Before bullets fly or embassies are targeted, a surge of digital influence prepares the ground. ISNAD – meaning “support” in Arabic – is a shadowy, decentralized influence network rooted in Muslim Brotherhood (MB) ideology and based primarily in Turkey. It operates as a “civilian” propaganda machine harnessing thousands of volunteers across borders to weaponize ideas and engineer anger. Over the past year, ISNAD has inundated Israel’s information space: on peak days it generates 8–10% of all Hebrew-language Twitter (X) activity. Its tactics – fake personas, coordinated hashtags, AI-crafted messages – aim not to persuade in open debate but to overwhelm, confuse, mimic, and erode the target society’s cohesion. Researchers warn that ISNAD represents a prototype of new cross-border cognitive warfare that Israel and Jewish communities worldwide are ill-prepared to confront.
Organizational Structure and Leadership
ISNAD is structured as a loosely coordinated volunteer network rather than a formal organization.
Leadership
It is reportedly orchestrated by exiled Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood activists operating from Turkey. In particular, a former Egyptian official affiliated with the Brotherhood – now living in Turkey – is identified as the network’s head and chief organizer. The figure (unnamed in open sources) provides strategic direction and training content via ISNAD’s online channels. Beneath him, a small team of administrators likely manages the network’s Telegram forums, curates propaganda, and assigns tasks.
Members and Volunteers
ISNAD self-describes as an “independent popular volunteer movement” launched in October 2023, comprising *“thousands of volunteers from many countries”*. These operatives – sometimes dubbed “keyboard Mujahideen” – are overwhelmingly Arabic-speaking Muslims drawn by Islamist, anti-Israel solidarity. Many are aligned ideologically with the MB and its Palestinian branch, Hamas. Volunteers span multiple countries (Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq and beyond), effectively forming a decentralized community united by the cause of “supporting Palestine” in the information arena. Recruitment appears to be open and peer-driven: ISNAD openly advertises its mission and invites like-minded individuals to join its Telegram channel for training. New recruits are onboarded in a communal Telegram forum where they receive guidelines on creating fake accounts, amplifying messages, and using the provided tech tools.
Recruitment and Training
Since the network seeks maximum participation, it openly describes its goals and methods in public forums, giving researchers a rare glimpse into its operations. Recruitment messages emphasize Muslim solidarity with Gaza and portray ISNAD as “the digital arm of the resistance” (a reference to supporting Hamas’s “resistance” against Israel). Volunteers are motivated by ideology rather than pay – this “civilian jihad” model relies on enthusiasm and a sense of duty to the ummah (Islamic community). Training is conducted in the open Telegram channel (and related groups), where administrators post step-by-step instructions, example posts, and even pre-fabricated slogans for volunteers to copy or adapt. This flatter structure – a mass of self-selected activists guided by a few coordinators – makes the network agile and resilient, though it still exhibits a hierarchy in content dissemination (from core admins to rank-and-file posters).
Geographic Hubs and Operational Locations
While global in reach, ISNAD’s operational nerve-center is firmly in Turkey. Turkey provides a permissive environment
President Erdoğan’s Islamist-leaning government has long offered safe haven and support to Muslim Brotherhood exiles and affiliates. The network’s leadership and likely some infrastructure are based in Istanbul or Ankara, leveraging Turkey’s tolerance (or tacit support) for MB-related influence activities. Indeed, Turkey’s ruling party (AKP) actively champions Brotherhood causes and has sheltered figures from Egypt’s MB and Hamas. This political climate enables ISNAD’s organizers to operate with relative impunity on Turkish soil.
Beyond Turkey, ISNAD’s volunteer base is distributed across the Middle East and Muslim diaspora. Egypt and Jordan appear prominently – many volunteers are Egyptian or Jordanian citizens sympathetic to Hamas and fluent enough in Hebrew to participate. Investigations into fake accounts tied to the network found some registrants’ phone numbers tracing to Egypt and Jordan, suggesting on-the-ground participants there (even if covert). Iraq has also been noted among the countries of origin for volunteers. It is likely that Gaza/Palestine itself contributes activists or at least content (Hamas media guidance may feed into ISNAD’s messaging), though wartime connectivity limits direct involvement from Gaza. Additionally, Lebanon (through Hezbollah-aligned individuals) and the broader Arab/Muslim world (Syria, Yemen, North Africa, Gulf states, as well as diaspora communities in Europe or North America) are potential contributor pools. Indeed, ISNAD explicitly notes it includes volunteers “from many countries” and posts content in multiple languages to broaden its reach.
Key Hubs
Turkey functions as ISNAD’s coordination and leadership hub, while clusters of volunteers in Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and possibly the Palestinian territories form regional nodes. There is also a significant online hub via Telegram where all these geographically dispersed actors converge virtually. By leveraging global online platforms, ISNAD can mask the physical location of its operatives – a volunteer sitting in Qatar or London can pose as an Israeli from Tel Aviv on X, for example. The result is a transnational influence network that is not confined to one locale. This diffuse presence complicates countermeasures, as no single country’s jurisdiction easily applies to the whole network.
Sources and Methods of Funding
ISNAD appears to be a largely volunteer-driven network with minimal overt financing, but it likely benefits from indirect funding and material support via Islamist networks. Because participants are not salaried (they are ideologically motivated volunteers), the operation does not require the kind of budget a formal troll farm might. However, there are still costs – e.g. maintaining communication infrastructure, creating propaganda materials, or possibly compensating core coordinators – that must be met.
Host State Support
Turkey’s government and allied organizations may be quietly underwriting or facilitating ISNAD’s activities. The Turkish state has a history of offering financial backing and logistical cover to Islamist groups aligned with its agenda. For example, other MB-affiliated initiatives in Turkey have received *“financial backing, logistical support and political protection from the Turkish government”*. It is plausible that ISNAD’s leadership, operating under Erdogan’s eye, enjoy similar patronage or at least tolerance. Turkey’s ruling party advisors like Yasin Aktay (an Erdogan confidant and MB liaison) have openly viewed the Brotherhood as a proxy for Turkish influence, indicating a willingness to support such influence efforts.
Allied Networks and Donations
Apart from state actors, MB’s global network of charities and donors (often based in Qatar, Kuwait, Turkey, etc.) could funnel resources to ISNAD. The Qatari connection is notable – Qatar is a major patron of Hamas and MB media. Elements of the “cognitive ring of fire” identified by analysts include Qatar-funded media outlets pushing aligned narratives worldwide. While direct funding from Doha to ISNAD is unconfirmed, the broader ecosystem of MB-friendly funding (foundations, wealthy sympathizers, Islamic NGOs) likely helps sustain the personnel or technology behind the campaign. For instance, resources might be provided to develop custom software tools or to ensure volunteers have VPNs and devices.
Volunteer Contributions
Many volunteers likely contribute in-kind resources – their time, their personal devices/internet connections, and even content creation skills (graphic design, video editing, coding). In some cases, more tech-savvy members like “Mohammad R’azi” (a volunteer identified as an AI applications expert) essentially donate their expertise by creating custom AI plugins for the network. This crowdsourced model lowers monetary costs. There are hints that some funding streams may even originate unwittingly within Israel: analysts ominously noted that certain propaganda campaigns *“receive indirect support from government-backed budgets within Israel itself”*. This likely refers to cases where Israeli public funds (perhaps for social media or academic programs) were exploited or diverted by activists who turned out to be part of hostile influence operations. However, details on such cases remain sparse.
ISNAD’s overt expenses are limited and its workforce is unpaid. The network thrives on intangible resources
Ideological commitment, state-sanctioned safe havens, and an online arsenal of free or low-cost tools. Nevertheless, the enabling role of Turkey’s patronage and possibly other Islamist funding cannot be discounted – providing the backbone that allows this volunteer army to organize and amplify its message at scale.
Coordination Infrastructure and Communications Platforms
ISNAD’s coordination relies on a blend of Telegram channels, cloud-based collaboration tools, and anonymization technologies. Its central nervous system is an openly accessible Telegram channel (t.me/IsnadPalestin) which serves as the hub for training and operational direction. Through this channel – titled “ISNAD – Palestine Media” – the network’s leaders broadcast instructions, slogans, and propaganda content to tens of thousands of subscribers. As of mid-2025, the channel has grown to over 56,000 subscribers, illustrating its extensive reach. Administrators use Telegram’s features to pin messages, schedule posts, and share media (the channel contains thousands of images and videos related to the conflict). Crucially, operational coordination is done in the open here – for example, admins will post a Hebrew phrase and explicitly tell volunteers “to publish [this] in comments on Hebrew social [media]”. Such transparency in method (likely a byproduct of recruiting/training amateurs at scale) inadvertently allows analysts to monitor ISNAD’s strategy in real time.
Key components of ISNAD’s infrastructure include–>
Telegram (Public Channel)
The primary coordination venue. Open to all volunteers, it disseminates strategic messaging guidelines, daily talking points, recommended hashtags, and even ready-made comments in multiple languages. Because this channel is public, it doubles as a propaganda outlet that any sympathizer can follow for updates (in effect blurring internal coordination with external messaging).
Telegram (Private Groups)
While the main channel is public, ISNAD has also used private or closed Telegram groups for specific purposes. Notably, in May 2025 the network posted a recruitment link to a new private channel dedicated to planning or encouraging physical attacks on Jews/Israelis abroad. This suggests a compartmentalized structure where most volunteers engage in influence-only activities via the open channel, whereas a subset might join covert groups if they signal willingness to participate in higher-risk tasks. These closed groups likely vet members and coordinate more sensitive operations away from prying eyes.
