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m073if urging a cyber attack on the Ukrainian grid- zarya, finkrolik, admnjrol, DjoBaiden1

If all these Russian keyboard cowboys had any courage, they would be in uniform in Donbass. Cowards

On the issue of dismantling the Ukrainian energy system, it is not clear why Russian hackers are still sleeping. Maybe it’s time to wake up?

Russian power grids, for example, have been regularly attacked by cyberattacks since the beginning of the NWO. The latter was caught yesterday in St. Petersburg and the Leningrad region.

The power grids of St. Petersburg and the Leningrad region were subjected to a massive cyber attack on October 11th. The LOESK company reported that no power outages were allowed.

The power grids of St. Petersburg and the Leningrad region were subjected to a cyber attack
Yesterday, October 11, a DDoS attack was made on the power grid company LOESK, which serves St. Petersburg and the Leningrad Region. At the time of writing, the company’s website also did not respond to inquiries. The company itself reported that the incident was a massive cyber attack with an attempt to hack into the network structure. At the same time, LOESK notes that they did not allow power outages. “We are constantly faced with such attacks on our infrastructure, their number has been constantly increasing lately,” the company’s public relations department said.
Since the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine, Russian IT infrastructure has been subjected to massive cyberattacks. 
For example, disruptions in the operation of the Mir payment system and an attack on the services of the Moscow Information Technology Department, as a result of which part of the state resources did not work , became a high-profile incident

Of course, without missile strikes, a complete blackout cannot be achieved, but cyberattacks would significantly help speed up the process of disorganization of the energy system.

Back in 2015, a scheme was tested to hack the Ukrainian power grid through the BlackEnergy malware. Then the hackers managed to deprive 1.4 million residents of Ivano-Frankivsk of electricity for several hours. Then they used the already modified GreyEnergy.

In addition to simply scaring the population, cyberattacks can disrupt the operation of railway signals, driveways and the movement of trains that carry weapons for the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

работаем над целью, ожидайте.
Скоро.

⚡️⚡️”Instead of positional battles, destroy the entire energy system of Ukraine in 10 days” – Mikheev

   Massive strikes against the critical infrastructure of Ukraine gave their results when Western embassies and journalists began to flee Kyiv, and the population of the country, which had been in the comfort zone for all 8 years, suddenly realized that the path to the EU and NATO was not so cloudless.

   Political scientist Sergei Mikheev stated this on air on the Rossiya-1 TV channel.

   “Ukrainian officials admit, or at least they say so, that we have disabled 30% of Ukraine’s power grid. Whether this is true or not is another question, but they say it. From what I draw conclusions within the framework of knowledge of arithmetic of the first and second class: it means that in seven to ten days, theoretically, it would be possible to disable all one hundred percent? Maybe this is actually a much more effective way to influence the situation than these endless positional battles and attempts to throw wave after wave against concrete dugouts?

Maybe if we did this in March, and mobilization would not be needed? I think now is the time to think about it. This is what I mean by not stopping these things.

   That is, if we continue, it will give a really real effect of disorganizing the life of the Ukrainian state, which means it will reduce the effectiveness of Ukrainian armed formations in the fight against our fighters,” Mikheev emphasized.

   In his opinion, it would be much more effective to transfer the problem deep into Ukraine, with an emphasis on people who all these years did not care at all about what is happening in the Donbass – they “moved” into the EU and NATO.

   “The population of Ukraine should understand such a thing. It seemed to them that the path to the EU and NATO is the path to a better life, and we must convey to them that the path to the EU and NATO is the path to a worse life,” the political scientist added


Vagner Group:

#political season
The next heating season in Ukraine will be the most difficult, as politicians/officials of various levels have repeatedly stated, but it is worth considering the changing situation with shelling of critical infrastructure. According to Ukrainian Energy Minister Herman Galushchenko, about 30% of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure has been hit by Russian missiles since Monday, October 10. These damages, although expensive, can be fixed in the next 2-3 weeks, but if the missile strikes continue, then when the damage reaches 60%, the energy system of Ukraine may not be able to withstand it.
However, even without Russian strikes, the upcoming heating season did not bode well for Ukraine – the lack of planned work on water supply, heating and sewer networks this summer, one way or another, should have come back to haunt the accidents in the winter. Why is that? It’s simple – more than 70% of energy and heating networks in Ukraine are worn out, which can directly affect the country’s security in the winter. Unofficial statistics indicate 15,000 boiler houses that are in urgent need of repair: when the coolant is delivered from its producer to the consumer, up to 40-45% of heat is lost. The energy efficiency of Ukraine is also in question – the losses that occur in Ukrainian electrical networks reach 20-30%. The infrastructure is outdated, and this is a global problem for the country. There is no sensation here, there is no discovery – they talk about it all the time. Especially on the eve of the heating season, when temperature drops from warming +9 to cold snap -16 are just around the corner.
Naturally, the additional load on the networks leads to additional emergencies – in addition to the fact that the networks themselves are worn out.


