگ اطلاعاتى و امنيتى توسط دشمن, استمرار تهديدات تركيبى و عدم قطعيت هايى كه ناظر بر تهديدها و فرصت هاى در پيش رو وجود دارد, لازم است با ايجاد دسترسى هاى هدفمند به اطلاعات متقن از اهداف, نيات و استراتژى تهديد گران و با بهره گيرى از ظرفيت ها و توانمندی هاى جامعه اطلاعاتى لشكرى و كشورى به منظور برقرارى امنيت پايدار در مراسم ياد شده موارد زير را اجرا و تتيجه را به معاونت اطلاعات و امنيت ستاد كل ن.م. و قرارگاه مركزى حضرت خاتم الانبياء(ص) گزارش نماييد;

۱) بر اساس ابلاغ شماره ۲۳۷۰/۳/۷۸۰/۰۵/۱۰۰۸ تاریخ ۱۴۰۵/۰۳/۱۹ سازمان هاى اطلاعاتى مسئول در رزمايش تلفيقى ضدجاسوسی – امنيتى حضرت اميرالمؤمنين (عليه السلام)(سازمان اطلاعات سپاه, فراجا, وزارت اطلاعات و حفاظت اطلاعات هاى ن.م.) در اقدام مشترک و مقتدر, به منظور حنثی سازی نوطئه دشمن و پيشگيرى از هرگونه اقدام مخل امنيت, ضمن تسريع در اجراى عمليات هاى اطلاعاتى پيش دستانه, تمامى سوژه هاى امنيتى خود را قبل از شروع مراسم در سرامر كشور تعيين تكليف نمايند.

۲) ضمن تمركز بر تشديد پايش و اقدامات كنترلى و مراقبتى در مرزهاى كشور, با هماهنگى شوراى تامين استان ها و مراجع قضايى, نسبت به برقرارى پستهای ايست و بازرسى هدفمند و داده محور به ويژه در مسيرها و گلوگاه هاى اصلى ورودى به استان هاى تهران, قم و خراسان رضوی اقدام نماييد.

۳) با ارتقاء سطح آمادگی های اطلاعاتی و پايش محيطى مسيرها و اماكن مورد نظر براى اجراى مراسم وداع,  تشییع و تدفین پیکرهای مطهر و سایر تجمعات در سراسر کشور،  از تمامى ظرفيت هاى فنى, سايبرى, سيگنالى و … به صورت هم افزا و براساس سطح و جغرافياى تهديد بهره بردارى نموده و نسبت به پوشش حداكثرى و اطمينان بخش تجمعات اقدام نماييد;

۴) در صورت نياز, از ظرفيت و توان سازمانهاى حفاظت اطلاعات نيروهاى مسلح برای توسعه فعاليت های اطلاعاتى استفاده نماييد;

۵) به منظور جلوگيری از هرگونه اقدام مخل امنيت توسط گروهك ها و عناصر خودسر تروريستى و درس آموزى از روش هاى رزم و تسليحات جديد گروه هاى تروريستى, طرح ريزی اطلاعاتى و عملياتى مناسب در سراسر كشور به ويژه مناطق امنيتى شمال غرب و جنوب شرق را به عمل اوريد; در اين راستا همكاری هاى اطلاعاتى راهبردى را با سرويس هاى همسو و همجوار توسعه دهيد;

۶) آسیب پذیری ها و خلآهای اطلاعاتی موجود در استان هاى تهران, قم و خراسان رضوى را بررسی و تصميمات مقتضى را براى ايجاد آمادگى هاى صددرصدى با بهره گيرى از ظرفيت هاى ملى, اتخاذ و اجرا نماييد.