Google Docs and Cloud Collaboration
ISNAD employs stealthy use of shared documents to coordinate content behind the scenes. For example, a Google Doc might be used as a live repository of Hebrew slogans or lists of target social media posts that volunteers can reference. Using cloud docs allows real-time updates by admins and access by many users without needing a bespoke platform. It’s essentially a low-tech command-and-control mechanism for crowdsourced information warfare.
Bots and Automation
The network leverages bots on Telegram and possibly other platforms. Telegram bots can help automate certain tasks – e.g. disseminating scheduled content, scraping trending topics, or distributing instructions via direct messages. ISNAD also encourages use of bots or scripts to manage social media accounts (for instance, phone bots that can engage in basic chat interactions, or scripts to quickly switch between multiple fake accounts). These tools reduce the manual burden on volunteers and increase scale.
VPNs and Anonymization
Operational security is maintained through widespread use of VPN services and other anonymity tools. Volunteers are likely instructed to mask their IP addresses (to avoid revealing their actual country of origin) and possibly to use temporary phone numbers or SIM cards (to register fake accounts on platforms like X). By concealing digital footprints, ISNAD’s operatives can bypass content filters and pose as local users within Israel without easy traceability.
Social Media Coordination
Outside of Telegram (the planning stage), the execution stage occurs on public-facing social media – primarily Twitter/X, but also other platforms like Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and TikTok as opportunities arise. The network coordinates hashtag campaigns on X, often creating Hebrew hashtags designed to trend on Israeli Twitter. Volunteers will all tweet or post using the same tags or phrases at pre-set times, amplifying their visibility. For example, campaigns such as #WeAreNotSafe (claiming Israelis are unsafe and should leave the country) or references to a “curse of the eighth decade” of Israel’s existence have been pushed in a coordinated fashion, achieving wide imprint in Israeli online discourse. On platforms like Facebook or Instagram, volunteers swarm the comment sections of popular Israeli pages, pasting prepared talking points in Hebrew. One analysis observed Israeli social media posts (e.g. news on the national broadcaster’s page) being flooded with comments from fake accounts parroting identical messages crafted by the network.
Overall, ISNAD’s infrastructure is an ad-hoc but effective blend of mass communication (Telegram broadcasts) and targeted amplification (social media swarming). It exploits readily available tech: by using open platforms and common tools, the network remains nimble and difficult to take down. Traditional counter-influence measures (like shutting a single website or account) have limited effect because ISNAD is diffuse and migratory – if accounts are banned, new ones appear; if a Google Doc is detected, content can be moved elsewhere. The backbone (Telegram) is largely resistant to censorship due to its lax moderation and encryption. This infrastructure gives ISNAD a robust foundation to continue operations despite efforts to disrupt it.
Generative AI Toolsets and Communications Technology
One of ISNAD’s defining features is its heavy reliance on generative AI and advanced communication tech to enhance content creation, translation, and deception. As Dr. Tehilla Shwartz Altshuler noted, by late 2023 “artificial intelligence tools based on large language models” had entered the battlefield of disinformation, and ISNAD’s operators were quick to harness them. The network has marshaled a wide array of AI-driven applications to solve its biggest operational challenges – chiefly, the language barrier and the need for scalable content generation.
Key AI and tech tools employed include
AI-Based Translation and Content Generation
ISNAD recognized that poor language skills often give away foreign influence attempts, so they moved to *“tame artificial intelligence tools to solve the language limitation”*. Volunteers are trained to use OpenAI’s ChatGPT as a real-time translator and copywriter. For instance, an operative can input an Arabic message or a rough machine translation into ChatGPT and ask it to output a fluent Hebrew version. Early on, the network simply copied authentic Hebrew comments from real Israeli users and echoed them via fake profiles – a brute-force approach to sound local. Later, they began generating original text: guides circulated on how to prompt ChatGPT to produce multiple reworded variations of a given talking point. This innovation countered one telltale sign of coordinated fake activity – identical phrasing across posts. By using AI to introduce slight differences in wording, ISNAD made detection by algorithms or fact-checkers much harder.
Custom AI Plugins/Add-ons
ISNAD volunteers haven’t just used AI tools off-the-shelf; some have even developed custom mini-applications to streamline propaganda work. In one case, a tech-savvy member (the aforementioned “Mohammad R’azi”) created a personalized ChatGPT add-on called the “Emoji-to-Hebrew Translator.” This tool allows users to input an emotion descriptor or even an emoji in English, and it instantly provides a “well-phrased Hebrew sentence describing that emotion,” ready for posting. The goal is to help non-native speakers convey authentic emotional tones in Hebrew – for example, turning a 😠 emoji into a natural Hebrew sentence expressing anger. Volunteers can copy-paste these AI-crafted sentences directly into tweets or comments. This level of nuance (correctly using Israeli slang or emotional cadence) significantly boosts the credibility of fake personas.
AI-Generated or Enhanced Imagery
Although ISNAD has focused more on text than deepfakes, it does exploit AI in visuals when useful. Network admins actually caution volunteers not to overuse blatantly AI-generated images in public posts, since obvious deepfakes are easily spotted and can undermine credibility. However, they do use AI to create profile pictures and graphic posts that slip under the radar. Fake personas have used profile photos that are AI-modified composites – for example, taking a real person’s photo and subtly altering facial features using generative adversarial techniques, so reverse-image searches won’t trace it back to the source. One exposed account “Liyal Tal” had a profile picture that was a “sophisticated AI creation” blending features to appear unique while hiding the original model’s identity. Additionally, volunteers use simple design AI tools to create memes or infographics (e.g. posts with Hebrew text over images) to amplify messages. These graphics look organic but can be mass-produced with templates and AI art generators.
Social Media Bots and Schedulers
Alongside generative AI, ISNAD reportedly uses automation tech to manage its army of sockpuppet accounts. Bots can generate activity at scale – dozens of accounts working in unison, posting and engaging simultaneously. Some of these accounts behave algorithmically (e.g. retweeting any post with a certain hashtag or auto-replying with pre-set text). The network may employ bot services or custom scripts to maintain a high volume of output around the clock. By using scheduling tools, operatives can queue posts at specific intervals (one Telegram instruction suggested posting a slogan “every 10 minutes” during a campaign). This consistent frequency, aided by automation, ensures continuous pressure on the information space.
Dual-Use Tech Applications
ISNAD shows ingenuity in repurposing commercial or open-source tech for its needs. It takes advantage of what experts call “dual-use” AI applications – tools built for benign uses that can be turned to malicious influence. For example, voice-cloning software could hypothetically be used to create audio messages in a native Israeli accent; hyper-personalized video editors might generate convincing clips; or chatbot programs could engage users in comment threads, mimicking human conversation. While specific instances weren’t detailed in open sources, the network is clearly aware of these possibilities. Indeed, observers note “an immense variety of such tailored applications” being experimented with – from phone bots that converse like activists to advanced language programs – all of which can be exploited to mimic human behavior at scale.
AI is the great force-multiplier for ISNAD. It allows a disparate group of volunteers – many of whom do not speak Hebrew or know Israeli society intimately – to produce polished, resonant propaganda in the target language. It also lowers the barrier to entry: even a volunteer with poor writing skills or limited time can use AI assistance to generate content rapidly. The network stays adaptive with technology, engaging in a constant cat-and-mouse game: if certain AI uses are curtailed by providers (e.g. OpenAI adding filters), ISNAD pivots to open-source models or new plugins. This tech-driven agility has made ISNAD a pioneer of what might be called “AI-augmented cognitive warfare.” As one report noted, the volunteers are effectively beta-testing the latest AI applications to pollute public discourse – a trend that intelligence agencies now must urgently study and counter.
Propaganda Narratives and Themes
ISNAD’s propaganda playbook is designed to amplify Hamas’s objectives and sow division and despair within Israeli society. The narratives pushed by the network vary by context and audience, but they are unified by an overarching goal: undermine the resolve and cohesion of Israelis (and Jews worldwide) while bolstering the image of the “resistance”. These narratives can be grouped into several key themes:
“Israelis Are Not Safe – You Should Leave”
A core message is that life in Israel is dangerous and hopeless, urging Israelis to emigrate or give up. This includes repeated slogans about Israel being on the brink of ruin or cursed by history. One prominent campaign invoked the “curse of the eighth decade” (קללת העשור השמיני) – alluding to a notion that no Jewish state has lasted beyond 80 years, implying Israel will soon collapse. Posts warned citizens *“Soon you will regret not leaving in time”* and *“Leave before it’s too late”*. By flooding social feeds with such doomful messages, ISNAD seeks to erode Israelis’ sense of personal security and future in the country. The narrative was so prolific that the Hebrew hashtag “#WeAreNotSafe” trended during the post-October 7 war period, fueled in part by inauthentic accounts repeating the sentiment that no place in Israel is safe from harm.
Internal Division and Anti-Government Fury
Another major theme is exacerbating Israel’s internal social and political rifts. ISNAD’s content frequently impersonates domestic voices to “amplify public outrage” on contentious issues. For example, fake profiles heavily promote anger at the government’s handling of the Gaza war and the hostage crisis, blaming leaders like PM Netanyahu for every failure. They also stoke resentment between groups – particularly secular versus religious Jews. Posts attack ultra-Orthodox Jews (Haredim) for draft evasion and consuming state resources, attempting to deepen the secular public’s animosity towards religious Israelis. Simultaneously, they encourage extremism in protests
Urging anti-government demonstrators (like those opposing judicial reforms or the war) to escalate to violence. A discovered set of fake accounts even promoted refusal to serve in the IDF and called for soldiers to mutiny. All these narratives aim to fracture Israeli unity and portray the state as internally imploding.
