The problem of uniting the Russian opposition is that the popular Russian oppositionists are not politicians, but media projects that create entertainment content under the guise of political activity. We in Russia have been living without a real political struggle for so long that we have ceased to understand the difference.
Politicians aspire to power in a certain country. To do this, they do what leads them to power: attract supporters, counting on support in exchange for representation, expand influence by creating coalitions, work with criticism and objections (for example, in debates), declare their position, program, look for opportunities and way to achieve the goal. Agitate people to fight for power, organize them.
The media project strives for views and subscriptions, for likes and reposts. The geography of the audience plays a small role, the main thing is the quantity. Videos with a catchy image, caustic comments of satirical or “extremist” content, and other easy-to-read content are created. A media project does not seek cooperation with other projects because they are competitors for the same audience. The goal of a media project is to make the most attractive content so that new subscribers come and old ones stay, so that the audience grows. A repost, link or story about another project is a huge favor that must be earned, or advertising. At the same time, the “popular Russian oppositionists” sincerely consider themselves to be the opposition, because they also ceased to understand the difference a long time ago.
Here lies the answer to the question: “why the millions of audiences of popular oppositionists and the media do not make a revolution.” In fact, their subscribers do not participate in the political struggle, but consume entertainment content that replaces this struggle.
The problem of uniting the Russian opposition is not that our politicians are somehow too intractable , but that politicians consider media projects to be potential political allies in achieving a common goal, and media projects consider politicians to be direct competitors for the audience, likes and reposts. That is why all sorts of associations of “everyone with everyone” over and over again reproduce the fable about the swan, cancer and pike, and immediately fall apart at the first attempt to do something together.
The invasion of Ukraine exposed the details of this difference , less noticeable in “peaceful” time:
– politicians declare not only goals, but also ways to achieve them; media opposition talks about how great it will be in the “beautiful Russia of the future”
– politicians call for an armed struggle (or support for it) against the Putin regime and the seizure of power in Russia; The media opposition is working on the picture of high-moral non-violent protest (e.g. “no war”, green ribbons), ignoring the question of how and why someone will give them power
– politicians comment on the news less often, more often they talk about their ideas and projects, the media constantly write about the new horrors of the regime, often even without their own comments
– politicians often talk about other projects with similar goals, regardless of political views; the media opposition considers it a duty and obligation to destroy the wrong opposition, a positive mention of other projects is paid advertising, or carefully selected “social advertising”, useful for the benevolent image of the oppositionist
– (Telegram specific) comments and “ugly” reactions are disabled in the channels of the media opposition so that it is impossible to express disagreement with the post or start a discussion that may affect the “authority” of the channel.
– the politician is open for feedback, you can find contacts and chat on some topic; the media opposition often does not even publish mail, it is impossible for people outside the “party” to get through
– suggest other differences that you noticed
The information field of the Russian opposition began to play with other colors, right? (:
