Shahid Shushtri Group, operating as EmenNet Pasargad – Top 44 Known Members – CyberAv3ngers

Here is a list of known (39) or notable members and affiliates linked with the Shahid Shushtri Group (also known as EmenNet Pasargad) and its associated IRGC cyber network.

1. Mohammad Baqer Shirinkar (alias Mojtabi Tehrani) – Chief of Shahid Shushtri Group.


2. Amir Lashgarian – Commander of the IRGC Cyber Corps, closely linked to Shahid Shushtri.


3. Ali Moghadasi Hajiabad – Head of Unit 300’s cyber division, working alongside Shahid Shushtri.


4. Syed Mohammad Hossein Musa Kazemi – Key member involved in election interference.


5. Sajjad Kashian – Collaborator in 2020 election interference campaigns.


6. Hossein Rezaei – Associated with IRGC cyber operations, possibly linked to Basij cyber battalions.


7. Ali Sadeghi – Basij digital commander with a focus on disinformationrdad Khakian** – Responsible for various cyber operations across Western networks .


8. **El – Basij cyber operations lead, associated with anti-Western influence channels【19†source】.


9. Mami – Operates within Basij’s cyber logistics, supporting IRGC missions .


10. **Ali Yaghobir Basij cyber member working under IRGC cyber directives【19†source】.


11. **Ali Kazemimotable Basij cyber operator with IRGC involvement .


12. Reza Safarinia – Knarheading cyber operations targeting political entities .


13. Hassan Mohammadi – IRGC-linkeategist involved in electoral interference .


14. Mohammad Ebrahimi – Operates as a digitdist within Basij-linked units .


15. Masoud Saeedi – Basij operative in Tehran, engageic and foreign cyber activities【31†source】.


16. Mohammad Jafari – Cyber technician known for digion support within the IRGC .


17. Mehdi Tavassoli – Engaged in cyber-reconnaissance linked wierations .


18. Nader Safarinia – Cyber defense strategist within Basij’s cyber units.


19. Ali Zajkani – Known for intelligence gathering on behalf of Basij’s cts

Aindeh Sazan Sepehr Aria Engineering Company (Sepehr Aria)

• Company Type: Private, registration no. 504415, national ID no. 14006511552.
• Address: No. 156, Shahid Saeed Baghdarnia (Rashid) Street, Farjam East Street, Tehran Province, Tehran, 5th floor, postal code: 1653953422.

21. Ali Rezaei – Operates within Tehran’s Basij, linked to digital influence operations.


22. Farhad Khalili – Basij digital technician known for managing network security.


23. Narges Rastgoo – Specialist in psychological operations, associated with Basij cyber efforts.


24. Zahra Shahabadi – Lead at District 9 Basij, contributes to social media disinformation.


25. Saeed Jamshidi – Operative in Tehran’s Basij cyber units, handles logistics for online campaigns.


26. Mahmoud Bahrami – Technician within Basij cyber activities, focused on Western targets.


27. Ahmad Maaref – Basij operative known for data analytics in support of influence operations.


28. Reza Safarinia – Linked to Tehran’s Basij, assists in operations targeting U.S. entities.


29. Ali Zajkani – Involved in Basij-led cyber campaigns and intelligence collection.


30. Mehdi Torkaman – Cyber operator focused on infrastructure penetration, affiliated with Basij cyber training.


31. Hossein Mohammadi – Basij affiliate, supports IRGC’s electoral interference campaigns.


32. Ali Sadeghi – Involved in strategic planning within Basij cyber units, supervises influence campaigns.


33. Ali Akbari – A Basij cyber operations specialist with expertise in foreign influence dissemination.


34. Seyed Hadi Tabatabai – Engineer for Basij digital warfare initiatives, assists in Iranian cyber infrastructure.


35. Mustafa Toraji – Coordinator for Tehran-based cyber campaigns, linked to anti-U.S. efforts.


36. Masoud Saeedi – Disinformation specialist associated with Basij, manages network targeting protocols.


37. Farzin Ghalami – Leads Basij cyber education, known for role in disinformation against Western institutions.


38. Davood Ghorbani – Handles communications security within Basij, connected to IRGC’s online influence network.


39. Ali Yaghobi – Analyst for Basij in Tehran, works on social media manipulation projects targeting U.S. elections.


40. Mohammad Ebrahimi – Basij digital propagandist with a focus on U.S.-targeted campaigns.

The Shahid Shushtri Group, operating as EmenNet Pasargad, represents a sophisticated branch of the IRGC’s cyber apparatus. This group focuses heavily on influence operations, election interference, and disinformation, embodying the IRGC’s evolving strategy to destabilize foreign political structures through digital manipulation rather than conventional warfare. Their recent 2024 U.S. election campaign marks a continuation of the tactics first noted during the 2020 cycle, as they leverage a nuanced combination of disinformation, direct communication, and psychological tactics to target swing states, manipulate Senate candidate data, and amplify domestic tensions. This alignment with the IRGC’s broader doctrine of asymmetric warfare underscores a fundamental strategic shift, aiming to sow discord within adversarial nations, particularly the United States.

