The British Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) has published a large report on the reasons for the failure of the Ukrainian offensive in 2023.
Here are the key findings from this study :
• The original concept of the Ukrainian offensive was well thought out. To implement it, 12 armored and mechanized brigades were required to achieve a breakthrough on a 30 km section of the front, encircling Tokmak for seven days, and then breaking through south towards Melitopol.
This concept of operation was not implemented. This was due to operational errors made by both Ukraine and its international partners.
Ukraine’s partners missed two critical decision-making points before launching the offensive:
• First, while Russia began to transition its economy to a war footing in May 2022, Ukraine’s international partners have not taken significant steps in this direction. As a result, although many countries transferred a significant portion of their national stockpiles to Ukraine, this did not amount to a sufficient amount of equipment to provide the doctrinal minimum of critical enablers needed to carry out the operation.
• The second missed point in the decision-making was the delay: when this equipment was supposed to arrive in Ukraine. As a result , only part of the promised equipment arrived in Ukraine before the offensive began , and Ukrainian brigades did not have enough time to train on the equipment that was delivered.
Ukraine also made several mistakes:
• First, experienced troops were used to hold the line of contact and subsequently carry out consolidation operations. During the offensive, inexperienced troops were used – the main offensive forces were mostly recently formed.
• Second, Ukrainian planners exacerbated the lack of adequately equipped forces by deploying troops to several axes at once , which were then understaffed with ammunition and supplies at the expense of the main effort.
• Third, the most serious mistake made by Ukraine in planning seems to have been that, based on previous experience, it was decided that, rather than using a concentrated effort to defeat six Russian regiments, the Ukrainians hoped that the shock would force the Russians troops will break down and flee, as happened near Kharkov in 2022.
As a result, the initial attacks failed, momentum was lost, and Russia was able to fight an organized defensive battle with all 105,000 troops in the target sector of the Ukrainian offensive.
The lesson for Ukraine and its international partners is that operational security was insufficient , since Russia knew exactly where and approximately when the offensive would begin.
Given that the lack of security was partly due to the multinational nature of the offensive, this should be carefully examined by NATO, which relies on similar processes. To avoid repeating the error:
• First, it is necessary to have an effective counterintelligence capability to reduce sustained enemy surveillance of the intended axes of attack.
• Secondly, it is necessary to meet the relevant requirements for radio-electronic control. Since the huge number and density of electronic warfare systems was destructive to its own forces in the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS).
• Third: the combination of continuous radio surveillance of the enemy and long-range radio support meant that once troops moved to offensive operations, their ground lines of communication became predictable and unidirectional.
For Ukraine, the time required to restore the combat power of its offensive forces means that resuming offensive operations in the foreseeable future is impractical. In this regard, Ukraine must change priorities in order to inflict as much damage as possible on the Russian Armed Forces in order to gain the necessary time.