October 12, 2022

The Russian Armed Forces again struck at the energy infrastructure of Ukraine: targets in the Sumy and Dnipropetrovsk regions were hit today. Compared to the previous two days, the salvos were less massive, but work continues to overload the country’s energy system


What needs to be done to cause irreparable damage to the energy infrastructure – Rybar’s analysis

This morning we presented a detailed analysis of the results of a two-day fire attack on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure facilities.

Rybar’s team additionally assessed the current integrity of the Ukrainian power grid based on reports from open sources. We have repeatedly repeated that in order to achieve any significant goals, systematic fire action is necessary.

In our opinion, the repeated defeat of these targets will lead to the loss of the ability to transmit power to end consumers through the backbone network of 330 and 750 kV of the Ukrainian energy system and will greatly depreciate the possibility of using it.

▪️In case of damage to these objects, there will be no need to act on the outdoor switchgear of 750 and 330 kV nuclear power plants.

▪️The network will still remain unified, but its throughput will drop to the transmission power limits for 110 kV overhead lines, which will obviously not be enough to maintain the static stability of energy-deficient regions in the east of the country, and the presence of operating nuclear power plants will not be able to change this situation in any way.

▪️Knocking out powerful thermal plants from the generation of the energy system will lead to the fact that nuclear power plants will have to work either in the mode of an energy island closed on itself, or operate with a rigid schedule of rolling shutdowns, which will inevitably lead to network overloads, emergencies and equipment failures in winter.

Russian Targeting of Ukrainian Power Grid

 What needs to be done to cause irreparable damage to the energy infrastructure – analysis of Rybar, list of goals #2

 Analysis: why you need to hit these targets
The first part of the goals

▪️PS Zhytomyr 330/110 kV – provides an energy corridor for power transmission from Trypilska TPP to the west of Ukraine.

Goals – autotransformers 330/110 kV
➖AT1 50.290763861814746, 28.699382243655833
➖AT2 50.291119310721136, 28.700527581469082
➖AT3 50.291298644716804, 28.701047252085342

▪️Burshtynska TPP is the largest thermal power plant in western Ukraine. Provides electricity to the Carpathian and Transcarpathian regions.
   
Possible targets:
➖Turbine Hall: 49.21065751469936, 24.66610498412276 | 49.20946578650526, 24.667731219265054
➖AT1 (phase B) 49.207685, 24.657305
➖AT2 (phase B) 49.205225, 24.660447
➖AT3 (phase B) 49.202786, 24.663926
➖AT4 (phase B) 49.203146, 24.663399

▪️ Substation Khmelnitskaya 330/110 kV – repeated fire defeat is necessary.

Goals – autotransformers:
➖AT2 49.409053, 26.931006
➖AT3 49.408927, 26.931883

▪️ Substation Rivne 330/110 kV is the largest substation in the north-west of Ukraine, it connects the Rivne NPP with the Kyiv and Lvov energy districts.

Goals – autotransformers:
➖AT1 50.641171, 26.224357
➖AT2 50.641264, 26.224755
➖AT3 50.641412, 26.225007
➖AT4 50.641803, 26.225715

▪️PS Kremenchug 330/154 kV – repeated fire damage is required.

Goals – autotransformers:
➖AT1 49.122543, 33.639340
➖AT2 49.122601, 33.637475

▪️PS Poltava 330/110 – an element of the central energy corridor 330 kV west-east, powered by Zmievskaya TPP, SS Kremenchug.

Goal options:
➖MSKU (main control panel) 49.54041946366375, 34.52469348826309
➖AT1 49.540655676455096, 34.52348975749085
➖AT2 49.54051341206981, 34.52410610073849
➖AT3 49.54026109308467, 34.525301558447005
➖AT4 49.54017788121882, 34.52561179833676

▪️Zmiivska TPP – repeated fire damage is required. The most powerful source of power supply in the Kharkiv region.

Purpose – turbine hall:
➖49.5849676229959, 36.52194313888642 | 49.584432029967935, 36.525311993489396

▪️Pridneprovskaya TPP – repeated fire defeat is necessary. The main source of power supply for Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporizhia after shutdown of the ZNPP.

Purpose – autotransformers and transformers 330/150 kV and 330/110 kV:
➖AT1 48.406121, 35.114341
➖Т1 48.408071, 35.110708
➖Т2 48.407763, 35.111175
➖Т3 48.407499, 35.111629
➖Т4 48.407207, 35.112101

▪️PS Pervomaiskaya 330/154 kV is a large substation that supplies the Kryvyi Rih industrial region.

The goal is autotransformers:
➖AT1 48.131172, 33.573008
➖AT2 48.131780, 33.572755
➖AT3 48.132373, 33.572760

▪️Krivorozhskaya TPP

The goal is autotransformers:
➖AT1 47.552077, 33.654544
➖AT2 47.551883, 33.654592

▪️PS Adzhalyk 330/220/110 kV is a power hub through which power is supplied to the entire Odessa region and Odessa itself.

