Iran’s state media and officials corroborate the police claim. Multiple Persian-language outlets – including IRNA, Tasnim, Fars (via Etemad Online), and others – reported that two “internal agents” linked to Mossad were arrested in the Fashafuyeh area of Tehran province. Police spokesman Gen. Saeed Montazer al-Mahdi announced on 25 Khordad 1404 (June 15, 2025) that in “two separate operations by the special law-enforcement command of Shahr-e Rey in Fashafuyeh, two of Mossad’s domestic elements were identified and arrested,” with over 200 kilograms of explosives and equipment for 23 drones seized at the scene. These details – the number of suspects, the quantity of explosives, and the drone-related materiel – are consistently reflected across official Iranian news reports. No independent confirmation is available, but the uniformity of the information in Iran’s state-run media suggests the authorities are presenting an agreed-upon account of the incident.
Location
Fashafuyeh, the site of the arrests, lies on the southeastern outskirts of Tehran. Iranian reports indicate this area falls under Shahr-e Rey County (Tehran province). The operation was specifically conducted in Fashafuyeh, within the jurisdiction of the Rey county police command. (Shahr-e Rey, sometimes called just “Rey,” is a district just south of Tehran; Fashafuyeh is a locality in that district, known for its prison and industrial areas.) In other words, the arrests took place just outside Tehran proper, roughly to the south/southeast of the capital. IRNA’s report explicitly notes that the “special law enforcement command of Rey County in Fashafuyeh” carried out the operation, making clear the geographic context. This matches the police description of the locale as being south of Tehran – consistent with the “southeast of Tehran” reference in the claim.
Units Involved
The Islamic Republic of Iran Police (FARAJA) – not the Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS) – led this operation. In particular, it was executed by the Rey County special police unit (فرماندهی انتظامی ویژه شهرستان ری) under FARAJA. Gen. Montazer al-Mahdi (the national police spokesman) credited the “فرماندهی انتظامی ویژه شهرستان ری” for the successful identification and arrest of the suspects. According to local officials, both police intelligence and regular law-enforcement teams were involved: “Based on a report from one of the neighbors about suspicious comings and goings, the intelligence units of the police, in coordination with law enforcement, entered the house…” explained Colonel Hossein Mafi, the commander of NAJA/FARAJA in Rey. He noted that officers obtained a judicial warrant and then raided the suspected safehouse. This indicates the operation was a domestic police action (albeit likely with intelligence coordination), rather than a direct MOIS or IRGC operation. The public announcements came through police channels – first via the police spokesperson and later via Col. Mafi – underscoring that FARAJA (national police) took the lead. There has been no mention in these reports of MOIS agents on the scene, suggesting the Ministry of Intelligence was not directly credited in this particular raid (though information may have been shared behind the scenes).
Equipment Seized
The raids yielded a large cache of explosives and drone hardware. Official statements describe the seizure of “بیش از ۲۰۰ کیلوگرم مواد منفجره” – over 200 kg of explosive material – as well as “تجهیزات ۲۳ فروند پهپاد، لانچر و دستگاه هدایت و کنترلر”, i.e. equipment for 23 drones, launchers, and guidance/control devices, plus a Nissan vehicle used to transport these items. In other words, the cell had assembled an arsenal sufficient for dozens of improvised explosive devices and weaponized drones. Notably, police later revealed that the site was essentially a workshop for constructing “suicide drones” and handmade bombs. Col. Mafi stated that upon searching the premises, officers discovered “a significant number of drones, equipment to build kamikaze (explosive) drones, homemade bombs and other related apparatus”. He quantified the find, specifying that over 200 kg of explosives were recovered, along with “30 drone wings” and “33 launcher devices” stored in the workshop. These components suggest the group could assemble a fleet of small “پهپادهای انتحاری” (suicide drones). The mention of 23 fully-equipped drones in the initial report likely refers to either completed drones or drone kits, while the later detail of 30 wings implies additional drone parts were present (possibly enough to build more units). Along with the drones and explosives, the police seized remote controllers (guidance systems) and at least one Nissan pickup truck that was apparently outfitted to carry the illicit cargo. Photographs of the confiscated items have not been widely published in traditional media as of the reporting, but the police emphasized the sheer scale of the materials. The implication is that this cell had the material to launch multiple bombings or drone attacks. For example, one report noted that if these tools had been put into action, “significant loss of life and property could have occurred”, underscoring how destructive the plot might have been. Overall, the seized explosives (~200 kg) and 23+ drones (with 30 wings/33 launchers) indicate a well-equipped sabotage operation that was in advanced stages of preparation.
