0 0

Personnel: ~166,000 (+720)
killed: ~41,350 (+180)
injured: ~124,050 (+540)
captured: ~600 (0)

Military equipment: 11286 (+28)
Armored combat vehicles: 4022 (+8)
Tanks: 1774 (+6)
Artillery: 939 (+3)
Aircraft: 223 (0)
Helicopters: 191 (0)
RSZV: 259 (0)
Air defense means: 118 (+1)
Automotive equipment and tanks: 2922 (+8)
BpLA OTR: 740 (+1)
Special equipment: 83 (+1)
Ships and boats: 15 (0)
Missiles: >2800 (no data)

 Percentage characteristics of Russian losses (08/03/2022):

Personnel:
– 87.37% | from the intended for invasion (190,000 units)
– 18.44% | from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (900,000 units)
– 0.38% | daily percentage of destruction from the intended for invasion (190,000 units)
– 0.08% | daily percentage of destruction from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (900,000 units)

Armored combat vehicles:
– 100.0% | from the intended for invasion (2900 units)
– 29.23% | from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (13,758 units)
– 0.28% | daily percentage of destruction from the intended for invasion (2900 units)
– 0.06% | daily percentage of destruction from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (13,758 units)

Tanks:
– 100.0% | from the intended for invasion (1200 units)
– 53.76% | from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (3,300 units)
– 0.5% | daily percentage of destruction from the intended for invasion (1200 units)
– 0.18% | daily percentage of destruction from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (3,300 units)

Artillery:
– 58.69% | from the intended for invasion (1600 units)
– 16.51% | from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (5,689 units)
– 0.19% | daily percentage of destruction from the intended for invasion (1600 units)
– 0.05% | daily percentage of destruction from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (5,689 units)

Aircraft:
– 67.58% | from the intended for invasion (330 units)
– 16.17% | from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (1,379 units)
– 0.0% | daily percentage of destruction from the intended for invasion (330 units)
– 0.0% | daily percentage of destruction from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (1,379 units)

Helicopters:
– 79.58% | from the intended for invasion (240 units)
– 19.88% | from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (961 units)
– 0.0% | daily percentage of destruction from the intended for invasion (240 units)
– 0.0% | daily percentage of destruction from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (961 units)

Marine:
– 20.0% | from the intended for invasion (75 units)
– 2.89% | from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (519 units)
– 0.0% | daily percentage of destruction from the intended for invasion (75 units)
– 0.0% | daily percentage of destruction from the total composition of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (519 units)

RSZV, Air defense equipment, Automotive equipment, tanks, BpLA OTR: No data

About Post Author

Treadstone 71

@Treadstone71LLC Cyber intelligence, counterintelligence, Influence Operations, Cyber Operations, OSINT, Clandestine Cyber HUMINT, cyber intel and OSINT training and analysis, cyber psyops, strategic intelligence, Open-Source Intelligence collection, analytic writing, structured analytic techniques, Target Adversary Research, cyber counterintelligence, strategic intelligence analysis, estimative intelligence, forecasting intelligence, warning intelligence, threat intelligence

https://www.treadstone71.com/

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