Abstract—An inertial measurement unit (IMU) takes the key responsibility for the attitude control of drones. It comprises
various sensors and transfers sensor data to the drone’s control
unit. If it reports incorrect data, the drones cannot maintain their
attitude and will consequently crash down to the ground. Therefore, several anti-drone studies have focused on causing the significant fluctuations in the IMU sensor data by resonating the mechanical structure of the internal sensors using a crafted acoustic wave.
However, this approach is limited in terms of efficacy for several
reasons. As the structural details of each sensor in an IMU
significantly differ by type, model, and manufacturer, the attack
needs to be conducted independently for each sensor. Furthermore, it can be easily mitigated by using other supplementary sensors
that are not corrupted by the attack or inexpensive plastic
shielding.
In this paper, we propose a novel anti-drone technique that
effectively corrupts any IMU sensor data regardless of the
sensor’s type, model, and manufacturer. Our key idea is to distort the communication channel between the IMU and control unit
of the drone by using an electromagnetic interference (EMI) signal injection. Experimentally, for a given control unit board,
regardless of the sensor used, we discovered a distinct susceptible
frequency at which an EMI signal greatly distorted the sensor data.
Compared to a general EM pulse (EMP) attack, our work requires
considerably less power since it targets the specific susceptible
frequency. It can also reduce collateral damage from the EMP
attack (e.g., permanent damage to the electric circuits of any
nearby devices). For practical evaluations, we demonstrated the
feasibility of the attack using real drones, wherein it instantly
paralyzed the drones. Lastly, we conclude by presenting practical
challenges for its mitigation.
