Moscow is not facing a telecom glitch. Moscow is enduring a state-imposed communications drill disguised as security. Reporting from Reuters, T-J, Kod Durova, and official sources align on the outage, the selective survival of approved services, and a new legal order that allows the FSB to demand suspensions. Drone defense is real, yet drone defense does not explain why approved domestic platforms, approved media, and a state-backed messenger keep breathing while open access chokes. Best judgment places Moscow within a larger project — turning emergency control into routine governance, herding users toward compliant domestic platforms, and teaching the public that online freedom exists only with state permission. Confidence stands at moderate to high.
Actors are plain. The Kremlin writes the script. The FSB holds the coercive switch. The communications ministry shapes the white-list. Roskomnadzor fogs responsibility. Operators comply. Favored platforms include VKontakte, Odnoklassniki, MAX, Gosuslugi, Yandex services, Mail.ru services, Rutube, Dzen, and other approved domestic channels. Peskov called the restrictions lawful and tied them to security. February legislation then gave the FSB direct authority to order service suspensions while protecting operators from liability. Kremlin power is no longer improvising. Kremlin power is codifying a civilian kill switch.
Disruptions began in central Moscow on March 5. Reports describe zone-based outages rather than a flat citywide blackout. Phones dropped to E or 2G. Some users reached only approved resources. T-J logged more than 2,000 complaints on March 10, while Kod Durova reported broad white-list testing in central districts and partial white-list restrictions even on parts of the metro Wi-Fi system. Operators blamed external restrictions rather than faults inside their networks. Pattern fits intervention, not accident.
Meaning sits in the method. Blanket shutdowns are giving way to rationed connectivity. Citizens do not just lose access. Citizens receive a narrow corridor containing payments, maps, transport, state portals, domestic social media, and approved news. Human Rights Watch found that Russian authorities increasingly use blocking, throttling, and shutdowns under public safety and national security pretexts. Mediazona showed the social result in the regions — people run from Wi-Fi point to Wi-Fi point and drift toward VK after the white-list rollout. White list policy does not merely preserve convenience. White list policy conditions obedience.
Timing reflects security pressure, legal readiness, and regime learning. Officials cite drone threats after a year of mobile shutdowns tied to the war. The February law gave the FSB clearer authority. Regional Russia then spent months as a proving ground before Moscow entered the same system. Pure force protection does not explain why approved media, domestic social networks, and MAX sit inside the protected lane while Telegram and WhatsApp face escalating pressure. Security is part of the story. Control is the larger design.
Daily life degrades fast under such a model. Residents lose taxis, bus tracking, routine messaging, ad hoc payments, and street navigation. Businesses shift to workarounds and manual fixes. Mediazona recorded fear, harassment risk, cashless payment failures, and a forced search for Wi-Fi in blackout zones. T-J reported Moscow firms absorbing delivery tasks and buying hardware to keep operating. State coercion here is not abstract. State coercion walks citizens home in the dark and leaves them disconnected on purpose.
Core facts are firm. Mobile outages happened. Selective access happened. A white-list exists and has expanded since September 2025. Official silence lasted for days before hardening into a security explanation. Lower-confidence areas remain the full extent of metro filtering, the precise technical path used in each zone, and the full command chain behind each outage window. High confidence fits the event. Moderate confidence fits the deepest mechanics and full motive stack.
Near-term direction points toward more granular geofencing, greater reliance on approved domestic platforms, deeper legal normalization, and less daylight between emergency restrictions and ordinary governance. Carnegie warned in December that white-lists risk becoming the rule rather than the exception. Re: Russia argues that the Kremlin is moving from blocking forbidden material toward authorizing only permitted addresses. Most likely, the next stage is not one giant blackout. Most likely, the next stage is repeatable, local, event-driven permissioning that Russian citizens slowly come to accept as normal.
No fully transparent official live register is publicly viewable. T-J reported that public data from the ministry, operators, and media diverge. Kod Durova’s February 19 update remains the most detailed public reconstruction. Some entries below are official. Some sit in a gray zone where operators or companies claim they are working during restrictions, even though ministry confirmation is absent. Opacity is not a side effect. Opacity keeps firms dependent and citizens guessing.
What is not on the list — confirmed omissions — Confirmed omissions start with Telegram. T-J reported that rumors of Telegram’s inclusion were false and stated that only domestic sites and apps are included on the white-list. Reuters then documented rising pressure on Telegram and the broader push toward MAX. WhatsApp also sits outside the fence, and Reuters reported a full block in February. FaceTime also fell under Russian restrictions. Public guidance in Kod states that when Gosuslugi opens, but foreign sites that previously worked stop opening, white-list mode is active. Foreign access is not collateral damage. Foreign access is the target class.