Defeatism and Psychological Warfare
ISNAD uses psychological operations-style messaging to sap enemy morale. This includes spreading exaggerated accounts of Israeli battlefield losses and Hamas/Hezbollah’s strength. The Telegram channel, for instance, relays every Hamas “military victory” claim – detailing purported Israeli casualties or equipment destroyed by Qassam Brigades – to then be shared on Israeli forums. Such posts often carry Hebrew captions like “This is a great victory, it will be complete and absolute”, celebrating Israel’s supposed impending defeat. The network also circulates graphic or emotive content (possibly images of rocket damage or grieving families) to shock and depress the target audience. By constantly emphasizing triumphalism for the “resistance” and humiliation for Israel, the narrative pushes Israelis toward hopelessness and fear.
Sympathy and Solidarity Deception
In a cunning twist, ISNAD doesn’t only spew hostile messages – it also mimics sympathetic or patriotic voices when useful. Fake accounts have posed as concerned Israeli citizens supporting causes like the families of Hamas-held hostages or the anti-government protests, only to subtly inject divisive ideas. For instance, an imposter profile might join a Facebook group of Israelis advocating for kidnapped soldiers’ return and agree passionately, but then pivot to blame the government or sow mistrust among group members. Similarly, accounts with names like “Patriotic Israelis” were created to lure real Israelis in, then feed them disinformation. This narrative of false solidarity is meant to build credibility (“I too am Israeli and I feel your pain”) as a Trojan horse for subversive messaging.
Pro-“Resistance” Islamist Narrative
A foundational narrative, aimed more at Arab/Muslim audiences (and to fortify volunteer morale), is that Hamas and allied “resistance” groups are righteous, heroic, and achieving divine victory. The very name ISNAD – support – frames the network’s work as supporting the Palestinian resistance. In Arabic-language posts, the network shares religiously infused slogans and glorification of jihad against Israel. References to defending Al-Aqsa, avenging Muslim blood, and fulfilling God’s will by defeating the Zionists are common tropes (though these are often kept off the Hebrew-language channels to avoid alerting the targets). The channel’s feed routinely features Hamas communiqués and Hezbollah statements boasting of attacks on Israeli forces. By amplifying these across languages, ISNAD reinforces the narrative that the entire Muslim world is uniting and that violent “resistance” is succeeding by God’s grace.
Global Anti-Israel Narratives
In English (and sometimes other languages), ISNAD’s messaging aligns with broader anti-Israel propaganda prevalent on Western social media. This includes themes like accusing Israel of genocide or war crimes in Gaza, calling for international sanctions, and depicting Israel as a pariah state. The network likely co-opts hashtags such as #FreePalestine, #GazaUnderAttack, or trending Western activist slogans to insert its content into global discussions. The goal is to influence international public opinion and policy by bolstering narratives that delegitimize Israel’s actions. Additionally, ISNAD content sometimes echoes or amplifies conspiracy theories or extreme rhetoric from Western fringe groups (far-left or Islamist circles), for example comparing Israel to Nazis or spreading misinformation about Israeli actions. All of this serves to increase pressure on Israel from the outside and isolate Jewish communities.
These propaganda narratives are carefully tailored to the audience. Hebrew messaging is calibrated to resonate emotionally with Israelis while aggravating fears and fault lines; Arabic messaging is rallying and triumphalist; English messaging appeals to human rights discourse and leftist sensibilities; Persian messaging (if used) might emphasize Muslim unity against Israel or highlight resistance in a way that resonates with Iranian revolutionary rhetoric. Underpinning all themes is a coherent strategic intent: to align perceptions with Hamas’s objectives. As one analysis summarized, ISNAD floods Israeli networks with messages “designed to promote Hamas’s objectives”, effectively shaping opinion to make Israelis act (or despair) in ways that benefit Hamas. By recycling and amplifying these themes incessantly, ISNAD creates an echo chamber of propaganda that can influence not only public sentiment but even mainstream narratives if unchallenged.
Multi-Lingual Operations
Hebrew, Arabic, Persian, and English
A hallmark of ISNAD is its polyglot operation – it conducts influence campaigns in multiple languages simultaneously, each serving a different facet of its strategy. This multilingual approach is explicitly part of ISNAD’s mission to *“post in different languages to break censorship restrictions on media content”*. Below is an overview of ISNAD’s four primary language theaters and how each is utilized:
Hebrew
This is the network’s main target language. ISNAD generates enormous volumes of Hebrew content to infiltrate Israeli discourse. Thanks to AI-assisted translation and native-speaker guidance, their Hebrew posts are often fluently written and idiomatic. The purpose is to impersonate Israeli voices – thereby influencing real Israelis who encounter the content. Hebrew operations include creating fake Israeli profiles on X, Facebook, Instagram, etc., complete with Hebrew names and bios, and then using these sockpuppets to disseminate propaganda. These profiles post about divisive issues (security failures, government scandals, societal tensions) entirely in Hebrew, and engage other users in Hebrew conversations. The scale is massive: at peaks, the “Hebrew Twitter” conversation is flooded such that up to 10% of posts are coming from ISNAD-linked accounts. Common tactics involve hijacking popular Hebrew hashtags or trending topics, and injecting coordinated narratives. For example, during a surge of protests in Israel, ISNAD accounts might all tweet with a protest hashtag but add incendiary lines to encourage chaos or despair. Hebrew content is carefully calibrated to sound local – leveraging AI for flawless grammar and even replicating Israeli slang, cultural references, and emotional tones. By blending in linguistically, ISNAD’s Hebrew campaign makes it difficult for average users to discern that an outsider influence operation is at play.
Arabic
Arabic is the network’s internal lingua franca and a public outreach language to the Arab/Muslim world. Within ISNAD’s Telegram channel and volunteer communications, Arabic is heavily used for instructions, discussions, and motivation. The channel’s description and most admin posts are in Arabic (often paired with translated Hebrew snippets to provide volunteers the text to use). Arabic serves to brief the volunteers on what narrative to push and to explain context (e.g. summarizing Israeli news in Arabic before giving the Hebrew talking point). Additionally, Arabic content is pushed externally to Arab audiences via social media, aiming to rally pan-Arab support and celebrate the “resistance.” For instance, ISNAD shares Arabic news updates highlighting Hamas and Islamic Jihad operations, as well as emotional calls for Muslim unity against Israel. These are meant for broad consumption in Arabic media spheres – reinforcing anti-Israel sentiment and legitimizing violent “resistance” as popular and effective. Because Arabic content isn’t subject to the same infiltration goal as Hebrew, it can be more openly extremist (glorifying jihad, martyrdom, etc.) without disguise. By operating in Arabic, ISNAD also ensures it can recruit from and coordinate with the vast pool of online supporters across the Arab world.
Persian
While not as prominently featured as Hebrew or Arabic, Persian (Farsi) is a notable part of ISNAD’s multilingual strategy – reflecting the Iranian and Persian-speaking audiences’ importance in the anti-Israel axis. There is evidence of Persian-speaking operatives or content: researchers found screenshots indicating some ISNAD volunteers use Persian interfaces on their devices. This suggests participants from Iran, Afghanistan, or Tajikistan may be involved. The network likely produces some content in Persian to be shared on Iranian social platforms or among Shi’a communities aligned with Iran’s “Resistance Axis.” Such content would frame the Israel-Hamas conflict in terms resonant with Iranian narratives (e.g. highlighting the unity of Muslim ummah, praising Hezbollah’s stance, condemning Israel’s actions in Persian-language propaganda). It might also be used to spur Iran’s homegrown anti-Israel networks to echo ISNAD’s themes. Given that Iran’s regime is a patron of Hamas and shares the goal of demoralizing Israel, ISNAD’s Persian-language efforts could act as a bridge or force multiplier between Sunni Islamist and Iranian influence campaigns. In effect, Persian content helps synchronize messages across the Sunni MB and Shi’a Islamist spheres where interests converge. However, due to potential ideological differences, the Persian outreach may be more limited and carefully crafted to focus purely on the anti-Zionist common denominator.
English
English is the primary global lingua franca and is used by ISNAD to influence Western public opinion and diaspora discussions. Although our connected sources do not detail specific English-language campaigns by name, it is clear that ISNAD or its operatives also push content in English on platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube. These messages often seek to amplify pro-Palestinian, anti-Israeli narratives in the West. For example, volunteers might swarm the replies of international news tweets with pro-Gaza messages or disinformation about Israeli actions, all in English to maximize reach. They also likely create English-language graphics and videos highlighting civilian suffering in Gaza or accusing Israel of apartheid, aligning with narratives that gain sympathy in the West. The objective is to erode international support for Israel and to encourage protests or political pressure against Israeli policies. Additionally, by posting in English, ISNAD can directly target Jewish and Israeli diaspora communities abroad – injecting polarizing content into their social media circles and even impersonating diaspora voices. English content provides cover for reaching a very broad audience, from North America to Europe to Asia, and for penetrating the global media conversation around the conflict. Since English posts are visible to journalists and opinion-makers, ISNAD’s propaganda (if sufficiently viral) can indirectly shape news narratives or public debates beyond the Middle East.
The multi-language agility is a force multiplier: ISNAD can tailor the same core message to different audiences. For example, after an event like a high-profile Gaza battle, ISNAD will disseminate: a triumphant Arabic post praising the fighters, a dismal Hebrew post claiming “our army is broken,” a Persian note about regional resistance, and an English post condemning Israeli “atrocities” – all concurrently. By doing so, it encircles the information environment of Israel from all sides. As one Israeli institute observed, ISNAD *“mobilizes large numbers of volunteers…relying heavily on generative AI tools for content creation, coordination, and translation”*. The inclusion of translation highlights how critical language-crossing is: AI lets a volunteer in Cairo take an Arabic slogan and propagate it in fluent Hebrew or English within seconds. This linguistic weaponization ensures that ISNAD’s influence is not siloed but rather globally resonant, feeding disparate audiences with mutually reinforcing perspectives that all serve the network’s end goals.
