The congress in the separatist formation of Transnistria “addressed Russia”, as well as the UN, OSCE, CIS, ICRC, etc. in order to influence Moldova so that it would stop the “pressure” on the separatist region and be inclined towards a peaceful settlement of disputes.
This appeal cannot (!) be regarded as non-militaristic on the sole basis that Transnistria did not indicate “annexation to the Russian Federation” as a desired measure.
The so-called “return to peace programs” can be of an ambivalent nature and can be interpreted as either purely diplomatic steps or full-scale military actions (remember 2008 and the occupation of part of Georgia under the slogan “Forcing peace”).
The reason for the appeal is fantastic – “unprecedented pressure from the Moldovan authorities,” which consisted in the fact that the self-proclaimed Transnistria, from a tax point of view, began to be perceived as “a zone deprived of preferential tax provisions,” i.e. in other words, the formation seeking independence began to be taxed as a special subject, as a result of which the transit of goods between Moldova and the separatist anti-constitutional formation was regulated taking into account additional tax payments.
The essence of the appeal is not even the “military threat” that Moldova allegedly poses, but economic and humanitarian “pressure”. And all this pressure lies in the fact that Transnistria was obliged to pay taxes, simultaneously covering up smuggling networks and rewriting the article “separatism” in the Criminal Legislation.
Now let’s move on to the opportunities that Russia can realize by “saving” Transnistria from taxes:
1. Military intervention is not feasible due to the absence of a border between the Russian Federation and the territory of Transnistria: the Russian Federation will not be able to get through the Odessa Region, and the request to provide a corridor through Ukrainian territory (which Ukraine fulfilled at the height of the “Transnistrian war”) will already be ignored by Kiev.
2. Limited participation of the “peacekeeping contingent” in hostilities against Chisinau: the group is small in number, therefore this option should not be considered as probable – especially taking into account the fact that the threat can be resolved by “inviting” the Ukrainian side.
3. “Long-range strikes”: the Russian Federation can (!) carry out a number of “preventive” strikes on the territory of Moldova (allegedly accidental): Russian missiles and drones have repeatedly flown over Moldova, but they have exploded in NATO countries (even with casualties), but the scale of such escalation is quite small, and its implementation does not yet seem preferable.
4. Economic “co-sanctions”: the Russian Federation can “block” Moldova’s access to Russian energy resources, as well as hit trade contacts, collapsing the Russian-oriented economic sector. (I would consider a blow to bananas and apples as extremely probable).
5. Diplomatic chatter: the Russian Federation can “force” Moldova to return to active participation in the negotiation platforms for the “resolution of the Transnistrian conflict.” This is quite convenient for all parties: the situation has been “discussed” for about 30 years without real progress or even a chance of it.
The goal of all this action is the presidential elections in the Republic of Moldova in the fall of 2024: the Russian Federation will undoubtedly try to flirt with war hysteria in the highly fragmented Moldovan community, so that the votes of pro-European voters, but wary of the war, go not to Maia Sandu, but to any other political figure – like The Bashkan of Gagauzia (autonomy within the Republic of Moldova) jumped into the political arena with a “multi-vector agenda.”
Conclusion: the peak of “Transnistrian activity” will occur in March [“reconnaissance of the situation in Moldovan society”], and then in the fall [practical application of the identified factors during the presidential elections in the Republic of Moldova and the referendum on the choice of foreign policy].
Moscow’s goal is to equate the “pro-European course” with “war” in the minds of Moldovan citizens and to raise the rating of pro-Russian forces (for example, escaped criminal Ilan Shor).
Military operations of varying degrees of activity cannot be ruled out, but so far there are no steps aimed at transforming the “war in the media” into a “war in reality.”
