Secrets of the SPETSNAZ “School of Special Warfare, Combat Drone Operator”

A new book from the series Secrets of the SPETSNAZ “School of Special Warfare, Combat Drone Operator”, a practical guide with step-by-step instructions for controlling Combat UAVs – for future military operators, as well as an encyclopedia of modern unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with a lot of illustrations and photographs, which tells about their combat and technical characteristics, as well as the book tells how to fight enemy UAVs and camouflage from them, the book provides the history of the creation of combat UAVs, as well as the use of combat drones by NATO countries in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Denis Solovyov School of Special Warfare Combat Drone Operator

Series Secrets of the Special Forces

Denis Soloviev

SPECIAL WARFARE SCHOOL COMBAT DRONE OPERATOR

Chapter 1. Pilots, soldiers, gamers: how drone operators work

That UAVs are the future of the world’s air forces is as obvious as the fact that no real unmanned reconnaissance or combat aircraft exist yet. Each UAV has an operator, and in many cases, more than one, and this “man-machine” combination creates many problems and causes a number of …

…Expert opinions

According to the chief designer of the Russian company “Eniks” (the developer of UAVs) V. Pobezhimov, successful combat use of such UAVs is possible where there is no developed (and, accordingly, expensive) air defense and radar reconnaissance system, that is, in local conflicts. At the same time, the use of the “Repellent” type electronic warfare systems and their analogues in service with the Nagorno-Karabakh air defense to suppress UAV control channels is not always effective due to the small range of such systems (no more than 10 km). Low-speed UAVs like Bayraktar, after their detection by radar systems, can be very vulnerable to low-speed turboprop fighters with machine guns or cannons, such as the Brazilian Embraer EMB 314 Super Tucano.

Other experts noted that despite its low speed and rather fragile hull, the Bayraktar TB2S remains stealthy due to its small size, composite hull, and ability to strike from a considerable distance. The creation of mass and relatively inexpensive air defense and electronic warfare systems to counter drones remains an unsolved problem as of the end of 2021, so the dispersal of equipment, camouflage of the location of troops and equipment, and placing them in shelters remain effective measures to counter attacks by attack drones in local conflicts. Ukrainian military experts, in relation to the conflict in Donbas, specifically noted that mass round-the-clock operations of attack drones are capable of “changing the paradigm of the conflict” and can demoralize the enemy, similar to their impact on the morale of the Armenian army during the Second Karabakh War.

ZRPK “Pantsir-S1” vs. “Bayraktar”

Main article: Pantsir-S1

On December 19, 2021, Deputy Chief of the Anti-Aircraft Missile Troops of the Russian Aerospace Forces (RF VKS) Yuri Muravkin, speaking about the Bayraktar TB2 drones, said: “This is a very light, very tasty target for the Pantsir.” According to him, Bayraktar has such speed and mass-dimensional characteristics that shooting down a drone does not present any difficulty even for a calculation prepared for a “satisfactory” assessment. However, according to military expert of the Izborsk Club Viktor Murakhovsky, the Pantsir-S1 systems did not justify themselves in a real combat situation in Syria: they regularly recorded false targets, including flying birds, did not notice low-speed and low-flying UAVs. Taking this into account, in 2018, Tor-M2U systems were sent to Syria, which showed significantly higher efficiency (80%) than “Pantsir-S1” (19%).

There have been numerous attempts in the press and analytical articles to compare the effectiveness of the Pantsir-S1 and Bayraktar air defense missile systems in destroying each other in combat conditions. A US Department of Defense analyst estimated the approximate cost of losses of 19 Turkish Bayraktar TB2s at $47.5 million ($2.5 million per unit) during the conflicts in Libya and Syria in 2019-2020, which is more than 2 times less than the $112 million export price of 8 Pantsir-S1 air defense missile systems destroyed by these UAVs. Taking into account the cost of tanks and other armored vehicles, artillery, and missile systems destroyed by UAV strikes, the loss ratio is even higher in favor of Bayraktar. Russian analysts cite a different ratio of losses and their cost: with an estimated export cost of 1 Bayraktar TV2 of $5 million and 54 Bayraktars declared as shot down, against 9 Pantsir-…