Emotional and Cognitive Warfare Tactics
ISNAD conducts a campaign of emotional manipulation and cognitive overload designed to wear down its targets’ psychological defenses. In modern conflicts, controlling the narrative and public sentiment can be as important as battlefield gains – and ISNAD explicitly operates on that premise, functioning as a “cognitive warfare” front. Its tactics exploit human emotions and cognitive biases to maximize the impact of its propaganda. Key methods include:
Emotional Triggering
The network carefully crafts content to provoke strong emotional reactions – be it fear, anger, grief, or mistrust. By “weaponizing ideas” and “engineering anger”, ISNAD aims to make the target audience feel before they think. For instance, graphic descriptions of violence or dire warnings (“blood will flow”, “you and your children are not safe”) instill fear and panic. Posts highlighting government betrayals or societal injustices spark anger and resentment. On the flip side, fake supportive messages might tug at heartstrings (feigned empathy or patriotism) only to redirect emotions against a scapegoat. The network’s use of the custom Emoji-to-Hebrew AI tool is telling – it enables operatives to perfectly express emotions in Hebrew, ensuring their disinformation comes packaged in authentically heartfelt language. By mirroring the emotional tone of real Israelis (whether it’s outrage at a political figure, sorrow for a fallen soldier, or terror of incoming rockets), the fake posts blend in and amplify those sentiments to extreme levels. The goal is to create an emotional echo chamber where negative feelings spiral.
Cognitive Overload and Confusion
ISNAD practices what could be called “firehose” tactics – blasting so much information (and disinformation) into the public sphere that people become overwhelmed and unsure what to believe. By coordinating thousands of posts and comments daily, the network ensures that whatever the online conversation is, it is inundated with its angle. This sheer volume can crowd out factual news or balanced discussion. It also leads to confusion: when numerous social media profiles (that appear human) vehemently push a narrative, casual observers might assume “where there’s smoke, there’s fire.” For example, if dozens of accounts comment on a news article claiming “this government has failed us, we need to riot,” it plants the idea that many citizens feel that way, potentially normalizing extreme responses. ISNAD’s use of repetitive but slightly varied messaging is designed to cognitively saturate the information space – even if one dismisses a single post, seeing the theme echoed everywhere can subconsciously reinforce it. Moreover, by mimicking multiple perspectives (some posts from a “left-wing activist,” others from a “right-wing religious Jew,” etc.), the network creates the illusion of broad consensus, further confusing the public’s grasp of reality.
Mimicry and Impersonation
A key cognitive tactic is deception through impersonation, which we detail further in the next section. In cognitive warfare terms, impersonation allows ISNAD to exploit trust. People are cognitively predisposed to trust messages that come from those they identify with (e.g. fellow citizens, members of one’s community). By posing as Israelis across the spectrum, ISNAD’s fake personas can enter different echo chambers (left, right, secular, religious) and push tailored narratives that those audiences find relatable. This “local user” camouflage not only evades immediate rejection but also hijacks the cognitive biases of readers – such as the bandwagon effect (“people like me are saying this, so it might be true”) and confirmation bias (feeding each group what they are primed to hear). For Israeli targets, seeing a Hebrew message with slang and cultural references triggers the brain’s familiarity heuristic, making the disinformation less likely to be critically scrutinized as foreign propaganda.
Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt (FUD)
ISNAD intentionally spreads rumors and false information to create FUD within Israel. This might include unverified reports of impending doom (e.g. “massive Hezbollah attack imminent” or “foreign investors pulling out, economy about to collapse”), conspiracy theories (“the leadership knew about the attack and did nothing”), or distorted statistics (“half the country wants to flee”). By injecting a constant stream of alarming or demoralizing claims, the network causes mental fatigue and anxiety. People under continuous stress and uncertainty are more susceptible to manipulation and may start doubting even factual information. A concrete example: network posts revived an old superstition about an “eighth decade curse” on Israel – a notion that might normally be fringe, but by repeating it across channels, they turned it into a talking point that sowed real anxiety among some Israelis. This exploitation of cognitive weak points – superstition, rumor, doubt – is aimed at reducing the population’s psychological resilience.
Echo Chamber Amplification
Internally, ISNAD likely uses its Telegram community to maintain an echo chamber that keeps volunteers motivated and engaged. They share only news that fits their narrative (e.g. every Israeli setback is celebrated, Hamas’s hardships are downplayed), creating a sense of inevitable victory that fuels the volunteers’ zeal. This psychological reinforcement ensures the “keyboard warriors” remain emotionally invested. Externally, ISNAD’s mass postings can create temporary echo chambers in Israeli social media – for instance, hijacking a popular forum or trending topic such that most comments push the same line. This can isolate a typical user in a swirl of negativity or radical voices, potentially nudging their own sentiments over time.
ISNAD’s strategy operates like an emotional blitzkrieg and a cognitive fog. As one commentary put it, *“incitement [in this kind of war] operates like fog—diffuse, ambient, and ever-present. It saturates meaning, turning slogans into signals and chaos into climate.”*. The network doesn’t issue direct orders or logical arguments; instead it cultivates a pervasive atmosphere of crisis, betrayal, and inevitability. The emotional stress and cognitive overload can lead people to make irrational decisions (like fleeing the country out of panic, or lashing out violently in protests, or distrusting neighbors) that ultimately serve the adversary’s goals. Israel’s adversaries hope that long before physical defeat, the populace will be psychologically defeated. ISNAD is the instrument attempting to achieve that collapse of the will via bytes instead of bullets.
Impersonation Techniques and Inauthentic Personas
Central to ISNAD’s success is its sophisticated use of impersonation – creating and deploying false online personas that appear to be ordinary individuals. By blending into the social fabric under assumed identities, these operatives can inject narratives covertly. The network’s impersonation tradecraft includes:
High-Fidelity Fake Profiles
ISNAD-linked profiles are crafted with remarkable attention to detail. Unlike crude bots with gibberish names, these fakes “seem like regular Israelis”, often with Hebrew names and even backstories. They typically have a history of posts (sometimes built up over months) to appear legitimate. For example, an account might have been posting innocuous content about sports or daily life for a period before pivoting to heavy propaganda once “activated.” Investigators note that many profiles had “rich content history” and flawless Hebrew, making them harder to spot. Photos and personal info are chosen to be credible: one fake persona “Avraham Moshe” used the image of a real Swedish singer (unknown to Israelis) as his profile picture and amassed 2,400 followers while tweeting in elaborate Hebrew about Israeli politics. Another, “Keren Ovadya,” had an evocative profile picture of a heart with Israel at its center and focused on anti-Netanyahu content, gaining nearly 3,800 followers. These details create the illusion of authentic grassroots voices.
Stolen and AI-Altered Avatars
To supply photos for these profiles, ISNAD operatives often steal images from unwitting people online or generate composites. However, they take the extra step of modifying images to obscure their origin. FakeReporter (an Israeli disinformation watchdog) found that some profile pictures were originally of real individuals (like a Canadian high school student for “Maya Lipschitz”), but had subtle changes applied – likely via an AI filter – to avoid easy reverse image identification. In other cases, entirely AI-generated faces may be used, but carefully enough that they don’t trigger obvious tells (such as the bizarre artifacts older GAN-generated faces had). The result: even tech-savvy users might not immediately recognize the profile as fake. Deepfake identity creation allows these “ghosts” to have unique faces and thus persist longer on platforms.
Local Persona Persona and Language Mastery
Each fake account’s content is tailored to the persona it adopts. Language is a big part of this – ISNAD’s impersonators use “fluent, emotionally resonant Hebrew” including slang, texting lingo, and cultural references to mimic Israelis accurately. They also exhibit behavioral traits expected of local users. For instance, they might comment on popular Israeli TV shows, or wish everyone a happy Jewish holiday (copying from real posts). Some pose as secular liberals, sharing memes about Tel Aviv life, while others pose as religious or right-wing, perhaps quoting scripture or expressing security hawkish views – depending on which audience segment they intend to influence. By adopting diverse Israeli avatars across the political/religious spectrum, ISNAD covers more ground and can infiltrate different online communities (from left-wing Facebook groups to right-wing Twitter circles, etc.). One uncovered profile, “Rebecca Elia,” would even change its profile photos frequently (perhaps to avoid detection as the same person) and appealed to patriotic sentiments while secretly funneling followers into a propaganda Telegram group. This chameleon-like behavior is a hallmark of the operation.
Mimicking Protesters and Activists
A specific impersonation technique is posing as leaders or passionate participants of real social movements. During Israel’s 2023 domestic turmoil (mass protests over judicial reforms, etc.), ISNAD accounts pretended to be protest organizers or fervent supporters. They used the “language of protest” – slogans like “saving our democracy” or “fighting for our children’s future” – to blend in. Once embedded, they would subtly manipulate the message: e.g., calling for more extreme actions (“block more roads, it’s the only way!”) or shifting the focus of blame (“the real enemy is within – accuse this or that group”). By impersonating protest voices, they sought to radicalize genuine protesters and increase polarization between the protest movement and the rest of society. This infiltrative approach extends to solidarity movements too – as noted, some fakes acted as if they were allies of hostage families or mourning terror victims, only to then direct that sympathy toward hate or vengeance. The net effect is to hijack authentic grassroots energy and steer it toward ISNAD’s disruptive agenda.