What is not on the list — political omissions and surveillance-driven exclusions — Another omission tells the political story. Human Rights Watch found that Russian authorities have blocked thousands of sites, including independent media, human rights organizations, opposition pages, and foreign social platforms. Compare that pattern with a white-list media roster crowded by state, establishment, or tolerated mass outlets. Strong inference follows — adversarial journalism, rights advocacy, opposition speech, and foreign platforms are outside the model by design, not by accident. Even domestic institutions face exclusion if they refuse to accept surveillance terms. Kod reported that Sber, T-Bank, and Gazprombank were among the banks left out because security agencies demanded SORM-style storage or domestic infrastructure conditions they had not met. The regime is not merely choosing domestic over foreign. The regime is choosing compliant over noncompliant.
What is not on the list — gray zones and undisclosed sub-services — Opacity creates another kind of omission. Official materials list Yandex, Mail.ru, and X5 Group services without naming the exact sub-services. Kod also reported that MTS Live, Kion, MTS Music, and Strokes were not on the ministry’s official list, even though the operator said they were working during the restrictions. Kod placed Azbuka Vkusa, Magnit, Dixy, Pyaterochka, Perekrestok, Delimobil, and BelkaCar in similar gray zones through operator or company claims. Citizens are left with a white-list whose edges stay secret, movable, and politically useful.
What is on the list — government and control core — Gosuslugi, the state e-government portal; state information systems; sites of the Interior Ministry, Emergencies Ministry, Prosecutor General, and other federal agencies; selected Federal Tax Service services; GIS Housing; sites of the Federation Council, State Duma, Presidential Administration, and Russian government; regional government services; Russian Post; Rosseti, the grid operator; Chestny Znak, the state product-marking system; Tensor and SKB Kontur, electronic document operators; Inspector, the remote business inspection app; the remote electronic voting platform; public feedback services; Explain.RF, and the yearly Putin results site. Function — administration, tax, compliance, voting, public services, logistics, and official narrative. The most plausible reason for inclusion is plain — the state protects command, collection, supervision, and regime legitimacy before open speech.
What is on the list — social, finance, and access pipes — VKontakte and Odnoklassniki, domestic social networks with long-standing proximity to state influence; MAX, the state-backed messenger Moscow is pushing as a substitute for foreign platforms; VTB, PSB, Alfa-Bank, the National Payment Card System behind Mir, Central Bank resources, and the Moscow Exchange; then the operator tier made up of MTS, MegaFon, T2, Beeline, Rostelecom, SberMobile, T-Mobile, ER-Telecom Dom.ru, and Motiv. Function — messaging, payments, banking, market plumbing, and the networks that keep white-list traffic alive. Inclusion pattern suggests a simple hierarchy — money must move, state-approved speech must circulate, and the carriers must remain obedient.
What is on the list — media and narrative gatekeepers — RIA Novosti, TASS, Parliamentary Gazette, Kommersant, Vedomosti, RBC, Izvestia, Gazeta.ru, Lenta.ru, Rambler, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Komsomolskaya Pravda, Arguments and Facts, Moskovsky Komsomolets, the Radioplayer app, VGTRK, Zvezda, Vmeste-RF, RT, Channel One, Mir, Channel Five, Ren TV, Spas, TNT, STS, NTV, OTR, TV Center, TV3, Match TV, Friday, Domashny, Muz TV, and Vitrina TV. Function — news, entertainment, radio, television, and narrative saturation during a crisis. The inclusion pattern here is damning. The regime does not merely keep information flowing. The regime keeps approved information flowing.
What is on the list — commerce, travel, and daily dependence — Ozon, Megamarket, Wildberries, Avito, HeadHunter, unspecified Yandex services, unspecified Mail.ru services, unspecified X5 Group services, Vkusno i Tochka, Burger King, VkusVill, Spar, Metro, Ashan, Petrovich, Detsky Mir, CDEK, Kuper, Samokat, Delovye Linii, Domklik, Caesar Satellite, Rosagroleasing, Evotor, Russian Railways, Tutu.ru, Aeroflot, Pobeda, Grand Service Express, 2GIS, Gismeteo, Yandex Taxi, Maxim Taxi, Citydrive, Rosatom charging stations, Rutube, Dzen, Kinopoisk, Okko, Ivi, Russia Land of Opportunity, Youth of Russia, Tvoy Khod, and the Movement of the First. Function — shopping, jobs, food, delivery, property, travel, navigation, weather, taxis, streaming, and youth mobilization. The inclusion pattern shows the real political craft. The Kremlin is not preserving an open internet. The Kremlin is preserving a state-selected routine that keeps people buying, traveling, paying, watching, and staying inside domestic channels.
