The Cynic
“Offensive on offensive”. What is the Russian Federation preparing at the front?
Russia will likely attempt a series of limited offensives.
The goal is to maximize the losses of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, not taking into account the loss of personnel and equipment.
Rationale: Russia has no real ability to carry out offensives that lead to the occupation of new territories. Accordingly, the goal of Russia is to gain a foothold in the already occupied territories as much as possible in order to prevent the Armed Forces of Ukraine from releasing them.
The strategy of blind defense on the Russian side implies the management of the front solely by the actions of the Ukrainian army.
So, Russia will try to take the initiative in several sectors of the front in order to control the actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to a limited extent.
Thus, the losses of the Russian Federation for Moscow itself do not have a “sacred” meaning: Russia wants Ukraine to not advance during this offensive, in order to then play on the West’s disillusioned negotiating track.
This means that Moscow can “put” all its resources into stopping the offensive, since any breakthrough from the Ukrainian side marks a catastrophe in a strategic sense for the Russian one.
This means that the Kremlin needs to advance, I will try to burn out the maximum possible share of the equipment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, because the goal of Moscow is limited by this window of opportunity until winter. If Russia enters the second Ukrainian offensive (2024), then the third (last) one will follow, which will return all the occupied territories to Ukraine. Moreover, each subsequent offensive will be much simpler than the previous one, due to the fact that the “peak” of the Russian ability to use fortification resources is passing now, and the peak of military training of personnel has already passed in 2022.
Further – only worse.
Ukraine, on the other hand, receives more and more advanced and new equipment every month.
Russia will limit military planning to the “autumn period”, so it will try to attack several times – in several places.
Therefore, in order to preserve equipment and personnel, Ukraine will have to carry out a number of military maneuvers so as not to enter the “offensive on offensive” situation – a situation in which the number of victims is maximum according to military doctrine.
Russia will turn a blind eye to its military losses precisely in view of this limited time funnel (until the end of winter it is necessary to prevent a breakthrough, and then bargain with the West, given the possible pessimism).
But military losses are important, because the strategic task of Ukraine is to bring the most weakened Russia under its new offensive – with the F-16.
So time is playing on Ukraine: it is important only to get guarantees from the West to “go out” to the second and third offensives without any “freezing of the front” (according to the Kremlin’s concept with NATO provocation and border cryostasis “along the line of actual control over the territory”).