Adaptive Evasion of Exposure
When one fake persona is exposed or suspected, the operators don’t simply abandon it – they adapt. For example, the profile “Maya Li” changed her name to a more Jewish-sounding “Maya Lipschitz” after some of her network connections were uncovered. This implies the network tries to “launder” an identity if compromised, hoping a tweak in name or profile picture will let it slip past renewed scrutiny. Similarly, some accounts that were flagged would temporarily go dormant or change their posting patterns, then resurface when investigators’ attention waned. This cat-and-mouse game demonstrates a level of responsive control: handlers (likely via the Telegram groups) coordinate these persona adjustments. The goal is to preserve the follower counts and credibility that a fake built up, rather than start from scratch, by quickly shedding whatever element drew suspicion.
Coordinated Persona Network
These fake profiles do not operate alone; they often act in clusters. They friend or follow each other, comment on and amplify each other’s posts, creating a synthetic community that can bait real users into engaging. For instance, one fake might post an incendiary claim, and several others will reply in agreement (“Absolutely right!”) to give it traction. This coordination extends to interactions with real influencers: one incident saw a fake persona’s post amplified by a real Israeli rapper/activist who thought it genuine, which then cascaded to broader visibility. By skillfully inserting fake personas into genuine social networks, ISNAD uses social proof to its advantage – if an influential person shares content from “Sara Aviram” (not knowing she’s fake), thousands of that person’s followers will see it and assume an organic Israeli voice made a compelling point, when in fact it was engineered propaganda.
Collectively, these impersonation techniques make ISNAD’s influence operation particularly insidious. It’s not just anonymous bots shouting from the outside; it’s an array of counterfeit citizens whispering from within the crowd. As FakeReporter’s director Achiya Schatz noted, this network of fake profiles “managed to reach hundreds of thousands of Israelis… some of its posts significantly influenced conversations” by blending seamlessly into the Israeli social media milieu. In essence, ISNAD weaponizes trust – every time an Israeli netizen trusts that the person they’re arguing with or agreeing with online is a fellow Israeli, when it might be a distant operative with a false identity, ISNAD wins a small battle. Over time, these impersonation tactics can distort the marketplace of ideas, making it hard for even savvy individuals to discern authentic public sentiment from planted narratives. This erosion of authenticity is precisely what an influence network seeks, and ISNAD has raised impersonation to a fine art in service of that aim.
Targeting Priorities and Victim Audience
ISNAD’s activities demonstrate clear targeting priorities, with Israel and its global Jewish diaspora at the top of the list. Understanding who the network targets (and why) is key to grasping its strategic intent:
Israeli Public (Primary Target)
The Israeli populace – specifically Jewish Israelis, but also to some extent Israeli Arabs and other residents – is the central target of ISNAD’s influence campaign. All the Hebrew-language effort is directed at shaping Israeli public opinion and social stability. The aim is to weaken Israel from within: demoralize civilians, erode trust in institutions, intensify social fractures, and reduce the will to fight or persevere. By targeting Israelis’ morale and cohesion, ISNAD serves Hamas’s immediate objectives (e.g. undermining public support for military operations in Gaza, pressuring the government for concessions) as well as long-term goals (fomenting societal breakdown). Young people of military age are a particularly important subgroup – persuading even a small fraction of them to dodge service or spread defeatism can have security implications. Similarly, communities already critical of the government (like many of the secular middle-class protesters in 2023) are targeted to push them from peaceful protest into disruptive civil disobedience or violence, thereby straining Israel’s internal unity. The network’s extensive impersonation of “regular Israelis” indicates just how laser-focused it is on Israeli minds. When 8-10% of Hebrew Twitter content on a given day comes from ISNAD, it illustrates an attempt to engulf the average Israeli netizen in a flood of manipulative messaging. In effect, every Israeli scrolling social media could be a target, as ISNAD interjects into discussions on everything from security to religion to the cost of living, always twisting the narrative toward despair or discord.
Israeli Security Forces and Decision-makers
A subset of the Israeli public targeting deserves mention – the IDF soldiers and Israeli decision-makers. While these are harder to reach directly, ISNAD content does sometimes aim at them indirectly. For example, calls for refusal to serve or to disobey orders are meant to penetrate the military’s rank-and-file through social influence. If soldiers see trending claims that “others aren’t reporting for duty” or that “protesters will treat returning soldiers as war criminals,” it could sap morale or discipline. Additionally, by inflaming public criticism of leadership (e.g. portraying the government as inept or corrupt relentlessly), ISNAD seeks to put pressure on Israeli leaders’ decision-making – perhaps making them second-guess tough choices due to perceived public backlash. There’s also a psychological warfare aspect: some content may be meant to be seen by Israeli intelligence or military (who monitor social media) to mislead them or tie up resources in chasing fake domestic “trouble”.
Palestinian and Broader Arab/Muslim Audiences
While Israelis are the adversarial target, ISNAD also targets friendly audiences – namely pro-Palestinian sympathizers in the region and worldwide. The Arabic content, as well as any outreach in Persian and Turkish or Urdu, etc., is aimed at galvanizing these audiences to support the cause. In practice, this means encouraging more volunteers to join (targeting potential recruits among educated, tech-savvy Arabs), and inciting anti-Israel protests or actions in those communities. By spreading emotive content about Gaza’s plight or Jerusalem’s sanctity, ISNAD rallies the Muslim street, which can in turn pressure Arab governments or create hostile environments for Israeli/Jewish visitors and interests regionally. One could say ISNAD has a secondary objective of community organizing – uniting Islamist and pro-Palestine activists under a shared narrative and digital campaign. This enlarges its influence network and can inspire parallel efforts (like local hashtag campaigns or spin-off groups in different countries). Essentially, anyone receptive to Muslim Brotherhood-style Islamist rhetoric is a target for mobilization.
Jews and Israelis Abroad
A worrying evolution in ISNAD’s targeting is the explicit expansion to Jewish and Israeli people outside Israel’s borders. Initially, the focus was domestic (inside Israel), but in May 2025 the network openly called for attacking Jews and Israelis *“abroad”*. This indicates a shift to global terror incitement. Communities of Israeli expats, Jewish organizations, embassies, and even random Jewish individuals in the diaspora are now in the crosshairs. The network’s Arabic message declaring “Our enemy understands only… the language of bullets, blood, and skulls” and urging followers to join a channel for action abroad was a direct attempt to target Jews overseas with violence. This means ISNAD is trying to inspire or coordinate lone-wolf attacks or small-cell terrorism against Jewish targets worldwide – effectively broadening the Israel-Hamas conflict to a global front. It aligns with historical MB/Hamas ideology which often views all Jewish supporters of Israel as legitimate targets when expedient. By prioritizing Israelis and Jews abroad, ISNAD hopes to instill fear in those communities (deterring travel or support for Israel) and to send Israel a message that its people are not safe anywhere. The propaganda after a Washington D.C. attack on Israeli embassy staff – calling it “a historic day” and claiming “calls for violence are beginning to bear fruit” – underlines how high diaspora Jews have moved up on ISNAD’s target list. Simply put, global Jewry is now seen as an extension of the battlefield.
Western Public Opinion and Institutions
Though not as directly targeted as Israelis/Jews, Western societies form a tertiary target group. ISNAD’s English-language messaging (and possibly other European languages via sympathetic activist re-sharing) aims to influence policymakers, media, and public opinion in democracies that support Israel. By fueling protests (like campus movements, BDS campaigns, or street demonstrations) and flooding Western social media with its narratives, ISNAD pressures democratic governments. The intended effect is to curb their freedom of action in supporting Israel – for instance, making Israel’s actions so controversial domestically that leaders push Israel towards ceasefires or concessions. Additionally, undermining the sense of safety of Jews in the West (through both incitement and the general rise in antisemitic atmosphere) is a goal, as it isolates Israel and sows division in allied countries. We can see this in how ISNAD fits into what was termed a “Cognitive Ring of Fire” encircling Jews worldwide – where manipulated narratives radicalize campuses and media outlets in the West to adopt a hostile stance toward Jews and Israel. Thus, Western minds are a target – not for conversion to pro-Hamas views per se, but to ignite such polarization and confusion that Israel loses global support.
Israel’s societal fortitude and the safety of Jewish communities globally are the bullseyes of ISNAD’s campaign. By prioritizing Israelis at home, the network attacks the front-line enemy’s morale; by extending to Jews abroad, it seeks to widen the conflict and induce a sense of siege everywhere. Other audiences (Arabs, Muslims, Westerners) are secondary targets used either as force multipliers (adding their voices or actions to the fight) or indirect pressure points. ISNAD’s volunteer army thus functions like a guided missile swarming system – the munitions (messages) are numerous, but they are all guided toward a common set of high-value targets: the unity, sense of security, and resolve of the Jewish people and the Israeli state.
Operational Lethality and Incitement to Violence
Although ISNAD itself is an influence network without an armed wing, its operations have demonstrated a disturbing potential to incite or facilitate real-world violence. What began as an online propaganda effort has increasingly embraced rhetoric and actions that blur into the kinetic realm. We can assess its operational lethality on two levels: direct incitement of violence by followers and the indirect contribution to an atmosphere that breeds lone attackers.