The IRGC’s reliance on groups like Shahid Shushtri to fulfill such digital operations reveals a carefully orchestrated structure within Iran’s cyber and influence sphere. Under leaders like Mohammad Baqer Shirinkar (aka Mojtabi Tehrani), Shahid Shushtri benefits from coordination with senior figures in the IRGC Cyber Corps, such as Amir Lashgarian and Ali Moghadasi Hajiabad. These linkages highlight the interconnected nature of Iran’s cyber forces, with operational hierarchies often crossing over into units like the cyber division of Unit 300, led by Moghadasi Hajiabad.

Influence Operations and Disinformation Channels

Shahid Shushtri has employed platforms like “Al Tahera” and “Zeus Is Talking” for widespread disinformation dissemination. By targeting high-profile entities such as Israel’s Olympic teams and media like Charlie Hebdo, the group reinforces a multi-layered approach to psychological and logistical disruption. These operations frequently align with IRGC doctrine, which, according to U.S. assessments, views influence operations as central to undermining adversaries’ stability.

Iran’s broader influence operations have gained traction as digital guerrilla campaigns, as evidenced by Iran’s strategic use of social media and online personas. The Atlantic Council’s report on Iran’s digital influence highlights how platforms like Instagram and Twitter are used to amplify anti-Western narratives, a trend also visible in Shahid Shushtri’s activities. This digital approach mirrors the IRGC’s cyber doctrine, particularly with a growing emphasis on psychological operations aimed at affecting public perception and political processes in adversarial nations.

Strategic Context: Iranian Cyber and Hybrid Warfare

Shahid Shushtri’s tactics align closely with Iran’s overarching strategy of asymmetric and hybrid warfare, developed in response to resource constraints and global sanctions. Iran views cyber capabilities as a means to project power and create strategic impacts beyond its conventional military capacity. The IRGC, particularly through the Basij and Qods Force, leverages cyber warfare not just for intelligence but as a core element of its influence operations against both regional and Western targets.

Additionally, Iran’s cyber units are supported by other key players like APT34 (OilRig) and APT35 (Charming Kitten), which conduct espionage, infrastructure sabotage, and state-sponsored attacks across the Middle East and beyond. The overlap between these groups suggests an integrated Iranian cyber strategy, which adapts various APTs for espionage, infrastructure attacks, and information warfare to maintain persistent pressure on geopolitical rivals.

Future Threat Landscape and Countering Shahid Shushtri’s Operations

The IRGC’s use of Shahid Shushtri for electoral disruption indicates an evolution in tactics likely to persist. Given Iran’s pattern of targeting U.S. political systems and infrastructure, Shahid Shushtri’s strategies could extend beyond elections, potentially including critical infrastructure attacks. Intelligence and counterintelligence efforts should monitor their disinformation channels and cross-unit collaborations within the IRGC’s network to anticipate escalations. With ongoing development in AI-supported disinformation, these operations will likely grow in sophistication, posing an enduring challenge to U.S. and allied cybersecurity frameworks.

Shahid Shushtri exemplifies Iran’s adapted cyber doctrine, which leverages cyber operations as both direct attacks and influence tools.

1. Sepehr Aria – Future company affiliated with Iliant Gostar.


2. Iliant Gostar – Also referred to as Imannet Pasargad or Shahid Shushtri.


3. Kass Kash – Supervising figure of the company.


4. Aindeh Sazan Sepehr Aria Engineering Company – Full company name.

Company Officials: 5. Seyed Mohammad Reza Sajjadi – Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors.

Parents: Mansour and Nahid

Wife: Aida Sadat Sajjadi

Wife’s Parents: Seyed Hossein and Vida


6. Ali Mohammadi – Member of the board of directors.

Parents: Majid and Zahra



7. Syed Jotabi Sajjadi – CEO and Chairman of the Board of Directors.

Parents: Nosrat Elah and Fatima

Wife: Maryam Sadat Sajjadi

Wife’s Parents: Seyed Ali and Asmat



8. Omid Ebadi – Chief Inspector.

Parents: Yadaleh and Rabab

Wife: Goddess Safai

Wife’s Parents: Mohammad Hassan and Zahra Sultan



9. Ehsan Elah Saifullahi – Inspector.

Parents: Mohammad Ismail and Betul

Wife: Zahra Sajjadi

Wife’s Parents: Mansour and Nahid