The forecasted intent relative to the white-list points in one harsh direction. Putin most likely wants crisis-time censorship that feels like continuity rather than rupture. Law hands the FSB a switch. Platform policy channels users toward MAX and away from Telegram and WhatsApp. White-list design keeps state portals, approved commerce, and domestic media alive. Carnegie warned that white-list logic risks becoming a normal rule. Re: Russia argues that positive filtering — access only to approved addresses — marks the next phase of Russian online control. Best judgment sees Putin testing a model that calms urban anger with partial convenience while shrinking freedom to a menu of permitted acts. White list policy is not just a safety valve. White list policy is a rehearsal for an obedient internet.
The present draft already identifies a mechanism, yet stronger language is warranted. Evidence shows a regime moving from episodic shutdowns toward permission-based access, from emergency rhetoric toward standing authority, and from open-ended network use toward a domesticated corridor of state-approved functions. White-list policy keeps society just working enough to blunt outrage while stripping citizens of choice, privacy, spontaneity, and independent reach. Harshest fair judgment is simple — Putin is not protecting Russian citizens from inconvenience. Putin is training Russian citizens to live in a smaller cage and to call that cage ‘safety’.
References —
Antonov, D. (2026, March 10). Kremlin says Moscow mobile internet outages are done for sake of security. Reuters.
Committee to Protect Journalists. (2026, January 28). Russia’s State Duma advances bill allowing FSB to shut down internet. CPJ.
Human Rights Watch. (2025, July 30). Disrupted, throttled, and blocked — State censorship, control, and increasing isolation of internet users in Russia. Human Rights Watch.
Human Rights Watch. (2025, July 30). Russia — Internet blocking, disruptions and increasing isolation. Human Rights Watch.
Kod Durova. (2026, February 19). Which websites and services are in the Ministry of Digital Development white-list [In Russian]. Kod.
Kod Durova. (2026, March 2026). Moscow left without communications and internet [In Russian]. Kod.
Kod Durova. (2026, February 2026). Why some banks are not in the white-list [In Russian]. Kod.
Kolomychenko, M. (2025, December 16). How far will the Kremlin take its internet crackdown. Carnegie Politika.
Mediazona. (2026, January 5). Running from Wi-Fi to Wi-Fi. How Russian regions live under mobile internet shutdowns. Mediazona.
President of Russia. (2026, February 20). Law requires telecommunication providers to suspend services at the Federal Security Service request. Kremlin.
Re:Russia. (2025, November 28). White-lists for dark times — Russian authorities persistently build a closed internet on top of an open one. Re:Russia.
Reuters. (2026, February 10). Telegram app faces further restrictions, possible fines as Russian authorities clamp down. Reuters.
Reuters. (2026, February 12). Russia fully blocks WhatsApp, talks up state-backed alternative. Reuters.
Reuters. (2026, February 19). Russia steps up campaign against Telegram with allegations against its founder. Reuters.
T-J. (2025, December 3). Russia has restricted mobile internet for half a year [In Russian]. T-J.
T-J. (2025, December 21). White-list services that should work during mobile internet shutdowns [In Russian]. T-J.
T-J. (2026, March 10). Mobile internet has not worked in parts of Moscow for days — what is known [In Russian]. T-J.