Direct Calls for Violence
In May 2025, ISNAD crossed a critical line by explicitly calling for violent attacks. On its Telegram channel, administrators posted in Arabic urging followers to target Jews and Israelis outside Israel, proclaiming *“Our enemy understands only…the language of bullets, blood, and skulls”*. They shared a recruitment link to a private channel, effectively rallying volunteers to graduate from keyboard warfare to physical terrorism. This marked a shift from influencing minds to actively trying to spill blood. By doing so openly, ISNAD signaled its evolution from a propaganda machine into a facilitator of extremist militancy. The network’s celebratory reaction to actual violence underscores this lethal turn: when an assailant in Washington, D.C. shot and killed two Israeli Embassy staff members in late May 2025, ISNAD’s channel rejoiced, declaring *“This is a historic day… it seems that calls for violence are beginning to bear fruit.”*. Notably, the suspect in that attack reportedly told police “I did it for Palestine”, suggesting he was motivated by the very kind of incitement ISNAD and similar propaganda networks spread. While a direct causal link is hard to prove, ISNAD’s messaging likely contributed to a radical milieu that made such an attack more probable. The network essentially fanned embers among extremist sympathizers, one of whom turned those words into bullets.
Lone-Wolf Terror and Stochastic Attacks
ISNAD’s style of incitement exemplifies stochastic terrorism – using mass communication to inspire random individuals to commit violence. By saturating social media with dehumanizing and violent rhetoric against Jews (“they only understand bullets”, etc.), ISNAD increases the probability that someone in its dispersed audience will take action. There is no direct chain of command (ISNAD doesn’t hand a person a gun and target), but as analysts note, *“in cognitive warfare, incitement does not follow chains of command. It operates like fog”*, everywhere and nowhere. Thus, the lethality of ISNAD lies in its ability to catalyze lone wolves or small cells. The Washington attack is a case in point, and there could be others: one worries about volunteers or sympathizers in Europe or North America who, after being steeped in ISNAD’s hate, might attack a synagogue, Israeli tourists, or diplomats. The network’s global reach (56k Telegram subscribers is a sizable pool) means the violent exhortation was heard by many – and even if 0.1% are inclined to act, that’s still potential for dozens of incidents.
Encouraging Violent Unrest
Another aspect of operational lethality is ISNAD’s push to make protests and divisions turn violent within Israel. The network has encouraged demonstrators to escalate confrontations and even to attack symbols of authority. For example, content promoting “escalate protests to the point of violence” or advocating attacks on ultra-Orthodox neighborhoods (in retaliation for draft evasion) were identified. If these calls were heeded, they could have led to civil clashes or riots – indeed, Israeli security services have been on alert partly due to fear that online incitement could spark Jewish-Israeli infighting or vigilantism. While we have not seen reports of ISNAD directly organizing a riot, its rhetoric certainly fans flames that could ignite violence on the streets (e.g. if fake accounts convince a faction that another group is about to harm them, they might pre-emptively strike).
Linkages to Militant Organizations
ISNAD doesn’t exist in a vacuum; it’s affiliated ideologically with Hamas (and by extension other militant Islamist groups). This raises the possibility that it could be used in synergy with terror operations. For instance, in wartime Gaza conflicts, Hamas might use ISNAD to spread false information (like claiming an IDF unit was destroyed somewhere) as a psychological tactic, while simultaneously planning an ambush there – causing confusion and advantage in battle. Or, ISNAD might call for protests or roadblocks at a specific time, indirectly aiding a militant attack by diverting police resources. These are speculative, but not far-fetched given the coordination seen historically between propaganda and military wings of groups like Hezbollah and Hamas. Already, ISNAD’s dissemination of detailed reports of Hamas attacks (through the Telegram feed) serves as both propaganda and potentially as open-source intelligence signaling to followers which tactics “work” against Israel, possibly inspiring copycats.
No-Kill, High-Impact Outcomes
Even absent physical violence, ISNAD’s operations can be considered “lethal” to the social fabric. The corrosive effects – increased hatred, antisemitic incidents, communal fear – have real-world harm. For example, Jewish communities worldwide have faced a spike in harassment and threats during periods of heightened anti-Israel agitation. ISNAD’s content directly contributes to that climate by demonizing Jews collectively. While not lethal in the immediate sense, such incitement can lead to low-level violence (assaults, vandalisms) and make daily life hazardous for Jews in some locales. It also puts lives at risk in more subtle ways, like sowing distrust in public emergency information (if disinformation convinces people a rocket alarm is fake, they might not seek shelter).
In terms of capability versus intent
ISNAD has clearly signaled the intent to spur violence, and it has modest but non-negligible capability to do so via radicalizing others. It doesn’t have organized armed units of its own, but it potentially operates as a digital hand on the trigger of lone actors. This makes it a dangerous adjunct to terrorist organizations. Indeed, Israeli intelligence likely treats it as part of the broader Hamas/Muslim Brotherhood threat matrix because it both enables militant recruitment and extends the conflict domain. The network’s shift to incitement prompted urgent warnings – experts caution that *“ISNAD is no longer simply a social media phenomenon… It is now actively extending its influence beyond Israel’s borders – with dangerous implications for Jews around the world.”*. In conclusion, while ISNAD might not plant bombs, it plants ideas – and as the tragic events in Washington showed, those ideas can kill. The operational lethality of ISNAD lies in the untraceable, diffused way it can inspire violence, effectively turning ordinary devices and social networks into potential weapons.
Messaging Campaigns: Telegram, X, and Beyond
ISNAD’s influence operations unfold through a combination of public and covert messaging campaigns, exploiting both encrypted channels and open social media platforms. The two most critical platforms explicitly noted are Telegram and X (Twitter), though the campaign’s reach extends to other networks as well.
Telegram – Training and Coordination (Public & Semi-Covert)
Telegram serves as ISNAD’s command center. The main “ISNAD-Palestine” channel on Telegram is public in the sense that anyone can subscribe to view its content, yet it functions as a semi-covert training ground because it is not widely known outside the participant community and is written mostly in Arabic (inaccessible to many Israeli observers). On this channel, ISNAD’s operators conduct what amounts to a live operations manual. They post guidance on messaging themes, share visual propaganda, and crucially, distribute bilingual templates – content in Arabic with parallel Hebrew (or other language) phrasing for volunteers to use. This effectively trains volunteers in real time, telling them what to say, in which language, and where. For example, an admin might post: “Phrase to post in Hebrew social media comments: ‘Soon you’ll regret not leaving in time’”, alongside the Arabic translation for context. Volunteers can literally copy that Hebrew line and paste it as a comment on an Israeli news site or tweet. In this way, Telegram is used to coordinate swarm behavior across the internet. The channel also helps synchronize timing – announcing when to launch a hashtag drive or flood a certain platform (“post every 10 minutes with #Battle_of_the_bunkers now” for instance). By using Telegram’s broadcast capability, a handful of ISNAD leaders can instantly reach and direct tens of thousands of foot soldiers online.
Alongside the main channel, Telegram likely hosts group chats or secondary channels for more interactive coordination. Volunteers can discuss tactics, share screenshots of their work, and alert others to trending topics that are ripe for hijacking. There may be specialized sub-groups (e.g. a Hebrew-language practice group, or a tech support chat for using VPNs and AI tools). These provide a feedback loop, allowing the campaign to refine messages on the fly. Notably, after pivoting to incitement in 2025, ISNAD created a private Telegram channel for those interested in violent action. That indicates a layered approach: a broad public channel for general influence ops and a closed channel for higher-risk, covert plotting. Telegram’s relative anonymity and encryption make it ideal for such gradations of secrecy.
X (Twitter) – Execution and Amplification (Public)
Twitter (now X) has been the chief arena where ISNAD’s output meets the public square. Israeli Twitter has been inundated with ISNAD-coordinated tweets, replies, and trends. The network’s use of X is aggressive and multi-faceted: it creates fake personas that tweet original content (like a thread ranting about government failures), it runs bot accounts that mostly retweet or like content to boost algorithms, and it hijacks hashtags by mass posting. One key tactic is trend hijacking – identifying popular hashtags (whether related to the war or even unrelated domestic issues) and flooding them with the network’s narrative. For instance, if Israelis organically use #BringBackOurBoys (for hostages), ISNAD accounts might adopt that tag but twist the message to “Bring back our boys – government incompetence lost them!” thereby sowing anger under a veneer of unity. Additionally, ISNAD has launched its own hashtags in Hebrew, attempting to push them into Twitter’s trending list via sheer volume of coordinated tweets. By some accounts, they have succeeded at times, effectively inserting a propaganda slogan into the top Twitter discourse that many Israelis see.
X is also where ISNAD’s disinformation can reach journalists and opinion leaders quickly. A false narrative (say, “IDF soldiers looted homes” or “mass exodus from Haifa underway”) tweeted by what looks like an Israeli eyewitness can rapidly spread if picked up by others. ISNAD’s campaign on X is public-facing – unlike Telegram, which the average Israeli might never see, Twitter is where the targets actually consume the content. Thus, the network invests effort in maintaining those accounts’ credibility (as described in impersonation) so that when they engage others on X, they won’t immediately be dismissed. The accounts have followers, some even tricked notable Israelis to interact, as mentioned earlier. By leveraging X’s openness, ISNAD turned the platform’s strengths (real-time communication, virality) into vulnerabilities. Even Elon Musk’s rebranding to “X” and evolving moderation policies haven’t stopped a flood of sockpuppet activity. Researchers observed that at certain times, coordinated ISNAD campaigns on X were so pervasive that they dominated Hebrew discourse percentages – a testament to how thoroughly a dedicated influence network can game that platform.