۷) با برنامه ريزى منسجم و از طريق تعميق اشراف و تشديد اقدام اطلاعاتى بر گروه ها و كنشگران ضدامنيتى و اقشار آسیب زا اعم از شبكه هاى اراذل و اوباش, خانواده جانباختگان اغتشاشات سال هاى اخير, عناصر فوم گراى غيرهمسو و … از هرگونه تهديد امنيت روانى جامعه پيشگيري نماييد;

۸) ضمن تكريم و پيگيرى براى فراهم سازى زمينه هاى حضور مهمانان مردمى خارجى در كشور توسط سازمانهاى مسئول, اشراف اطلاعاتى را در اين زمينه توسعه و اطمينان كافى را در خصوص پايش جمعيت ياد شده حاصل نماييد;

۹) با ايجاد هماهنگى ها و همكاری هاى برون مرزى و همچنين پيشبينی, پيشگيرى و اقدام اطلاعاتى, نسبت به برقرارى امنيت اجراى مراسم در شهرهاى مقدس نجف اشرف و كربلاى معلی اطمينان حاصلنماید;

۱۰)  به منظور ارتقاء اشراف اطلاعاتى در اماكن و مسيرهاى اجراى مراسم وداع, نماز, تشييع و تدفين, ]ماده سازى زيرساخت هاى مورد نياز را از سازمانهاى مسئول به صورت جدى پيگيری نموده و از تمامى امكانات نيروهاى مسلح در اين راستا استفاده نماييد;

۱۱)  با توجه به عدم قطعيت هاى موجود در اقدامات تروريستى دشمن, به منظور حفاظت از فرماندهان و شخصيتهای موثر, تمهيدات حداكثرى را پيش بينى نماييد;

۱۲) نسبت به رصد نارضايتى ها و فراخوان هاى صادره, اقدام و از هرگونه تجمع غير مجاز و بروز دوقطبی هاى احتمالى در قبل و حين برگزاری مراسم پيشگيرى نماييد;

۱۳) معاونت اطلاعات و امنيت ستاد كل ن.م و قرارگاه حضرت خانم الانبياء (ص) نسبت به اخذ گزارش و نظارت بر اقدامات اطلاعاتى در برگزارى مراسم, اقدام و نتايج را به اينجانب منعكس نمايد.

فرمانده قرارگاه مرکزی حضرت خاتم الانبیا (ص)
سرلشگرپاسدار خلبان علی علداللهی

گیرندگان:
۱-امیر فرمانده محترم کل ارتش ج.ا ایران – سرلشگر امیر حاتمی
۲- سردار فرمانده محترم کل انتظامی جمهوری اسلامی ایران  – سرتیپ پاسدار احمد رضا رادان
۳- سرپرست محترم وزارت اطلاعات جمهوری اسلامی ایران -جناب آقای دکتر ناصر کریمی
۴- رئیس محترم دفتر سیاستگذاری و نظارت راهبردی حفاظت اطلاعات نیروهای مسلح
۵- سردار معاون محترم عملیات ستاد کل ن.م و قرارگاه حضرت خاتم النبیا (ص)

بر اساس اطلاعات دریافتی از منابع داخلی و ارگان های معتبر که به دست «عدالت علی» رسیده، تعداد شرکت کنندگان در مراسم خاکسپاری و تشییع خامنه ای در تهران بسیار-بسیار کمتر ازچیزی بود که رسانه های رسمی اعلام کردند.
این آمار با ادعاهای رژیم که از حضور «میلیون ها نفر» سخن میگفتند کاملا در تضاد است. به همین دلیل بازوهای تبلیغاتی رژیم با انتشار تصاویر محدود از پیش انتخاب شده و نمایش صحنه های فشرده تلاش میکنند تصویری اغراق آمیز از حضور مردمی ارائه دهند.
نکته قابل تامل:
بخش بزرگی از جامعه (کارمندان دولت، نیروهای انتظامی، بسیجیان و خانواده هایشان با وجود این وابستگی و اجباری بودن بسیاری از این افراد برای حضور، باز هم استقبال از مراسم بسیار ناچیز و ناامیدکننده برای رژیم بود.

اگر ما را به رگبار نمیبستید شکوه واقعی را به شما نشان میدادیم و در نهایت نشان خواهیم داد!