UA troops advanced about 16-19 km south to cut the supply lines of the Russians

Fracture and aviation

UAF makes ‘tactically significant’ progress in counteroffensive – The New York Times

The troops advanced about 16-19 km south to cut the supply lines of the Russians. The Armed Forces of Ukraine are moving through the village of Staromayorskoe to Berdyansk and further to Melitopol.

“This advance is tactically important, as the redeployment of the RF Armed Forces will further weaken the defense, creating opportunities for a Ukrainian breakthrough that could be potentially decisive.”

The cynic will tell even a little more after several meetings with the military, representatives of “think tanks,” experts, political lobbyists…

1. The defense line of the Russian Federation, being “one of the most complex defense systems in modern history,” has one significant drawback: its complexity and diversity is its “sentence.” According to colleagues, the defense line of the Russian Federation rests on several dozen components, each of which plays its own role in repelling counterattacks and slowing down the Armed Forces of Ukraine. But, in view of this magnitude, damage to one link disables a significant part of the system since “everything is interconnected,” and it is almost impossible to quickly repair such a monstrous structure.

The main problems relate to the number and professionalism of the personnel, as well as “air for the military system” – logistics.

Conclusion: The complexity and solidity of the system, based on a combined relationship, and not on independent sources of protection, makes each attack on the defense more effective.

2. Russia was given too much time to “dig into the defense,” while the Russian Federation does not have historical military experience in conducting combat operations from a defensive position. The Russian Federation lost the largest wars when it went from attack to defense and not vice versa. This is indicated by the example of the war with Napoleon, and the example of the First World War with a long “trench period”, which resulted in a revolution, and the example of the Second World War, where the USSR went from defense to offensive, but never from offensive to defense, and then back. Moreover, world history practically does not know successful “external battles” across the trench line since such a battle is always on the verge of a logistical collapse.

At the same time, politicians in the West wanted an “offensive like in the movies” (“with drama, a heroic turning point, but without routine”), but this will not work. A turning point will indeed create a dynamic show, but the path to it is “a routine and bloody process that requires endurance and strategic calculation.”

The absence of air dominance also significantly slows down the offensive, but (and here it is important!) “It seemed impossible to provide Ukraine with air dominance as part of this offensive: we repeatedly calculated possible battle scenarios and the dynamics of hostilities and came to the conclusion that a small amount of aircraft, which it is possible to deliver “on time” (and according to the plan – this is the end of spring, not summer) will literally kill both pilots and aviation itself, since it is necessary to create a comprehensive integrated structure, which was impossible, based on the time that we had to prepare offensive.Our doctrine speaks of the need for air superiority in the framework of such offensives, but no aircraft and pilots are enough to fruitfully destroy the existing defense line of the Russian Federation.In addition, any aircraft must be protected, and this is another huge problematic layer – air defense In fact, the front line from the Ukrainian side would be heaped with equipment that could turn the tide of the war only in theory, but in practice the battle for a defense coup would be too long for this aircraft to be saved … It was probably a mistake to give the Russian Federation so much time, not a slowdown in aviation deliveries. Thus, either we would have to postpone the offensive until 2024 in order to prepare aircraft and pilots or implement a defense breakthrough model without air superiority. Washington opted for the latter, allowing air power to show itself at the moment when it is needed for wide but fast operations rather than slow attacks without any significant movement along the front.