Other Platforms and Campaigns
While Telegram and X are highlighted, ISNAD’s reach extends to Facebook/Meta, Instagram, YouTube, TikTok, and possibly WhatsApp. On Facebook, fake profiles have joined Israeli groups (like community forums or political discussion groups) and regularly post inflammatory content or leave comments that align with ISNAD narratives. They also can exploit Facebook’s algorithm by mass-sharing certain news links with added misleading commentary. Instagram has been another battleground, notably in comments. An Israeli research paper noted an influx of “comments in broken Hebrew” on popular Israeli Instagram posts right after Oct 7, traced to foreign coordination. As ISNAD improved Hebrew quality via AI, those comments became more convincing. Instagram’s visual nature means ISNAD likely also spreads memes or infographics there – possibly repurposing content from its Telegram (which often has images and short videos). TikTok, being hugely popular among youth, is another channel: short video memes or slideshows with pro-Palestinian, anti-Israeli messaging can be spread by network members using trending sounds or challenges. Although we have less documentation of TikTok in our sources, it would be consistent with ISNAD’s adaptive approach to target younger Israeli and global audiences on that platform as well.
Covert vs Overt Messaging
ISNAD’s campaigns can be categorized as overt propaganda vs. covert influence. Overt propaganda is directed at sympathizers – for example, public posts on its Arabic Telegram praising attacks are clearly pro-Hamas and not trying to hide bias. Covert influence is directed at the targets under false pretenses – e.g. a tweet by “Maya Lipschitz” pretending to be a concerned Israeli mother calling for surrender is covert (the reader doesn’t know it’s enemy propaganda). The brilliance (or danger) of ISNAD is its ability to coordinate both simultaneously. On Telegram they will say openly “we need to spread message X to Israelis” (overt within their circle), and then on X and other public sites they spread message X covertly as if it were an organic sentiment. The two reinforce each other: the success of covert posts (likes, shares by real people) is reported back on Telegram to encourage volunteers (“see how well our narrative is doing!”), fueling further efforts.
Case Study – #WeAreNotSafe Campaign
As a concrete example of a messaging campaign, consider the “We Are Not Safe” narrative. In the chaotic days after Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attack, fear in Israel was high. ISNAD seized on this, launching a Hebrew hashtag roughly translating to “We are not safe” and variations thereof. Via Telegram, they distributed heart-wrenching one-liners about nowhere being safe in Israel, suggested personal anecdotes (fake) of people saying they plan to leave the country, etc. These were blasted onto Twitter and Facebook. Soon, posts claiming the Israeli government can’t protect its citizens and insinuating that the only wise choice is to emigrate or protest wildly, became omnipresent. An intelligence report later noted how an influence network (implicitly ISNAD) was behind a lot of those social media panics. The campaign combined both terror (fear of rockets/infiltrations) and blame (government incompetence) and had the effect of amplifying real Israelis’ anxieties. This campaign, run largely on public platforms but orchestrated through covert channels, exemplifies how ISNAD can exploit a specific incident to run a coordinated information attack.
ISNAD’s messaging campaigns are a one-two punch
Telegram for behind-the-scenes coordination and indoctrination of volunteers, and X/other social media for executing the influence operation in plain sight of the targets. The public nature of the end platforms means the damage is done in full view – societal discourse is distorted, often without users realizing an organized effort caused it. Meanwhile, the coordination in private channels remains invisible to most, making it challenging for defenders to attribute and respond in real time. The interplay of these channels is precisely what makes ISNAD effective: it leverages secrecy when needed and publicity when beneficial. Any comprehensive counter-operation must therefore monitor and address both fronts – the content being spread openly and the coordination happening covertly – to neutralize this kind of influence network.
Historical Development, Affiliations, and Tactic Evolution
ISNAD did not emerge in a vacuum; it is the product of evolving trends in Islamist activism, technology, and geopolitical events. Tracing its historical arc and affiliations provides insight into how it became what it is by mid-2025, and how its tactics have sharpened over time.
Origins (2021–2023)
The ideological seeds of ISNAD lie in the Muslim Brotherhood’s long-standing propaganda efforts, which gained new life after the Arab Spring. When Brotherhood-affiliated governments (like Egypt’s Morsi administration) fell, many Brotherhood figures took refuge in Turkey and Qatar, where they established media channels and influence campaigns to continue their cause. Turkish President Erdoğan’s vision of himself as a patron of global political Islam created a nurturing environment for MB initiatives. Throughout the late 2010s, various MB-linked organizations in Turkey, such as the International Organization to Support the Prophet (IOSPI) and others, honed techniques of mobilizing popular Islamist sentiment internationally. These were mostly issue-specific (e.g. protests against insults to Muhammad) but built networks of activists and know-how in running influence ops.
By the early 2020s, MB activists in Turkey had started experimenting with social media-driven campaigns, often in response to events (like Gaza conflicts in 2021 or Jerusalem tensions). However, those early attempts were limited by language barriers and platform moderation. The transformative moment came with the introduction of accessible Generative AI in late 2022 and, tragically, the outbreak of full-scale war between Hamas and Israel in October 2023. Sensing an unprecedented opportunity, MB diaspora activists launched ISNAD in October 2023 specifically to capitalize on the global surge of pro-Palestinian anger and to actively intervene in Israel’s information space. The name “ISNAD – Palestine” signaled a direct mission to support the Palestinian struggle, aligning squarely with Hamas’s war efforts.
Initial Phase (Oct–Nov 2023)
In its first weeks, ISNAD functioned more as an Arab/Muslim solidarity network. It focused on pumping out content on mainstream social media that praised Hamas’s actions and condemned Israel, primarily in Arabic and English. Many volunteers joined during this time via word-of-mouth on Islamist forums and Telegram groups. The network likely cut its teeth on global platforms by spreading gruesome images of Gaza destruction and emotional slogans, which helped it recruit thousands of like-minded individuals into its Telegram coordination channel. However, initial forays at targeting Israelis directly may have been clumsier – as Israeli observers noted, early on many fake accounts were detectable due to “poor language and errors in Hebrew content”, a hallmark of Iranian or foreign ops. ISNAD learned from these missteps.
Pivot to Hebrew Discourse (Dec 2023)
By December 2023, ISNAD made a strategic shift: it *“began directing its efforts toward influencing Israeli internal affairs”*. This coincided with a few factors: the Gaza war was ongoing with high Israeli casualties and internal political tensions (the Netanyahu government was under criticism). Sensing vulnerability, ISNAD threw its growing volunteer corps into a campaign to exacerbate Israel’s internal discord. This was when it started heavily using AI to overcome the Hebrew language gap. The volunteers, guided via Telegram, adopted new tactics – copying real Israeli online comments to mask origin, then employing ChatGPT to diversify phrasing. Hashtag campaigns aimed at Israeli audiences took off around this period. The “WeAreNotSafe” narrative and others gained traction in late 2023 and early 2024, showing that ISNAD had matured in its ability to set pieces of Israeli social conversation. An Israeli counter-disinformation expert (FakeReporter) investigating in early 2024 found what was likely ISNAD’s handiwork all over Facebook and X, although at the time some attributed it to Iran. By January 2024, the phenomenon had been publicly exposed in Israeli media: Haaretz ran a piece headlined “We’re Playing With Israelis’ Minds: Inside the Telegram Group…”, revealing an Egyptian exile in Turkey at the helm of a 12,000-strong pro-Palestinian Telegram influence operation. This aligns exactly with ISNAD. Thus, by early 2024, Israeli authorities and researchers were aware of ISNAD’s existence, although they may have used different terms to describe it.
Adaptation and Growth (2024)
Throughout 2024, ISNAD adapted to cat-and-mouse efforts by platforms and investigators. When clusters of fake accounts were identified and suspended (Twitter/X and Meta did periodically remove suspected inauthentic networks), ISNAD recruited new volunteers and built new accounts. Its Telegram subscription swelled from ~12k in early 2024 to over 50k by mid-2025, indicating successful outreach and perhaps notoriety. Tactically, this period saw increased sophistication: the network diversified personas (covering more segments of Israeli society, as FakeReporter documented in late 2024 with multiple characters like “Avraham Moshe,” “Keren Ovadya,” etc. all active simultaneously). ISNAD also started integrating multimedia: e.g., if a fake persona tweeted text, another account might reply with a supportive image or video (sometimes Hamas-produced footage) to give the content more punch. The narrative focus evolved with events – during lulls in fighting, they emphasized Israeli political strife (like continuing to stir anger over the judicial overhaul in early 2024); during spikes in conflict (e.g. a Hezbollah skirmish or West Bank flare-up), they amplified fear of multi-front war.
Affiliation-wise, ISNAD maintained its alignment with Hamas and the Brotherhood. Hamas figures abroad were likely aware of and encouraging the campaign. In fact, at Hamas’s request or by ideological alignment, ISNAD tailored messaging to match Hamas’s needs. For example, when Hamas needed a breather, ISNAD heavily pushed ceasefire calls and “stop the war” protests in Israel. Conversely, when Hamas resumed rocket fire, ISNAD ramped up “support the resistance” chants. The Muslim Brotherhood parentage also meant ties to other MB projects. It wouldn’t be surprising if individuals involved in MB’s Turkish media (like presenters from MB-run satellite channels in Istanbul) were quietly participating or providing content to ISNAD’s team. The network’s leader, being a former Egyptian official with MB links, implies he possibly had standing in the Brotherhood’s expatriate hierarchy. The MB’s international apparatus has committees for media/information, and ISNAD could be seen as an outgrowth of those. It’s essentially the Brotherhood entering the era of crowdsourced cyber warfare.
