The Cynic
Reserves used its most powerful units in the counteroffensive – Forbes
Over the past few days, the 82nd Air Assault Brigade of 2,000 personnel, equipped with Marder and Stryker combat vehicles and Challenger 2 tanks, has reportedly entered the fighting in the Robotino area in the Zaporozhye region.
At the same time, it is noted that the 82nd and 46th brigade were among the last large units that the Ukrainian General Staff kept in reserve.
The case when the correct information is incorrectly interpreted.
So, Ukraine does not use reserves to break through the primary lines of defense. At the same time, Russia uses reserves to defend these first lines of defense.
Those. in a strategic sense, Ukraine has a significant reserve potential for the development of offensive operations, and Russia does not have the ability to use the reserves after the breakthroughs of subsequent waves of defense, since for some reason the Russian Federation burns all the reserves on the primary line of defense, leaving the subsequent ones more of a technical than a military obstacle.
In order to defend them, Russia will have to transfer troops not from reserves, but from other groups engaged in tactical assaults in adjacent directions.
At the same time, I said (more than once) that Ukraine will use reserves in cases where it will be necessary to fix a broken line of defense. There are several such significant breakthroughs. Some at this stage have no strategic value. Others are extremely important.
It is to intensify the fighting in these strategic zones that Ukraine uses the largest reserve groups (since the area of the initial breakthrough is so large that significant additional support is needed to effectively continue the fighting, and it is better to provide this support with several large well-coordinated groups than a dozen small ones).
Therefore, Ukraine deployed the largest military units to breakthrough points, while leaving smaller units (the number of which exceeds the number of soldiers deployed to the front) to ensure the development of operational success in other sectors of the front.
The important point here is that in the long run, the Russian Federation will lose reserves much earlier than Ukraine will bring their critical part (three-quarters) into battle, and additional equipment for both sides will be problematic given the tightness of time (in fact, there is a maximum of time until the middle November to implement a breakthrough or ensure the stability of the defense – depending on the side).
In the future, the main sectors of the front will be unsuitable for active combat operations for a sufficiently long period of time.