Goal options:
➖OPU 46.699736665846196, 30.932283388618796
➖AT1 46.699869, 30.931734
➖AT2 46.699267, 30.932110

Map in high resolution

What needs to be done to cause irreparable damage to the energy infrastructure – analysis of Rybar, list of goals #2

 Analysis: why you need to hit these targets
The first part of the goals

▪️PS Zhytomyr 330/110 kV – provides an energy corridor for power transmission from Trypilska TPP to the west of Ukraine.

Goals – autotransformers 330/110 kV
➖AT1 50.290763861814746, 28.699382243655833
➖AT2 50.291119310721136, 28.700527581469082
➖AT3 50.291298644716804, 28.701047252085342

▪️Burshtynska TPP is the largest thermal power plant in western Ukraine. Provides electricity to the Carpathian and Transcarpathian regions.
   
Possible targets:
➖Turbine Hall: 49.21065751469936, 24.66610498412276 | 49.20946578650526, 24.667731219265054
➖AT1 (phase B) 49.207685, 24.657305
➖AT2 (phase B) 49.205225, 24.660447
➖AT3 (phase B) 49.202786, 24.663926
➖AT4 (phase B) 49.203146, 24.663399

▪️ Substation Khmelnitskaya 330/110 kV – repeated fire defeat is necessary.

Goals – autotransformers:
➖AT2 49.409053, 26.931006
➖AT3 49.408927, 26.931883

▪️ Substation Rivne 330/110 kV is the largest substation in the north-west of Ukraine, it connects the Rivne NPP with the Kyiv and Lvov energy districts.

Goals – autotransformers:
➖AT1 50.641171, 26.224357
➖AT2 50.641264, 26.224755
➖AT3 50.641412, 26.225007
➖AT4 50.641803, 26.225715

▪️PS Kremenchug 330/154 kV – repeated fire damage is required.

Goals – autotransformers:
➖AT1 49.122543, 33.639340
➖AT2 49.122601, 33.637475

▪️PS Poltava 330/110 – an element of the central energy corridor 330 kV west-east, powered by Zmievskaya TPP, SS Kremenchug.

Goal options:
➖MSKU (main control panel) 49.54041946366375, 34.52469348826309
➖AT1 49.540655676455096, 34.52348975749085
➖AT2 49.54051341206981, 34.52410610073849
➖AT3 49.54026109308467, 34.525301558447005
➖AT4 49.54017788121882, 34.52561179833676

▪️Zmiivska TPP – repeated fire damage is required. The most powerful source of power supply in the Kharkiv region.

Purpose – turbine hall:
➖49.5849676229959, 36.52194313888642 | 49.584432029967935, 36.525311993489396

▪️Pridneprovskaya TPP – repeated fire defeat is necessary. The main source of power supply for Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporizhia after shutdown of the ZNPP.

Purpose – autotransformers and transformers 330/150 kV and 330/110 kV:
➖AT1 48.406121, 35.114341
➖Т1 48.408071, 35.110708
➖Т2 48.407763, 35.111175
➖Т3 48.407499, 35.111629
➖Т4 48.407207, 35.112101

▪️PS Pervomaiskaya 330/154 kV is a large substation that supplies the Kryvyi Rih industrial region.

The goal is autotransformers:
➖AT1 48.131172, 33.573008
➖AT2 48.131780, 33.572755
➖AT3 48.132373, 33.572760

▪️Krivorozhskaya TPP

The goal is autotransformers:
➖AT1 47.552077, 33.654544
➖AT2 47.551883, 33.654592

▪️PS Adzhalyk 330/220/110 kV is a power hub through which power is supplied to the entire Odessa region and Odessa itself.

Goal options:
➖OPU 46.699736665846196, 30.932283388618796
➖AT1 46.699869, 30.931734
➖AT2 46.699267, 30.932110

Map in high resolution English

#analysis #Russia #Ukraine #electricity #goals
#rybar

About Post Author

Treadstone 71

@Treadstone71LLC Cyber intelligence, counterintelligence, Influence Operations, Cyber Operations, OSINT, Clandestine Cyber HUMINT, cyber intel and OSINT training and analysis, cyber psyops, strategic intelligence, Open-Source Intelligence collection, analytic writing, structured analytic techniques, Target Adversary Research, cyber counterintelligence, strategic intelligence analysis, estimative intelligence, forecasting intelligence, warning intelligence, threat intelligence
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By Treadstone 71

@Treadstone71LLC Cyber intelligence, counterintelligence, Influence Operations, Cyber Operations, OSINT, Clandestine Cyber HUMINT, cyber intel and OSINT training and analysis, cyber psyops, strategic intelligence, Open-Source Intelligence collection, analytic writing, structured analytic techniques, Target Adversary Research, cyber counterintelligence, strategic intelligence analysis, estimative intelligence, forecasting intelligence, warning intelligence, threat intelligence