Operational Context
Iranian authorities have cast this incident as part of a broader Mossad sabotage campaign unfolding inside Iran, especially amid the heightened tensions of mid-2025. Police officials praised public vigilance and tied the Fashafuyeh arrests to other foiled plots around the country. General Ahmadreza Radan, the national police chief, stated in a televised interview that thanks to “the alertness of the people and effective phone tips to the 110 police line,” several sabotage operations in multiple provinces – including Alborz – were detected and thwarted. He indicated that the threat was not isolated to one area: “this issue is not limited to Alborz province, and similar actions have taken place in other regions of the country as well.” The Fashafuyeh case appears to be one of these coordinated counter-sabotage efforts. In fact, Iranian media around the same time reported the discovery of another Mossad-linked drone workshop in Islamshahr (another suburb of Tehran), suggesting multiple cells were active in the Tehran region.
In the specific Fashafuyeh operation, local vigilance was key. Col. Mafi recounted that a neighbor’s report of “unusual movements” at a residence in that area prompted an investigation. Acting on this tip, police intelligence units surveilled the location, obtained a judicial order, and then launched raids (described as two separate operations) to capture the suspects and secure the stash. The phrase “دو رشته عملیات جداگانه” (“two separate operations”) likely refers to a coordinated effort to nab each suspect or to raid two locations in sequence, resulting in the two arrests. It’s possible one operation involved intercepting a suspect (or explosive shipment) and the second involved storming the safe-house workshop in Fashafuyeh – Iranian reports don’t elaborate the tactical details, but do emphasize that both actions were part of the same case. What is clear is that a bomb was apparently ready for use: authorities say they managed to defuse an explosive device just in time. On the afternoon of June 15, police in Shahr-e Rey *“in a timely and successful operation, defused a ready-to-explode bomb in one of the streets of Shahr-e Rey before it could take any lives”*. This suggests that at least one explosive had already been planted or prepared by the cell, and was neutralized by bomb-disposal teams. Additionally, officials revealed that *“the night before, three operatives involved in launching a projectile that caused an explosion at the [Tehran] oil refinery were identified and arrested by Rey police”*. (Tehran’s main oil refinery, located in Shahr-e Rey, had reportedly suffered an explosion, which authorities attribute to a sabotage attack using a launched device – possibly a small drone or rocket – by a Mossad-linked team.) These concurrent events paint a picture of an ongoing sabotage campaign: one cell had already triggered a blast at critical infrastructure, while another in Fashafuyeh was on the verge of carrying out bombings when it was stopped.
Iran’s security apparatus has been on high alert due to the open conflict with Israel (around that time, Iran was retaliating with missile strikes, and Israeli forces had struck targets in Iran, according to state media). The arrests in Fashafuyeh are framed as part of preemptive counter-sabotage measures during this conflict. Police officials actively encouraged citizens to report anything suspicious – “unusual comings and goings, short-term rentals of residences, or odd activities in buildings” – via emergency hotlines 110 (police), 113 (Ministry of Intelligence), or 114 (IRGC Intelligence). This public outreach underscores that Iranian authorities believed multiple Israeli-directed terror cells were operating domestically under cover of the war. In the Fashafuyeh case, that strategy paid off: a resident’s call led directly to the uncovering of the safehouse.
Regarding evidence and media release, Iranian officials have publicized some details to reinforce their narrative. General Radan mentioned that several suspicious vehicles carrying illicit equipment were identified with the help of citizen tips, and “images of these vehicles have been published by the Police Social-Cultural Department in cyberspace” to alert the public. It appears the Nissan truck used by the alleged Mossad agents may have been among those photographed – effectively displaying the cache of drones and explosives it carried. Furthermore, Iranian media disseminated footage of the raid and arrests. For example, Hamshahri Online (a Tehran municipality-affiliated news outlet) published a video clip described as the “moment of arrest of two Mossad operatives in a team house”, corresponding to the operation in a safehouse. Although state outlets did not broadcast all seized items in detail, the release of videos and the mention of published photos indicate that Iranian authorities are attempting to provide some visual corroboration to their claims (likely for domestic audience effect). In summary, the operation took place amid a climate of intense security concerns, and the Iranian police integrated public intelligence with law-enforcement action to foil what they characterize as a major terror plot orchestrated by Israel. The timing (coinciding with Israeli attacks on Iran) and the simultaneous foiling of other plots (in Rey, Alborz, Islamshahr, etc.) form the operational context in which this claim is being presented.