онная система жилищно-коммунального хозяйства (ГИС ЖКХ); сайты Совета Федерации, Госдумы, Администрации Президента России; сайты Правительства России, ряд региональных сервисов, а также сайты правительств субъектов РФ; Почта России, «Россети» и Честный знак; операторы электронного документооборота «Тензор» и «СКБ Контур»; мобильное приложение «Инспектор» для дистанционных проверок бизнеса; Платформа электронного дистанционного голосования; сервисы обратной связи с властями; сайты «Объясняем РФ» и «Итоги года с Владимиром Путиным». Соцсети и мессенджеры ВКонтакте и Одноклассники; Национальный мессенджер Max. Банки и биржи ВТБ; ПСБ; Альфа-банк; сервисы Национальной системы платёжных карт (является оператором системы «Мир»); онлайн-ресурсы Центробанка; Московская биржа. По данным СМИ, некоторые банки не попали в «белый список» из-за того, что не установили системы хранения переписок. Операторы МТС; «МегаФон»; Т2 (бывший Tele2); Билайн; Ростелеком; «Сбермобайл» и «Т-Мобайл»; «Эр-Телеком» («Дом.ру»); «Мотив». СМИ и ТВ Газеты, интернет-издания и информационные агентства: РИА Новости, ТАСС и «Парламентская газета»; «Коммерсант», «Ведомости», РБК и «Известия»; «Газета.ру», «Лента.ру» и Rambler; «Российская газета», «Комсомольская правда» и «Аргументы и Факты»; «Московский комсомолец». Радио: приложение с радиостанциями «Радиоплеер». Телеканалы: медиахолдинг ВГТРК; телеканалы «Звезда» и «Вместе-РФ»; RT, «Первый канал», «Мир» и «Пятый канал»; «Рен ТВ», «Спас», ТНТ, СТС, НТВ, ОТР, ТВЦ и ТВ3; «Матч ТВ», «Пятница», «Домашний» и «Муз ТВ»; дистрибьютор телеканалов в цифровой среде «Витрина ТВ». Маркетплейсы и сервисы объявлений Маркетплейсы: Ozon; «Мегамаркет»; WB (полное название — Wildberries). Сервисы объявлений: «Авито»; вакансии и поиск работы HeadHunter. Экосистемы сервисы Яндекса (не уточняется, какие); сервисы Mail.ru (не уточняется, какие); сервисы X5 Group (не уточняется, какие). Сервисы МТС, включая «МТС Live», Kion, «МТС Музыку» и «Строки», не включены в «белый список» от Минцифры, но, согласно информации от оператора, работают при ограничениях мобильного интернета. Cети магазинов и ресторанов «Вкусно — и точка» и «Бургер Кинг»; «Вкусвилл» и «Спар»; Metro и «Ашан»; «Петрович»; «Детский мир». Службы доставки «Сдэк»; «Купер»; «Самокат»; «Деловые линии». По данным операторов, при ограничениях мобильного интернета должны работать также ресурсы следующих ритейлеров, но в «белый список» от Минцифры они не включены: «Азбука вкуса»; «Магнит»; «Дикси»; «Пятёрочка» и «Перекрёсток». Коммерция и недвижимость аренда и покупка недвижимости «Домклик»; система охраны «Цезарь Сателлит»; компания «Росагролизинг»; онлайн-кассы «Эвотор». Поездки и путешествия Билеты на поезд и авиа: РЖД и «Туту.ру»; авиакомпании «Аэрофлот» и «Победа»; железнодорожный перевозчик «Гранд Сервис Экспресс»; Карты и погода: 2ГИС; Gismeteo; Такси, каршеринг и авто: «Яндекс Такси»; такси «Максим»; каршеринг «Ситидрайв»; «Росатом Сеть зарядных станций». Сервисы «Делимобиль» и BelkaCar были включены в «белый список» по данным самих компаний. Медиаресурсы Rutube и «Дзен»; «Кинопоиск», «Окко» и «Иви». Социальные платформы Платформа «Россия — страна возможностей»; Федеральная государственная автоматизированная информационная система «Молодёжь России»; Всероссийский студенческий проект «Твой ход»; Сайт «Движения первых». Практические советы Частые вопросы Что делать, если в «белом списке» нет нужного сайта или сервиса? В периоды ограничения мобильного интернета ими можно воспользоваться при подключении к сети Wi-Fi. Ближайшие точки беспроводной сети указаны в «Яндекс Картах» или «2ГИС» — просто откройте любое из этих приложений и введите в поиске Wi-Fi. Важно! Эксперты говорят, что иногда все сайты даже при ограничении мобильного интернета всё же могут открываться, если переключиться на 2G: на Android это можно сделать в разделе «Предпочтительный тип сети» в настройках SIM-карт, а на iPhone — в разделе «Голос и данные» в настройках SIM-карт меню «Сотовая связь». Почему не работают некоторые сайты из «белого списка»? Операторы обязаны выполнять требования, но в разных регионах и с разными операторами могут возникать проблемы. Возможно и так, что у одного оператора сайт запускается, а у другого нет. В качестве решения проблемы можно попробовать пользоваться SIM-картами разных операторов. На сетях какого поколения работают сайты из «белого списка»? По данным «МегаФона», сервисы при ограничении мобильного интернета будут доступны при подключении к 3G или 4G/LTE.