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The Cynic

With the arrival of Surovikin as chief commander of the troops in the Ukrainian war, the format of military operations has changed significantly.

The “Syrian past” of the military makes itself felt, as well as the ferocious cruelty with which this nonhuman crushed people with tanks during the putsch during the collapse of the USSR.

For example, the previous technology of “flooding the battlefield with artillery” has been temporarily put on pause, since a functioning artillery “barrage” requires an efficient infrastructure network that allows the use of a large number of artillery strikes. So, in the “precision-mass character” parameters, Russia could focus exclusively on mass character, but after the destruction of the main infrastructure channels, Moscow lost the opportunity to attack both targetedly and massively.

Surovikin came with a “new understanding” – he takes the war into the air. Thus, we clearly see the combination of missile strikes (in fact, a return to February-March reality) with raids by Iranian “mopeds” that perform a reconnaissance function, and sometimes they can break through air defense lines, providing detonation near “programmed” targets.

There is no mention of accuracy. Surovikin’s model of “war” assumes the same “mass character, instead of precision”, but in the context of air threats to Ukraine. However, there is a significant nuance: air attacks do not represent an offensive potential; especially considering that Russian aviation does not fly over the front line, since it will be suppressed by air defense systems. That is, from the air it is possible to try to break the defense or key centers of defense, but such tactics do not abound with independence. One way or another, we will have to try to go deeper, which is not entirely possible, given the real military potential of the Russian Federation.

Thus, the format of the war moved from ground to air, but this did not happen because of a change in the realities of the front, but because the new military leadership understands only the model of air war.

Let us note that aerial suppression of targets (or attempted suppression, since with the accuracy available to the Kremlin, it is possible to suppress something by accident rather than intentionally) in Kyiv and Western Ukraine does not have much significance for military realities.

Moreover, the diversification of the system of small warehouses in Ukraine does not give the Russian Federation the opportunity to suppress the military potential of Kyiv, and the key infrastructure arteries used for the movement of equipment are reliably covered by air defense.

That is, the Russian Federation once again switched to a sharply offensive strategy under conditions when an offensive is impossible in principle and Russia needs to protect the occupied territories.

But defense has nothing to do with uncontrolled rocket attacks on random targets. This causes civilian harm, but not military harm, so the shift in emphasis on the part of the Kremlin, on the contrary, worsens the position of the Russian defense, since the previous leader at least tried to “throw meat on the front line” in order to “fill” the Ukrainian meat grinder with minced meat. Immediately, the amount of meat and equipment in the “defense bloc” is reduced in favor of rocket attacks, but rocket attacks can only be a preparation for an offensive operation, and it is impossible due to the shift in emphasis from the immediate front line to the “rear”.

With Washington and European allies promising to strengthen Ukrainian air defenses, Surovikin’s tactics will lead to a classic retreat for the Russian command.

In turn, the Kremlin’s idiotic and senseless tactics of civil terror not only have no direct military meaning, it has a diametrically opposite effect, since the West, seeing the intensification precisely in the plane of bombing civilian targets, increases military assistance to Ukraine, putting emphasis on the terrorist nature in the press. Russian regime. That is, in the winter, when “the West’s transition to internal problems” was expected, Surovikin came to the leadership, helping Western politicians increase supplies just in time for the expected “dry” cold period for supplies.

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Treadstone 71

@Treadstone71LLC Cyber intelligence, counterintelligence, Influence Operations, Cyber Operations, OSINT, Clandestine Cyber HUMINT, cyber intel and OSINT training and analysis, cyber psyops, strategic intelligence, Open-Source Intelligence collection, analytic writing, structured analytic techniques, Target Adversary Research, cyber counterintelligence, strategic intelligence analysis, estimative intelligence, forecasting intelligence, warning intelligence, threat intelligence
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By Treadstone 71

@Treadstone71LLC Cyber intelligence, counterintelligence, Influence Operations, Cyber Operations, OSINT, Clandestine Cyber HUMINT, cyber intel and OSINT training and analysis, cyber psyops, strategic intelligence, Open-Source Intelligence collection, analytic writing, structured analytic techniques, Target Adversary Research, cyber counterintelligence, strategic intelligence analysis, estimative intelligence, forecasting intelligence, warning intelligence, threat intelligence