What we have now:
– Deceased, jailed, and released generals in the Russian Federation.
– Merged audio recordings of disaffected people in the ranks of the Russian army.
– there are almost no Russian troops left on the territory of Belarus.
This video (either a real Wagnerian or a very apt and timely ipso).
A little flashback to this post.
We decided to write a couple of long posts on the topic of some events from within the Russian Federation, about which little was written or not written at all. There will be a lot of theory or speculation here, but most of the information we have gathered is supported by facts that we have checked through many sources and compared to the timeline of many recent events (including up to 6/24/2023).
The information collected is different, but everyone will find something interesting for themselves.
1) You all know that the mercenary units of the “Wagner” PMC were moved to the Mogilev region (Belarus) due to agreements made along the lines of Prigozhin-Lukashenko-Putin-Dyumin (and God knows who else).
If you look at the map, you can see that very close to Mogilev is the city of Orsha, through which the Minsk-Moscow highway passes. If we take as a basis a repeated attempt to march to Moscow, then we can see that there is no large river on the way and there are no bridges that can be blown up in any case. There are only almost 500 km of smooth expressway and there are 130 kilometers to Smolensk, which can become the first goal (last time Rostov-on-Don became such a bridgehead).
The march began around 12 o’clock at night, and the advanced units of the Kremlin traitors can reach the outskirts of Moscow at 7-8 in the morning (if you take into account the speed of armored vehicles). No one will have time to rush in view of the lack of troops capable of defense in Moscow itself (OMON, Rosgvardiya, FSB and other Moscow units are unlikely to be capable of defense against the military). At the same time, the march can be coordinated and supported by other rebels. Agree that this is not the same as starting the march from Rostov-on-Don.
2) Surovikin. A Syrian butcher, a VIP member of the “Wagner” PMC (since 2017) and a close friend of Prigozhin, for example: the idea of storming Bakhmut was the fruit of their “friendship”.
In addition, Surovikin and Prigozhin shared resources and/or financial flows on very “friendly” terms while serving in Africa. Surovikin has been considered Prigozhin’s “personal” general for many years.
By a happy coincidence, Rostov, from which the march to Moscow began, is under the command of the Southern Military District, that is, in the area of responsibility of Surovikin. Fortunately, there was no resistance. Considering all the facts, it can be concluded that Surovikin was definitely informed.
After the mutiny attempt, he was interrogated and is still being held in solitary confinement. According to the sources of the Russian security forces, he may be in a special detention center of the FSB for such “persons”, which was built on the basis of the mansion of the criminal authority “Sylvester” (Russian). It should also be understood that Surovikin is an army general (one of the highest military ranks, there are very few such generals) with connections in the Kremlin, the FSB, Russian elites, oligarchs and others, so the growing distrust between him and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation forces the Kremlin to consider Surovikin, as an “unreliable element”. However, they cannot simply take him and liquidate (or imprison) him because of the above connections. In the scenario of Surovikin’s liquidation, the consequences may be unpredictable.
3) Dumin. Many Russian sources claim that Dyumin was one of the most important figures during the Kremlin-Wagner negotiations. In this situation, he is one of the most interesting people, because he was Putin’s personal bodyguard, and he is also a retired colonel general. He is called one of Wagner’s beneficiaries (or a very influential person) and a person who is very close to Prigozhin. The second beneficiary of Wagner is the Russian GRU, which has not been a secret for a long time.
A few facts about Dyumin: he was the deputy of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation in 2015-2016, since 1995 he served in the FSO (presidential communications department in the Main Directorate of Security).
It is also known that the most influential people from among the “Russian elites” often go to Dyumin.
An interesting fact is that Dyumin is currently the governor of the Tula region. It was in the Tula region (to the west of Moskovskaya) that Prigozhin stopped and went to the negotiations. In this situation, given the great influence of Dumin, he, in our opinion, looks like an accomplice to the rebellion and acted according to the established plan.
End of the first part.
Part Two:
Link to the first part
3) Let’s assume, based on all the information above, that Prigozhin’s “first time” was a trial version.
After that, everyone who participated in this rebellion saw the amount of support from the power structures, from ordinary people (media activism and sociology), the behavior of the top leadership during the “emergency situation”, maybe even finding additional allies to those who were already .
Now, taking into account all the collected information, we can assume preparations for “Moscow 2.0”.
Moreover, it does not necessarily have to be Prigozhin, but, most likely, everything will start again with him.
4) In this situation, Prigozhin is very similar to Lenin or Trotsky, who were in exile for a while, and then returned to the Russian Federation to make a revolution. He has precisely political intentions and ambitions, Prigozhin has powerful media support from all his media resources, warlords and forces that support him. And, as it turned out, there are many, many of them. But about Prigozhin in more detail in the next part.
5) Lukashenko. In the recent year 2020, Lukashenko kept his power only thanks to Putin, and it is quite obvious that today they are on board the same sinking boat. Nevertheless, Lukash dislikes his “unfortunate neighbor” and this resentment dates back to the time of the first president of the Russian Federation. Yeltsin practically guaranteed Lukash the tsar’s throne, but according to the old tradition of the Russian Federation, he was thrown and put on the throne of Putin, and the cheated man was left with only Belarus.
We all remember how, for the entire last year, Luka froze from joining the war, realizing the consequences for himself personally. All these events are interconnected and reflect Lukashenko’s psychological state well.
Lukashenko understands that he needs to save face and come out of this war with power (or at least not in The Hague), so he can afford to conspire to make his country the next springboard for “March 2.0.” It is not known exactly what guarantees he received and from whom, but I assume that it could be everyone who is dissatisfied with the current circumstances and the potential future leadership of the Russian Federation (including Dyumin).
6) About Putin, who lost control over the situation. During his reign, Putin built an imperial system in which his word became more important than written and unwritten laws. In the vertical of power, he rose above everyone and received unconditional control over the country, and the bodies were formed from his friends and acquaintances, whom he kept under constant control and constantly fed with corruption money, so to speak, connected to him by blood (criminality).
A system that is built and centralized exclusively on one person is doomed to collapse.
Rebellion 1.0 showed the real state of affairs in the Russian Federation (weakness) not only for the domestic consumer, but also for the whole world, including “Chinese partners”.
In this situation, Putin understands that if you don’t remove Prigozhin = show others that you can do the same and you won’t get anything for it.
7) We have in this situation what Budanov said recently – a war between the GRU ( Prygozhin, Dyumin, Surovikin, the GRUshniks themselves, some oligarchs and other affiliated people and structures ) and the FSB ( the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the Kremlin, the NSDC, some oligarchs, security forces). During this war, people on both sides will go to each other one and it already happened on 06/24/2023.
For example: during the uprising, the heads of two departments fled Moscow with their families — the head of the Russian Guard and the head of the Ministry of Emergency Situations of the Russian Federation (Russian). Oligarchs fled, security forces fled, people close to the Kremlin fled.
Some sources write that during the mutiny there was no communication with Putin at all, and all negotiations on Putin’s side were taken over by the FSB of the Russian Federation (Patrushev and Bortnikov), effectively ruling the country for a day.