Credibility Assessment
From an analytical standpoint, the Iranian narrative about this incident is plausible and broadly consistent with past tactics attributed to Israeli intelligence, but certain details remain unverified by independent sources. On one hand, Iran’s security forces have previously accused Mossad of running sabotage networks inside Iran, and there is historical precedent for the elements described: clandestine bomb materials, local operatives, and drone-based attacks. For example, over the past decade, Israel (or its proxies) has been linked to operations ranging from assassinations of nuclear scientists to explosions at nuclear facilities and drone strikes on military sites. Notably, small quadcopter or “suicide” drones have been used in several incidents – e.g. the 2021 drone attack on an Iranian centrifuge workshop in Karaj and the January 2023 drone strike on a defense industry site in Isfahan were widely attributed to Israel. Recruiting Iranian insiders or using dissident networks to plant explosives is also a known Mossad method (Iran has arrested cells in the past that were allegedly plotting bombings for Israel). The scenario revealed in Fashafuyeh – a safehouse full of explosives and attack drones – fits this pattern closely. Iranian officials explicitly tie these arrests to Mossad and describe the suspects as “عوامل داخلی موساد” (Mossad’s internal agents), which aligns with Iran’s longstanding assertion that Israel employs local mercenaries to carry out terror on Iranian soil. The use of multiple drones and IEDs as described would be consistent with an Israeli strategy to create chaos and target infrastructure during a war, and General Radan’s comments confirm that Iranian police see this as one node of a larger Mossad-led sabotage campaign. The fact that around the same time another drone-building cell was reportedly uncovered in a nearby town (Islamshahr) and that police in Alborz province arrested two other suspected Mossad operatives adds credibility that these were not one-off claims but part of a wider counter-intelligence sweep. In essence, the overall narrative – that Israeli intelligence is orchestrating sabotage operations inside Iran using locals and equipment like drones and bombs – aligns with known Mossad modus operandi and past incidents, lending it a measure of credibility.
On the other hand, the specific details and scale of the Fashafuyeh claim should be viewed with some caution. All information comes from Iranian official sources; there is no external or neutral confirmation of the arrests or the materials seized. During the current conflict, Iranian state media and officials have a clear incentive to highlight victories against Israel and to rally public vigilance by showcasing foiled plots. The timing (in the midst of an active Iran-Israel confrontation) means these reports also serve a propaganda purpose – demonstrating that Iran is successfully countering Israeli “terror” on the home front. It’s conceivable that some aspects are exaggerated for psychological impact (for instance, the exact number of drones or the weight of explosives might be rounded up to impress). However, the consistency of the core facts across IRNA, Tasnim, Fars, etc. suggests that the basics (two arrests, ~200 kg of explosives, dozens of drone parts) are not a fabrication at least as far as Iranian authorities are concerned. The authorities have even provided a fair amount of detail (down to counts of wings and launchers), which implies they did indeed find a substantial cache. Without independent photographs of the cache (none were openly released aside from the mention of vehicle images) or statements from outside observers, we have to rely on Iran’s word. In credibility terms: the claim is internally consistent and fits a broader known context, so it cannot be dismissed out of hand; but it remains an unverified, one-sided account. No Israeli source will confirm such losses (Israel typically never acknowledges Mossad operations), and independent media cannot easily access the scene due to security and censorship.
The Iranian version of events – that a Mossad-directed sabotage cell was busted southeast of Tehran with a trove of explosives and drones – is credible in the sense that it is plausible and in line with past Mossad tactics against Iran. The Iranian police indeed have reported similar foiled plots recently, which gives context to this claim. However, because the evidence presented is controlled by Iranian authorities, one should recognize the possibility of propaganda embellishment. Still, given the ongoing conflict and previous incidents, it is quite believable that Israel might attempt to utilize local operatives to bomb targets in Iran, and that Iranian security forces would actively hunt such cells. Thus, while we verify that Iranian sources uniformly attest to this arrest and haul, we cannot independently verify the details beyond those official statements. The narrative serves Tehran’s interests (demonstrating internal security successes against Israel), but it also fits a pattern that has been observed before – lending it a degree of factual credibility, even if precise details remain subject to question.
Sources: Iranian state media and officials (IRNA, Tasnim, Hamshahri, etc.), translated from Persian.