Escalation to Incitement (2025)
The biggest evolution was the aforementioned shift to violent incitement in May 2025. Likely triggers for this were developments like protracted conflict with no resolution and a sense among Islamist hardliners that global jihad against Jews needed rekindling. Affiliations here are telling: the phrasing “our enemy understands only the language of bullets” echoes both Al-Qaeda/ISIS style rhetoric and classic Hamas/MB militant language. It suggests that by 2025, ISNAD was influenced not just by Brotherhood political cadres but also by more radical jihadist thought currents. Perhaps younger, more militant volunteers or external jihadist propagandists had gained influence in the network. The creation of a private militant channel could indicate coordination with groups planning attacks. In the ecosystem of anti-Israel actors, one might see ISNAD becoming a bridge between the Brotherhood/Hamas and rogue Islamist actors worldwide, facilitating a call to arms that traditional MB leadership might publicly eschew but privately condone once things got desperate. The Washington D.C. shooting in May 2025 can be viewed as a grim milestone on ISNAD’s timeline – where narrative warfare potentially spurred lethal action, validating the fears of analysts who had warned of “calls for lone-wolf attacks” emanating from such influence operations.
Current Status and Ongoing Evolution
As of mid-2025, ISNAD remains active and adaptive. Its tactics likely continue to evolve in response to countermeasures. For instance, if Hebrew-language AI detectors improved, ISNAD might pivot to focusing more on visual memes or short video content that’s harder to filter. If Twitter/X clamps down further on bot networks, they might shift more efforts to platforms like Telegram (e.g., encouraging their volunteers to flood Israeli Telegram channels or WhatsApp groups with propaganda) or fringe platforms. The decentralized nature (volunteer-driven) means the network can survive decapitation to an extent – even if a few leaders are arrested or deplatformed, the community may reconstitute under new branding or migrate to new channels.
In terms of focus, ISNAD represents the convergence of old ideologies with new tech. The Muslim Brotherhood’s decades-old goal of uniting the Muslim ummah against Zionism and Western imperialism is being pursued with cutting-edge means – AI, social networks, and crowdsourcing. It reflects an ideological evolution too: historically, the Brotherhood engaged in dawa (proselytizing) and political activism, sometimes violence via offshoots like Hamas, but the ISNAD model shows the Brotherhood ecosystem embracing information warfare as a primary front. This is likely influenced by other actors like Russia and Iran’s success in hybrid warfare; MB ideologues see the value in “soft” jihad via keyboards, especially when direct military confrontation with Israel is costly.
Affiliations Recap
ISNAD can be seen as affiliated with or overlapping several spheres: the Muslim Brotherhood (Egyptian and regional MB networks, including Hamas as the Palestinian MB); the Turkish Islamist nexus (with figures like Yasin Aktay, Nurettin Yıldız etc. creating a supportive milieu); and possibly the Iran-led “Resistance Axis” (though Sunni-led, ISNAD’s alignment with Hamas and anti-Israel stance means it de facto complements Iran’s strategy, and some coordination – direct or indirect – cannot be ruled out, especially given Persian-language outreach). It is not state-controlled per se (plausible deniability is key – Turkey or others can claim no formal ties), but it operates under state indulgence and alongside state-aligned NGOs.
Looking ahead, the existence of ISNAD has signaled to hostile actors that decentralized influence networks are a powerful weapon. We may see copycats or spin-offs: for instance, Iran might refine its own version, or other extremist movements might adopt the model (we already see far-right and other groups in various countries attempting similar tactics on smaller scales). ISNAD thus is both a specific entity and a harbinger of a new era in conflict – where information frontlines are manned by swarms of volunteers armed with AI, blurring the line between civilian activism and orchestrated psychological operations.
Wrap up
ISNAD represents a paradigm shift in the landscape of information warfare. It is decentralized yet coordinated, civilian in composition yet military in purpose. Rooted in the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology and empowered by generative AI and social media, this Turkey-centered network has proven capable of reaching deep into the heart of Israeli society and beyond, manipulating perceptions and potentially even triggering violence. Under the guise of ordinary voices, ISNAD’s volunteers have pushed propaganda that accounts for a startling proportion of Hebrew online discourse, all while training openly on an accessible Telegram channel – a transparency that belies the deceitful nature of its content.
Our investigation reveals ISNAD’s multifaceted dimensions. Structurally, it is led by exiled Brotherhood operatives in Turkey and manned by thousands of ideological volunteers worldwide. Geographically, it leverages Turkey’s safe haven and draws manpower from across the Middle East, effectively forming a global Islamist influence hub. Financially, it thrives on low-cost volunteer labor and likely tacit support from state and non-state allies of Hamas. Its coordination is highly agile: using Telegram, cloud tools, and bots to orchestrate an army of fake personas in real time. Technologically, ISNAD is at the cutting edge – exploiting AI for translation, content generation, and persona creation, demonstrating how readily available tech can be repurposed for malign ends.
In terms of content and tactics, ISNAD’s propaganda narratives have been sweeping and adaptive, ranging from demoralizing Israelis with talk of curses and collapse, to inflaming existing social divides, to rallying the Muslim world with triumphant jihadist messaging. Its multilingual operations (Hebrew, Arabic, Persian, English) show a keen understanding of how to localize influence and maximize reach. By weaponizing emotions and cognitive biases, the network has aimed to degrade the very reality perception of its targets, turning truth on its head and trust into treachery. Its impersonation of Israelis – from activists to everyday citizens – stands as one of the most sophisticated deception campaigns seen in modern social media conflict.
Perhaps most alarmingly, ISNAD has evolved from a keyboard battle into a catalyst for real-world harm. Its journey from 2023 to 2025 – launching amid a war, growing in ambition, and ultimately calling for blood – illustrates the slippery slope of unchecked incitement. While ISNAD might not have commanders and fighters in the traditional sense, its *“loose network of ideological volunteers”* has shown it can inspire others to take violent initiative, effectively acting as a digital insurgency that complements physical insurgencies.
From an analytical perspective, ISNAD underscores several key points. First, ideology finds a way: given refuge and new tools, the Muslim Brotherhood and its allies have re-imagined their struggle for the 21st century. Second, technology is a double-edged sword: the same AI and social platforms that connect societies can be harnessed to tear them apart, exploiting openness and anonymity. Third, attribution and defense are hard: ISNAD’s structure makes it hard to dismantle – you cannot drone strike a Telegram channel or sanction an amorphous group of volunteers as you would a terror cell. Counter-measures will require equally networked and innovative approaches, from better detection algorithms (to flag coordinated inauthentic behavior) to digital literacy and resilience training for the public (so citizens learn to question unusually uniform “grassroots” trends).
Finally, ISNAD’s existence is a wake-up call beyond Israel. It reveals how cognitive warfare has gone global, targeting diaspora and international opinion as much as front-line states. As Dr. Altshuler poignantly wrote, *“just as Israel faces a physical ring of fire… it now faces a cognitive one”* – and this cognitive ring of fire encircles Jewish communities and democratic societies far and wide. The case of ISNAD should prompt security and technology stakeholders around the world to recognize the emergent threat of decentralized influence networks. They are inexpensive, deniable, and scalable – a potent combination that adversaries will surely replicate.
ISNAD is both a product of specific circumstances (the Hamas-Israel conflict and MB activism) and a prototype of a new warfare model. Its story is still being written on the digital battlefield. Close monitoring, cross-national cooperation, and proactive counter-strategies will be crucial to mitigating its impact and preventing the next ISNAD from achieving even more dangerous success.
References
Shwartz Altshuler, T. (2025). The Cognitive Ring of Fire Threatening Jewish Communities. Israel Democracy Institute. – Insightful op-ed outlining ISNAD’s nature as a decentralized MB-inspired influence network, its extensive Hebrew output (up to 10% of Hebrew X content), and its escalatory calls for violence against Jews abroad.
Altshuler, T. (2024). When the ‘keyboard Mujahideen’ discovered AI. Israel Democracy Institute / Ynet. – Investigation revealing ISNAD’s leadership (Egyptian MB exile in Turkey) and Telegram base (12k+ members), active since Oct 2023, leveraging ChatGPT and custom AI tools to generate fluent Hebrew posts and vary content to avoid detection.
Klempner, U. (2024). #WeAreNotSafe – Exposing How a Post-October 7th Disinformation Network Operates on Israeli Social Media. ICT Report. – Research article analyzing a coordinated network (matching ISNAD’s profile) flooding Israeli social media with disinformation since Oct 7, 2023; details on narrative tactics, hashtag campaigns, and likely Jordanian/Egyptian origin of some accounts.
FakeReporter via Shahaf, T. (2024). The network of fake online profiles targeting Israeli society. Ynet News. – Report on an influence network (suspected Iranian by FakeReporter, but overlapping with ISNAD methods) using AI-made bots with flawless Hebrew to infiltrate Israeli online groups, incite division, and amplify Hamas/Hezbollah content; provides concrete examples of fake personas and their content.
Nordic Monitor (Bozkurt, A.). (2025). A new Muslim Brotherhood outfit operates under the wing of the Erdogan gov’t to execute influence operations. – Article on a related MB-affiliated network (IOSPI) in Turkey, illustrating the broader context of Turkey-backed Islamist influence campaigns; notes Turkish support for MB/Hamas proxies and roles of key MB figures.
CAMERA UK (H. Sela). (2024). Islamist “Civilian” Influence Campaign Targeting Israel. – Summary of an INSS report describing ISNAD: an influence campaign by Arab Muslim volunteers, orchestrated by Egyptian MB activists in Turkey, openly recruiting and sharing methods – effectively confirming the network’s identity and modus operandi.
Telegram (2023–2025). ISNAD – Palestine Media (@IsnadPalestin). – Primary-source Telegram channel for ISNAD with 56k+ subscribers; description confirms launch in Oct 2023 with volunteers from many countries and multilingual posting strategy; channel content provides examples of messaging (e.g. “leave before it’s too late” in Hebrew/Arabic, “curse of the eighth decade” posts) and real-time strategy directives.
